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Introduction 
The possibilities offered by electronic voting have interested the Cuyahoga County Board 
of Elections (CCBOE or agency) since at least 1998. Well before any federal legislation, 
the agency’s Board Members and executive staff began exploring vendors and 
technologies for possible Cuyahoga County deployment. Problems had been identified 
with the aging forty-year old punch card system, especially the difficulty in obtaining 
replacement parts. CCBOE Board Members were well aware that long range planning for 
replacing punch cards had to be a top priority. Demonstrations and test-runs of various 
voting equipment in small Cuyahoga elections educated the CCBOE on both the 
promises and the pitfalls of the emerging electronic voting machines. Then the 2000 
presidential election occurred which underscored a range of hidden issues with Florida’s 
— and Cuyahoga’s — operative voting system. Much of Florida’s difficulty lay in its 
lack of a statewide uniform standard for what constituted a legal vote on a punch card, 
see Bush v. Gore,1 an issue that Ohio had previously resolved as a matter of state 
statutory law. But the Florida election made very visible the punch card system’s aging 
technology, and its documented error rate averaging 2% (or higher in certain 
communities) — an error rate higher than the margin of victory in the 2000 presidential 
election — generated a public demand for greater accuracy and reliability in voting 
systems. 
The extended national (and even international) attention to an unresolved presidential 
election and its ultimate conclusion by judicial order from the U.S. Supreme Court 
highlighted many previously hidden voting technology and election administration issues. 
After considering voluminous congressional Hearings, reports from governmental and 
civic organizations (including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights), and competing 
legislative approaches, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002.2
The lion’s share of HAVA monies has been targeted to encourage the State governments 
to upgrade and update their voting technologies. While no State was forced to accept the 
monies, HAVA mandates that any State which does so must spend the monies only on 
new voting technologies that comply with the Act’s specifications. HAVA’s standards 
are designed to prevent “overvotes” and “undervotes”3 by providing a voter notice at the 
polling place that the ballot has not been completely and correctly voted. HAVA also 
included a definitive launch date for any new voting systems purchased with these federal 
funds: no later than the first federal election of 2006. Other HAVA monies were made 
available to support election administration studies and improved poll worker, election 
                                                 
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
2 To date, the federal government has spent well over $2 billion in HAVA monies with the express 
purpose of improving State election systems. 
3 An overvote is where a voter specifies more than the allowable number from the list of 
candidates running for an office. An undervote is where a voter specifies fewer than the allowable 
number of candidates in a race. 
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official, and voter education, and to create the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC). 
In Ohio, the Secretary of State’s office (SOS) decided to accept the federal monies (over 
$100 million, the third highest State allotment)4 and undertake the process of reviewing 
and approving the new voting technologies. As required by the federal legislation, the 
SOS published an official State Plan that discussed how the process would proceed. 
Unlike some other States which approved one statewide system (for instance, Georgia), 
the Ohio SOS permitted county Boards of Election to choose from any vendor whose 
voting system the SOS certified.5 Of the many vendors who submitted their voting 
systems for Ohio certification, the SOS approved only two: Election Systems and 
Software (ES&S) and Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI).6 Each of these companies 
offered both optical scanning paper ballot and touchscreen technology, as well as ballot 
creation and tabulation databases. 
The CCBOE hired Michael Vu as Director in 2003, at the time the Ohio SOS was 
involved in negotiations over which systems to approve for Ohio counties. The Ohio 
State Plan issued in 2003, and the SOS announced that 2005 was planned as the year all 
counties would roll out their new election systems. Using external legal assistance, the 
SOS negotiated a “Master Contract” with each of the approved vendors so that the same 
legal standards and protections would govern each county’s acquisition and use of a 
particular vendor’s equipment. As the year 2004 progressed, however, and Ohio received 
great electoral attention, the public and media increasingly challenged the security, 
accuracy, and verification of the invisible votes recorded on one of the new voting 
technologies, the DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) touchscreen. These questions 
culminated in the Ohio General Assembly’s passage of the “Fedor Amendment.” Named 
for Senator Teresa Fedor, this legislation required every DRE touchscreen used in Ohio 
elections to include a “voter verified paper audit trail” (VVPAT).7
To implement the Fedor Amendment, the SOS restricted the list of approved e-voting 
choices to optical scanners only. Use of touchscreen DREs was no longer permissible. As 
of January 2005, those Ohio counties that had selected the DREs as a part of their voting 
system, such as Cuyahoga, suddenly had to return to square one; they could choose only 
                                                 
4 Rep. Robert Ney, co-author of HAVA and chair of the U.S. House Administration Committee 
(charged with Federal election law supervision) at the time HAVA was enacted, stated these facts 
about Ohio’s HAVA allocation. [Cleveland talk, 11/30/2005] 
5 An apparent exception to this process allowed Hamilton County to adopt Hart Intercivic Optical 
Scanning, a vendor and system not on the statewide certification list. 
6 With the infusion of new federal monies, the voting systems manufacturers experienced a surge 
of financial interest. Acquisitions and consolidation of the industry occurred swiftly. Diebold, long 
a leader in the automatic teller machine business, purchased two smaller voting systems 
companies to create its DESI division. The company lacked prior experience in the voting 
machinery industry.  
7 Ohio Revised Code §3506.10(P). 
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between various vendors of “precinct count” optical scanners. In Cuyahoga’s case this 
meant that the months of investment in vendor and systems study, in pricing and service 
negotiations, and the comprehensive deal with DESI that was near completion, had to be 
scuttled. 
Since the public pressure for requiring voting machine paper trails was of national 
proportion, the voting machine manufacturers quickly sought to adapt their DRE models 
with a printer unit that would comply with the new legislation. DESI was able to develop 
and obtain Ohio certification for its new DREs with VVPAT capacity by April 2005. 
Director Vu turned immediately to re-open negotiations with DESI and to move forward 
with purchasing from DESI the county’s HAVA-compliant voting equipment. The hope 
remained that the CCBOE would be able to launch the system in small municipal 
elections in September 2005, and would be ready for a county-wide roll-out in November 
2005. This schedule was designed so that the staff would have an opportunity to build 
both operational systems and staff competency by moving from easy elections to those 
increasingly complex, and could troubleshoot their procedures as they progressed toward 
the largest elections. 
For a variety of reasons detailed below in this Report, these initial “best laid plans” were 
not realized. Cuyahoga ended up launching its new e-voting systems on the last legally 
permissible date — the May 2nd federal primary election. Unfortunately, of all the 
elections to be managed over each four-year period, the even-year federal primary is 
always the most demanding, even absent any change in technology. The complexity is 
particularly acute for urban Ohio election administration offices. Instead of having a 
single ballot that largely repeats among the precincts over the county, separate ballots 
must be created for each major political party’s primary. Further, because in this primary 
the political parties elect party committee representatives by precinct, each precinct 
presents a different race and different candidates for this one category. Thus, on May 2nd, 
the 1,434 Cuyahoga precincts each provided a different ballot for the Democrats, for the 
Republicans, and where triggered, for local issues such as school tax levies. 
For the even-year primary, then, the CCBOE is responsible for creating and tabulating 
potentially 3 x 1,434 different ballots. Additionally, the CCBOE must construct and proof 
separate curbside-only (disability) ballots, optical scan absentee ballots for all precincts 
and all parties, plus many other ballots. Also, the CCBOE has the responsibility during 
these elections to check for valid voter signatures three to five times the normal number 
of candidate petitions. The CCBOE management load for the “normal” even-year 
primary is therefore immense. By adding to this load the stresses of launching two new 
electronic voting technologies — including new staff and poll worker training, new 
delivery and security systems, and all the new ballot preparation and tabulation systems 
— the CCBOE had sowed the seeds for the May 2nd election failures. 
From the early morning hours of May 2nd through the certification and formal end of the 
election on May 20th, it was clear that the CCBOE had encountered a wide range of 
extremely serious problems. The first Election Day report was negative; at approximately 
2:00 a.m. the election morning, Director Vu alerted the SOS and some CCBOE Board 
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Members that the absentee ballot scanning system had failed to pass accuracy tests. Vu 
began to initiate processes for a hand count of the 17,000 paper ballots by temporary 
workers. Later in the day, while the Board was meeting in public session, reports flowed 
in to call centers detailing how precincts had opened late or were still closed, voting 
machines were not functioning, some voters were facing long lines, poll worker absences 
had reached exceptionally high rates, some ballots had omitted certain races, precincts 
lacked essential supplies, and other problems. The Board Members learned of many of 
these problems during their meeting, and expressed great surprise. Board Chair Bob 
Bennett summoned key vendors, and executives from DESI and the optical scan ballot 
printer appeared to answer Board Members’ questions. Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs 
Jones addressed the Board detailing facts she had discovered and her concerns about 
election planning. In the midst of this bad news, the Board chair announced that the 
Board would convene an independent inquiry to determine exactly what had happened, 
and why the difficulties, which were broad and largely unexpected, had occurred. 
The Board Chair quickly moved to consult with each Board Member and to select the 
investigatory Panel by the week’s end. Chairman Bennett stressed to each of the Panel 
members before any accepted the appointment that this would be a truly thorough, 
independent undertaking, with no attempt by him or other Board Members to interfere 
with or circumscribe the investigation. He invited the first appointed Panel members to 
draft the Panel’s charge while he worked on recruiting the Panel Chair, and he did not 
seek to narrow the charge or the policy statement that accompanied it.8
The Board issued this Panel a three-part charge which has defined the scope of our work: 
1. Identify the deficiencies in the Cuyahoga County elections performance occurring 
in the May 2, 2006 election, including problems with (a) preparation for the 
election, (b) the conduct of the election on May 2nd, and (c) those following the 
closing of the polls, including tabulating the vote. 
                                                 
8 The entire CCBOE Policy Statement can be found in the CERP Interim Report (Appendix N of 
this document); it reads in pertinent part: 
We sought to conduct an error-free election. We join the voters and candidates in saying that 
the technical and administrative performance levels of the May 2nd election are unacceptable 
and cannot be repeated. We can and will dramatically improve this Board's performance in 
conducting elections before the next federal election scheduled for November 7, 2006. The 
voters of this county deserve nothing less. …. 
We believe that this independent inquiry will generate the information that is essential for the 
Board to receive so that it can correct various problems that may impede citizens' rights to 
vote and the ability of the Board of Elections to tabulate that vote accurately. 
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2. Ascertain the causes and contributing factors to each aspect of deficient 
performance, including the technological failures, and training and administrative 
issues. 
3. Provide a set of recommendations for remedying the deficiencies and achieving 
the highest standards in election administrative performance. 
The Panel was informally fully constituted by Saturday, May 6th with all three Panel 
members having agreed to serve without compensation for the expected 60 days of work 
if the full Board approved the appointments. On May 17, 2006 the CCBOE Board held a 
Public Meeting where the Board Members formally approved the creation of the 
Investigatory Panel and the appointment of its three members, passing a resolution that 
adopted the earlier circulated Policy Statement and charge. 
The Cuyahoga County Commissioners also pledged their complete assistance in funding 
the Panel’s investigation and in supporting its charge. On May 18, 2006 the 
Commissioners unanimously enacted a Resolution by which the Cuyahoga Election 
Review Panel became the Commissioners’ own investigatory entity as well as that of the 
Board of Elections. We understood the Commissioners’ action and comments to charge 
us with a duty to report to them and the CCBOE Board with equal candor and alacrity — 
a duty we explicitly requested that they impose. The Commissioners ensured that we 
could expeditiously hire and equip a both a staff and office and move forward without 
logistical delays. Both the Board of County Commissioners and the County 
Administrator’s Office assisted our work in every way we requested. 
We quickly moved to hire predominantly law students as staff (an idea that was 
suggested by the two Panel members who were not law professors), posting the jobs on 
the student e-placement boards at the two area law schools. We solicited applications, 
interviewed and hired for almost all positions in roughly three days9. Cleveland State 
University allowed the Panel to occupy at favorable rates a set of offices that are slated 
for renovation. We considered ourselves enormously blessed to have this office space 
that was both empty for the 60-75 days that we needed and adjacent to the University’s 
law library. Even before the Panel office received telephones and office equipment, staff 
began their work. We held an orientation meeting, developed a scope of work plan, and 
divided into work groups.10
The Panel members decided that the first task they would undertake personally was to 
interview every CCBOE staff member. Because Tom Hayes was a former CCBOE 
Director and had maintained friendships with several high level managers, he recused 
himself from all interviews of managerial level employees and Board Members. Instead, 
                                                 
9 Investigating staff included two experienced software engineers, a former Ohio auditor, a 
systems integration manager and others who had professional careers prior to entering law 
school. 
10 See the Interim Panel Report for a fuller discussion of how the Panel organized itself for its 
work.  
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Hayes conducted initial interviews with all line staff. Judge Adrine and Professor Hoke 
interviewed all managerial employees and Board Members, conducting most of these 
sessions jointly. A number of these interviews lasted for several hours. Both sets of 
interviews educated us about the staff and managerial insights into the May 2nd planning 
process, and all efforts that the CCBOE had undertaken to ready itself for the election. 
We found a startling degree of candor and frustration, and a persistent sense, at least 
among managers, that major problems had not received the necessary attention to right 
the course of the agency. Their frustration was palpable, and their hopes for dramatic 
improvements in their own performance impressive and heartening. 
Our Chair, Judge Ron Adrine, continued to meet his judicial docket while directing the 
investigation and its staff. Tom Hayes continued in his duties as the Director of the Ohio 
Lottery, and worked assiduously in all aspects of the investigation. Professor Candice 
Hoke took a temporary leave from directing the CSU Center for Election Integrity and 
gave up for the Panel her summer research time and funded grant so that she might 
devote all her time to the Panel’s work. 
The Final Report that follows presents for each Chapter a background overview so that 
the issues more fully developed in the factual Findings can be easily understood. Some of 
this material is extremely dense, however, but we did not seek to simplify the technical 
complexity if it might introduce ambiguities into the discussion. The Recommendations 
we offer have taken into account particular facts about Ohio election law, the County’s 
election complexity, emerging best practices, research into election practices in other 
Ohio counties and nationally, and our observations. Owing to the short timetable for the 
investigation and writing the Report, each Chapter includes a list of additional areas for 
further research and consideration. 
All three of the Panel members have been heavily involved in writing, reviewing, 
discussing and revising every word of this Final Report. We collectively stand behind it, 
including all of its Findings and Recommendations. Undoubtedly, the Report includes 
some inadvertent errors that we did not catch in the press of time and for which we 
apologize. With more time, we could offer an even more thorough investigation and set 
of recommendations, but the election calendar waits for no one. The CCBOE’s 
November 2006 election preparation has already begun. Unquestionably, the County’s 
elections must improve and improve quickly. We submit this Report with the earnest 
hope and expectation that the Boards of the CCBOE and Cuyahoga County Commission 
will confront the data unflinchingly, and that the CCBOE Board will mandate the 
significant changes that are required throughout the agency to achieve the excellence in 
election performance our voters deserve. 
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Work Plan and Methodology 
This investigation’s scope covers the breadth of activities of the Cuyahoga County Board 
of Elections (CCBOE) in preparing and implementing procedures for the May 2nd 
election, as well as the strategies that need to be undertaken to achieve excellence in 
future elections. 
In order to fulfill our charge entrusted to us, the Panel developed the framework that we 
outlined in the initial CERP project scope. The specific areas of focus called for by that 
scope are specifically set forth in Appendix A. 
Due to the massive scale of a primary election in a region as populous and segmented as 
Cuyahoga County, it is difficult to assess and evaluate all incidences that might occur. In 
order to achieve the most comprehensive results, the Panel and its staff utilized a number 
of sources for investigating issues and developing recommendations including: 
• Interviews with CCBOE personnel and recreations of processes; 
• Public Hearings conducted by public officials; 
• Exit polls of voters; 
• Telephone interviews with voters and polling place personnel; 
• Information provided by e-mail, online web forms, and other written submissions; 
• Booth Official and EDT focus groups; 
• Legal source materials; 
• Documents provided by vendors, advocate groups, and the CCBOE; 
• Interviews with relevant vendor personnel; 
• Interviews with relevant government offices from the State and its Counties; 
• Public Hearings conducted by the Panel, including specialized hearings with 
vendors and election advocacy groups. 
The Panel conducted primary analysis by: 
• Examination of a range of relevant documents from CCBOE administration and 
Election Day activities; 
• Research into additional sources of corroboration for information reported by 
voters, poll workers, technicians, CCBOE employees, and others; 
• Reconciliation of actual systems and procedures, and received equipment and 
materials, with those called for by contracts, directives, and the governing law. 
Recommendations were developed using a multitude of resources and activities, 
including: 
• Reviewing emerging national “Best Practices” in election administration, 
especially those generated by EAC/HAVA funding; 
• The compilation of relevant recommendations given by CCBOE personnel, poll 
workers, advocacy organizations, and voters in interviews and testimony; 
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• Additional corrections which became apparent through the Panel’s analysis and 
critique of expected, planned, and actual performance; 
• Reviewing the successes of other jurisdictions; 
• Discussions with relevant experts. 
In addition to the specific areas of focus entrusted to the Cuyahoga Election Review 
Panel, the County retained two outside consultants for their specific expertise. The 
County contracted for the services of SysTest Labs, LLC to examine issues rising from 
the failure of the optical scan absentee ballot system, with these specific tasks: 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system testing including Logic and Analysis (L&A) 
testing and ballot test packs; 
• Evaluate IV&V testing by Secretary of State; 
• Evaluate printed ballots for accuracy for all ballot styles; 
• Timing marks; 
• Assess alternate ballot count procedures used for unofficial and official count; 
• Evaluate the absentee ballot counting system to determine reason for failure 
during unofficial count and assign responsibility for system failure; 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system performance during February Special Election 
and any corrective actions. 
The County contracted with Election Science Institute (ESI) for several purposes: 
• Exit polling of voter satisfaction with electronic voting; 
• Evaluate need for additional machines based on failure rate; 
• Compare manual count with electronic vote; 
• Compare memory cards to manual count; 
• Review of election process for security threats. 
These experts’ draft and, if available, final reports form part of the data for the Panel’s 
study and Recommendations. See Appendix M for the report from SysTest Labs. 
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Chapter I: Major Procurement for Electronic Voting 
Background 
In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) which attempted to 
upgrade State election systems. It provides federal funds for States and counties to 
replace their existing voting systems with new equipment (predominantly electronic 
voting technologies) so long as the new voting systems satisfy certain requirements. 
Distributed to State election officials, these funds could be dispersed only after the State 
had completed specified duties to certify vendors and voting technologies according to 
the State Plan they wrote. State officials, as in Ohio, could then negotiate master 
procurement contracts with approved election system vendors. These contracts would 
then apply to any county seeking an allocation under the HAVA monies. As HAVA 
contemplated, county election officials were permitted to select from a State-created 
menu of e-voting choices. State officials then would purchase the selected systems for the 
counties using the HAVA funds. 
HAVA did not focus strictly on voting equipment but also sought to upgrade allied 
databases including state voter registration systems. HAVA mandated that each State 
create a statewide voter registration system, causing counties to have to research, 
purchase and install (or upgrade) voter registration software that was compatible with its 
State’s vote registration software. After using and upgrading registration system called 
VEMACS for several years, CCBOE switched in 2004 to DIMSnet, a voter registration 
system that it purchased from Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI). DIMSnet has many 
uses, but CCBOE used it primarily for recording voter registrations and processing 
petitions and absentee ballots. DIMSnet stores all voter registrations at the CCBOE, 
processes new registrations, assigns voters to precincts based on geographical 
information, and records which elections voters participate in. DIMSnet processes 
petitions for candidates and issues to be placed on ballots by allowing operators to verify 
petition signatures. The system also generates information about races. 
CCBOE Director Michael Vu began investigating electronic voting technologies for 
Cuyahoga County soon after his appointment. In 2005, after reviewing state-certified 
voting technologies, the CCBOE selected Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines 
with touchscreens sold by DESI (the machine is called the AccuVote TSx) as its precinct-
based electronic voting system of choice. For its absentee voting solution, CCBOE chose 
DESI’s AccuVote OS, an optical scan voting system. Absentee voters receive a paper 
ballot and they vote by darkening ovals on the ballot and mailing it back to the CCBOE. 
The optical scan system scans the absentee ballots and records the votes. See SysTest 
report, Appendix M. 
To accompany the new DREs and optical scan systems, the CCBOE selected another 
DESI product, the GEMS “election management system.” GEMS is used for ballot 
creation: it organizes races and issues by precinct, lays out the ballot format which the 
DRE voting machines display to voters, and implements ballot rotation as required by 
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state law. GEMS also generates the files which define the layout of the optical scan 
absentee ballots. GEMS creates the DRE memory cards for an election and tabulates 
election results following an election. 
To effectively run an election, all of these systems need to exchange data. For example, 
GEMS needs data from DIMSnet on candidates and races to create ballots, and GEMS 
uploads these “ballot definitions” to DREs via memory cards. After the election, GEMS 
takes the vote records data from the DREs memory cards and optical scan systems to 
tabulate the election results. DIMSnet needs to exchange data with the statewide voter 
registration database. For smaller counties, some of this data (e.g. DIMSnet to GEMS 
information for ballot creation) can be transferred manually, i.e. exported from one 
system and keyed into another system by a human operator. However, given the size and 
electoral complexity of Cuyahoga County, manual data transfer is not a realistic option. 
Efficient integration between GEMS and DIMSnet is essential for managing Cuyahoga 
County elections. 
Long-term agreement and payment for DIMS voter registration software 
never executed; vendor restricted support 
1.1  Finding: The CCBOE has been using DIMSnet voter registration software without a 
long-term contract with DESI and without any payment whatsoever for almost two years. 
DIMSnet was activated on 9/1/2004, and installation by DIMS staff took place during the 
two months prior to that date. Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham, and Jeff 
Jones and Jim Friedman of Benesch, Friedlander, who served as outside counsel in 
negotiating the county’s initial deal with DESI, all attest that this installation was 
provided by DESI, free of charge, and at DESI’s risk, as part of a total package of 
“seamlessly integrated” elections hardware and software. CCBOE personnel viewed the 
free installation as a “good faith” gesture, and as an inducement for Cuyahoga County to 
select DESI as its full-service e-voting vendor. 
The SOS allocated HAVA monies to all Ohio counties to purchase e-voting systems 
through the Secretary of State Master Contracts with two vendors, DESI and ES&S. The 
counties only had to select their vendor and e-voting system. The CCBOE, representing 
the State’s largest county, wanted to use its size leverage to negotiate package deals with 
vendors. Their strategy was to reduce the cost of package components by tying them 
together in bulk buys. The first and largest of these buys was the main quantity of the 
DRE machines, which would be paid for by the SOS upon vendor selection. Included in a 
list of covered items under Schedule G of the SOS-DESI contract were 5,407 DREs, and 
the GEMS server, plus a specified amount of cards and ancillary equipment, all of which 
would also be paid for by the SOS. Voter registration software was not included in this 
HAVA-funded list. 
The SOS allocated $150,000 in separate HAVA money for each Ohio county Board 
of Elections to upgrade or implement a new voter registration system. According to 
Director Vu, Cuyahoga County spent these funds on hardware upgrades required by the 
DIMSnet system. Regarding payment for DIMSnet itself, the Director and Deputy 
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Director assumed that DESI would consider its selection as the County’s e-voting vendor 
to be compensation for the installation and initial training on DIMSnet.  
Because of DESI’s representations of the “seamless integration” among its products, 
at no point did the CCBOE management regard DIMS as a company separate from DESI 
in any way. The Director and Deputy Director assumed that DESI’s contract negotiators 
were speaking for its DIMS division, and that DESI as a whole was absorbing the cost of 
the installation and/or internally compensating its DIMS division for the work from the 
HAVA funds the CCBOE had released to DESI under the SOS contract. This assumption 
appears to have been incorrect, as the SOS contract did not purport to cover voter 
registration software in any way, while listing specifically all products and services its 
funds were paying for. As to representations by DESI about what compensation was 
expected for the DIMSnet installation and training, the Panel asked to interview DESI 
sales staff and negotiators who took part in the transaction, but DESI denied access to 
these individuals. 
The Director and Deputy Director were openly seeking a sole-source e-voting partner 
in order to avoid dealing with multiple software vendors. The CCBOE had dealt with 
multiple vendors in the past, and wanted to eliminate the administrative complications 
and integration issues that such arrangements had led to. This made DESI’s promise of 
“seamless integration” a key decision factor, and it also meant that once any part of 
DESI’s overall system was installed, it was highly unlikely that the CCBOE would end 
up selecting another vendor for the rest of its needs. 
The CCBOE had every intention of paying for DIMSnet, and though a price of 
$160,305 per year was quoted initially, negotiations resulted in an annual fee of $50,000 
(plus the cost of inflation) for years two through seven, with the first year free of charge. 
Part of the reason the County was successful in negotiating the price down was that the 
CCBOE was also negotiating to purchase 900 additional DREs, to be paid for with 
county tax funds, to supplement the machines allocated under HAVA. This purchase of 
additional machines was intended to insure against machine failure and prevent long lines 
on election day. The contract listed additional “ancillary equipment” — such as extra 
memory cards, encoders, electrical cords and carts for the voting machines — as included 
in this deal, some of it for HAVA-funded voting machines and some for the additional 
900. All these purchases were packaged together in a second bulk deal often referred to 
as the ancillary or local contact, but this deal was to be exclusively shouldered by the 
CCBOE via County funds. 
Until September or October of 2005 (they don’t remember exactly), the Director and 
Deputy Director had believed that the CCBOE could make this purchase on its own, 
without the County Commissioners’ approval. According to Deputy Director Dillingham, 
Montgomery County had done just that to pay for its voter registration system, leading 
the CCBOE executives to believe they had similar sole discretion. But the County 
Prosecutor’s office informed the CCBOE sometime during the fall of 2005 that the 
CCBOE lacked the legal power to sign off on any such deal. As of 7/15/2006, this 
contract has not been approved by the County Commissioners. Additionally, Director Vu 
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has never presented the DIMSnet contract to the Commissioners as a potentially separate 
procurement, because the negotiations with DESI had included the entire bulk purchase 
(ancillary equipment and additional DREs, plus the embedded DIMSnet contract), and 
the pricing of individual components (including DIMSnet) was assumedly dependent on 
the entire purchase going through. 
The initial contract under which the CCBOE used DIMSnet was entitled the “Voter 
Registration System Limited License,” which commenced 7/13/2004 and terminated 
12/31/2004. It was signed by Deputy Director Dillingham and John Hice, who is 
identified as the Vice President/General Manager of Data Information Management 
Systems, Inc. (DIMS, Inc.) The first paragraph of the contract identifies it as an 
agreement between the CCBOE and “Data Information Management Systems, Inc., a 
California corporation (DIMS).” The only reference to Diebold or DESI in this 
agreement is on page four, where both of their addresses are listed as requiring copies of 
all required notices, originals of which are to be sent to the DIMS California address. The 
contract appears to have been written by DIMS and makes no direct reference to DIMS’ 
ties with Diebold. Cover sheets bear the pre-acquisition DIMS logo and the primary 
correspondence address is in California. The second paragraph begins “DIMS designs, 
manufactures, sells and licenses voter registration software…” and later mentions that 
DIMS and the BOE are cooperating “in certain related activities.” This paragraph ends by 
pointing out that no other oral or written agreement exists between the parties, and that 
these cooperative activities “should not be construed as evidence of any such agreement.” 
Section 3 of this agreement is titled “Limited Scope of Agreement” and under the 
subtitle “No Monetary Payment” it stipulates that “DIMS is providing the Software solely 
in consideration of the County’s undertakings set forth in this Agreement. DIMS 
acknowledges and agrees that DIMS is not entitled to paymentof [sic] any amounts for 
the County’s use of the Software…” The next part of Section 3 is subtitled “No Other 
Obligations” and states that DIMS has no other obligations to the CCBOE under the 
agreement, other than allowing the CCBOE to use software delivered by DIMS during 
the term of the contract.  
In December 2004, this Temporary License was extended until June 30, 2005, in 
“Limited License Amendment No. 1.” No changes were made in this amendment to the 
provisions of Section 3, described above, so DIMSnet was still being used free of charge, 
and DIMS had no other obligations to the CCBOE beyond allowing the software’s use. 
“Limited License Amendment No. 2” commenced 6/30/2005 but expired a month later, 
on 7/31/2005. This Amendment was identical to No. 1, in that it merely extended the 
terms of the original Limited License agreement for additional time. No changes were 
made to other terms, including the No Monetary Payment term and the No Other 
Obligations term.  
DIMS has in some ways proceeded as though the unsigned $50,000 agreement were 
operational and controlling. As soon as the first year of use had ended in July 2005, 
DIMS sent an invoice to the CCBOE for $50,000 worth of annual licensing and 
maintenance. This CCBOE never paid this invoice because the County Commissioners 
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had not approved the contract. The Director and Deputy Director did not consult with 
counsel either regarding this invoice or the general fact that DIMS was attempting to deal 
with the CCBOE on its own, without the DESI negotiators who had sold the overall 
system (including DIMSnet) to Cuyahoga County. 
Next came Amendment No. 3, executed 4/3/2006, within weeks before the May 
primary. This amendment similarly extended the term of the Temporary License, but it 
also replaced the No Monetary Payment clause with a term obligating the CCBOE to pay 
up to $15,000 for the next year’s usage of DIMSnet. This figure was arrived at by 
Director Vu, for the specific purpose of circumventing the County Commissioners’ 
approval process and getting as much money to DIMS as the CCBOE could on its own. 
Director Vu inserted a sentence stating that the $15,000 was to count toward the eventual 
contract price, referring to the County contract that had not yet received approval.  
Apparently, the CCBOE and DIMS lacked a controlling agreement to cover the 
period of 7/31/2005 to 4/3/2006. Under the original Limited License Agreement and 
Amendments No. 1 & 2, which collectively ended 7/31/2005, DIMS had no right to 
demand compensation for the software and the CCBOE had no right to demand training 
or support services, unless such was provided for in another agreement. [DESI hearing, 
conference call with DIMS staff 7/7/2006, interviews with Director Vu and Deputy 
Director Dillingham 7/14/2006, conference call with Benesch Friedlander law firm 
7/14/2006, examination of Temporary License Agreements] 
1.2  Recommendation: The CCBOE should involve legal counsel in all stages of all 
negotiations with major suppliers and their subsidiaries. More attention should be paid to 
implied and explicit quid pro quos, and to the specific corporate entity on the other side 
of the contract. The CCBOE should never assume that one entity’s negotiator is speaking 
for another, or that corporate units or subsidiaries are as “seamlessly integrated” as 
prospective vendors may claim. If the CCBOE receives any product or service without a 
written contract or during negotiations for one, it should be considered an open issue that 
needs to be resolved quickly. All purchases should be memorialized on and tied to a 
CCBOE purchase order, regardless of how the transactions are negotiated, so that a clear 
paper trail is formed regarding what has been bought, what the price really is, and what 
the terms are. All incoming invoices should be matched to purchase orders, and if they 
cannot be, this should be seen as a “red flag” requiring immediate investigation. Further, 
although it may be seen as an extra and perhaps unnecessary expense, legal counsel for 
the County and CCBOE should draft the terms of the CCBOE’s major acquisition 
contracts, rather than rely primarily on Sellers’ form contracts or suppliers’ boilerplate. 
This extra legal step is essential to protect the interests of the voters and taxpayers of 
Cuyahoga County. 
1.3  Recommendation: The CCBOE should present the proposed DIMSnet contract to 
the County Commissioners as a separate deal from the other purchases with which it has 
previously been bundled with. This would allow the Commissioners to evaluate it on its 
own merits. 
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1.4  Recommendation: Bundling a variety of products for purchase is a strategy that can 
benefit a Seller as well as one that Buyers can use profitably. But bundling necessary 
products along with those that are optional (but desired) as a strategy to compel a 
reviewing agency to fund the entire bundle without closely examining its products is a 
risky approach that can result in the CCBOE not receiving any portion of the sought 
products. Full disclosure is the best course. CCBOE executive managers need to 
demonstrate respect for the role elected County representatives have in protecting the 
public purse and not seek to force approval of deals automatically.  
Lack of integration between DIMSnet and GEMS software 
1.5  Finding: The “seamless integration” described by DESI sales representatives and 
printed materials did not materialize because the system purchased from DESI by the 
CCBOE was not set up or managed to perform as such. At the Panel’s 6/29/2006 Public 
Hearing, DESI representative Jessica Hiner, who had been in charge of project 
implementation in Cuyahoga County for DESI, stated that in order to seamlessly 
integrate, the DIMSnet and GEMS systems “need to be set up in such a way so that they 
can do that, because DIMS is designed to work with multiple election management 
systems. I’m not a DIMS person, but you would have to set it up in such a way so that it 
will do that.” When asked how they were set up in Cuyahoga County, Hiner replied, “I 
do not know how DIMS is set up in Cuyahoga. I can find out.” DESI assigned Hiner to 
manage all Ohio implementations, and DESI did not assign a Project Manager within 
DESI to Cuyahoga County in particular. All on-site implementation management appears 
to have been subcontracted by DESI to a third party company, Sogeti USA. When asked 
what would have needed to happen to realize the “seamless integration” that the CCBOE 
came out of negotiations expecting, Hiner stated that “DIMS is not within the scope of 
what my responsibilities are and it predates my responsibilities in terms of the voting 
systems in Ohio.” Later in the Hearing, in response to a question about additional 
purchases that may have been needed to complete the integration, Hiner replied, “I know 
I’ve had a few conversations to that regard. I don’t know that I’m the one that’s had all 
the conversations.” Since Hiner was the only DESI employee assigned to Cuyahoga 
County to run the implementation of the voting system, she presumably needed to know 
how her company’s products operated and what versions were in play on a given project. 
Without that knowledge she could not have scheduled the implementation effectively.  
E-mail evidence suggests that Hiner was aware in advance of the difficulty the 
CCBOE would encounter in the DIMSnet-GEMS data transfer. Joe Nista, a Sogeti USA 
employee who was subcontracted to work under Hiner as DESI’s on-site implementation 
leader, copied her on a 2/7/2006 email to Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham 
entitled “Conference Call with Diebold on DIMS-GEMS,” where he stated that “(i)t does 
not appear that we will be able to export candidate info from DIMS to GEMS very 
quickly and Diebold recommends that the Cuyahoga team begin to load race, candidate, 
issue information directly to GEMS asap.” It is unclear who from DESI recommended 
this manual data entry. If it was not Hiner who did so, it is unclear why it was not Hiner 
and even more unclear how she ended up unaware of the issue. It is also unclear how this 
issue was not within her responsibility as Project Manager, especially given that her 
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subordinate was reporting to her about it. Hiner stated in a 7/17/2006 conference call that 
her responsibilities were limited to implementation of the State Master Contract, which 
did not include DIMSnet. However, that contract in note 9 on page B-2 states that 
“Diebold will provide whatever support is necessary to ensure the first successful federal 
election.” 
When asked at the Hearing whether her work included the DIMSnet-GEMS interface, 
Hiner replied that since the scope of her position was only to implement the State Master 
Contract, and since she was also in charge of areas which did not use both DESI-
produced systems, and since the SOS mandated that tabulation systems not require 
interface to a particular voter registration system, and since DESI can’t possibly know 
how every registration system works, she therefore trains every county to do manual 
entry into GEMS. This stated policy would seemingly thwart any possibility of “seamless 
integration” simply by not attempting it at all, regardless of whether both DESI products 
were used. 
DESI’s counsel, who was also present at the hearing, told the Panel that DIMSnet and 
GEMS were purchased with two entirely separate contracts, and pointed out that the 
DIMSnet contract had not been finalized or performed on by the County. He then 
referred questions regarding “seamless integration” back to the CCBOE. It appears, 
however, that the CCBOE did not need to finalize or perform any contract with any DESI 
subsidiary to be entitled to “whatever support is necessary to ensure the first successful 
federal election.” These services had already been paid for in the state contract. 
Having two contracts was not the CCBOE’s idea; it was an automatic reality because 
the SOS Master Contract covered GEMS but not DIMSnet. Acquiring both systems from 
the same vendor was the CCBOE’s idea, but “seamless integration” among DESI’s voter 
registration and election management products was DESI’s open, written, and frequently 
stated claim during the CCBOE’s vendor selection process. The CCBOE could have 
obtained two separate systems under two separate contracts from any of several vendors, 
but the CCBOE wanted an integrated system from one vendor, and this was the reason 
the CCBOE selected DESI.  
According to DIMS staff and Tyrone Howard, the Sogeti USA in-house technical 
support assistant subcontracted by DESI to work at the CCBOE, certain software 
products, primarily VC Programmer, were not used during the data transfer from 
DIMSnet to GEMS and would have smoothed the process tremendously. Director Vu is 
less convinced that the VC Programmer package would have helped this process in any 
great capacity. Vu views it as more of a specific application to activate the Ballot-on-
Demand feature of the overall DESI product package. However, Director Vu also stated 
that DESI Sales Manager Barry Herron was unclear as to what VC Programmer did or 
how it worked. 
Ballot-on-Demand was not used in the 5/2/2006 election. DESI marketing materials 
noted that the Ballot-on-Demand system was included with the purchase of DIMSnet, 
without mentioning VC Programmer. But according to Vu this supposedly free feature 
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was not useable at all without the purchase of the $5,000 VC Programmer module, 
$1,200 worth of VC Programmer training, and several $150 ST-100 universal encoders. 
In a 7/17/2006 conference call, Hiner stated that VC Programmer was intended to work 
with multiple voter registration systems from multiple vendors, and was not necessary to 
use Ballot-on-Demand. 
The CCBOE did purchase the VC Programmer software, but has not yet purchased 
the VC Programmer training session that was quoted to Director Vu. In his view, VC 
Programmer would only have helped with GEMS-DIMSnet data transfer that was needed 
to use Ballot-on-Demand. On a conference call with the Panel, DIMS staff indicated that 
the VC Programmer training session also included information about the DIMSnet-
GEMS data transfer process. Vu believed that the DIMSnet-GEMS transfer, which VC 
Programmer may have eased, was a feature the CCBOE was already entitled to because 
that was what DESI had offered upfront as a competitive advantage of their package. 
According to Vu, this “seamless integration” of DIMSnet to GEMS was promised as a 
fundamental feature, and at no time did anyone from DESI tell him that additional 
software or service purchases would have to be made to realize this benefit. The 
“seamless integration” was proposed to him not as a set of items to purchase, but as a 
reason to select DESI over other vendors. 
Sogeti employee Howard stated that he and Nista, also from Sogeti, had asked for 
DIMSnet support several times during the difficult data transfer process of February and 
March 2006. Though some support was provided over email, it was limited, and no 
DIMS staff was ever on site to help with the data transfer. According to Howard, Tim 
Murawski of DIMS told him in an email that DIMS was dealing with another large client 
at that time, and that his supervisors had told him not to support Cuyahoga County 
because of the lack of payment and lack of a long-term contract. Howard was reluctant to 
provide the Panel with full access to his emails because of the confidentiality agreement 
he and his employer have with DESI. Joe Nista, though out of the Cleveland area at this 
time, was personally willing to share information with the Panel pending DESI approval, 
but DESI did not grant this approval. [Diebold-SOS Master Contract; Interviews with 
Tyrone Howard 7/13/2006 and 7/14/2006; interviews with Director Vu and Deputy 
Director Dillingham 7/14/2006; examination of DESI promotional materials and letters to 
the CCBOE; conference calls with DIMS staff 7/7/2006 and with Jessica Hiner 
7/17/2006; Public Hearing 6/29/2006; email from Joe Nista to Director Vu and Deputy 
Director Dillingham 2/7/2006; Nista’s progress status reports; email requests to Nista and 
his responses] 
1.6  Recommendation: The CCBOE should hold a public forum and invite the DESI 
sales representatives who convinced them to select DESI systems. DESI’s Hiner and 
other DESI management in charge of implementation for Cuyahoga County should be 
specifically invited. At this forum, the CCBOE could ask these representatives to explain 
how their assertions of a “seamless integration” among their products were reflected in 
the performance of those products leading up to the May primary, and why Diebold’s 
implementation plans for Cuyahoga County scarcely addressed, and did not achieve, the 
“seamless integration” advertised during vendor selection. The DESI representatives 
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might suggest and quote additional purchases that are necessary to complete the 
seamlessly integrated package they spoke of in 2003-2004. (The Panel held a Public 
Hearing and requested the presence of DESI sales staff to speak regarding these issues. 
Given their absence, it then requested phone or email conversations with these 
individuals, but DESI denied all forms of access to or communication with these 
individuals.) 
1.7  Recommendation: In future implementations, including whatever needs to be done 
to make the County’s systems fully operational and integrated for the November election, 
the CCBOE should insist that Project Managers assigned by vendors to Cuyahoga County 
are aware of all expected outcomes and charged with achieving them in their project 
plans. The CCBOE should keep lines of communications open between those who sold 
them the product and those who deliver it to insure that all features used as selling points 
are realized. Project Managers should also be aware of the product requirements of the 
projects they are managing and the configurations of their own company’s products that 
are used in these projects. The CCBOE should demand that subcontractors used by 
vendors to implement CCBOE purchases also be aware of expected outcomes, and that 
they receive the full cooperation of the vendors that hired them. 
Needs for training, and issues with regard to payment for training, on 
DIMSnet and GEMS software 
1.8  Finding: The DIMS-produced “Project Quality Plan of DIMS VR Implementation 
for Cuyahoga County” revision 1.6, 6/29/2004, lists on page 10 a DIMS training team of 
four people. In the Work Plan chart on pages 16-17, User/Admin Training is the only one 
of 42 events to have “N/A” instead of a date listed for start and end. Election Training is 
the only event to have been shortened, with its end date changed from 9/2/2004 to 
8/28/2004. Under “Targets” on page 17, the date for “Training Complete” was similarly 
tightened. 
In December 2005, Deputy Director Dillingham requested that DIMS complete the 
CCBOE’s training on all DIMSnet modules. Tim Murawski of DIMS replied with a price 
quote. The Panel has not seen this price quote, but Murawski referred to it as being an 
attachment to the 12/28/2005 email. He further stated that the training could only begin 
once the contract and payment issues could be resolved. 
Deputy Director Dillingham replied that training on the Candidate and Absentee 
modules had not been provided when the system was installed in 2004. She asked how 
the CCBOE could be charged for this training when the modules in question were not 
available for use in Ohio at that time. 
Ross Underwood of DIMS responded that once a year had passed after installation, 
all training would be at an additional charge. He asked Dillingham what training she 
thought CCBOE had not gotten initially, and ended the email with a request for payment 
under the proposed contract that had not been executed, including use to date and past 
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services rendered, the former of which had explicitly been provided at no charge under 
the Temporary License Agreement and Amendments thereof. 
Deputy Director Dillingham replied that DIMS never gave the CCBOE any 
documentation regarding training done or yet to be done. She asked how DIMS could 
have provided training initially “on modules that did not work when they were installed.” 
She listed Elections, Candidates, ballot ordering, and election calendar as some of the 
areas in which the CCBOE staff had not been trained. She responded to the demand for 
money by stating that “I feel that information should be coming to you from Diebold and 
not the Board of Elections.” There was no sense at the CCBOE that DIMS was in any 
way separate from DESI, that they were different negotiating units, or that they expected 
separate revenue streams. Dillingham closed with “(w)e were told that we would be able 
to pull the information from DIMS into GEMS to create our ballots, how can we 
import/export data if we were never taught how to input the data in the first place?” 
Underwood responded “(i)t sounds like you need more training than we realized at 
first.” He then listed items that would be added to the price quote, and indicated that the 
classes would have to be scheduled soon because they were in such high demand. 
Dillingham again asked why the CCBOE had to pay for training they should have 
received in the first place, and Underwood responded by explaining the DIMS policy of 
charging after one year, for budget and practical purposes, then pointed out that King 
County, Washington implemented the system at a similar time to Cuyahoga, then bought 
an additional $35,000 worth of training from DIMS. 
At the Secretary of State conference in January 2006, Director Vu asked Ross 
Underwood of DIMS about the missed training, as well as DIMSnet-GEMS integration 
training. Vu followed up this request with a 1/18/2006 email to Underwood asking that 
Tim Murawski come and provide training “to bridge the gap between DIMS and GEMS.” 
Underwood replied that this would happen, but only should happen after the in-house 
GEMS training. He stated that he wanted to make sure Murawski was involved, “so that 
he can support the procedures after the training has been concluded.” Director Vu then 
sent another email to Underwood on 1/30/2006 asking “(i)s it possible to get someone 
scheduled for DIMS/GEMS training for this week or next, as discussed?” 
This training never occurred. The DIMS-GEMS data transferal process became a 
critical bottleneck that delayed L&A testing and wasted valuable CCBOE resources when 
they were needed most. Given that the state contract, which allocated millions in federal 
dollars to Diebold, required Diebold to “provide whatever support is necessary to ensure 
the first successful federal election,” it is unclear how any necessary data transferal 
support could have rightfully been withheld over a $50,000 county billing issue. The state 
contract did not pay for DIMSnet itself, but it paid for support during the first federal 
election in which Diebold’s products would be used. 
Tyrone Howard stated that he and Joe Nista had created a GEMS training class to 
present at the CCBOE in January or February 2006. According to Howard, Joyce Sellers 
of the CCBOE said that the class would not be needed. Director Vu subsequently stated 
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in an interview that he had never heard of this proposed class or this exchange between 
Howard and Sellers. [Diebold-SOS Master Contract; interviews with Tyrone Howard 
7/13/2006 and 7/14/2006; interviews with Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham 
7/14/2006; emails between Deputy Director Dillingham, Tim Murawski, and Ross 
Underwood 12/28/2005-12/29/2005; conference call with DIMS staff 7/7/2006; Public 
Hearing 6/29/2006; email Director Vu to Underwood 1/30/2005; Project Quality Plan of 
DIMS VR Implementation for Cuyahoga County, Revision 1.6] 
1.9  Recommendation: The CCBOE needs to resolve the contract situation with DIMS, 
as it appears to have been the primary roadblock preventing integration training and, as a 
consequence, data transferal between the systems. As for what training should have been 
provided at the time of installation, this should be taken up with DESI and not DIMS. It 
is unlikely that DIMS staff began the installation spontaneously, without any prompting 
from within the DESI organization, or that DIMS staff took no part in the negotiations 
that landed their product in the CCBOE computers in 2004. These negotiations were with 
regard to the state contract, which provided for necessary support services in the first 
federal election held using Diebold systems. DIMS is part of Diebold, and arguably 
should be obligated under agreements made by Diebold. No contract, neither the 
proposed but unsigned county procurement nor the Temporary License, provided for any 
compensation for DIMS products or services during the first year of use, which included 
the installation and training period. In-house GEMS training should be prepared and 
scheduled to begin as soon as possible. 
SOS Master Contract did not provide for ancillary equipment 
1.10  Finding: The Secretary of State’s (SOS) Office and DESI signed a Master State 
contract on 7/14/2004, under which the SOS’s office purchased DESI touchscreen 
systems for electronic voting. The contract provided for the purchase of Direct Recording 
Electronic (DRE) systems. However, the machines themselves, as initially agreed upon in 
the contract, are not sufficient: the conversion requires the purchase of many items of 
additional “ancillary” equipment that are not provided under the Secretary of State’s 
contract. For example, extension cords are required to ensure that the electronic voting 
machines are fully charged on Election Day. Other ancillary equipment is optional, but 
very helpful. For instance, DRE carts with adequate locks are useful for firmly securing 
and transporting the voting machines before they go into use. [SOS-Diebold Master 
Contract; interviews with Director Vu and Manager Gorman] 
1.11  Finding: Procurement and Operations Manager Gorman stated that CCBOE 
employees spent roughly 60 hours researching vendors for ancillary equipment that later 
turned out to be DESI “sole sourced” items. [Interview with Gorman] 
1.12  Finding: The Secretary of State’s Master Contract omitted provisions and funding 
for the purchase of equipment other than that specified in the contract —even if the 
county in question considered the equipment imperative for its use of the e-voting 
system. This omission was one cause of the confusion and conflict between DESI and the 
CCBOE concerning the responsibilities each shouldered for that equipment. [SOS-
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Diebold Master Contract; interview with Fiscal Services Manager Durkin 6/12/2006; 
Secretary of State re contract; Procurement Operations spreadsheets] 
1.13  Finding: The Secretary of State’s contract contained relatively few details about 
how the conversion to electronic voting would occur, and the ambiguities on points such 
as consulting services placed the onus on the counties to research and plan the conversion 
to electronic voting. That was a heavy burden in light of the lack of prior experience with 
e-voting, and the lack of expertise in crucial matters such as security systems for the 
machines. 
1.14  Recommendation: When negotiating e-voting Master Contracts with vendors, or 
any revisions to the contract which governs currently, the Secretary of State should 
provide information concerning ancillary equipment needed for an e-voting system. The 
Master Contract should state in a Schedule or other attachment: 
1. a list of all necessary items for the designated electronic voting machine to 
function (both alone and in a system with other machines) but not included in the 
Master Contract list of products and services, with sufficient information 
concerning the quantities of items needed; 
2. a list of all optional items that might be helpful in the conversion to electronic 
voting; 
3. the exact specifications of all items that are not sole source listed in 1 or 2 above; 
4. reasonable deadlines for supplying all necessary, and especially “sole source,” 
equipment, with specified penalties for not meeting these timetables; 
5. if possible, maximum prices that can be charged for the necessary ancillary 
equipment.  
This information is critical for local governments and Boards of Elections so that they 
may pursue procurement in a timely and cost-effective manner, with maximum leverage 
for purchases. These requirements would help to level the playing field between the 
counties and the voting machine system vendors, and would impose clear duties and 
penalties on the vendors for strategic behavior that unfairly undermines the public’s 
ability to have its voting systems functional and reasonably cost-efficient. 
Combined procurement of required ancillary equipment with additional 
voting machines; CCBOE relationship with County Commissioners 
1.15  Finding: On November 14, 2005 the CCBOE signed a purchase order from the 
Secretary of State’s office that provided Cuyahoga County with 5,407 DESI voting 
machines. The CCBOE managers also sought an additional contract approval from the 
Cuyahoga County Commissioners that would authorize local funds for the CCBOE to 
purchase 900 additional electronic voting machines, along with ancillary equipment that 
would facilitate the operation of all 6,307 electronic voting machines. The negotiation of 
this “bundling” deal had occurred over the critical summer months and well into the fall. 
Because of their emphasis on the importance of the extra DRE units to be purchased 
locally, the CCBOE executive managers did not move forward quickly after the April 
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SOS re-certification of the DREs to sign the purchase order for the HAVA-funded, 
Master Contract authorized e-voting system the CCBOE had selected. By delaying and 
focusing on the extra DREs, the CCBOE was not able to obtain the system in time for the 
CCBOE to begin using the new e-voting system in small 2005 elections. The Director 
and Deputy Director said they did not sign the purchase order with the SOS in order to 
retain “leverage” for negotiating the ancillary equipment and additional DRE contract, 
and so they could negotiate higher performance standards. [SOS-Diebold Master 
Contract; Proposed November 2005 Agreement between CCBOE and DESI; Interviews 
with the Director and Deputy Dir.; with CCBOE Board Members; with David Lambert, 
attorney for Cuyahoga County Commissioners; Letter to Director Vu from DESI’s David 
Byrd, describing the supplementary discounts on voter registration and additional 
equipment that will accompany the purchase of 900 additional voting units] 
1.16  Finding: The CCBOE Director and Deputy Director stated to the Panel that they 
believed that “soon” after the 11/14/2005 date when they signed the Master Contract 
purchase order, the agency would receive the Board of County Commissioners’ (BOCC) 
authorization to purchase 900 additional electronic voting machines, along with ancillary 
equipment that would facilitate the operation of all 6,307 electronic voting machines. But 
the Panel finds no reasonable basis for this belief. Several weeks before signing the 
Master Contract purchase order, the Director and Deputy had received concrete, reliable 
information that the County would not approve the proposed contract for additional 
DREs before the DREs had established a performance track record. 
In October 2005, hoping to persuade the Commissioners that the extra voting units 
and ancillary equipment were needed and should receive County funding, CCBOE Board 
Member Loree Soggs discussed with Commissioner Jimmie Dimora the CCBOE’s 
request for the County Commissioners to approve the proposed contract. Mr. Soggs told 
the Panel that Commissioner Dimora was crystal clear that the Commissioners would not 
be approving the proposed contract that sought to “bundle” the 900 additional DRE units 
with essential and optional equipment for launching the e-voting system. Mr. Soggs 
reported back to the CCBOE Board Members, and to the Director and Deputy Director, 
that the proposed contract would not receive the Commissioners’ approval. Mr. Soggs 
recalled that Mr. Dimora had stated that the County wanted to be prudent with the 
taxpayers’ monies and that the Commissioners were not convinced that any additional 
DREs were needed. He said that the Commissioners would take another look at the 
CCBOE request for more machines after the DREs were used in an election, and thus had 
a track record. 
Mr. Soggs also reported back that the Commissioners were not impressed with the 
bundling of ancillary equipment with the requested additional DRE units, even though 
the CCBOE management had obtained $1.5 million in discounts from list prices. If the 
additional DREs were not needed or did not function well in an actual election, Mr. 
Dimora stressed, the $1.5 million in negotiated contract discounts could not offset the 
overall cost of the contract (approximately $4.3 million). [Proposed November 2005 
Agreement between CCBOE and DESI; Interviews with the Director and Deputy Dir.; 
with CCBOE Board Members; with David Lambert, attorney for Cuyahoga County 
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Commissioners; Letter to Director Vu from DESI’s David Byrd, describing the 
supplementary discounts on voter registration and additional equipment that will 
accompany the purchase of 900 additional voting units] 
1.17  Finding: The Director and Deputy Director did not accept and act on the 
information that CCBOE Board Member Soggs related, and so did not attempt to move 
forward expeditiously on the ancillary equipment needed for the e-voting system launch. 
Instead, for several additional months, they continued to try to convince the County 
Commissioners of their wisdom in “bundling” the items, arguing that the Commissioners 
should approve the side deal they had negotiated with Diebold. This delay and attempt to 
pressure the Commissioners also meant that the CCBOE managers did not launch the e-
voting system in any of the fall 2005 elections, though many other Ohio counties were 
able to do so. Some other counties, including some using Diebold DREs, were able to 
complete all negotiations for ancillary equipment and meet the highly preferred 2005 
timetable for launching the systems. When the Panel asked Director Vu why Cuyahoga 
took so much longer than the other counties that also had to acquire ancillary equipment 
information and negotiate deals directly with Diebold, he said that Cuyahoga’s size and 
complexity made the amount of extra and necessary ancillary equipment more difficult to 
research and obtain. [Proposed November 2005 Agreement between CCBOE and DESI; 
Interviews with the Director and Deputy Director] 
1.18  Finding: When the County Commissioners rejected the acquisition of 900 
additional machines, the CCBOE Director and Deputy Director maintained that they 
pushed the County Commissioners to purchase the ancillary equipment needed for the 
5,407 machines allocated in the Secretary of State’s contract. [Telephone Interview with 
Director Vu, July 13, 2006] However, there is no written documentation or other 
verification to confirm this. According to Dennis Madden, the County Commissioners 
never had an opportunity to consider buying solely the ancillary equipment. [Interview 
with Dennis Madden — County Administrator for the Board of the County 
Commissioners] 
 
1.19  Finding: The CCBOE erred in combining the purchase of 900 additional DRE e-
voting machines and the purchase of ancillary equipment for all DREs — those 
purchased under the Master Contract with federal funds and those sought to be funded by 
the County. Some ancillary equipment was essential for the 5,407 voting machines 
purchased under the auspices of the SOS’s office, regardless whether the 900 additional 
machines were purchased. This error introduced additional delays into the procurement of 
essential equipment. For example, DRE carts, known as TSx carts, were originally part of 
the November proposed agreement, but after the agreement was rejected by the County 
the carts were not ordered until 2/9/2006. Though the carts were needed by 4/14/2006, it 
was projected to take 10-12 weeks to deliver them to the CCBOE. As a result, DESI 
agreed to try to provide TSx carts for the May 2nd primary, but insisted that it not be 
liable if carts were not delivered for use before the May election. This term became part 
of the single source items contract. Not surprisingly, many carts were not delivered 
before May, and are arriving only now in July 2006. [November 2005 Agreement 
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between CCBOE and DESI; February 2nd email between DESI Consultant Joe Nista and 
Fiscal Services Manager Durkin; TSx carts contract; Interview with Director Vu] 
1.20  Finding: By focusing on the local “bundled” contract, and not accepting the heads-
up from the Commissioners that additional DREs would not be approved, the CCBOE 
was unable to launch the e-voting system prior to the May even-year primary. This 
mistaken set of priorities may have been the root cause of the launch difficulties. Had the 
CCBOE set a firm commitment for launch in one of the small Fall elections (and 
certainly no later than November 2005), and negotiated with Diebold with that 
commitment clearly governing their agency’s actions, the CCBOE would not have had to 
combine the immense management issues of the “normal” even-year primary with those 
of the e-voting launch. It would have had the opportunity to trouble-shoot its processes, 
as originally planned, and by May 2006, may have been able to have handled all the tasks 
with reasonable competency.  
1.21  Finding: Even with the delays the CCBOE experienced in negotiating the proposed 
local contract, had the Director and Deputy (upon learning of Mr. Soggs conversation 
with Mr. Dimora) promptly separated ancillary equipment from the additional DREs and 
presented that revised contract to the County, the agency would have retained more 
leverage for pricing and better delivery schedules than the CCBOE was able to garner in 
March-April 2006. The likelihood of delivery before the May 2nd Primary Election would 
have been substantially increased. The irony and two-way high stakes poker played by 
the CCBOE Managers do not escape us: by holding out for the items and pricing that they 
sought, the agency ultimately paid more for the ancillary equipment and on a worse 
delivery schedule, and still were not able to induce the County Commissioners to 
purchase more DREs.  
1.22  Recommendation: The relationship between the County Commissioners and the 
CCBOE needs to improve. The CCBOE should have sought to involve the County 
voters’ elected representatives in the voting machinery choices from the outset, instead of 
sidelining them until the last moment and then expecting them to pay the bills for 
whatever e-voting system the CCBOE executives had selected for purchase. A working 
agreement for how the two County agencies will jointly implement the duties imposed 
under §3506.03 of the Ohio Revised Code (which explains how voting equipment can be 
acquired) would be useful. The CCBOE and the County Commissioners should outline a 
clear policy and procedure regarding decision-making in voting machinery funding and 
procurement. 
1.23  Finding: The CCBOE executives have incited the County Commissioners to 
develop mistrust and skepticism towards the CCBOE by not briefing the Commissioners 
in a timely and complete manner on what would need to be purchased to complement the 
Secretary of State’s Master Contract. [Interview with Dennis Madden] 
1.24  Recommendation: When the Board of County Commissioners requests 
information from an agency to plan its budget, an agency such as the CCBOE should do 
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its best to assist the County Commissioners rather than to criticize inquiries. [Deputy 
Director Dillingham email to Sandy Turk]  
Inefficient procurement procedures for ancillary equipment 
1.25  Finding: In addition to its sole source purchase orders with DESI, the CCBOE 
ordered the rest of its ancillary equipment primarily through: 
• Sole source purchase orders from other companies; 
• Direct orders for amounts involved were less than $1,000; 
• Informal purchase orders between $1,000 and $14,999; 
• Formal purchase orders greater than $15,000 
After DESI sent notices to the CCBOE indicating the desired items were sole source 
items and the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor issued his approval, the CCBOE placed sole 
source orders. 
The bulk of the ancillary equipment ordered by the CCBOE was delivered in time for 
the May 2nd Election, but the procurement process itself was flawed and inefficient. On 
several occasions the Implementation Teams responsible for researching and 
recommending ancillary equipment failed to submit completed requisition forms to the 
Procurement and Operations Department managed by Brendan Gorman. The Ballot 
Department, for example, failed to submit a complete requisition form to obtain special 
size calculator rolls for optical scan printers; the Election Support Department failed to 
submit a complete requisition form for the luggage tags that are part of the precinct 
binders; and the Candidate & Voter Services Department failed to submit a proper 
request for certified mail envelopes. Altogether, four departments submitted 15 incorrect 
request forms. 
When someone filled out a requisition form incorrectly, a member of the procurement 
office had to either track down the “culprit” and ask that the order be resubmitted, or 
attempt to fill out the order correctly him/herself. Due to the influx of purchase orders to 
Procurement, it often took significant time to correct improper requisition forms. Rather 
than tackling pressing matters relating to the May 2nd Election, CCBOE managers’ time 
was wasted dealing with procurement. [November 2005 Agreement between CCBOE and 
DESI; February 2nd email between DESI Consultant Joe Nista and Fiscal Services 
Manager Durkin; TSx carts contract; Interview with Director Vu; Interview with 
Administrative Services Administrator Platten, 6/20/2006; Procurement and Operation 
Manager Brendan Gorman Interview 6/24/2006; Purchase Order List Year 2006, revised 
5/26/2006] 
1.26  Recommendation: The E-Voting Implementation Team process was not 
thoughtfully planned or managed, and this hampered procurement. Far better 
procurement planning must occur with procedures well-designed to consume little time 
of those outside the procurement office. Researching other counties’ experiences should 
have occurred promptly rather than the CCBOE “reinventing the wheel” itself. The 
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CCBOE should explore using electronic forms for requisitions and procurement software 
that automates the process. Some software is designed to identify errors and thus can 
reduce time spent on purchase orders. 
DESI failure to specify required ancillary equipment, sole source issues 
1.27  Finding: The CCBOE executive managers have expressed dissatisfaction with 
DESI’s approach and delivery of ancillary equipment. It has complained that DESI does 
not send sole source letters — letters representing that DESI is the sole source of supply 
for a given piece of equipment—in a timely fashion. On 3/20/2006 Director Vu requested 
sole source letters for “any item that is necessary for use of the TSx Voting System 
including: [sic] paper canisters & spindles, paper rolls, memory cards, & O/S memory 
cards, and VIBS kit.” Later that day, Administrative Services Administrator Platten listed 
other items she believed were sole source because CCBOE officials had “exhausted all 
resources for these items.” Those items included supervisor cards, TSx Batteries, and 
privacy shields. 
When the CCBOE signed the purchase order from the Secretary of State’s Office on 
November 14, 2005 to order 5,407 TSx touch-screen voting machines, DESI knew what 
additional items that were essential for using the DRE machines, and knew which of 
those items the CCBOE could obtain from other vendors. 
1.28  Recommendation: Given the importance of voting machines to the proper 
functioning of the electoral process that lies at the core of our representative government, 
leaders at the local, state, and federal levels should work together to craft uniform, 
stringent regulations for vendors who provide electronic voting systems. The regulations 
should communicate expectations clearly and impose responsibility and accountability on 
vendors. 
1.29  Recommendation: The CCBOE should not bid for ancillary equipment without 
determining the range of possible sources for the equipment and its pricing. A vendor’s 
sole source letters should be sought promptly, even before a contract is signed, as a 
condition for the CCBOE executing the deal. To help determine what is a sole source 
item, the CCBOE should seek advice from other jurisdictions that procured equipment 
from that vendor.  
1.30  Recommendation: The Secretary of State’s office should create an electronic 
bulletin board that Ohio county BOEs can use to share information about vendors of 
voting equipment, pricing and performance, solving various problems, etc., sorted by 
types of equipment and vendor. The SOS should monitor the postings and assist BOEs 
with subpar vendor performance. It should consider legal action where vendors have not 
performed.  
1.31  Recommendation: The CCBOE must establish more efficient interaction between 
the staff procuring equipment and the management personnel seeking sole source letters. 
It is highly inefficient to have CCBOE employees calling vendors about ancillary 
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equipment before sole source items (and letters) have been determined. Much valuable 
time was wasted. At worst, the CCBOE would have bought more items from DESI at a 
somewhat higher price, but the CCBOE managers would then have been able to focus on 
other pressing issues related to the May Election. 
CCBOE difficulty in accounting for delivered items 
1.32  Finding: On at least one occasion the CCBOE acquired ancillary equipment and 
had difficulty accounting for it. On 6/2/2006, Fiscal Services Manager Durkin received a 
reminder requesting payment for extension cords, roughly three months after the initial 
invoice had been sent. Assistant Manager of the Candidate and Voting Services 
Department, Joseph Dennis, insisted that the extension cords had been returned to the 
appropriate vendor. Seventeen days and several emails later, Dennis conceded. “Good 
morning, Lisa. We had the cords. They did not go back as they should have. I’m sending 
them over to Dan [Trif] this morning to be shipped back. Sorry for the mix up.” [Email to 
Fiscal Services Manager Lisa Durkin, 6/2/2006; Subject: Grainger Invoice 
#90497551804 $93.40; Email, Assistant Manager of the Candidate and Voting Services 
Department Joseph Dennis to Fiscal Services Manager Durkin, 6/19/2006, Subject: 
Extension Cords] 
1.33  Recommendation: A central, readily-accessible electronic system that monitors 
and accounts for all purchases, arrivals, and returns of equipment should be established. 
That system should include all transactions between the CCBOE and other vendors. 
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Chapter II: System Functionality: Essential Databases 
and E-Voting Technologies 
Voters see and interact with DRE touchscreen voting machines in their polling places, but 
Cuyahoga County’s conversion to electronic voting included two key systems installed at 
the CCBOE, as well as additional equipment required for the operation of the DREs. This 
Chapter describes functionality and other issues with these components which affected 
the preparation and conduct of the May 2nd election. 
DIMSnet Voter Registration System 
Voter registrations lost from the CCBOE system 
2.1  Finding: The DIMSnet voter registration system has dropped or displaced several 
hundred registered voters. This has occurred ever since the transition from the previous 
voter registration system, VEMACS, and it continues to occur regularly. There are two 
known explanations for this problem. Voters can disappear due to the “Merge Records” 
feature in DIMSnet. This feature allows a DIMSnet operator to combine two registration 
records into a single record and is primarily used to resolve duplicate registration records 
that correspond to a single voter. However, if an operator inadvertently or mistakenly 
merges records of different voters, one or both of these voters may be deleted. The 
problem is that DIMSnet does not permit the maintenance of an archive of voter records 
that have been merged. Once two voters are merged into one record the process cannot be 
reversed and some information will be lost. Additionally, DIMSnet includes no warning 
prompt or safeguard to alert an operator that a registration record is being deleted. Even a 
prompt as simple as “Are you sure you want to merge records? Sensitive information 
may be lost,” would alleviate much of this problem. 
Voters can also be displaced by placement in “fatal pending” status. Voters will be 
categorized as “fatal pending” when the address they have registered under does not 
exist, or the voter cannot be located due to an address change. These voters essentially 
disappear from the system once they are placed in the “fatal pending” category because 
they cannot be contacted to correct their registration information. 
The conclusion that voters mysteriously disappeared from the system without 
explanation is further supported by the fact that EDT and Booth official employees 
disappeared from the DIMSnet payroll system. The disappearance of this information 
from the DIMSnet payroll system cannot be explained by the “fatal pending” or merge 
records explanations because there is no reason to believe that anyone would ever merge 
any of the entries in the payroll system or that any of these entries were ever labeled as 
“fatal pending”. [Administrative Assistants Betty Jones and Linda Steimle; Interview 
with Department of Candidate and Voter Services Manager Mike DeFranco 6/20/2006; 
Interview with IT/GIS specialist Matt Jaffe 6/21/2006; Dr. Norman Robbins’ report on 
missing registrations] 
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2.2  Finding: Verifications of unexplained missing records also exist in document 3.28-3 
in a 12/16/2005 report from Executive Administrator Maiden to Assistant Manager 
Lawler; and in an 10/21/2005 report. Notably, a DESI publication states: 
Now in beta testing. We will enhance the system so that a MERGED voter record 
can be unmerged by the user when he/she believes the record was merged in 
error. The user will look up a voter record to determine if said record was merged 
with another voter record. Then if the user determines the merge was performed 
in error, the user can select the merge and reverse it by clicking the UNDO 
button. [DESI March 2006 Volume 1, Issue 8 VR NewsVue, new DIMS-net 
feature 29] 
2.3  Recommendation: DIMSnet must be equipped with a more robust method for 
entering, tracking, and maintaining records. The merge record feature should display a 
warning prompt before allowing DIMSnet operators to merge records. Additionally, there 
should be an archive of all merged records so that a CCBOE employee could go back 
through these records to try to identify where the problem occurred. Correcting the 
problem of “fatal pending” records requires DIMSnet to be updated with a function that 
will allow for more accurate entry of street addresses. 
2.4  Finding: In DIMSnet, registration records in which street addresses or voter names 
are entered incorrectly are assigned “fatal pending” status (e.g. if a voter residing on 
“East 55th St.” is entered into the system with an address on “E 55 St.” the system will 
not complete the registration because it categorizes the voter as lacking a valid address). 
Entire street addresses must be typed into the system rather than selected from a drop-
down menu of possible valid completions as the address is entered. VEMACS allowed 
street addresses to be selected from a drop-down menu, greatly reducing the probability 
of an operator entering an address that the system does not recognize. [Demonstrated in 
an interview on 6/20/2006 with the Manager of Candidate Voter Services; also confirmed 
in Dr. Victoria Lovegren’s 3/20/2005 report] 
2.5  Finding: DIMSnet does not limit the name entry to alphabetical characters only. A 
DIMSnet operator could also enter numbers and symbols while inputting voter names. 
This also increases the probability of operator error. [Demonstrated in an interview on 
6/20/2006 with the Manager of Candidate Voter Services; also confirmed in Dr. Victoria 
Lovegren’s 3/20/2005 report] 
2.6  Recommendation: Street name entry should be limited to the selection of the street 
name from a drop down menu within DIMSnet. This restriction would greatly reduce the 
chance of an operator error by limiting the number of possible entries within the system. 
This design feature facilitated greater productivity and accuracy in the VEMACS system 
used before DIMSnet was acquired. Veteran CCBOE Registration employees stress this 
as a major setback of the DIMSnet system. Entry of names should be limited to 
alphabetical characters only. DESI staff informed the CCBOE Ballot Department 
Manager that this limitation was not possible because of an individual residing in 
California with the last name “#2”. 
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2.7  Recommendation: Voter registration cards should have an optional field for phone 
numbers so that a voter can be reached if address information on his or her registration 
card is found to be incorrect, CCBOE staff should attempt to contact every such voter. 
The need for this field should be thoroughly explained so that voters will understand why 
they are being asked for their phone numbers. 
2.8  Finding: DIMSnet does not adequately permit searches for voters by name. At 
times, a DIMSnet operator will search for a person by name, but the search will return no 
results, so the staffer then has to search for the voter by address. CVS Manager DeFranco 
stated that he has seen these problems occur, but that they are impossible to document 
completely because these errors do not occur consistently; a name search might bring up 
nothing in one instance but will accurately locate the voter in another. [Interview with 
Manager of Candidate Voter Services; Dr. Victoria Lovegren’s 3/20/2005 report] 
2.9  Recommendation: The software problems causing this intermittent failure to search 
database records properly must be located and isolated through thorough system testing 
and analysis. The best possible solution would allow a DIMSnet operator to enter a 
person’s name or street address with either search approach returning accurate results 
quickly and consistently. 
DIMSnet software freezes when calling up archived registration cards 
2.10  Finding: Once batches of voter registration cards have been scanned and entered 
into DIMSnet, the original ballot images are archived for storage. The “Restore Batches” 
function in DIMSnet is supposed to retrieve archived registration card images, but 
invocation of this function causes the system to freeze and become unusable. The system 
operator must then force-quit the program and restart DIMSnet. [Demonstrated on 
6/20/2006 by the Manager of Candidate Voter Services, and mentioned in a CCBOE 
document (undated) from IS Administrator Lou Irizarry] 
2.11  Recommendation: DESI must remedy the shortcomings of its DIMSnet system. 
This problem must be reported and accurately tracked through the DESI customer 
support system until the issue has been resolved. 
Additional CCBOE trained staff needed to create DIMSnet reports 
2.12  Finding: The Crystal Reports reporting software embedded in DIMSnet allows 
operators to generate pre-defined reports of the data in the DIMSnet database. An 
operator with knowledge of Crystal Reports can create report templates to meet 
CCBOE’s needs. Presently, CCBOE is only able to make limited use of this feature 
because it lacks sufficient staff who know how to create the reporting templates. Those 
personnel who do know how to create the report templates have other responsibilities and 
lack the time to dedicate to report creation. CCBOE uses another version of Crystal 
Reports for other purposes, but the templates created for that version are not compatible 
with the version of Crystal Reports embedded in DIMSnet. This incompatibility creates 
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problems in extracting information from DIMSnet. [Interview with Candidate Voter 
Services Manager on 6/20/2006; Confirmed by GIS Technician Jaffe 6/21/2006] 
2.13  Recommendation: The Crystal Reports feature integrated into DIMSnet must be 
made more usable and must be customized to the needs of Cuyahoga County. The next 
version of DIMSnet must be upgraded with the newest version of Crystal Reports to 
avoid further compatibility problems. Furthermore, an employee at the CCBOE should be 
responsible for troubleshooting and creating these reports. 
System “upgrades” issued for DIMSnet often introduce new flaws 
2.14  Finding: DIMSnet upgrades are problematic. Upgrades have often caused DIMSnet 
features to stop working. DESI testing and version management of DIMSnet is very poor. 
At the time DESI releases an upgrade, DESI provides little information on the problems 
the upgrade is designed to fix or what other changes the upgrade will make to the system. 
These deficiencies are compounded by the fact that DESI customer support procedures 
require customers to adopt all upgrades. 
Certain problems caused by DIMSnet upgrades can remain unnoticed for long 
periods, depending on the point in the election calendar when the upgrade is installed. 
Some features are only used in the time directly before or immediately after an election. 
Such examples include the absentee ballot and signature verification functions of 
DIMSnet. 
According to CVS Manager DeFranco, the process of verifying that features worked 
correctly in DIMSnet after an upgrade became too burdensome for the Information 
Systems Department at the CCBOE. The task then devolved upon individual CCBOE 
department managers. DESI staff stated that each major version of DIMSnet is released 
with a printed list of features, for example, the listing of “New Dims-net features” in the 
March 2006 Volume 1, Issue 8 VR News Vue. However, when minor changes are made 
for a specific customer, they are merged into the next nationwide DIMSnet release 
without accompanying documentation. [Interviews with Candidate and Voter Services 
Assistant Manager Lawler, GIS Technician Jaffe, and Manager DeFranco. A specific 
instance of this problem is recorded in an October 7th report from Executive Assistant 
Lally to Executive Administrator Maiden in document 3.28-3; Interviews with Ross 
Underwood, Mike Lindross, Tim Murowski and counsel, 7/7/2006] 
2.15  Recommendation: DESI must document in a user-friendly manner all DIMSnet 
upgrades. Each upgrade should contain as a bare minimum: any changes made to 
DIMSnet; all the functions of DIMSnet that these changes might affect; any testing done 
by DESI staff to verify the integrity of DIMSnet after the upgrade; a list of any known 
problems at the time of release; contact information for reporting any problems with the 
upgrade; and a list of features being considered for the next upgrade. 
2.16  Recommendation: The CCBOE should create a streamlined process for testing 
new versions of DIMSnet before installing. This should be done by creating a test 
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environment for the upgraded system while leaving the previous release of DIMSnet 
operational. Information Systems staff should undertake the DIMSnet verification 
process because that staff is best-suited to identify and correctly characterize problems. 
This process should not be completed by department managers because it is not their area 
of expertise and it creates the potential for redundancy because several departments use 
the same DIMSnet features. If each IT staffer were assigned a particular list of DIMSnet 
functions to track and test for each upgrade expertise and efficiency could be developed 
internally. Department managers should convey their system needs to Information 
Systems staff. Information systems should do all testing of the system in the interest of 
time, efficiency, and accuracy. If provided with thorough DIMSnet documentation for an 
upgrade, CCBOE IS staff should reevaluate any workarounds then in place to determine 
whether any of the DIMSnet software improvements contained in the upgrade address the 
defect that originally necessitated the workaround. 
The DIMSnet registration system needs to be customized for Cuyahoga 
County 
2.17  Finding: DIMSnet is not customized to the needs of Cuyahoga County. DIMSnet is 
released and upgraded with a wide menu of features that, depending on the State and 
County, may be useful. Approximately fifty-five counties in five States use DIMSnet. 
This means that a large number of the features in DIMSnet designed for use elsewhere 
are not used by Cuyahoga County. Further, some features that would be useful for 
Cuyahoga County will not be created because they would not be useful for other 
DIMSnet customers. Essentially, the DIMSnet system design and support apparatus bars 
customization of DIMSnet. DESI states in its Election Systems Proposal for a Voter 
Registration System and Related Services for Cuyahoga County, November 7th, 2003 that 
“the county will benefit from many technology and application advances being designed 
and implemented for other DIMS counties in the US.” This promise of “benefit” to 
Cuyahoga has been unfulfilled; with DIMSnet designed so that it is a universal rather 
than a customized system. The system omits features Cuyahoga needs and includes 
others that are dysfunctional. 
2.18  Recommendation: Smaller counties are able to modify their own procedures or 
create workarounds in order to use DIMSnet for their elections. Because of Cuyahoga 
County’s size and complexity, however, system customization is needed. Small changes 
such as creating customized data entry forms for voter registration cards would greatly 
reduce the risk of operator error and would increase efficiency by eliminating the amount 
of time spent determining which fields are relevant under our State law and which are 
not. While some of these changes seem trivial they could potentially save a great deal of 
time and money when taking into account the relative experience levels of CCBOE 
employees as well as the sheer volume of transactions that take place on DIMSnet in 
Cuyahoga County. The current DIMSnet system as implemented at the CCBOE is 
unworkable and according to GIS Specialist Jaffe, “essentially everything we do in DIMS 
is a workaround.” 
Some important areas of DIMSnet where customization should be considered: 
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• Easier methods for printing duplicate labels for absentee voters 
• Customized archiving features which would allow for easy management and 
referencing of previous elections; specifically previous petitions need to be 
archived. 
• Signature verification features including the creation of signature sufficiently 
image button to verify that the registration signature sufficiently matches the 
petition signature 
• A new field to designate a petition as a pre-check or as a filing 
• Customized data entry tables for the voter registration department 
• Auto type features to facilitate the data input process 
• Automatic challenge code of “not registered” for non registered voters 
• Custom sized data tables 
• Features to help with the archiving of voters whose name changed 
• Custom search features (specifically a search for voter that allows the operator to 
search by entering partial name and address) 
• Customized crystal reports 
• The process for scanning of returned ballots should be customized so that it can 
be completed in one step 
• Customizations relating to interaction between DIMS/GEMS 
• The batching system must be customized in order to prevent potential operator 
errors 
• On a petition, when a duplicate signature occurs, the automatically generated 
report needs to include which part of the petition has a duplicated signature as 
well as what candidate the duplicate signature corresponds to owing Ohio law that 
requires not counting signatures as valid in certain circumstances. 
• For petitions automatic page numbering for signer checking pages (manual input 
of page numbers creates the possibility that the wrong page number can be 
entered) 
• Incorrect signature dates need to invalidate the signature only, not the whole part 
petition. 
• A mechanism is needed to confirm that the person circulating a petition is a 
registered voter. In some cases a mechanism is needed to determine if the petition 
circulator is from the same city or ward — this depends on requirements 
established by city charter. 
• As Ohio election law changes, new requirements such as for petition circulators 
pursuant to H.B. 3, Ohio’s DIMSnet must permit incorporation as DIMS features, 
in other words, DESI should create a separate state DIMSnet version for each 
State where it is deployed and allow for updating as state law requires. 
DIMSnet software problems not tracked or effectively addressed 
2.19  Finding: Currently CCBOE lacks a formal process for identifying, tracking, and 
resolving DIMSnet problems. Originally, agency staff used a form reporting DIMSnet 
errors, but after the November 2004 election this form was no longer used. Now 
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managers must try to resolve errors by contacting DESI directly or by approaching 
Information Systems staff in order to create workarounds. Although the Information 
Systems staff is currently understaffed for managing this process on their own, as of 
7/5/2005. 
Information Systems Administrator Lou Irizarry has started a DIMSnet problem 
management process. 
When DESI was consulted concerning problems with Cuyahoga County’s system, 
CCBOE staff were told that fixing the specific concerns or defects required 
“enhancements” which would demand additional compensation. After requests for 
alterations to DIMSnet that would permit DIMSnet to function adequately were made by 
former CCBOE head of Information Systems, Michael Coletta, DESI quoted a price of 
$11,200. [DESI Proposal for a Voter Registration System and Related Services for 
Cuyahoga County, November 7th, 2003; interviews with IT/GIS Specialist Jaffe, 
Candidate Voter Services Manager DeFranco, Executive Assistant Lally, and Candidate 
and Voter Services Assistant Manager Lawler; Systems shortcomings are identified in a 
“DIMS questions” document provided by Information Systems Administrator Irizarry; 
Lawler’s specific DIMSnet problems are identified in document 5.59 from 6/28/2006. 
Page 14 of the DESI proposal for A Voter Registration System states that, “DIMS assures 
that our software will be free from defect.” DIMS Voter Registration Agreement, 
Schedule 1 to Exhibit C, Error Resolution Standards — Provides documentation as to 
what an error is and what remedies exist, documented in a 9/9/2005 email from Ross 
Underwood of DESI to Michael Coletta; interview with DESI staff Ross Underwood, 
Mike Lindross, Tim Murowski and counsel on 7/7/2006] 
2.20  Recommendation: Executive management at the CCBOE must do a better job of 
encouraging employees to come forward with system problems and shortcomings and a 
better job of seeking and obtaining swift resolution. Director Vu informed us that he has 
told his staff to take all DIMSnet issues to Lou Irizarry, the head of IS, as of 7/5/2006. 
2.21  Finding: From Fall 2004 through June 2006, the CCBOE managerial staff had 
decided it was a waste of time to report DIMSnet problems or any proposed 
customization because executive management would not take any action. Though they 
tried to flag DIMSnet issues, middle management had been frustrated in obtaining top 
managerial action. 
2.22  Recommendation: The Board of Elections should begin to use a defect tracking 
system or bug tracking system in order to better manage all of the problems with 
DIMSnet. Currently there are several different CCBOE documents that describe various 
DIMSnet problems. This information should be kept in a centralized fashion in order to 
track how each issue is being resolved, who spotted the issue, who is going to be 
responsible for handling the issue, the general time frame for resolution, what 
departments this issue might affect, what functions it might affect and other related 
information. Mozilla’s Bugzilla software is well suited as a system to track DIMSnet 
problems. Bugzilla would allow employees at the Board of Elections to track all 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 38 of 398 
problems and changes to the DIMSnet software and would also allow CCBOE employees 
to communicate about these trouble areas. Bugzilla is used for a variety of purposes by 
large organizations such as AT&T, Advanced Micro Devices, and the University of 
Minnesota. (On 7/6/07 we were informed by Information Systems Administrator Irizarry 
that he was beginning the process of starting an error tracking system.) 
2.23  Recommendation: Before the CCBOE decided to spend monies on DIMSnet 
enhancements, it needs a professional assessment of DIMSnet success in other complex 
jurisdictions. If it decides to move forward with desired changes that are mutually 
classified as “enhancements” made to DIMSnet, but finds DESI pricing unreasonable or 
unwilling to undertake the complete customization needed. CCBOE should consider 
purchasing a better, more reliable voter registration system. DESI DIMSnet staff will 
most likely be more receptive to any changes Cuyahoga County wishes to have made if 
the Board of Elections obtains the standard license for DIMSnet and begins paying the 
standard maintenance fee of $50,000. Any replacement system should be thoroughly 
researched and tested before implementation and any new contract should explicitly state 
terms for system performance plus warranties and remedies that protect the county’s 
investment. 
Other voter registration systems that should be considered include: ES&S 
Megaprofile (used by Hamilton County), and Sequoia’s Voter Registration System 
(Franklin County). Hamilton County BOE suggested that the ES&S system had problems 
interfacing with the Secretary of State’s DXI system and that the system was poorly 
supported. Franklin County expressed satisfaction with the Sequoia system describing it 
as being robust and having versatile report design and data output. [“Best practice” 
interviews with County Election Directors] 
Inadequate research done prior to choosing DIMSnet as voter registration 
solution 
2.24  Finding: DIMS represented that DIMSnet would work well in Cuyahoga County 
because it had been implemented in the County of Los Angeles (another large county) 
using a similar architecture. DIMS’ Proposal for Voter Registration System states, 
“DIMS’ track record of success includes large-scale voter registration systems, such as 
the County of Los Angeles, using a very similar architecture to that recommended for 
Cuyahoga County.” (At p.4) Two pages later , the proposal states: 
Large Scale Implementations: Los Angeles County, with over six million 
registered voters, is one example of our experience and success with large-scale 
voter registration implementations. With 88 cities and municipalities within its 
boundaries, this system serves LA cities in much the same way Cuyahoga County 
serves the City of Cleveland and other municipalities and jurisdictions. 
DIMS’ representations about DIMSnet were often misleading and incorrect. Another 
example of a misleading representation was that DIMSnet and GEMS were “seamlessly 
integrated.” [DIMS’ refusal to provide test version conveyed by anonymous staff 
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interview, verified by Director Vu; DESI’s Cuyahoga County Proposal for Voting 
Equipment, pg 67; The lack of “Seamless Integration” between DIMSnet and GEMS 
verified by interviews with Ballot Department Manager Baker, IT/GIS Specialist Jaffe, 
and Executive Assistant Lally; DIMS’ Proposal for A Voter Registration System, pg. 4; 
other DIMSnet problems outlined in Information Systems Administrator Irizarry’s 
CCBOE document labeled “DIMS Questions”] 
2.25  Recommendation: Given the sacred trust at stake the CCBOE should not have 
accepted DIMS’ representations about DIMSnet without significant research and a test 
version. Where so much was at stake an independent consultant’s review might have 
saved the CCBOE numerous aggravations as well as improved efficiency and staff 
morale. There was no rational basis for moving forward with DIMSnet when crucial 
questions persisted. The fact that the Secretary of State certified DESI as an e-voting 
machines vendor is no indication that the DIMS voter registration system was also 
recommended. Further, the fact that DIMSnet was being used by other large counties, 
such as Los Angeles County, is no indication that the system would work in Cuyahoga 
County, which has a completely different set of election guidelines and procedures. 
2.26  Recommendation: The CCBOE should not have implemented DIMSnet without 
first verifying that it would: 
• Meet their organizational needs 
• Perform as promised and support an accurate, efficient, and cost effective election 
solution in Cuyahoga County. 
2.27  Recommendation: The CCBOE should not have implemented DIMSnet without 
obtaining a test copy, receiving relevant feedback from other counties using DIMSnet, 
and identifying how the needs of Cuyahoga County differ from other counties already 
using the system. 
2.28  Recommendation: If it is determined that DIMSnet must be replaced with a new 
voter registration and election management system, thorough testing must occur by each 
department at the CCBOE and all representations made by the system vendor must be 
verified before purchase and agency wide final installation. 
The DIMSnet voter registration system is not certified 
2.29  Finding: The DIMSnet voter registration system was never certified by the 
Secretary of State or the Federal Government, because neither Sovereign currently 
requires certification of voter registration systems. Perhaps the justification for a lack of 
certification standards for voter registration database system is because they are not used 
to record or tabulate votes. In a document from DESI answering CERP’s 6/29/2006 
questions, DESI stated, “DIMS-NeT does not have to be certified at this time. However, 
the DIMS-Net eXternal Interface (DXI), a related program specifically modified for Ohio 
to act as a “bridge” between DIMS-NeT and the Secretary of State’s Office, was certified 
by the State to work with the State’s software to upload information to and from DIMS-
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NeT.” [Conveyed in anonymous staff interview; Confirmed in interviews with DESI 
Director of Research and Development Pat Greene and DESI’s Ohio Project Manager 
Jessica Hiner on 6/29/2006] 
2.30  Recommendation: Although a voter registration system does not directly influence 
the recording and tabulation of votes, it indirectly influences the final outcome of the 
voting process because the system determines who is eligible to vote. The functions of 
voter registration systems are significant enough that they should be thoroughly analyzed 
before implementation. It is essential that all technologies that are used in the election 
process undergo rigorous certification assessments. CCBOE joined by the Cuyahoga 
County Commissioners and public interest groups should file a petition with the U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission the Ohio General Assembly and the Ohio Secretary of 
State requesting their creation of certification standards. 
A large amount of voter registration data in the DIMSnet system is incorrect 
2.31  Finding: A large amount of the voter registration data within DIMSnet is incorrect, 
duplicated, or incomplete. Numerous records have bad dates such as 01/01/1901 and 
other records are missing information. The SOS DXI system lists Cuyahoga County as 
having approximately 86,000 records that are duplicated in other counties within Ohio. 
This system links all voter registration systems throughout the state and searches for 
duplicate records. The DXI interface was not operable until immediately before the May 
2nd election because it was not able to handle the number of duplicate records that exist in 
Cuyahoga County. The Secretary of State’s DXI User’s Guide itself states that, “While 
this system means more work for both the counties and the state, a lot of effort has been 
invested into its development…” 
The CVS Department was unable to resolve these “dupe” issues due to understaffing 
and various problems with the Secretary of State’s DXI interface. [Interview with 
Candidate and Voter Services Manager DeFranco 6/20/2006; DXI system’s 
unavailability verified by a 2/7/2006 email from Candidate and Voter Services Assistant 
Manager Edwards to DeFranco, stating that Nick (last name unverified) at DESI’s 
election center in California said “The (DXI) system was never intended to store in 
excess of 80,000 records.”; The Secretary of State’s DXI User’s Guide V 1.8 2-18 pg. 4] 
2.32  Recommendation: With its current low staffing it would be unreasonable if not 
impossible to ask the CVS Department to correct all of these data anomalies. A 
temporary, high quality team should be formed and trained by the CVS Department to 
undertake the process of cleaning up the incomplete, duplicate, and incorrect data entries 
within DIMSnet. Furthermore, procedures must be developed to reduce the amount of 
incorrect information entering DIMSnet in the future. 
An unknown number of voter notification mailings are incorrect 
2.33  Finding: DIMSnet is creating voter notification mailings with incorrect 
information. Mr. Ron Olson received a letter from the CCBOE postmarked 6/22/2006 
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that contained a large amount of incorrect information. This letter informed him that an 
election would be held in his precinct of North Olmsted on August 8th. Mr. Olson, 
however, lives in Shaker Heights. After calling the Board of Elections, Olson determined 
that his precinct was not involved in any August 8th election. Additionally, the mailing 
contained an incorrect phone number to reach the CCBOE. The phone number listed was 
216-443-2398 and the correct number was 216-443-3298. 
2.34  Recommendation: The CCBOE must determine how many incorrect mailings 
were sent on and around the time of 6/22/2006. Immediate action must be taken to 
identify and repair the error that is causing these incorrect mailings. Additionally, notices 
giving correct information to those who have received incorrect mailings should be sent 
as soon as possible. 
2.35  Finding: In promotional materials used to sell DESI products to the CCBOE, 
Diebold implies that 14,000 workers worldwide are behind these efforts. In fact, only 166 
of these 14,000 employees are employed specifically by the DESI division. Diebold also 
implies that its 150 years of experience are brought to bear with regard to election 
operations. In actual fact, Diebold’s 2002 acquisition of Global Election Systems and 
subsequent acquisition of DIMS were Diebold’s first exposure and undertaking of 
election work. Pat Green, DESI Director of Research and Development, knew very little 
about DIMSnet and referred all DIMSnet-related questions to actual staff of the recently 
purchased unit. [7/1/2005 promotional packet, Public Hearing 6/29/2006, DESI official 
responses to 6/29/2006 hearing follow-up questions 7/6/2006] 
2.36  Recommendation: Marketing “puffery” can blur into deceptive business practices. 
Diebold/DESI must strive to make more accurate representations about the actual number 
of staff members they have engaged in election support activities. DESI should also 
accurately portray the duration of their experience in dealing with elections and election 
support materials, separating true employees from contracted temporary staff. Finally, 
DESI should be more candid about the actual level of integration between its DIMS voter 
registration team and its DESI general election support team. 
The Payroll module in DIMSnet does not work correctly 
2.38  Finding: The Election Day Technician/Booth Official payroll function of DIMSnet 
does not keep accurate records. A CCBOE document entitled “DIMS Questions” from 
Lou Irizarry, the Information Systems Administrator, lists several payroll problems 
including: 
• Some “Notice to Serve” cards did not print. 
• Poll worker assignments to polling locations were not saved. When referenced, 
some poll workers were not in the system and had to be re-entered. 
• When the CCBOE sought to send checks out, some workers were not listed in the 
system at all. 
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• DIMSnet printed checks and envelopes with incorrect information. Some checks 
had incorrect zip codes, missing apartment numbers, incorrect names, and 
incorrect payment totals. 
2.39  Recommendation: The CCBOE must isolate and identify all problems with the 
payroll system. The CCBOE or DESI should conduct an analysis to determine whether 
any of the problems present in the payroll system might also be present in other areas of 
DIMSnet. DESI should fix the payroll system free of charge, as it is clearly defective. If 
DESI will not do so the CCBOE should try to hold DESI liable for breach of contract 
under the clause stating that the system is “free of defects.” 
Additionally, if DESI will not fix the payroll system embedded in DIMSnet it should 
no longer be used. Having a separate payroll system may be a better way of keeping 
accurate and complete records. 
The DIMSnet registration system was not fully implemented in Cuyahoga 
County 
2.40  Finding: The CCBOE does not utilize the Candidates module or the Election 
module of DIMSnet. Essentially, DIMSnet was never fully implemented in Cuyahoga 
County. This makes the process of exporting information from DIMSnet to GEMS 
significantly more complicated. DESI staff conveyed that using these Modules would 
make the entire voting process much easier and that full implementation of these modules 
would be relatively easy. According to DESI’s Tim Murowski the Candidates module 
could be implemented with few or no changes and training would take about two days. 
Murowski also stated that the Election module would require few or no changes and 
would take about a half day of training. [Interview of IS administration Lou Irizarry, 
Interview with DESI staff Ross Underwood, Mike Lindross, Tim Murowski and counsel 
on 7/7/2006] 
Lou Irizarry was the first person to tell us that these modules were not used and that 
he believed using them would ease the DIMS/GEMS information migration process. 
2.41  Recommendation: A full investigation should be launched to determine why 
DIMSnet was never fully implemented. The failure to fully implement DIMSnet is 
closely tied to several of the problems that led up to the May 2nd election. 
DIMSnet must be fully implemented. The candidate’s module and election module 
must be activated so that the data transfer from DIMSnet to GEMS will not be as difficult 
for the next election. 
DIMSnet and GEMS do not function well together 
2.42  Finding: DIMSnet and the GEMS system were not “seamlessly integrated” as 
suggested by DESI. DIMSnet exports candidate and precinct information that is used for 
ballot creation in the GEMS system. This information could not be directly imported into 
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GEMS. When this DIMSnet data was exported precincts became disordered, candidate 
names were incorrect or truncated, and information was not in the correct format to be 
imported to GEMS. This caused the need for tedious hours of manual data entry to the 
GEMS server, which only permitted one keyboard user. 
2.43  Finding: The CCBOE expected that this data migration process would be relatively 
easy; instead it cost staff weeks of extra work which severely impacted the work schedule 
for the May 2nd election. While the planned completion date for transfer of information 
from DIMSnet to GEMS was 1/10/2006, this process was actually not completed until 
2/13/2006 according to status reports. This 2/13/2006 completion date may even be 
incorrect; according to a 3/2/2006 email from DESI’s Tyrone Howard, the process might 
still have been incomplete as late as March 2nd, which was two months late. Additionally, 
validating the information imported from DIMSnet to GEMS took a month longer than 
expected; its planned date of completion was 2/24/2006 and the process was actually 
completed on 3/23/2006. 
According to several of DESI’s DIMS personnel this process was so difficult because 
Cuyahoga County did not use the election or candidate’s module and because Cuyahoga 
County declined a DIMS/GEMS data transfer training session led by DESI’s Tim 
Murowski. [Page 67 of DESI’s Cuyahoga County Proposal for Voting Equipment states 
“DIMS-NeT and GEMS Election Management System: A Seamless Integration”; DESI’s 
Cuyahoga County Project Manager Joe Nista’s weekly status report 2/17/2006 and 
3/24/2006; Interview with DESI DIMS staff Ross Underwood, Mike Lindross, Tim 
Murowski and counsel 7/7/2006] 
2.44 Recommendation: As of this Report’s date, the CCBOE Director and the IS 
Administrator take opposing views on whether the DIMS-GEMS interface problems have 
been solved. Director Vu asserts that exporting from DIMSnet to GEMS will be much 
easier the second time around. Information Services Administrator Irizarry believes that 
exporting from DIMSnet to GEMS will be just as difficult as it was in preparing for the 
May election. The appropriate CCBOE staff needs to undergo the DIMS/GEMS data 
transfer training session. They also must do a test import into GEMS very soon to 
determine how accurately, efficiently, and quickly they can undergo this process. In order 
to establish and meet and election preparation calendar, the staff must be able to estimate 
accurately how many staff hours the import/correction process will consume. The 
CCBOE must not assume this process will be easy and that its kinks have been resolved. 
The CCBOE should contact DESI as soon as possible about activating the Elections 
and Candidates modules. The CCBOE should assess which Information System and 
Ballot Creation/tabulation staff need to attend DESI’s training sessions and which classes 
are best suited for their needs. They should also consider bringing Chris Bellis to the 
CCBOE for an on site training session, over at least a three day period, with questions 
and processes prepared by the CCBOE in advance. 
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If DIMSnet is not replaced, it must be fully implemented. The Candidates module and 
Elections module must be activated so that the data transfer from DIMSnet to GEMS will 
not be as difficult for the next election. 
DRE Units and Components 
Keys to open secure compartments of DREs are not unique 
2.45  Finding: The same barrel key opens all the DRE voting devices in Cuyahoga 
County. This key provides immediate access to the memory card behind one door on the 
back of the machine, to a second door that conceals a modem and a port for a network 
interface card, and also opens the printer housing. While the keys themselves would be 
very difficult to copy because they do not use a standard size, a copy of this key is sent to 
every precinct as part of the supply kit. Additionally the keys assigned to each location 
are not individually numbered, nor is there any record of which key is assigned to each 
precinct. This creates a significant security problem for the CCBOE and the devices. [Site 
visit and inspection of DRE devices at the CCBOE warehouse facility on 6/1/2006; 
Locksmith inspection of key and duplicability assessment at Cleveland Key, 17th and St. 
Clair] 
2.46  Recommendation: Immediately after the L&A test on each individual device the 
CCBOE should place a recorded numbered seal over the modem access door. This would 
require modifying existing Secretary of State directives. If the precinct technical staff 
find that the seal is broken or disturbed in any way, the device should not be used in the 
election and should be quarantined until a forensic examination can determine if the 
device has been compromised. The CCBOE warehouse staff should also record the 
numbered seal on every DRE modem access door to insure that it has not been tampered 
with between Election Day and the day it is returned to the warehouse. 
2.47  Recommendation: The CCBOE should attach a numbered bar code seal to each 
key in order to record each time a key leaves or returns to the CCBOE. Affixing a seal 
would allow the CCBOE to track any lost/stolen key to its assigned precinct and 
Presiding Judge. 
A number of DRE units malfunctioned on Election Day 
2.48  Finding: A number of DRE units crashed, froze, or malfunctioned during boot-up 
or use on Election Day, an unknown number of which were returned to service without 
further investigation. [Poll worker interviews; Interview with Deputy Director 
Dillingham; Ron Olson’s 5/30/2006 report] 
2.49  Recommendation: Testing should be carried out to determine what the possible 
outcomes are when a DRE unit crashes, freezes, or otherwise fails on Election Day. 
Testing should focus on the preservation and integrity of voting data following a system 
failure. 
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Machines that crash during Election Day should not simply be rebooted and placed 
back in service. There should be a specific procedure for tagging these units as TSx units 
that have crashed. The machines should then be investigated and repaired if they are 
defective. The circumstances of each crash should be documented to identify scenarios 
that cause DRE units to crash. If there are any indicia of a security breach on the 
malfunctioning DRE, it should be sequestered to preserve any potential evidence of 
wrongdoing. 
DREs provide little voter privacy 
2.50  Finding: As arranged in some polling places on May 2nd, DRE units did not 
provide enough privacy to voters. [Voter exit poll questionnaires; Ron Olson’s May 30th 
report; Item #8 of the CCBOE’s 11/28/2005 report to DESI’s Jessica Hiner; Incident 
Sheets; EDT logs] 
2.51  Recommendation: Voter privacy is mandated by ORC §3506.19 and §3506.10 
(N). The Board of Elections must enforce recommended DRE floor placements and other 
features that provide more privacy and ensures compliance with ORC §3506.19 and 
§3506.10 (N). Disabled voters must be ensured the same amount of privacy as other 
voters. 
The CCBOE took inadequate measures to safeguard the chain of custody 
of electronic voting equipment 
2.52  Finding: Procedures regulating control and chain of custody of Election Day 
equipment are poor and underdeveloped. Security of the entire system depends upon 
access to election supplies. 
Tamper seals were not logged. Numerous memory cards disappeared altogether or 
were found weeks after the election. Some voters left polling locations with voter access 
cards. Not all items from the polling locations were returned in the black binders. 
CCBOE staff was directed to take DRE units home the weekend before the election in 
order to test the transmission process. [Interviews with Ballot Department Manager Bob 
Baker 6/10/2006 and Deputy Director Dillingham 6/9/2006] 
A 3/2/2006 NASED memo detailing newly mandated electronic voting security 
measures states: “Every memory card requires at least the same level of protection as the 
ballot boxes and ballots used in the election…Throughout the life of the voting system, 
the election official shall maintain control of all memory cards and keep a perpetual chain 
of custody record for call of the memory cards used with the system. Use controlled 
serialized seals that are tamper resistant and resistant to inadvertent breakage along with 
verifiable seal logs. Failure to comply with this addendum negates the voting systems 
status as a NASED-qualified voting system.” [emphasis in original] 
2.53  Recommendation: Monitoring the chain of custody of memory cards and DRE 
units is particularly important because they contain vital election information including 
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ballots. Additionally, DRE units have software that must not be tampered with to ensure 
election integrity. The CCBOE must develop more strict procedures for handling and 
accounting for all memory cards on election night. Poll workers must be instructed to 
treat memory cards with the same amount of care they would give to paper ballots under 
the previous election system. During the course of our investigation four memory cards 
were found in DRE units, several weeks after the May 2nd election. The CCBOE needs to 
keep a strict account of how many memory cards go out on Election Day and how many 
memory cards are returned on election night, with a procedure for immediately seeking 
the lost memory cards. 
Keys to memory card doors must be kept under watch by poll workers. Limiting 
access to the PCMCIA slots and memory cards is a core part of Election Day security. 
Tamper tape seal numbers must be logged with accompanying procedures and poll 
worker training on how to deal with breached seals. Encoders and access cards must be 
accounted for at all times. If someone was able to get an encoder and an access card they 
could potentially vote multiple times. 
Information on DRE memory cards can be automatically deleted 
2.54  Finding: A study shows that voting systems may overwrite voting data when the 
memory card is full. [The GAO’s 11/21/2005 report] 
2.55  Recommendation: What happens to information on the memory card when it 
becomes full must be investigated. The GAO’s report on this problem states that votes 
could be overwritten when the card reaches its capacity. It would be best if DESI could 
find a way to remedy this problem such as a notification on the DRE that the memory 
card was almost full. The SOS and the CCBOE should determine how many votes can be 
cast per memory card on an election to election basis as the amount of information stored 
in one ballot is subject to change for every election. A full SOS and Federal analysis 
should be done to determine what potential this has to disrupt elections and the CCBOE 
should undertake a preliminary analysis to help guide it in fashioning appropriate 
procedures. 
The memory cards used for electronic voting in Cuyahoga County have a 
potential for tampering, excessive expense, and chain of custody concerns 
2.56  Finding: Memory cards can be tampered with, are overpriced, and are not treated 
with the degree of care that is necessary to guard against potential election problems. 
Because so much vital information is located on memory cards, they are a prime 
target for tampering. A malicious voter or poll worker who wished to sabotage an 
election could do so by tampering with a card, loading a pre-voted memory card into a 
DRE, or loading a card with software code that could potentially compromise the system. 
(To gain entry to the PCMCIA slot where the memory card goes you need a key.) 
Problem 1.26 of Section 8, Diebold Risk Mitigation Strategies document 1/09/2004 states 
that “there is a risk that an unauthorized person could decrypt the contents of the 
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removable PCMCIA card using the hard coded key.” [Memory card modification is an 
issue that was brought to the CCBOE’s attention in an 11/21/2005 report by the GAO 
which was forwarded to the CCBOE by Harriet Slive] 
As documented elsewhere in this report, a number of memory cards missing from the 
May 2nd Primary Election have yet to be accounted for. Additionally, though other 
vendors offer a similar memory card for $26, DESI documentation prices the cards at 
$135. 
2.57  Recommendation: Poll workers and the CCBOE must be educated on the 
importance of memory card handling procedures and how unauthorized access to the 
cards can disrupt the election process must be stressed. A thorough chain of custody 
procedure must be created and followed by anyone who will come into contact with the 
memory cards. Memory cards should be provided with protective cases or sleeves to 
prevent them from being damaged by static, moisture, or debris. 
2.58  Recommendation: Memory cards from other vendors should be certified for use 
and procured at market value. 
A number of memory cards were placed in the wrong voting machines 
2.59  Finding: Poll workers would occasionally place a memory card intended for a 
specific DRE unit into another DRE unit. This occurred because some DRE units were 
not marked with a number that corresponded to the memory card. If a poll worker places 
a memory card in the wrong machine this can be a source of confusion. In particular if a 
memory card goes missing and the CCBOE needs to re-create the card by going to the 
corresponding machine, it will be far more difficult if cards were that card was originally 
inserted in the wrong machine because the label on the card will not accurately reflect the 
machine that the memory card was used in. [Interviews with Ballot Department Manager 
Baker, IT/ GIS Specialist Matt Jaffee, and Executive Assistant Francis Lally; Incident 
Reports] 
2.60  Recommendation: Both DRE units and memory cards must be clearly marked so 
that correct cards can be inserted into the machines. Poll workers must be informed of the 
importance of placing memory cards in the correct machine, and which of the machine’s 
numbers are to be used. Overall, a better system should be created to ensure that the 
correct memory card is in the correct DRE. 
Voter Access Cards have problems with chain of custody, have potential 
for counterfeiting, and create bottlenecks 
2.61  Finding: Access cards create a potential bottleneck for poll workers because a card 
must be encoded for each voter. Security regarding the possession of access cards is 
relatively low and some cards did not work or would stop working in the midst of 
Election Day. Because access cards can stop working, go missing, and are in constant use 
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there is a risk of running short of access cards on Election Day, with a resultant 
possibility of delays at the polls and disenfranchising voters. 
There is a risk that someone could counterfeit supervisor or voter access cards in 
order to access secure functions of the voting machine or cast extra ballots, because 
access cards used for voting are no different from those commonly used in mainstream 
commerce. [Poll worker interviews; Incident Reports; risk of counterfeiting access cards 
is identified in 2.01 of the section 8 Risk Mitigation strategies document from 1/09/2004; 
also discussed in email correspondence between Director Vu and Pat Green dated 
3/21/2006] 
2.62  Recommendation: All access cards must be accounted for, including cards that 
appear to be nonfunctional. Voters must be informed about the importance of returning 
cards after their use and poll workers must be trained in how to watch and reclaim these 
cards. Election Day materials should include several extra access cards as they are 
essential to the voting process. A full investigation should be conducted on the ease with 
which one could create an access card in order to disrupt or tamper with the election 
process. 
Access cards are given a digital signature by the Secretary of State. The CCBOE 
needs to determine if the Secretary of State uses the same signature for the entire state or 
if it is on a county to county basis. In other words the CCBOE needs to find out if one 
access card would work anywhere in the state. This could be problematic if other 
counties do not have as stringent of procedures regarding access card management. 
Voter Access Card encoders make it too easy to encode for the wrong 
ballot 
2.63  Finding: During a demonstration of the Voter Access Card encoder, it was apparent 
that the encoder automatically defaulted to a Democratic ballot. The reason for this is 
because the options are placed in the encoder in alphabetical order. Therefore, if the poll 
worker does nothing the encoder will program the access card as a Democratic ballot. 
[Demonstration of device and interview with Deputy Director Dillingham 6/7/2006] 
2.64  Recommendation: In order to remain non-partisan in the execution of the election, 
it is recommended that the default position on the encoder be changed to “issues only” 
for primary elections. This would require the poll worker to take an affirmative action to 
give a voter a Democratic or Republican ballot. 
Split precincts experienced a number of encoder problems 
2.65  Finding: In precincts that are split into two school districts, the CCBOE supplies 
separate sets of encoders to give voters the correct electronic ballot. The encoders were 
marked by stickers and caused confusion among poll workers. In some cases this caused 
poll workers to incorrectly encode voter access cards, which resulted in voters receiving 
incorrect ballots. When this occurred it prevented voters from being able to vote on their 
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school district issues and gave other voters the ability to vote on issues outside their 
precincts or school districts. This irregularity potentially violates §3506.10 (B) and 
§3506.10 (C). The same problem can arise when a voter is mistakenly given an access 
card that is encoded for the wrong precinct: certain races or issues specific to that 
precinct do not appear on the ballot. 
No encoder was created and provided for precinct 4B in Highland Heights. As a 
result Donna Parina was unable to receive votes or vote for herself as a write-in for 
precinct committeeperson. The only encoder that the poll workers had was for precinct 
4A. No votes were recorded for Donna Parina even though friends and family intended to 
vote for her. Other candidates also complained of their names not appearing on ballots. 
[Interviews with Information Systems Administrator Lou Irizarry 7/6/2006; confirmed as 
a potential problem by Ballot Department Manager Baker 6/20/2006] 
2.66  Recommendation: Poll worker training must be improved and if possible a better 
system must be developed for handling split precincts. The SOS should consider this 
problem. The current system makes it possible that a voter could receive a ballot that 
does not contain issues it should or that contains issues that it should not. This is in direct 
violation of Ohio law. Additionally, precautions must be taken to ensure that enough 
encoders are provided for each precinct and that voters are given access cards that are 
encoded for the correct precinct. The option of using specially trained poll workers to 
handle all split ballot styles should be considered as an alternative to supplying separate 
encoders. 
Encoders experience problems including difficulty of use, failures, 
provisional ballot problems, and battery life 
2.67  Finding: Many poll workers found the encoders were not easy to use. The lanyards 
on the encoders were very short which made it hard for some poll workers to encode an 
access card while wearing the device around their neck. Encoders have very small 
buttons which are difficult for some poll workers to use. 
The design of the encoder increased the chances that a poll worker would mistakenly 
encode an access card incorrectly. Also, because of the size and nature of the encoder’s 
display, it is difficult for one poll worker to determine how the other poll worker is 
encoding an access card. This undermines the oversight intended by the partisan-balanced 
election one D, one R system employed in Ohio. 
Booth officials could potentially create a provisional ballot for a legitimate “regular” 
voter which would cause the vote to be void because provisional ballots must be cast with 
requisite paperwork. Also, a provisional voter could have an access card encoded as 
though they were a normal voter which would cause their vote to be counted without 
verification of their eligibility to vote. This could happen accidentally or intentionally. 
If an access card is left in an encoder the battery life will be depleted within several 
hours. There is no low battery notification and batteries are difficult to replace. One 
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individual stated that he was only to get four and a half hours of battery life after 
continued use and he did not receive a low battery message before the unit shut off. [Item 
#6 of the CCBOE’s 11/28/2005 report to DESI’s Jessica Hiner; email from Executive 
Assistant Gary Barna to CCBOE staff] 
2.68  Recommendation: All provisional voting must be done using optical scan ballots 
to prevent these grave problems. 
2.69  Recommendation: Encoders need to be made more usable for all poll workers. 
Precautions should be taken to ensure that there is minimal error in the encoding of 
access cards. Also, encoders should be designed in a fashion so that all poll workers and 
the voter can tell how the card has been encoded and if it has been encoded correctly. 
Encoders need to have a low battery indicator and all precincts should be provided 
with extra encoders in case batteries fail on Election Day. 
Extra encoders should be provided to each precinct to ensure that the voting process 
flows smoothly. The CCBOE should not allow the use of DREs as encoders as a 
contingency plan as it could cause longer wait times and voter dissatisfaction. 
The Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPAT) created confusion among voters 
2.70  Finding: Many voters did not know that they could check the printer display for 
verification of their vote because the DRE printer’s opaque cover had to be opened in 
order to see the VVPAT print of their votes. If voters are not well informed about the 
VVPAT they will not be able to use it to verify their vote. The VVPAT display was very 
difficult to read for some voters because of the font size/ type and the magnifying plastic 
cover. The CCBOE was aware that some voters might not check the VVPAT and states 
that “A voter is not going to know why it is even there unless they open it up. The cover 
should either be eliminated or in the open position all of the time.” [Item #11 of the 
CCBOE’s 11/28/2005 report to Jessica Hiner; Incident Reports] 
2.71  Recommendation: Doors covering the VVPAT should be removed. A DESI 
representative claimed that VVPAT doors are installed as a way to ensure the privacy of 
blind voters. This was never explained in greater depth to us. If this is the case the doors 
should be removed from all DREs except the ones equipped with equipment for disabled 
voters. The font size on the VVPAT should be increased to accommodate older voters 
and voters with poor eyesight. 
Malfunctioning VVPATS, trouble installing printers, questions regarding 
storage of VVPAT 
2.72  Finding: Poll workers experienced significant difficulty installing the printers and 
loading the paper. It was easy to load the paper backwards which prevented recording of 
the paper trail. Further, reports from poll workers indicate that paper sometimes would 
unravel altogether and make the paper spool unusable. Or, the face plate was installed on 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 51 of 398 
the wrong side, requiring poll workers to remove and reinstall it—and this also 
sometimes caused the spool to unravel. Moreover, there are questions as to the integrity 
of thermal printer paper as it may not be resistant to heat, and both printer paper and ink 
are subject to fading relatively quickly. This situation results in the VVPAT potentially 
becoming unreadable within the required retention time of 22 months, violating §3506.05 
(H)(3)(a). [Item #7 of the CCBOE’s 11/28/2005 report to Jessica Hiner; Poll worker 
interviews] 
2.73  Recommendation: All precincts should be given several extra spools of paper to 
ensure that there is enough paper even if a few spools malfunction or are misused. 
Training must include techniques for how to handle the paper rolls and troubleshoot the 
printers. 
2.74  Recommendation: The CCBOE should conduct automatic routine, random audits 
of VVPATS according to standards that are announced and vetted in a public process. 
Audits are recommended by the Brennan Center for Justice’s 6/27/2006 report on voting 
machine security. Further, the Center includes specific guidelines for conducting a 
VVPAT audit in this report. Failure to conduct regular and meaningful audits of VVPATs 
increases the security risks greatly. 
2.75  Recommendation: A complete analysis must be done to test the longevity of the 
printed paper. This includes determining the environmental factors, including 
temperature and humidity, necessary to insure the paper trail can be stored for the 
required amount of time. [The Brennan Center for Justice’s 6/27/2006 report on voting 
machine security] 
Parallel testing to ensure proper operation of voting machines 
2.76  Finding: Ohio does not require parallel testing by law but this practice, if followed 
correctly, can help to ensure that voting machines are operating properly. Parallel testing 
refers to auditing a voting machine during the actual election and monitoring for 
software-based attacks. Parallel testing is an effective security measure because it can 
catch any glitches or attacks that occur on the DRE that might be time sensitive or only 
active during election time. [Brennan Center Report, Page 14] 
2.77  Recommendation: Cuyahoga County should perform parallel testing on a few 
machines during each Election Day. Additionally, the selection process of machines for 
parallel testing or VVPAT auditing must be transparent and random to ensure 
effectiveness. [Brennan Center Report, Page 15] 
Accumulation and transmission processes create unacceptable levels of 
security risk and are too error-prone 
2.78  Finding: While the current transmission and accumulation practices were intended 
to allow for quicker tabulation of an unofficial count and allow for results to be posted at 
the polling place, the current practices of the CCBOE actually increase the chances for 
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error and fraud. Further, on May 2nd, the hope of quicker tabulation through the 
transmission and accumulation procedure ended up taking much longer than anticipated 
on election night for various reasons. 
2.79  Recommendation: The CCBOE should take immediate steps to eliminate 
accumulation and transmission of election results, and all memory cards should be 
transported directly to the BOE for direct uploading. The CCBOE should purchase 48 
DESI Election Media Processors (EMP), each of which may be used to feed up to six 
memory cards at once into the GEMS system. At peak load these devices, which are 
pending ITA certification by the Secretary of State for use by Boards of Election, will 
allow the CCBOE staff to read 288 memory cards simultaneously and will eliminate the 
need to accumulate memory cards at the polling location and upload the cards at the 
transfer stations. 
Implement procedures for addressing fraud or error 
2.80  Finding: Although security seals are used by the CCBOE they are not recorded or 
strictly monitored. The security seals are essentially useless unless the CCBOE adopts 
sound methods for training and issues specific directions for election workers on what 
steps to follow if security seals are voided, broken, etc. 
2.81  Recommendation: Procedures must be put in place for the usage, recording, and 
tracking of security seals. Further, the CCBOE must issue clear, easy to follow 
procedures for dealing with machines and other equipment whose security seals have 
been voided or broken. 
The CCBOE must conduct random and transparent audits of all election and election 
support systems. The Brennan Center Report sets excellent guidelines for conducting 
such audits. 
GEMS Ballot Creation and Tabulation Software 
Overview of the present system 
Several factors impeded the successful adoption of GEMS prior to the May 2nd election. 
The County’s current GEMS configuration, with its hastily implemented workarounds 
and onerous usage restrictions, compromises election accuracy, security, efficiency and 
audit-ability to a degree that threatens both reliable election execution and regulatory 
compliance. 
Problems with the CCBOE’s election management systems and procedures adopted 
in the run-up to the May 2nd election fall into three general categories: 
1. Differing expectations between DESI and CCBOE as to the capabilities of DESI’s 
software systems, the role DESI was to play in preparing CCBOE’s systems for 
the May 2nd election, and the depth of DESI-system-specific expertise that would 
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need to be developed within CCBOE to permit it to become self-sufficient in 
election preparation. [Interviews: Director Vu, Baker, Jaffee, DESI reps; emails 
between Director Vu and Hiner] 
2. The failure of either CCBOE or DESI to design and implement a reliable and 
practical procedure for relevant, appropriately structured data to flow from 
DIMSnet to GEMS. Upon discovery of the incompatibility of the two software 
systems as originally configured, the CCBOE and DESI personnel focused on 
implementing ad hoc workarounds and performing manual entry of essential data 
rather than on reconfiguring the two systems to work together. Most of the 
considerable effort that was expended on working-around the system 
incompatibilities in preparations for the May 2nd election would have been better 
directed toward reconfiguring the systems to work well together in preparation for 
May 2nd, and on into the future. [CCBOE staff interviews, CCBOE email and 
DESI hearing] 
3. Usability, concurrency and security limitations in the architecture of the GEMS 
software and the consequent restrictive regulations in place to accommodate these 
limitations. [Interviews with CCBOE IS and Ballot Department staff; consultation 
with county elections officials in California and Washington; DESI hearing] 
In preparing for the May 2nd election, CCBOE lacked sufficient knowledge of and 
experience with GEMS, particularly with the importation of data into GEMS and the 
generation of reports of election results. For the May 2nd election, the CCBOE Ballot 
Department fashioned its own time-consuming and error-prone workarounds and 
procedures. Even now, the Ballot Department is reliant on informal (and likely 
uncompensated) support from DESI technicians. [Interviews with CCBOE staff, 
including Baker and several IS staff; demonstration of processes by ballot department; 
DESI hearing; DESI representatives] 
In preparation for May 2nd, CCBOE relied on some of DESI’s misleading and 
unfounded representations 
2.82  Finding: CCBOE and DESI had drastically different expectations as to the 
potential for interoperation of DIMSnet and GEMS, and for the nature and scope of the 
assistance DESI was to provide to the CCBOE in implementing an integrated, reliable 
and efficient electronic voting system for Cuyahoga County. DESI’s representations to 
the CCBOE about the DESI election products and related services in contracts, proposals, 
marketing collateral, product documentation and informal communications are 
misleading or demonstrably false. In response to the CCBOE’s RFP, DESI submitted a 
proposal which identified the advantages CCBOE could expect if it purchased DESI 
systems. One advantage cited was the “seamless integration” of DIMSnet and GEMS. 
[DESI proposal to CCBOE, DESI letter to Director Vu.; DESI hearings; Interviews with 
Ballot, IS and CVS staff, Director Vu] 
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DESI’s DIMSnet registration system was offered at a discount to the CCBOE, 
possibly in order for DESI to get a foothold at the CCBOE in order to increase DESI’s 
chances of getting Cuyahoga County to adopt DESI election management system and 
voting equipment when the County selected a vendor for its HAVA-funded election 
system purchases. [CCBOE contract for DIMSnet; CCBOE proposal for DIMSnet; 
Statements between Cuyahoga County lawyers and Director Vu regarding the 
negotiations for DIMSnet; Interview with Director Vu] 
Director Vu anticipated, based in part by representations made by DESI, that 
substantial benefits would accrue to the CCBOE if it used two integrated systems from 
the same vendor. With DIMSnet already in use at the CCBOE, the suggestion was that 
they could expect the two programs to interoperate without the integration difficulties and 
processes that would be required if the County chose systems from different vendors. The 
Board’s decision to select GEMS and its related e-voting systems was heavily influenced 
by the anticipated interoperability of DIMSnet and GEMS. [Interviews with Director Vu, 
DESI proposals] 
CCBOE made personnel and other resource allocation decisions based on its 
expectations with respect to, inter alia, the amount of effort required to integrate 
DIMSnet with GEMS. This understaffing directly contributed to the problems leading up 
to the May 2nd election. [Interviews with Director Vu, Deputy Director Dillingham, 
Ballot Department and IS staff] 
2.83  Recommendation: In future dealings with DESI, CCBOE should scrutinize and 
verify DESI representations before accepting as truthful and taking action in reliance on 
those representations. Wherever possible, the CCBOE should insist that DESI 
representations on which it plans to rely be made expressly in contracts, with contractual 
penalties (including perhaps liquidated damages) for any material misrepresentations. 
DESI assistance, training and knowledge transfer 
2.84  Finding: DESI sent no one who had substantial GEMS training as a part of the 
DESI Cuyahoga Project Team, thus not providing the same level of support to Cuyahoga 
as to, for instance, Lorain County. Lorain County had already run one DRE election, and 
despite Cuyahoga County being far more complex and populous, and having larger 
hurdles for launching the dual systems in the May 2nd primary, DESI chose not to place 
equally well trained and experienced DESI personnel here. 
Technicians allocated to Cuyahoga County (Jeff and Tyrone) only received GEMS 
training just before assignment; had no depth training and experience, unlike Lorain 
County with Chris Bellis; Tyrone was at the same GEMS training session as the CCBOE 
staff and said this was his initial training on GEMS. 
After CCBOE five-day GEMS training, CCBOE staff could not practice or use the 
GEMS system because it had yet to be installed at the CCBOE. 
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Joe Nista, an employee of a subcontracted firm (Sogeti USA), lacked the range of 
experience necessary for generating an appropriate Election Plan for launching the entire 
system in the complex May 2nd primary. 
DESI refused to provide a training or demo copy of GEMS — not even for practice. 
2.85  Finding: DESI personnel in Ohio characterize CCBOE as insistent on mastering 
the new electronic voting systems prior to the May 2nd election so as to be able to conduct 
future elections without depending on DESI’s assistance. This is, in essence, the same 
way that individual personnel at CCBOE describe their approach to the adoption of 
electronic voting. DESI suggests that the problems incurred by CCBOE in attempting to 
integrate GEMS into their election preparation procedures were due to the fact that 
DESI’s offers of assistance were rebuffed by CCBOE management, who insisted on 
becoming self-sufficient with respect to election preparation despite the limited amount 
of transitional time. CCBOE management insisted that agency self-sufficiency be 
attained by the May 2nd election It did not conduct a detailed evaluation of whether that 
deadline and expectation was reasonable given the complexity of the new material 
CCBOE had to master to run electronic elections [DESI hearing; Interviews with Director 
Vu, Deputy Director Dillingham, Baker] 
The CCBOE was unique among DESI’s Ohio counties in its insistence on taking the 
lead in preparation for May 2. The CCBOE maintains that it wanted training and overall 
assistance from the DESI contractors assigned to help them, but did not want DESI to 
simply step in and do the work for them, leaving them dependent on DESI for technical 
services in future elections. [Interviews with CCBOE management, DESI hearing, emails 
between CCBOE management and Hiner] 
2.86  Recommendation: The CCBOE should, to the extent possible, work on its 
conversion to electronic voting and attend appropriate training outside the context of 
hurried preparation for an impending, complex election such as that of 5/2/2006. DESI 
should make a clear commitment to aiding the CCBOE to become self-sufficient in its 
conduct of elections. A reasonable timeframe should be established for CCBOE’s 
achievement of self-sufficiency. 
2.87  Finding: DESI’s DIMSnet software was already in place at CCBOE at the time that 
the County was selecting a vendor for its voting and election management systems. In the 
course of trying to make a deal with the County to become the County’s election systems 
vendor, DESI DIMS and DESI GEMS personnel made representations about the 
interoperability of DIMSnet and GEMS, stating that DIMSnet and GEMS utilized a 
common data structure that would allow DIMSnet to generate a data file containing the 
candidate, race, precinct and polling place data for an election in a format GEMS could 
easily process to populate its own database. [DESI proposal to CCBOE, interview with 
Director Vu, email between Director Vu and CCBOE counsel] 
The promised ease of data transfer from DIMSnet to GEMS has yet to be realized in 
Cuyahoga County, and no single factor, by itself, explains this failure. 
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2.88  Finding: Whatever its formal corporate structure, from the perspective of its 
customers, DESI is not a single provider of election solutions, but rather two, largely 
independent vendors under a common brand. The DIMS unit provides software to handle 
voter registration, among other things. The EMS/DRE unit is a vendor of: (1) software 
for electronic and paper ballot creation, vote tabulation and reporting of election results, 
and (2) voting machine hardware and software. No DESI representative has yet been able 
identify any significant work DESI has done to integrate DIMSnet and GEMS software 
following its acquisition of Global and DIMS. Likewise, its engineering, training and 
support organizations lack the requisite integration to be of service to customers 
attempting to use DIMSnet and GEMS together effectively in a complex electoral 
jurisdiction such as Cuyahoga County. [DESI hearing, discussion with DESI’s DIMSnet 
representatives, email between DESI and project manager contracted by DESI to oversee 
Cuyahoga County] 
2.89  Recommendation: Proper integration of DIMSnet and GEMS is perhaps the most 
crucial technical challenge to be addressed before the upcoming November election. This 
project should be given the utmost priority and should be allocated whatever resources — 
including funding, personnel, consultants, training, software and hardware — are 
required to get the job done and done well. 
2.90  Recommendation: If DESI has misrepresented its products in a manner that causes 
significant, unforeseen costs to be assumed by Cuyahoga County, legal recourse should 
be considered. Our quick review suggests the county does have standing and potential 
grounds, but this is a matter that should be referred to the Board’s legal counsel. 
Management and personnel issues 
2.91  Finding: Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham effectively ordered workers 
to do the impossible, or nearly impossible, with inadequate resources (e.g. L&A and 
transmission testing schedules; GEMS ballot preparation without adequate time or 
training and using a single input terminal; generation of reports without adequate Crystal 
Reports training) forcing CCBOE personnel to: (1) cut corners, (2) work inhumane hours, 
often without recognition or compensation, or (3) fail to complete tasks on-time [Emails 
between CCBOE management and staff; emails between CC project manager for DESI, 
DESI technicians and Hiner; Interviews with CCBOE department managers, line staff 
and warehouse workers; interviews with Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham] 
2.92  Finding: The Ballot Department has insufficient staff with the requisite experience 
and expertise to make effective use of the election management facilities GEMS 
provides. 
In preparing for the May 2nd election, CCBOE lacked sufficient knowledge of and 
experience with GEMS, particularly with the importation of data into GEMS and the 
generation of reports of election results. For the May 2nd election, the Ballot Department 
fashioned its own time-consuming and error-prone workarounds and procedures. Even 
now, the Ballot Department is reliant on informal (and likely uncompensated) support 
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from DESI technicians. [Interviews with CCBOE staff, including Baker and several IS 
staff; demonstration of processes by ballot department; DESI hearing; DESI 
representatives] 
Ballot Department Manager Robert Baker began working as the leader of the Ballot 
Department only 3 months prior to the 5/2/2006 election. Baker lacked relevant 
experience in a number of Ballot Department tasks. In interviews, Baker said he had not 
received GEMS training but the Director and Deputy Director stated that a prime reason 
he was hired lay in Baker’s having prior GEMS training. CCBOE did send Baker to 
GEMS training several weeks after the May 2nd election. It is clear that at the time of the 
May 2nd election, Baker was not prepared for the responsibilities of his position. 
[Interviews with Baker, IS staff, emails between CCBOE staff and DESI personnel and 
contractors, interviews with the Director and Deputy Director] 
The CCBOE may have chosen not to take advantage of all training and assistance 
offered to it for transitioning to an electronic voting system; conflicting information was 
presented. [DESI hearing; Secretary of State’s master contract with DESI; discussion 
with DESI’s DIMSnet representatives; email between Hiner and CC project team] 
2.93  Finding: Director Vu, at times, frustrates DESI’s attempts to support the County by 
rejecting DESI’s recommendations with respect to equipment, training, and the 
timeframe and manner of achieving the CCBOE’s goal of self-sufficiency. [Email 
between Director Vu and Hiner; email from CC project manager and Hiner; CCBOE 
contract with DESI; CCBOE staff emails] 
2.94  Recommendation: While the CCBOE is justified in its criticism of DESI 
representations and support, the Director’s and Deputy Director’s unrealistic plans and 
expectations for achieving proficiency must be taken into account. DESI’s guidance, 
informed by its experience and expertise with its own systems, led its Project Manager to 
urge the CCBOE not to try to assume so many tasks for its first e-voting election. 
Data importation was a significant problem 
2.95  Finding: Ballot creation system at the CCBOE, as presently configured, staffed and 
operated, requires an unmanageable amount of manual data entry. [Interviews and 
demonstrations by Ballot Department staff] 
2.96  Finding: The importation of election data was perhaps the most significant problem 
encountered by the CCBOE in the use of GEMS in preparation for the May 2nd election. 
Not only did it consume the time and exhaust the energy of the staff and contractors, it 
also held up numerous critical activities that could not be performed until the GEMS data 
were entered, edited and proofed. Facing the sheer volume of work needed to get the 
necessary data into GEMS, the burdensome security mandates that constrained the use of 
GEMS, and fundamental technical limitations of the GEMS software itself, the CCBOE 
Ballot Department circumvented established procedures in a manner that compromised 
the efficiency, accuracy and security of the May 2nd election. [Interviews with Ballot 
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Department staff, CCBOE Director and Deputy Director, email between IS staff and 
DESI contractors] 
2.97  Finding: DESI’s DIMSnet software was already in place at CCBOE at the time that 
the County was selecting a vendor for its voting and election management systems. In the 
course of trying to make a deal with the County to become the County’s election systems 
vendor, DESI personnel made representations about the interoperability of DIMSnet and 
GEMS, stating that DIMSnet and GEMS utilized a common data structure that would 
allow DIMSnet to generate a data file containing the candidate, race, precinct and polling 
place data for an election in a format GEMS could easily process to populate its own 
database. 
2.98  Finding: The CCBOE does not have written procedures for electronic ballot 
preparation. [Interview with Ballot Department staff] 
2.99  Finding: The mandate that a single, non-networked, computer be used to for all 
data entry, ballot creation and report generation, and a single authorized operator (Baker), 
created a backlog and occupied Baker’s time when he should have been tending to other 
managerial duties. [Interview with Ballot Department and IS staff] 
2.100  Recommendation: Proper integration of DIMSnet and GEMS is the most crucial 
technical challenge to be addressed before the upcoming November election. This project 
should be given the utmost priority and should be allocated the necessary resources — 
including money, personnel, consultants, training, software and hardware — as are 
required to get the job done and done well. 
In addition to this troubling disregard of security protocols, this scenario suggests that 
policies limiting GEMS access to a single operator are unrealistic for a county the size 
and complexity of Cuyahoga. [Interview with IS and Ballot Department staff, DESI 
hearing] 
In discussing Best Practices for populating the GEMS database, DESI representatives 
suggested manual data entry as an appropriate substitute for the problematic DIMSnet-to-
GEMS export. A manual approach to GEMS data entry, given the complexity of 
Cuyahoga County’s elections and the short window of time between finalization of 
candidates and the deadline for producing ballots, is unworkable. In failing to offer a 
realistic practice for the CCBOE’s use of GEMS, representatives basically abandoned the 
County; in pursuing a workable implementation of GEMS in the complex county, 
CCBOE was on its own. [DESI hearing; emails between Hiner and project manager for 
Cuyahoga County] 
2.101  Recommendation: The CCBOE’s successful integration of DIMSnet and GEMS 
is essential. A practice of continuing to execute elections using workarounds is untenable. 
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As currently configured and used, GEMS reporting facilities do not meet 
CCBOE’s needs 
2.102  Finding: CCBOE relies on the tabulation server to generate various reports of 
election results. GEMS, as presently configured and staffed in Cuyahoga County, offers 
inadequate reporting facilities to meet the needs of the CCBOE. CCBOE requires a broad 
range of election results reports. In addition to basic vote totals, CCBOE needs 
breakdowns of data by polling place, precinct, district, absentee, provisional, and many 
others. CCBOE management was not satisfied with the reports generated by GEMS 
following the May 2nd election. [Examination of reports; interviews with Ballot 
Department staff, Director Vu] 
2.103  Recommendation: The CCBOE should work with DESI to define the necessary 
reports and ensure that they are possible using GEMS. The CCBOE must also prepare to 
hire additional personnel with experience designing reporting templates should the 
CCBOE presently lack sufficient personnel with such expertise at present. 
Security practices must be adopted and observed 
2.104  Finding: In the period leading up to the May 2nd election, there were two operator 
accounts set up on the GEMS machine: gemsuser and gemsadmin. The former account is 
used for data entry and ballot configuration, the latter to configure the GEMS application 
itself. There was a single password for both the gemsuser and gemsadmin accounts. 
Considering that so many unauthorized persons were permitted to use the system and, 
therefore, likely to have known this password, all operators could change both the data in 
GEMS via the gemsuser account and reconfigure the system using the gemsadmin 
account. [See GAO Report#: GAO-05-956, p26] On top of this, the fact that all operators 
used the same, anonymous accounts (gemsuser and gemsadmin) prevents anyone 
examining transaction logs from determining which person made a particular 
modification to the system. Logs would only show that transactions were performed by 
either gemsuser or gemsadmin, rather than a specific individual. [Interview with Ballot 
Department staff; NIST SP 800-27, Rev. A: Engineering Principles for Information 
Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving Security), June 2004] 
2.105  Recommendation: Basic security practices must be adopted and enforced for the 
GEMS system. Important aspects include: limiting authorized operators, limiting 
operators to appropriate roles, and ensuring identification of specific operators for 
logging and auditing purposes. These practices must be viewed as absolutely essential for 
the basic integrity of Cuyahoga elections and election reporting. They should be designed 
by security experts, have penalties for employee noncompliance, and be a part of Ballot 
and IS Department training. 
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Some security mandates are of dubious benefit and restrict necessary 
usage 
2.106  Finding: The Secretary of State mandates the installation of Digital Guardian 
(“DG”) software on the GEMS computer. This software, among other tasks, monitors and 
constrains data access and modification of a system’s configuration. While DG offers a 
security benefit as configured in the CCBOE GEMS system, it inhibits the use and 
maintenance of the GEMS machine while providing only limited security benefits. For 
example, some basic system maintenance is impeded and requires the cooperation of the 
Secretary of State’s office, and data are routinely moved between the GEMS machine and 
machines that do not have the software. [Secretary of State Guidelines, interviews: Ballot 
and IS department staff, Digital Guardian software vendor website 
http://www.verdasys.com] 
2.107  Finding: Per Secretary of State Directive #2005-23, county election boards are 
prohibited from connecting GEMS to a local network, even if that network is completely 
isolated from other networks. It is not clear how using a single, isolated computer for all 
GEMS data entry is significantly more secure than a small network of dedicated 
computers completely isolated and not networked with other systems. This prohibition 
impairs the efficient use of the system. [Secretary of State directives, Interviews with 
Ballot and IS staff] 
2.108  Finding: Core aspects of the GEMS architecture are not well suited to CCBOE’s 
present needs and, further, cast doubt upon its capacity to meet future needs. GEMS 
relies on a Microsoft Access database. MS Access is typically used for home and small-
business database applications and as a tool for rapid prototyping. It is not marketed as a 
robust, scalable and secure enterprise database solution such as Microsoft’s SQL Server 
and numerous products from other vendors. The use of this more-limited underlying 
database system constrains GEMS’ capacity for intrinsic security and auditability, 
concurrent usage, and system performance. Without the security features of a more 
appropriate database, GEMS’ database security depends primarily on controlling access 
to the GEMS server. GEMS architecture does not permit practical concurrent usage. 
Anticipated increases in the complexity of Cuyahoga County’s election needs (with 
factors such as multiple ballot languages on the horizon), may further tax the GEMS 
design and its underlying Access database management system. [DESI hearing; 
Interviews with IS staff; Microsoft Whitepaper on Choosing the Right Database 
Management System, http://www.microsoft.com] 
2.109  Finding: A usage restriction on GEMS recommended by DESI and promulgated 
by Secretary of State, permits the use of only one computer (the GEMS server itself) for 
GEMS data entry, tabulation and reporting. At all levels, this restriction is presented as a 
security measure, and it does undeniably reduce to some degree the potential for 
tampering with the insecure GEMS database. It is important to note, however, that the 
GEMS architecture would not efficiently support multiple clients performing concurrent 
resource-intensive operations even if security was not an issue. [GEMS procedure 
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manual, Secretary of State directive #2005-23, MS Access database specifications; DESI 
hearing; Interviews with Ballot and IS staff] 
2.110  Recommendation: As part of any security evaluation, a survey of the extrinsic 
security measures mandated for use of GEMS should be undertaken to identify which 
measures properly augment security and which are required to remedy the lack of 
meaningful intrinsic security features in the GEMS software itself. Vendors should be 
required to address and remedy security holes in their software rather than over-rely on 
extrinsic security measures, particularly ones that burden system usability. 
2.111  Finding: Such security measures as the CCBOE implemented (e.g. restricted 
access to GEMS, tamper tape and seals on DREs, etc.) were ignored or frustrated by 
ineffective implementation. [Interviews with Ballot and IS staff, demonstrations at 
CCBOE computer room, pink room and warehouse] 
2.112  Recommendation: The CCBOE’s mandated actions to be taken in response to 
security breaches should be established, published, and a matter of core training leaving 
CCBOE personnel no discretion as to what steps to take upon discovery of a breach. 
[NIST SP 800-34: Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems 
(June 2002); NIST SP 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (January 
2004)] 
Election Systems Testing and Certification 
Testing by Certification Authorities 
2.113  Finding: The multi-tiered voting equipment certification process contains 
numerous gaps. These gaps are profound, affecting accuracy and reliability of electronic 
voting results. Voters and election advocacy groups legitimate question the adequacy of 
the certification systems. Voter confidence in election systems based solely on 
Independent Test Agency (ITA) certification, government approvals and public logic and 
accuracy (L&A) testing is unjustified. Election systems are currently tested primarily for 
compliance with specifications. CCBOE officials responsible for implementation of 
electronic voting in this County did not adequately evaluate the chosen election systems’ 
capacity to meet the County’s unique needs, including its complex organization of 
precincts, districts and polling places, the unfamiliarity of CCBOE staff, poll workers and 
voters with electronic voting, and the effort and costs that would be needed to adapt 
CCBOE’s prior practices to support a new type of election. [Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project, Immediate Steps to Avoid Lost Votes in the 2004 Presidential 
Election: Recommendations for the Election Assistance Commission (Pasadena, Calif., 
July 2004)] 
2.114  Recommendation: While each step in the testing and certification process has its 
role justifying confidence in election systems, it is ultimately the responsibility of those 
entrusted with the execution of elections at a local to ensure the integrity of the systems 
they select. The prior testing by vendors, ITAs and state authorities should be treated by 
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the CCBOE as a prerequisite to consideration, not a guaranty of suitability. Governmental 
entities charged with machine certification should undertake their own rigorous testing. 
Testing by government entities or their designees should be aggressive and focused on 
discovering flaws rather than merely validating specifications. 
2.115  Finding: ITAs do not test, or claim to test, all potential weaknesses or 
vulnerabilities. Vendors and public officials often tout ITA certification as proof of 
reliability and security. It is not. A statement that a system is ‘ITA Certified’ is not an 
adequate response to public concerns about the security and reliability of an electronic 
voting system. Conversely, some individuals and groups wary of electronic voting 
criticize ITAs for not conducting tests beyond of their mandate and impute improper 
motives to the ITAs. This criticism is misdirected; the mandate must be changed in order 
to change the activities of ITAs [GAO Report#: GAO-05-956, p34-35; Brian Phillips, 
Systest Labs, LLC, Center for Election Integrity Public Forum, 6/9/2006] 
2.116  Recommendation: ITAs should be evaluated on the thoroughness of the tests they 
are hired to conduct rather than the omission of tests they did not contract to perform. 
ITAs should be required to deny certification to systems if they discover material defects 
even when those defects do not fall within the scope of their testing mandate. In all cases, 
local and state elections officials should not rely on the limited ITA testing to decide if an 
election system is well designed for a particular jurisdiction’s needs. [National Task 
Force on Election Reform, Election 2004: Review and Recommendations by the Nation’s 
Elections Administrators (Houston, TX: Election Center, May 2005)] 
2.117  Finding: Whatever the shortcomings the ITA testing regime, Cuyahoga County’s 
experience with DESI systems offers compelling, if anecdotal, evidence that ITA testing 
has a positive impact on election systems. The contrasting experiences that Cuyahoga 
County has had with DESI’s two major election administration software products, 
DIMSnet and GEMS, illustrates a benefit of the ITA certification. DIMSnet, used to 
process voter registration, candidate, race and various other election data, does not fall 
into a category of systems that requires ITA certification. In Cuyahoga County’s 
experience, it is buggy, unstable and exhibits symptoms of poor software engineering 
practices. It is a monolithic, one-size-fits-all approach to handling the unique 
requirements of diverse electoral jurisdictions. In CCBOE’s experience, DIMSnet 
displays haphazard configuration management and inadequate regression testing. GEMS, 
used in the county for ballot creation and vote tabulation, requires certification. CCBOE 
has found it to be stable and well tested. It demonstrates an awareness on the part of the 
vendor of the crucial importance of strict configuration management. There are reasons to 
expect that the difference in the two systems is, in part, due to ITA testing of GEMS. The 
requirements of the testing, as well as the time and expense of recertification of modified 
systems, forces vendors to adopt sound approaches to testing and configuration 
management. [Discussions with DESI’s DIMSnet representatives; interviews with CVS 
and IS staff; demonstrations of GEMS and DIMSnet at CCBOE; DESI hearing, 
consultations with DIMSnet operators and former elections officials in counties in 
California and Washington] 
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2.118  Recommendation: All critical election systems should require some form of 
certification in order to promote sound engineering practices by the vendors. 
2.119  Finding: Procedures of ITA testing are often treated as trade secrets, and not made 
publicly available for review. [GAO Report#: GAO-05-956, p35] 
2.120  Recommendation: Release of testing protocols should be a requirement for a 
testing organization to become, or remain, an approved election systems ITA. 
2.121  Finding: The reliability of election systems depends both on the systems 
themselves and the manner in which they are used, as demonstrated by a recent NASED 
directive modifying its certification of DESI systems, making its certification contingent 
on promulgation of certain memory card handling regulations. [April 2006 NASED 
Memorandum on Memory Cards] 
2.122  Recommendation: ITAs should document acceptable procedures for use and 
configuration of systems they approve, issuing their own express guidelines upon which 
their certification is contingent. 
Testing by the CCBOE 
2.123  Finding: As presently performed at CCBOE, Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing, 
while useful for identifying clearly defective machines before and after an election, is 
more akin to a demonstration process than a testing effort. Given that there are thousands 
of ballots styles and rotations and over five-thousand DREs to test, CCBOE’s testing 
prior to the May 2nd election was far from an exhaustive evaluation of each DRE’s 
performance in all of the circumstances it was likely to confront on Election Day. [See 
findings of specific testing practices, herein; interviews with IS and warehouse staff; 
testing protocols; statements of testers; email between CCBOE management and staff and 
project manager for Cuyahoga County] 
2.124  Recommendation: L&A testing procedures should be changed to provide a 
thorough pre-election test of all machines such as would be worthy of public confidence. 
An analysis of the problems encountered on Election Day and of all probable scenarios 
should be used to redesign L&A tests. CCBOE should consider contracting an outside 
organization to design and perform the testing — an organization that does not have a 
strong interest in results of the testing as the CCBOE does. 
2.125  Finding: The testing of the election systems by the CCBOE before the May 2nd 
election suggests an awareness on the part of the CCBOE that the L&A tests were not 
designed to expose significant flaws in the systems. The tests took place in the 2 weeks 
preceding the May 2nd election—scarcely enough time to complete testing of all 
machines, much less make arrangements to fix or replace machines should any 
significant number of DREs fail the tests. The transmission tests that took place over the 
weekend immediately prior to Election Day was also hurried and left no time to address 
failings exposed by the testing. [CCBOE testing protocols and schedules; interviews with 
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IS and warehouse staff, Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham; testing protocols; 
statements of testers; email between CCBOE management and staff and project manager 
for Cuyahoga County] 
2.126  Finding: The CCBOE’s execution of the L&A testing undermined the tests 
because, being performed so close to Election Day, CCBOE workers were forced to work 
long shifts for extended periods, often without recognition or adequate compensation. As 
the tests went on, employee fatigue made errors more likely while the hours took a toll on 
morale. [Interviews with IS staff; Deputy Director Dillingham; Kaluscak] 
2.127  Recommendation: The CCBOE should ensure that all performance tests are 
sufficiently rigorous, and performed on a schedule that will allow the CCBOE to respond 
to test failures and workers to work sensible hours. Testing procedures at all levels should 
be documented and published, with specific criteria for passage and failure. [GAO 
Report#: GAO-05-956, p26, 37-38, 42; NIST SP 800-34: Contingency Planning Guide 
for Information Technology Systems (June 2002); NIST SP 800-61: Computer Security 
Incident Handling Guide (January 2004)] 
2.128  Finding: Nearly all DRE testing is done in “test mode,” a software configuration 
that purports to simulate the behavior of the machine during an election, without creating 
official “voted” ballot records. [DESI hearing; interviews with IS staff; DESI 
documentation] 
2.129  Recommendation: Whatever the benefits a “test mode” may offer, it is not testing 
in “election mode.” The execution of different software code (however similar or 
overlapping) for testing and actual elections voting reduces the authenticity of the tests 
undertaken. Moreover, not testing in election mode creates a significant risk of masking 
buggy or malicious code that may be invoked in an election but bypassed in test mode. 
All L&A testing should be performed in election mode on DESI DREs, if the machines 
can be configured for this. 
Testing by vendors 
2.130  Finding: Even the most responsibly engineered software systems contain 
numerous bugs and areas of functionality that are not exhaustively specified. Good 
software is a perpetual work-in-progress. Both the CCBOE and, subsequently, this Panel, 
have faced a lack of candor on the part of DESI with respect to defects and limitations in 
their systems. DESI states that the problems experienced in Cuyahoga County in trying 
unsuccessfully to integrate DIMSnet and GEMS were entirely due to failures on the part 
of the CCBOE. DESI describes the extrinsic security measures and policies required for 
operation of GEMS simply as prudent steps for security of any computer system, without 
acknowledging that many are directly necessitated by the lack of intrinsic security 
features within GEMS. DESI’s DIMSnet personnel claimed that they do not issue 
releases of the DIMSnet software containing any bugs known to them. [Interviews with 
CCBOE staff, DESI representatives, hearing with DESI representatives, DESI website; 
interviews with IS Department, Ballot Department and CVS staff] 
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2.131  Recommendation: Representations that an election software system is without 
defects, while perhaps intended to be reassuring, should be greeted with alarm for they 
evince either ignorance of engineering realities, or deceit. Proper, ongoing maintenance 
of software systems should include solicitation of possible bugs identified by users and 
other interested parties, and speedy resolution of those possible bugs by the vendor. To 
make their systems worthy of public confidence, election systems vendors should invite 
all who are qualified, and willing to offer their time, to test their products. Vendors with 
an ongoing commitment to improving the quality of their election systems should 
welcome scrutiny and provide access to their election systems, without necessarily 
disclosing source code or other intellectual property, and acknowledge and address 
defects as inevitably they are discovered. 
Recommended Areas for Future Inquiry 
1. Does the Secretary of State’s DXI system support the voter registration lookup 
system that is on their website? 
2. What are all of the problems with the voter registration lookup system? 
3. Are problems with the registration lookup system indicative of problems with the 
DXI system? 
4. In what ways can the DXI system potentially compromise or cause problems with 
the CCBOE’s voter registration system? 
5. Does the Secretary of State’s usage of the DXI system limit the county’s potential 
choices for voter registration systems? 
6. What incentives are there for Board of Election personnel to eliminate duplicate 
voter registration records on the DXI system when other counties will eventually 
resolve the problems? 
7. What are the procedures for dealing with all the “dead weight” or accumulated 
records that are kept in the system indefinitely? 
8. DESI offers an application called VC programmer. This application needs to work 
with both DIMSnet and GEMS and is used for the Ballot on Demand service. The 
representations that were made about this service and the Ballot on Demand 
service are of particular interest. Did the CCBOE know that they would have to 
purchase VC programmer in order to get the full functionality of the Ballot on 
Demand service? 
9. A full investigation should be launched regarding the DIMSnet/GEMS data 
transfer training program. According to DESI’s Tim Murowski both Richland and 
Fairfield Counties attended this training program and had no problems 
transferring data from DIMSnet to GEMS. CCBOE staff should contact these 
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counties to determine if they found that the DIMSnet to GEMS transfer was as 
easy as Tim Murowski claims. 
10. A complete list of people who have had access to the GEMS server must be 
compiled. We know that the entire ballot creation staff had access and perhaps 
some IS staff. Procedures surrounding access to GEMS should be carefully 
examined. 
11. The Secretary of State’s practice of only certifying two vendors of voting machine 
equipment needs to be investigated. Formal inquiries of the Secretary of State’s 
Board of Voting Machine Examiners should occur in public meetings for full 
accountability. 
12. The Secretary of State’s Digital Guardian system should be analyzed. The system 
seems unsuited and impractical as a security precaution. 
13. The Secretary of State’s requirement that GEMS not be networked to any 
computer should be regarded as impractical for a county as large as Cuyahoga 
County. A properly created secure and managed local network of two to three 
computers is just as safe as having the GEMS server not be connected to any 
other computers. Because of Cuyahoga County’s size and complexity, an analysis 
must be completed to show whether that this requirement is impractical. 
14. The software limitations of the GEMS server need to be further analyzed. 
15. A full investigation should be undertaken to determine whether DESI’s DIMSnet 
staff is adequate to provide required support to their growing customer base. In an 
interview with DESI DIMSnet staff Ross Underwood, Mike Lindross, Tim 
Murowski and counsel on 7/7/2006 we were told that DESI’s DIMSnet operation 
has twenty full time employees, six of whom which are software programmers. 
This staffing seems far too low considering that DIMSnet serves fifty-five 
counties in five states. 
16. More investigation should be done regarding DESI’s DIMSnet staff error tracking 
procedures and reporting systems. In an interview with DIMSnet staff Ross 
Underwood, Mike Lindross, Tim Murowski and counsel on 7/7/2006 no list of 
known software issues because none exist. For a software program as complex as 
DIMSnet it seems impossible that there would be no known software problems. 
17. Investigate what happens to information on the memory card when it becomes 
full. The GAO’s report on this problem states that votes can potentially be 
overwritten when the card reaches its capacity. The CCBOE must determine how 
many votes can be cast per memory card on an election to election basis as the 
amount of information stored in one ballot is subject to change for every election. 
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18. A full list of DIMSnet considerations should be compiled by contacting the head 
of each CCBOE department, asking them what features they would like to see in 
DIMSnet. A full analysis should be done to determine what potential this has to 
disrupt elections in Cuyahoga County. 
19. The Secretary of State’s DXI system should be fully analyzed and scrutinized. 
The Secretary of State claims that if there is an inadequate buffer between the 
state run database and the county’s system to prevent interference. This should be 
verified and the State’s DXI system should be fully investigated. 
20. An independent, qualified consultant should be retained to conduct a study of 
whether the DESI DRE and absentee ballot optical scan combination can be 
effectively and efficiently implemented for Cuyahoga County’s elections. The 
study should consider: 
• Functionality of hardware and software; 
• Interoperability of registration software 
• Policies, procedures, staffing, training; 
• Security risks of various options; 
• Comparative costs and benefits of other available systems 
The CERP’s preliminary assessment is that a single voting system used in both 
the polling locations on Election Day and for absentee ballots is preferable. 
21. CCBOE should investigate carefully whether the ballot rotation functionality built 
into GEMS actually performs what is required. At the 6/29/2006 Hearing, DESI 
refused to disclose what steps it had taken to ensure that the ballot rotation built 
into its GEMS complies with Ohio law; this needs to be examined closely. 
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Chapter III: Election Planning and Implementation 
Background 
The CCBOE’s election planning process for the e-voting conversion began in earnest 
after the SOS announced in April 2005 that the Diebold TSx units with the new voter 
verified paper trail printer would be available as an approved HAVA compliant e-voting 
technology. This approval pleased Director Vu since he had not invested any time in 
reviewing the optical scanning technologies. Vu then pursued strategies for obtaining 
additional DRE units, favorable performance terms, and ancillary equipment. Deputy 
Director Dillingham managed the planning process for the conversion. The CCBOE did 
not receive a list of all equipment needed for the transition, and its managers were not 
aware of the types of decisions — including procurements large and small — that were 
required. After having difficulty researching the procurements because the predicate 
policy and procedural decisions had not yet been made, Fiscal Officer Lisa Durkin 
suggested that the CCBOE undertake a comprehensive implementation planning process 
by which the managers would make these decisions. Procurement would then follow the 
policy decisions. Since the Deputy Director had been named CCBOE Project Manager 
for the e-voting conversion, she determined who would lead the implementation 
decisional process. She tapped Kathy Dreamer and Administrator Maiden for these 
primary roles.  
During the summer of 2005, these teams commenced their work. But in retrospect the 
planning process has been severely criticized as lacking direction by knowledgeable 
leaders experienced in such conversions. As one manager put it, “it was the blind leading 
the blind.” The CCBOE had not secured consultant services, and its top managers 
believed that all the guidance they needed was to be supplied by Diebold as a part of the 
Master Contract. As detailed in Chapters I and II of this Report, the Diebold State Project 
Manager Jessica Hiner did not view consultant services for the conversion as a part of the 
package of goods and services negotiated by the Ohio SOS but wanted additional 
compensation for any consultant services. 
Enlarging the focus beyond the planning for the May 2nd election, the Panel discovered 
that the CCBOE has persistently experienced Election Day problems that, with better 
planning, should have been eliminated or greatly diminished long before the challenge of 
e-voting. The planning and election preparation issues concerning polling places and poll 
workers receive extended discussion in Chapter IV. Other issues that predominantly 
concern CCBOE managerial skills and focus are addressed in Chapter VII. Vendor, 
technological planning and related procurement issues are addressed in Chapters I and II. 
Planning for the actual management of the May 2nd Election Day and for other e-voting 
elections is addressed in Chapter V.  
Given the detailed attention to other aspects of election planning in the Report’s other 
Chapters, this short chapter addresses only a narrow and unique set of issues that 
otherwise might be unaddressed: were there any early warnings to the CCBOE of 
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possible pitfalls and even land mines to be avoided in the conversion to e-voting? If so, 
what kind of response, if any, did the CCBOE take to modify its preparation and planning 
process so as to sidestep the worst and achieve the best possible first e-voting election? 
Were there steps that the CCBOE should have taken to have better prepared itself for the 
procurement decisions as well as for any other issues?  
Warnings of potential disasters not taken seriously 
3.1  Finding: Diebold contracted with Sogeti USA to supply a Project Manager for the 
Cuyahoga conversion. Sogeti named Joe Nista as the Manager. In early January 2006, 
Nista alerted Director Vu and Deputy Director Dillingham to thirteen potential major 
risks that concerned him regarding the May election: 
1. A single Tech Support person may not provide sufficient technical coverage for 
the May election because of device count volumes… and the fact that the 
warehouse and the GEMS server are in different physical locations. 
2. Modeming failures may occur on election night. 
3. Accumulation failures may occur on election night. 
4. Poll-workers may not sufficiently understand new election processes and/or 
equipment. 
5. TSX devices may not be completely and properly discharged/charged 3 times 
prior to start of L&A testing. 
6. TSX devices to be used for Absentee voting may not be ready in time…. 
7. County staff may not be able to fully support the use of TSX and OS devices on 
election day. 
8. Printed ballots may not be available for the open of Absentee Voting on March 28 
due to insufficient time available between the time the ballot is approved and the 
time the physical ballots are proofed and printed. 
9. TSx electronic ballots may not be ready in time for the open of Absentee Voter 
voting (March 28) due to insufficient time available between the time the ballot is 
approved and sent to the audio vendor and the time the audio ballot is received, 
proofed and finalized into GEMS. 
10. Printed ballots may be unscannable by OS devices on election night. 
11. Election media memory cards may not be returned to the CCBOE on a timely 
fashion on election night. 
12. An incorrect number of TSX devices may be deployed to polling locations. 
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13. Confusion may occur on election night relative to roles and responsibilities for: 
a. Collecting and accounting for returned supplies including memory cards 
b. The process for returning memory cards to CCBOE and uploading results to 
GEMS 
c. Producing GEMS election night reports 
d. Producing a GEMS extract to the county web site 
e. Accounting for and storage of memory cards already uploaded 
f. AV ballot processes including opening Absentee Voter mail, flattening 
ballots, sorting by ballot style, prepping for canning [sic], scanning ballots, 
etc. 
g. The process for handling help/trouble calls on election night (documenting, 
tracking, servicing etc.)  
The above list accurately predicted many of the most troubling aspects of the 
CCBOE’s performance in the May primary election. [Nista email to Director Vu and 
Deputy Director Dillingham 1/3/2006 containing the list “Potential Risks for the 
Cuyahoga May Election”] 
Despite a variety of efforts, the Panel has been unable to locate records or obtain 
interview recollections that suggest the CCBOE Implementation Teams or other core 
planning entities engaged in any systematic review and counter-planning to guard against 
these contingencies occurring. Thus we conclude that Nista’s email was not taken 
seriously in the CCBOE.  
3.2  Recommendation: Before Cuyahoga’s effort, e-voting conversions had occurred for 
several years around the nation, with very different track records of success. The CCBOE 
top managers should have been well apprised of the grave risks even without the Nista 
email. But Nista’s message can be seen as a wake-up call for the CCBOE to become 
serious and focused on ensuring that the nightmare occurrences he listed would not 
materialize in the County. A review of the available evidence indicates that Deputy Dir. 
Dillingham did not consider these realistic possibilities for this County’s elections, and so 
was not persuaded that any special planning and trouble-shooting needed to occur to 
avoid these problems. By not confronting these potentialities head on, the CCBOE was 
left unprepared for the ensuing nightmare election. By our count, at least ten of these 
thirteen worst scenarios occurred but possibly as many as 12 of 13, depending on the 
interpretation/scenario embedded in a few propositions.11 Managerial over-confidence 
prevented the CCBOE from preparing properly to avoid the potential risks. Any future 
planning must occur from the outset, and must not be hastily assembled in reaction to 
unfolding adverse events.  
                                                 
11 This count did not inventory the seven disastrous subheadings collected under the last 
category, where Cuyahoga also achieved yet another high batting average – realizing six of 
seven possible problems. 
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3.3  Recommendation: When risk predictions of this magnitude exist, they should be 
thoroughly and individually analyzed in a “reverse-engineering” process so that all the 
potential causes that can lead to the occurrence of each unsavory outcome can be charted. 
Then careful avoidance planning and contingency planning must occur rather than taking 
a blasé, overconfident approach that all missteps will be avoided. Based on his prior 
experience in project management and implementation of electronic voting systems, 
Nista foresaw major difficulties ahead. But it seemed no one was listening.  
3.4  Recommendation: Election planning must not only anticipate all possible disasters 
and plan to avoid their causes, but also build in “buffer time” to take care of unexpected 
contingencies. The entire election calendar should be geared so that a full week remains 
after all tasks have been completed. This last week then allows for dry-runs of 
procedures, trouble-shooting, and quality control in all aspects. Staff can become well 
rested before Election Day, so they have maximum energy and their best judgment for 
handling any untoward occurrences. In sum, as a part of the November 2006 planning 
process, special care must be taken to address known risks such as those presented here 
by Nista. Complete planning for follow-up and risk avoidance must be formalized, 
executed, and documented to be complete well in advance of any election. Tasks will 
need to be performed earlier and more efficiently in preparing for Cuyahoga County’s 
next electronic election. 
Logic and Accuracy testing must be more carefully planned 
3.5  Finding: Director Vu stated in a 7/14/2006 interview that he realizes the L&A 
testing he ordered before the May primary was too extensive and complicated. Given the 
opportunity to do the testing over, Director Vu would have ordered less extensive testing. 
In deciding to run do comprehensive tests, Vu consulted Judy Grady and Pat Wolfe of the 
SOS office and with counsel Reno Oradini, as to the extent of testing required by law. In 
a memorandum listing state Best Practices, Grady instructed Boards of Election to 
“(m)ake sure your L&A Test accounts for every possible ballot position in every possible 
vote combination… This may seem tedious, but it is extremely important. A written test 
script that allows L&A testing to confirm only the proper number of votes for the proper 
positions will pay huge dividends.” In considering how to realize Grady’s instruction, Vu 
determined that the internal DESI DRE L&A test was insufficient because it did not 
involve actual human input via the touchscreen. [Interview with Director Vu 7/14/2006; 
Joe Nista Progress Reports; Judy Grady Memorandum Re: Pre-Election Logic and 
Accuracy Testing; emails between Vu and Reno Oradini 4/13/2006-4/19/2006] 
The extent of the L&A testing done before the May primary was intended to satisfy 
the SOS Best Practices and the legitimate concerns of the voting public. When the task of 
complying with these stringent SOS requirements for L & A testing were combined with 
the multitude of separate jurisdictions and required ballot styles in Cuyahoga County, the 
situation quickly cascaded into a situation that demanded 12-hour workdays and little 
availability of key staff during the critical two weeks before the election. [Interview with 
Director Vu 7/14/2006; Joe Nista Progress Reports; Judy Grady Memorandum Re: Pre-
Election Logic and Accuracy Testing; Interviews with Managers] 
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3.6  Recommendation: By the time L&A testing could begin, after the DIMS-GEMS 
data transferal had been completed and validated, the CCBOE was already well behind 
schedule. Given that the Ballot Department problems with the GEMS-DIMS interface 
had consumed all of the buffer time in the schedule plus more, placing the CCBOE 
behind schedule, Director Vu should have opted for less arduous and less time consuming 
L & A testing. Given that under the Diebold DRE system the L & A testing is not able to 
be performed in actual “election mode” but only in “test mode” (and thus lacking the 
integrity of testing under the software commands that would be operative on an Election 
Day), expending this huge amount of time did not make good sense. Memory cards 
cannot be prepared until the filing period is over but have to be created and available for 
the DREs to be L & A tested. In a county as complex and large as Cuyahoga, it may not 
be possible in the exceptionally short period available to conduct the complete L & A 
tests that would be most highly recommended for ensuring the accuracy and reliability of 
the DREs. This is yet another factor that should be taken into account in deciding whether 
the DREs are well suited for Cuyahoga County. Speeding up the data transferal process 
between GEMS and DIMS would reduce the schedule compression but given the size of 
the County, any county-wide election would still place great pressure on the staff to 
complete meaningful L&A testing before the DREs are deployed to the polls.  
3.7  Recommendation: The Director’s desire to achieve the highest standards in 
operational testing of the DREs is laudable. Unfortunately, the Diebold DRE’s artificial 
context in which the L & A testing would be conducted should have led the Director to 
seek a less aggressive and time consuming L & A approach. The CCBOE should explore 
the L & A methodologies that are being used by the other most populous Ohio counties, 
and also by other metropolitan counties nationwide which are using Diebold DREs. It 
should consider retaining an independent voting systems consultant who can advise the 
agency on the pros and cons of various L & A methods. After deciding on the best 
approach for the County in light of all the factors, the CCBOE should seek SOS approval 
for the method(s) it has selected.  
3.8  Recommendation: As mentioned earlier in the Report, Diebold should reconfigure 
the DREs so that they can be tested in “election mode” and yet securely protect against 
the generation of false votes stored on a memory card.  
Security seals must be recorded and the security system perfected 
3.9  Finding: The CCBOE uses as many as 13 different numbered seals for outbound and 
inbound equipment materials and supplies, not including “tamper” or “void” tape seals. 
Currently none of the seal numbers are recorded, either outbound by CCBOE staff, or 
inbound by poll workers as items are unpacked for use at the polls. Failure to record seal 
numbers breaks the chain of custody in determining if a device or bag has been tampered 
with. [Site visit to the CCBOE warehouse and interview with the Deputy Director 
Dillingham and Election Support Manager Kaluscak 6/1/2006; Email discussion with Joe 
Hall] 
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3.10  Recommendation: Admittedly, given the volume of materials returning to the 
Board on Election Night, the security processes must be thought out exceptionally well or 
the steps will create a bottleneck in the efficient processing of memory cards and optical 
scan ballots. At a minimum, however, the CCBOE must assign and record the outbound 
seal numbers on the DREs, the red/blue supply bags, and the “void” tape seals on the 
memory card doors and the modem doors. The poll workers (Judges or “Booth 
Officials”) must record all seal numbers on clear memory card bags, green bags, red/blue 
bags, and DREs. Inbound from the polls on Election Night, the CCBOE should record the 
seal numbers on the red/blue supply bags and the clear memory card bags as they arrive. 
The seals on the green bags containing the VVPAT canisters should also be recorded but 
that is not an imperative for the CCBOE on Election Night. Seal numbers on the DRE 
modem door, however, should be recorded upon the units’ return to the warehouse.  
3.11  Recommendation: Sufficient, competent, permanent, well-trained, and 
scrupulously honest detail-oriented CCBOE staff must be placed in charge of tracking the 
security chain of custody for all items and reporting on any failures.  
3.12  Recommendation: To facilitate the processing of materials on Election Night, the 
CCBOE should investigate the availability of scannable seals on all outbound and 
inbound materials, parcels and devices. 
3.13 Recommendation:  To help assure that no one has tampered with the results in the 
DREs or memory cards while poll workers transfer them to the transmission site or to the 
CCBOE, the CCBOE should implement another control besides the seals placed on the 
bags. Specifically, the CCBOE should make available on its website a list of each DRE’s 
results organized by polling location, and also the results by voting location. We also 
recommend that the DRE results be posted at each polling location on a VVPAT printout. 
This combination of data would allow interested parties or voters to verify that the results 
posted at a polling location are the results that the CCBOE uses in its official and 
unofficial tallies. Currently, however, the Diebold GEMS software does not permit the 
tracking of votes by DRE unit, but this omission should be a matter of public and 
CCBOE demand for software modification to protect against forms of election fraud. (see 
Chapter II and Chapter VI Ballot Count and Post-Election). Maximum public 
accountability should be sought in the planning and reporting of election results.  
3.14  Finding: The Security Event Log was the form to be used by poll workers to record 
security seal numbers and ballot totals for each machine. The top section is subtitled 
“BEFORE POLLS OPEN” and includes fields to match up DRE serial numbers with 
canister seal numbers, memory card slot tamper tape numbers, and DRE ballot totals. The 
middle section, “AFTER POLLS CLOSE,” is identical except that it lacks fields for 
tamper tape numbers. The bottom section, “RECORD THE SEAL NUMBER AS YOU 
SEAL EACH BAG,” has a grid listing four seal locations, the memory card bag, the 
canister bag, and the top and side of the supply bag. All four include a space to record 
seal numbers for election night, while the supply bag also has fields for election morning 
and the top of the supply bag has an additional field for a Monday night seal number. 
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Examination of a sample set of Security Event Logs from May 2nd (239 Logs) 
demonstrated that there was widespread confusion by poll workers as to how the Logs 
were to be filled out. Use of the fields and boxes was sporadic and subject to variation. 
Many poll workers created new columns or fields of their own to record seal numbers 
they felt should be kept but were not provided for on the form. Of the 239 Logs 
examined, 86 displayed some form of spontaneous modification or creative misuse by 
poll workers. Comments about technical problems and supply shortages were written in 
various margin areas, indicating that poll workers knew of no other formal mechanism 
for reporting these issues. Tamper seals were affixed directly to some forms. Starting 
ballot totals (which should always be confirmed as zero) were almost never recorded, and 
ending ballot totals were missing on 88 out of 239 Logs examined. Following are the 
comments that appeared on this sample of Logs: 
• RIHT-03-C: “Printer is printing half of info and showing abort sign. No longer 
using as of 10:42 AM” 
• RIHT-03-B: One DRE machine “not sealed, not used” 
• SHV-03-B: “This machine was out of order all day” 
• SEVC-02-A: “I had to use blue seals because I didn’t have enough red” 
• SEVC-04-C: No seals available for supply bags Monday night 
• MPHT-03-C: No seals for last canister 
• MPHT-05-A: No ballot total because “machine locked up” 
• MAYV-03-A: No ballot total because “no such instruction given in manual” 
• MAYV-03-A: “Didn’t have enough seals” 
• OAKV-01-A: Not including ballot totals because “not taken from screen at proper 
time” per instruction from the CCBOE 
• ORNG-00-A: “Could not unlock” memory card door 
• LAKWD-04-A: No ballot total because “the man from Diebold had us close up 
the machines and the total are [sic] lost” 
• LAKWD-04-B: “Only one out of three machines had a tag” 
• LAKWD-04-B: “Zero machine… not working. Replaced” 
• LAKWD-01-D: Memory card tamper tape “was removed” before poll opened 
• LAKWD-01-G: Seal number 921768 “broke trying to put it in” 
• LAKWD-01-J: “No one here to help with closing, did the best we could” 
• ECLE-03-E: First seal broken on memory card door 
• BRKV-00-L: “Did not send enough” supply bag seals 
• BRTNL-00-A: Supply bag seal damaged 
• BRTNL-00-A: “Problem with paper” on one printer 
• BRTNL-00-A: “Machine didn’t work” reported for two other machines 
• CUHT-00-A: “Had no more seals” 
• BEREA-02-B: Canister seal “broke open because the paper ripped” 
• BEREA-04-C: “We didn’t have seals to send machines after taken down” 
• BEREA-04-C: “Machine shut down too soon” to get ballot count 
• BEREA-04-D: “?” entered for ballot totals 
• CLEV-21-V: “Machine didn’t work” 
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• CLEV-20-L: One canister “did not work” 
• CLEV-20-L: One machine “fixed,” no explanation of problem 
• CLEV-14-K: “Instructions weren’t given to match memory card with serial 
number on back of machine. Thus they do not match and rather than mess up the 
ballot numbers, we did not switch them as advised” 
• CLEV-14-Q: Absolutely blank, nothing filled out 
• CLEV-03-M: “Not enough locks” 
• CLEV-03-U: “Problem with this machine” 
• CLEV-05-D: “No blue seal” on one memory card door 
• CLEV-05-D: “Not enough seals” 
• CLEV-05-S: “Ran out of time” 
• CLEV-05-T: Absolutely blank, nothing filled out 
• CLEV-05-U: Absolutely blank, nothing filled out 
• CLEV-07-H: “NA” entered for ballot totals 
• CLEV-03-M: “Not enough locks” 
• CLEV-01-T: “Malfunction” of one machine 
• CLEV-03-A: “We didn’t have enough seals” 
• CLEV-03-G: “Do not get number” for ballot totals 
3.15  Recommendation: Tracking of seal numbers must improve before the next 
election. The Security Event Logs should be redesigned with clearly marked and clearly 
explained fields for all security seals. Use of the new form should be covered in poll 
worker training and testing should occur to make sure that crucial security procedures are 
understood and followed. Failures to fill out the form on Election Day need to be 
addressed directly with workers from that precinct, so that the importance of physical 
security and chain of custody are understood. Poll workers should be provided with a 
separate form for reporting equipment or supply failures. After the election, a member of 
CCBOE management should audit all Security Logs and present a report to the Board 
listing every anomaly. These anomalies should be followed-up and reconciled before the 
next election, and any hardware that experienced gaps in its chain of custody should be 
quarantined until it has been checked for tampering. Recording of ballot counts, 
especially the confirmation of zero counts before polls open, is critical and should be 
stressed in training as well. These counts should be totaled and reconciled with poll 
books and with GEMS totals after uploading is complete. 
3.16  Finding: The CCBOE, operating at the direction of the Secretary of State, did not 
begin delivering the memory cards to individual polling places until the day before the 
May 2nd Primary Election. According to CCBOE staff, for a variety of reasons some 
polls’ memory cards could not be delivered on Monday. As a result these cards had to be 
delivered on Election Day morning starting at 5:00 am. This impediment caused two 
separate problems that undermined the possibility of achieving a smooth, successful 
election. First, it required experienced CCBOE staff to spend all day Monday and part of 
the early morning hours on Tuesday delivering memory cards. The second problem was 
that at least 50 precincts were not supplied with the memory cards at the right time, 
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delaying the initiation of DRE machines and thus the polls opening on time in these 
polling locations. [Staff interviews; On-site inspections of the warehouse facility on 
6/1/2006; Analysis of Incident Reports] 
3.17  Recommendation: This memory card problem is not a problem unique to 
Cuyahoga. Other election jurisdictions with far greater experience than this County have 
dealt successfully with this problem. The CCBOE should research the strategies 
employed by other election jurisdictions that use DREs. The agency should also place 
this problem on the list for advice from a highly qualified election systems security 
consultant. The obvious possible solutions may introduce other unacceptable risks into 
the system (such as security risks that could infect the entire GEMS system), but we 
mention: (1) permission from the Secretary of State to seal the memory cards into DRE 
voting devices immediately after the L&A testing (using a recorded numbered seal and 
shrink-wrap of the machines) or (2) deployment of more reliable delivery and DRE set-
up personnel on Election Day morning who would hand-deliver the memory cards and 
also assist with initiation of the DRE units; (3) sending the memory cards to the most 
reliable Presiding Judge for hand delivery to the polling place. Each of these strategies 
includes risks for the poling place not being able to open on time. But this is yet another 
factor that must be considered when the County reassesses the voting machine system 
most appropriate for this County.  
Effective planning for local budget responsibility and potential liabilities 
3.18  Finding: The Secretary of State negotiated its Master Contract with Diebold 
without involvement of the CCBOE and perhaps without any BOE representation. While 
involving up to 88 separate counties in a contract negotiation would introduce waste and 
delays, involving a small set of representatives of various sized and situated BOEs might 
have helped the SOS to avoid some of the omissions that have injured the planning and 
budgeting by BOEs and County Governments. [Director Vu to Board Members, 
11/10/2005; Amendment to SOS Master Contract; Interviews with Director Vu]  
3.19  Recommendation: Because of the complexity of the County’s voting 
configuration, Cuyahoga County and the Secretary of State must develop ways to work 
more closely with one another to ensure that electronic voting is a success. The election 
process cannot succeed if the Secretary of State makes substantial changes without 
listening to, or appreciating their effect on, local Boards of Election.  
3.20  Recommendation: While the HAVA legislation provided federal funds to upgrade 
voting systems, it did not seek or compel the outsourcing of election management to 
private voting machine manufacturers and vendors. Yet this seems to be the path on 
which Ohio and much of the nation seems to be moving, for the county BOE executive 
managers generally lack the high level technological training and experience with 
election software and e-voting issues that would allow them to fathom the subtleties of 
how and whether the systems are working accurately. The move to e-voting seems to 
have placed the BOEs and public into a position where we are asked simply to trust that 
the tabulation software is accurately reporting election results, that the DREs are 
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accurately recording and reporting votes, and that the ballots that are electronically 
created are properly reflecting Ohio ballot rotation law. The State and county BOE 
planning processes must begin including mechanisms that will permit far greater public 
accountability of election tabulations with independently verifiable results. A State 
Elections Inspector General should be contemplated to assist the county BOEs in 
ensuring that the e-voting systems fully achieve the public trust in honest, accurate 
elections and that the election planning and execution culminate in total integrity and 
accountability.  
3.21  Finding: The CCBOE skipped conducting important research on other jurisdictions 
that had previously used DESI systems when it was involved in planning its ancillary 
equipment purchases. On 12/29/2005, an election official from Montgomery County, 
Maryland offered several observations concerning issues that Cuyahoga County could 
and should have foreseen before negotiating its proposed local agreement. [Email, Lisa 
Durkin to Director Vu, 12/29/2005, Subject: Diebold Contract] For instance, printer 
paper rolls are standard calculator tapes that can be purchased off the shelf, as opposed to 
being purchased from DESI; and many of DESI’s items, such as encoder batteries, are 
available at much cheaper prices from other vendors. Many of these recommendations 
could have been discovered simply by calling other counties and asking what ancillary 
equipment they had purchased to implement their Diebold DREs. Instead, the CCBOE’s 
failure to consult other jurisdictions cast doubt on its due diligence in voting machines 
and ancillary equipment procurement and planning. [Email, Lisa Durkin to Director Vu, 
12/29/2005, Subject: Diebold Contract; Amendment to SOS Master Contract] 
3.22  Recommendation: Other jurisdictions that have worked with a major vendor are 
often willing to share their successes and failures, and the benefits of hindsight. The 
CCBOE should have been far more assiduous in developing these relationships and lines 
of inquiry, especially with election officials who had years more experience with the 
same vendor. It is regrettable that the CCBOE executive managers did not aggressively 
seek out Maryland and California officials’ views about their Diebold procurements and 
the course of their relationship with the vendor so that the CCBOE could function as 
better negotiators for and protectors of the County’s best interests. In the future, the 
CCBOE should seek out this knowledge from other jurisdictions else it will inevitably be 
at a disadvantage in negotiations with experienced vendors. 
Ensuring privacy for absentee voters 
3.23  Finding: The current method used by the CCBOE for absentee voting is to require 
the voter to record his/her vote on an optical scan ballot. After recording their votes on 
the optical scan ballot, the voter inserts the completed ballot into the “Identification 
Envelope Statement of Voter” envelope (Form No. 12-A-OS Prescribed by the Secretary 
of State). The voter fills in the required personal information and signs the statement on 
the envelope. On or immediately before Election Day the CCBOE verifies the 
authenticity of the voter and opens the envelope. The major concern with this procedure 
is that an employee can clearly see how any individual absentee ballot is cast. [Walk-
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through of the absentee ballot process at the CCBOE and information provided by 
CCBOE staff] 
3.24  Recommendation: Once completed, the absentee optical scan ballot should be 
placed in an unmarked solid white envelope for purposes of confidentiality. This 
envelope would then be placed in the current voter identification envelope. Adding this 
additional envelope would enable the CCBOE to authenticate the legitimacy of voters 
while still protecting voter anonymity. 
Voter education 
3.25  Finding: The voter education campaign is currently limiting their educational plan 
to three or four messages. Limiting the number of messages based on theories of 
advertising may deplete the effectiveness of the educational side of voter education. The 
project is currently not a year long effort, but rather an intensive campaigning effort close 
to major elections. The “Pink Sheets” indicated a large amount of confusion over 
provisional ballots on the part of poll workers as well as voters. Voters need to be 
informed and educated about when they are entitled to cast a ballot provisionally and how 
to properly fill out the paperwork when doing so. [Interview with Community Outreach; 
Incident Reports] 
3.26  Recommendation: The voter education campaign should be reevaluated to become 
more of an “educational program” rather than a “marketing campaign.” The project needs 
to be able to incorporate more messages to fully educate the public, including rights 
regarding provisional voting. Instead of briefly focusing on a few messages over short 
periods of time, the CCBOE could develop a year round program that educates the public 
on various Election Day topics. The electoral process occurs on a regular basis, and it 
may be more effective to properly educate the voters rather than reeducate the voters on 
the same issues during each election. Voters should be made aware of their right to a 
provisional vote and the proper procedure for filling out the appropriate paperwork. 
3.27  Finding: Currently the “official voter information guide” mailers are sent out 
without enough time to inform voters of their ability to vote by mail through an absentee 
ballot. The mailers, which include instructions on how to vote by absentee ballot, cannot 
be sent out until the updated list of registered voters is published. This list is currently not 
available until approximately two weeks prior to the election. 
3.28  Recommendation: The list should be made available earlier to the CCBOE Human 
Resources staff. Human Resources recommended that two rounds of mailers should be 
sent out. The first round should inform voters of their right to vote by absentee ballot. 
The first mailer should also ask voters to update their voting information if it is not 
correct. The second mailer should include Election Day procedure and inform the voter 
of the polling location. This second mailer will also include the requirements of H.B. 3 
and list the acceptable forms of identification a voter will need at the poll in order to cast 
a ballot.  The CCBOE needs to “test-run” all letters, flyers, and other proposed advisories 
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with representatives of advocacy groups and members of the public to ensure that its 
communications educate rather than frighten or confuse. 
3.29  Finding: DRE demonstrations were held by the CCBOE to introduce electronic 
voting to the general public. The DRE demonstrations included instruction on how to use 
the machines. They allowed voters to actively participate in the process by allowing them 
hands-on interaction with the new technology. The DRE demonstrations were staffed by 
the Community Outreach Department and used temporary workers. Occasionally a 
representative from the Booth Officials Department would be sent to hand out recruiting 
information at the demonstrations. 
Voters repeatedly asked for receipts of their votes. The CCBOE did not adequately 
inform voters of the paper trail and the ability to review their vote before their ballot was 
cast. The poll workers indicated aggravation with the repeated questions regarding the 
paper trail. Repeated questioning about the same issue displays a failure on the part of the 
CCBOE to adequately inform the public about the ability to view the paper trail 
associated with electronic voting. [Incident Reports; Community Outreach DRE surveys] 
3.30  Recommendation:  Before future elections, the CCBOE should inform voters that 
they are able to view their selections but will not receive a paper receipt from the printer.  
They should also explain why no paper receipt is provided. More education about what to 
expect once a ballot has been cast should be incorporated into the voter education 
campaign. More DRE demonstrations would be a good way to inform more people about 
the capabilities of the machines. 
3.31  Finding: The grass roots characterization of the community outreach plan could 
include more aspects of voting, including registration and recruitment of poll workers. 
The community outreach department had DRE demonstrations at local malls, banks, and 
grocery stores. The current scope of the voter education program, however, is limited and 
could be expanded to include more general concepts of elections, including the 
importance of civic participation. Lorain County targets college students and Hispanics 
through their voter education plan. Lorain, Franklin, and Montgomery County target 
senior citizens through voter education. Franklin County specifically targets inner city 
voters. [DRE demonstration project plan] 
The voting population needs to be informed about the importance of civic 
participation. Civic participation is an important element in voter awareness and 
recruiting issues. This issue is currently not included in the voter education plan and is 
not covered in the community outreach materials. [Interviews with Booth Officials 
employees] 
3.32  Recommendation: Civic participation should be made a larger part of voter 
education. The public should be well informed of the need for people to work the polls, 
and the importance of poll workers’ roles in the electoral process. The general public 
should be informed through various facets of media exposure and community outreach 
efforts. 
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Community Outreach efforts could also inform local business leaders and government 
employees of electoral participation opportunities as poll workers and in other positions. 
Efforts could encourage interested citizens to donate their time or services to the electoral 
process and help to make Election Day in Cuyahoga County a success. 
3.33  Recommendation: The grass roots concept of the community outreach program is 
a good idea. Saturating the voting population through numerous site locations is critical 
to educating and informing such a diverse audience. The voter education should cater to 
the specific needs of the smaller enclaves that exist within Cuyahoga County. These 
populations may need further investigation so that community outreach efforts can be 
more specifically targeted to their needs. The expansion of community outreach materials 
could also not only be greatly beneficial in recruiting, but in making the community 
aware of the significance of poll workers. This may induce more public respect towards 
Booth Officials. Broader Election Day education could also be used as a tool to rebuild 
voter confidence. 
3.34  Finding: Ohio legislation recently made absentee ballots accessible without 
requiring voters to state a reason for needing one. Voters now have the option of voting 
by absentee ballot rather than going to the polls to cast their ballot. Many problems 
associated with absentee ballots were encountered in the May 2nd election. Proper 
procedure associated with absentee ballots is essential. Voters must be educated on how 
to properly complete an absentee ballot to ensure that their vote will be counted. 
Numerous reasons exist for rejecting absentee ballots. These reasons include: 
• Statement accompanying an absentee voter’s ballot is insufficient: 
• Signatures do not correspond with the person’s registration signature; 
• Applicant is not a qualified elector in the precinct; 
• Ballot envelope contains more than one ballot of any one kind, or any voted ballot 
that the elector is not entitled to vote; 
• Stub A is detached from the absent voter’s ballot; or 
• The elector has not included with the elector’s ballot any identification required as 
referenced. 
These reasons are all stated on the CCBOE website.  Most but not all of these 
problems are mentioned in informational pamphlets. 
3.35  Recommendation: Larger efforts need to be taken in educating the voting 
population on their ability to vote absentee. Specific groups who may have a greater need 
to vote by absentee ballot should be targeted and informed of this option. Voters also 
need to be educated on how to properly complete an absentee ballot. The importance of 
proper completion should be emphasized because if a ballot is not completed properly 
one can not be assured that his or her vote will count. Voters also need to be assured that 
absentee procedures are reliable. Voter confidence must be restored because of the 
problems with the ballots in the last election.  
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3.36  Finding: H.B. 3, passed earlier this year, will require all Ohio voters to present 
some form of identification at polling places beginning in November. This bill could 
create major problems at the polls if voters are not aware of the ID requirements 
associated with it. A large effort to inform voters of the requirement and the proper forms 
of ID that are necessary to vote will have to be undertaken to educate the public for the 
November election. Voters should be informed of their ability to vote provisionally if 
they have forgotten their identification, but also forewarned that they will have to then 
prove their identity within ten days or their ballot will not be counted. The Greater 
Cleveland Voters Coalition presented testimony at an advocacy group forum concerning 
the public’s need to be educated on the requirements of the Bill. Without education, the 
Coalition believes H.B. 3 will lead to the disenfranchisement of many voters, and that the 
I.D. requirement will disproportionately affect specific segments of the populations such 
as the elderly and various minority groups. 
3.37  Recommendation: The CCBOE must inform and educate the public on the 
identification requirement. They should use various forms of community outreach to 
make the public both aware that ID will be required to vote and educated on proper forms 
of ID that can be used at the polls on Election Day. The CCBOE should encourage voters 
to obtain an ID prior to voting through education of the requirement and assistance in 
obtaining a proper form of identification. The CCBOE could also coordinate ID 
distribution drives with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles prior to the election. 
3.38  Recommendation:  The Ohio Secretary of State and the General Assembly should 
revisit the provisions requiring voter ID at the polling place.  The current provisions 
trouble the Panel greatly.  They will cause great difficulties for poll workers and voters in 
November 2006 and will likely suppress voter participation in the election.  The 
differential impact on population subgroups, with particularly grave import for elderly 
and urban minority voters, will lead to unfairness in the ability to exercise the right to 
vote.  The backup provisional ballot rules will also generate huge problems. 
3.39  Finding: A significant portion of the voter education budget, just under $15,000, 
was devoted to bus advertisements preceding the May 2nd election. The Human 
Resources department has indicated that more funds will be designated towards the bus 
campaign for the upcoming November election, completely replacing the use of 
billboards. The CCBOE believes that the mobility of buses allow them to be seen by a 
larger segment of the voting population. 
Bus messages stated the date of the election and the phone number to contact the 
CCBOE, but contained little educational information. [RTA advertisement proposal; 
Interviews with Community Outreach and HR]  
3.40  Recommendation: While the bus campaign was successful, billboards should also 
be used. Billboards are more likely to be seen repeatedly on a regular basis, as opposed to 
bus messages that are most often spotted sporadically.  Because they are seen more 
frequently, billboards can convey more information than a bus message. The CCBOE 
should consult the Ohio Department of Transportation for traffic estimations, and locate 
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billboards in key locations, such as electronic billboards, which would allow for the 
largest numbers of voters to view the advertisements.  
3.41  Finding: The CCBOE currently airs public service announcements (PSAs) on 
public television and public radio which seem distinctly geared toward an older 
population. The CCBOE would reach a much greater number of voters if the PSAs 
appealed to an audience more representative of Cuyahoga County’s population. 
Specifically, PSAs should be produced that will appeal to younger and more ethnically 
diverse voters. The current public service announcements feature only an elderly woman 
who explains the procedure of voting in a relatively uninspired manner. 
3.42  Recommendation: PSAs should be produced that specifically target different 
audiences, for instance, younger voters.  A wider range of PSAs would attract broader 
radio play and attention by a wider voter demographic of radio listeners. The PSAs 
should be easy to follow and interesting enough to grab any viewer or listener’s attention. 
PSAs should also feature a more diverse cast considering the diversity of the population 
toward which they are aimed. 
3.43  Finding: The CCBOE staff associated with voter education feel greatly limited and 
restricted by budget concerns and believe that they could accomplish much more if they 
had more money. They expressed difficulty in finding sponsors to support community 
outreach projects. Pizza Hut had sponsored pizza parties awarded to school students who 
turned in the most voter awareness signatures, but other sponsors were hard to locate. 
[Interview with Community Outreach] 
3.44  Recommendation: The budget for the voter education program is critical. Greater 
amounts of funding need to be dedicated to voter education and community outreach. 
While poll worker training is also important, the need to inform the public should not be 
ignored.  Funds should be designated not only to continue the voter education programs, 
but also to expand the issues on which it focuses. The current mailer program for voter 
education should continue, and should at least be sent out for major elections if not all 
elections. Funding for these mailers should be included in the budget. Funding should 
also be included for more forms of advertising. In addition, businesses should be 
encouraged to help in the campaign to educate the voting population of Cuyahoga 
County. This again relates to informing the general public of the importance of the 
electoral process and encouraging civic service and participation. 
3.45  Finding: Poll workers worry about the lack of voter education, especially that 
geared to seniors and the elderly. Anecdotal reports from one Presiding Judge and from 
other observers mentioned that the turn-out rate for senior citizens in the May 2nd election 
was very low compared to primaries in years past. 
3.46  Recommendation: Part of the voter education effort needs to be geared to these 
elderly voters. A consultant should be retained to improve educational efficacy with this 
demographic group and with others. Part of the education to be conveyed to the people is 
that they will not receive a print out of their ballot and why they will not. More 
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demonstrations at senior centers, at churches and synagogues, and at other locations 
where seniors gather is crucial. Better voter education will reduce polling place lines and 
help to limit the problems at the polling locations. 
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Chapter IV: Poll Workers and Polling Place Support 
System (including Voting Locations) 
Background 
An under-recognized aspect of the election system infrastructure, poll workers determine 
who will be permitted to vote and what kind of ballot will be provided to a voter on 
Election Day. Thousands of dedicated and knowledgeable individuals have been serving 
as poll workers in Cuyahoga County. Because election laws and procedures have become 
far more complex, voters’ ability to cast valid Election Day ballots depends greatly upon 
effective poll worker recruitment and training. 
It is the CCBOE’s responsibility to prepare the poll workers for their increasingly 
difficult duties and to support them on Election Day by providing a supplies and technical 
support system. For at least the past two years, voters, local election watch organizations, 
the media, and the poll workers themselves have flagged problems with the CCBOE’s 
preparation of poll workers and with its support system for the polling places. The 
CCBOE’s lukewarm remedial efforts, plus the tremendous challenges of retraining for e-
voting, caused the cracks in the poll worker training and support system to become 
gaping holes on May 2nd. 
Cuyahoga’s poll workers (whose names, as later will be defined, include “Booth 
Officials,” “Judges,” “Election Day Technicians,” and “Inspectors”) themselves have 
been some of the most vehement critics about the quality of the CCBOE’s preparation for 
the e-voting transition. Our research revealed that large numbers of poll workers 
earnestly desire to have the thorough training that will permit them to serve the voters 
with the utmost knowledge and efficiency. Their desire and continued willingness to be 
retrained in a high quality training system is crucial. But more citizens must volunteer or 
be recruited as poll workers to rebuild polling place competency. And the CCBOE must 
reorganize some core functions and obtain specialized services from qualified experts in 
order to provide the training and support systems required at the polls. 
For ease in following this portion of the Report, clarification of a few terms might be 
helpful. A “polling place” or “voting location” designates a room in which separate tables 
are positioned to process voters who reside in designated “precincts.” A precinct is 
simply a geographical division of the county into smaller units for purposes of voting. 
Boundary lines for local and state offices (for instance, for a City Council seat # 3) 
normally are drawn so that precincts are kept whole — that is, all voters in a precinct 
have exactly the same races on the ballot, and exactly the same candidates.12  
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, a few “split precincts” exist in Cuyahoga County owing to school district lines not 
being concentric with municipal boundaries. These present special problems for voters and for 
the poll workers. 
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In one polling location, voters may discover that several precincts share the same room 
but by Ohio law, voters must locate their correct precinct in which to vote. As a practical 
matter, this translates into voters of different precincts needing to find the correct table. A 
school gym for instance, may be the assigned voting location for 5 precincts, each of 
which has a separate “regular” ballot. These will differ from one another causing a 
different ballot to be created for each of the precincts largely because of “ballot rotation” 
rules—which mean that no one candidate can always occupy the top spot in the race.13 
Plus, depending on the type of election, a range of other types of special ballots may be 
required, and each must be used according to the legal prerequisites and administrative 
methods delineated. Some special ballots include provisional ballots and the curbside 
disabled voters’ ballot, plus the range of ballots that apply only in a partisan primary — 
Democratic, Republican, Issues Only, and 17-year-old ballots (discussed below). Some of 
these are electronic ballots and some are paper (optical scan) ballots. Taking the 
hypothetical school gym that houses five precincts, in the May 2nd election it was likely 
that this one voting location handled a total of at least 30 different ballot “styles” on this 
primary Election Day. 
Poll workers must direct a voter to the correct precinct table so that the voter’s 
registration can be confirmed on the precinct listing of names and so that the voter can be 
given the correct precinct ballot. If the voter’s name is not listed, HAVA requires in 
federal elections that the voter must be offered a provisional ballot. Under Ohio law, a 
provisional ballot voter must not only be registered but must vote at his or her own 
precinct or the vote will be administratively rejected. Thus, if a voter does not locate the 
correct precinct table and still completes a provisional ballot, that ballot will not be 
counted. Poll workers must be carefully trained in the steps to be taken so if the 
provisional ballot voter casts the ballot in his or her correct precinct, that provisional 
ballot will be counted.  
Poll workers play critical roles on Election Day in matters other than with provisional 
ballots and sending voters to the correct precinct table. They decide if a prospective 
voter’s signature is sufficiently like that found on the registration record to permit the 
person to vote. Poll workers also set up the polling place, the precinct table, the voting 
equipment, and the flags and signs so voters can find their way into the right location and 
efficiently cast their ballots. With the DRE system, the poll workers “encode” or 
authorize the “voter access card” that tells the voting machine to let someone cast a ballot 
and what kind of ballot. Where groups of “loiterers” can illegally seek, for instance, to 
persuade a voter standing in line to vote that it is “not a good idea,” poll workers serve as 
the first line of protection for voters from intimidation tactics. And after the polls close, 
the poll workers have the duty to pack up the voting records and protect them from harm 
until they pass custody to the transportation group that will deliver the votes to the BOE 
for tabulation. Beginning this fall in Ohio, poll workers will also be charged to check 
voters’ satisfaction of the new ID rules as a precondition for their voting.  
                                                 
13 Ohio mandates some complicated ballot rotation rules for candidates. 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 86 of 398 
Thus, the CCBOE’s poll worker staffing and training decisions are crucial determinants 
of voters’ rights to vote and to have their votes correctly tabulated. Additionally, the 
network that supports and supplies the voting locations can cause the polling locations to 
fail the voters if the ballots or other materials have not arrived or need to be re-supplied. 
Significant revisions must occur in every aspect of poll worker recruitment, training and 
staffing positions, and in the polling place support network, in order to deliver a quality 
election performance on every Election Day. 
Polling Place Personnel 
Positions created and duties 
CCBOE’s staffing approaches for the polling places 
4.1  Finding: Ohio statutory law mandates precinct staffing of four “Judges” no more 
than two of whom can be of the same political party. (See ORC §3501.22; ORC 
§3501.23). Additional polling place personnel positions may be created by a county BOE 
in its discretion. The CCBOE has changed its additional polling place support titles and 
the duties of these positions depending on the year and type of election. For November 
2004, the CCBOE created the “Inspector” position, who served as a general trouble-
shooter and greeter for voters at the polls. For the transition to e-voting, the CCBOE 
eliminated the Inspector position and substituted the Election Day Technician (“EDT”). 
From roughly 2004 forward, some precincts have also received a High School Assistant 
who is a trained, normally 17-year old who can assist the other poll workers. (See ORC § 
3503.07). The position of “Rover” has also been filled when the CCBOE faces a complex 
election; these are individuals who can be sent as trouble shooters to the polling 
locations, and who can deliver supplies from the regional zones. [Interviews with Booth 
Officials Department; with Board Members; with Director and Deputy Director] 
4.2  Finding: In addition to the assigned Judges and polling place personnel, the CCBOE 
has created additional reserves for staffing the polling places. For the May 2nd 2006 
election, these included: (1) at the regional “zone” stations around the county, some 
trained EDTs ready to be assigned to replace or assist those already at the polling 
locations; (2) by city, a list of trained, substitute poll workers who were standing by 
waiting for a phone call alert on Election Day or the Monday night before, in case they 
were needed; and (3) a reserve pool of workers stationed at the Fraternal Order of Police 
building in Cleveland from roughly 5:30 am-11:00 am, ready to be dispatched if they 
were needed. [Interviews with Booth Officials Department Managers and former 
managers; with Board Members; testimony from substitute workers at the Public 
Hearings] 
Problems and recommendations for major reform  
4.3  Finding: Numerous problems existed in personnel staffing prior to the May 2006 
election. Because of the exceptional demands of the e-voting transition, unresolved prior 
problems were greatly exacerbated on May 2nd. The issues included: poorly trained 
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polling personnel; insufficient staffing for certain duties; lack of crucial supplies; polling 
place personnel who had a poor work ethic being returned repeatedly to poll worker 
positions; error-filled or ambiguous Manuals for poll workers; lack of BOE interest in 
broader recruitment or hiring of others who wanted to be poll workers; no evaluations of 
polling place staff; no effective assessments of errors occurring at the polls for rethinking 
polling place training; plus many others. (The Training and Manuals issues will be 
addressed below.) [“Pink Sheet” Incident reports, Election Day Technician incident 
reports; ESI poll worker survey; press reports after May 2nd election; Republican 
Inspector report summary from 2004 and Democratic challenger reports from 2004] 
4.4  Finding: Poll workers’ morale is low. Many factors contribute to their low morale. A 
wide perception exists that the CCBOE is not concerned with redressing the problems at 
the polling locations but is quick to blame poll workers for any problems that occur. In 
addition to disregarding poll worker feedback on issues that need to be redressed, factors 
generating low morale include:  
• Inadequate and inconsistent training on new technologies and processes; 
• Absence of performance evaluations, which implicitly communicates to poll 
workers that the CCBOE does not care about the quality of their performance; 
• Lack of attention to and appropriate action regarding poll workers who have 
difficulty understanding training or performing their duties; 
• Absence of year-round communications initiatives to stay in touch with poll 
workers and deliver small-scale, inexpensive year-round training enhancements; 
• Inattention to the needs of polling place workers for consistent, well-managed 
supply logistics on Election Day; 
• Poor or nonexistent support for inquiries and emergencies on Election Day, 
including an inability to reach the CCBOE because of busy phone lines or 
excessively long phone queues; 
• Outdated, inconsistent and confusing paperwork poll workers are required to 
complete; 
• Sloppiness in payroll accounting, and delays in payment of poll worker wages; 
• Low pay and extremely long hours. 
[“Pink Sheet” Incident reports, Election Day Technician incident reports; ESI poll 
worker survey; press reports after May 2nd election; Republican Inspector report 
summary from 2004 and Democratic challenger reports from 2004] 
4.5  Recommendation: A comprehensive reform of CCBOE poll worker positions, 
training, support systems, and staffing policies must be undertaken, as will be discussed 
below. 
Additionally, the CCBOE should study the Best Practices and guidebooks that the 
U.S. Election Assistance Commission has funded on poll worker recruitment, training, 
and retention. These materials are presently in draft form, while they are being tested and 
vetted more fully before being issued nationally. Because the CCBOE must move quickly 
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to institute a quality poll worker program in all respects, the CCBOE should consult and 
incorporate the wealth of wise, practical recommendations from these draft studies. The 
Panel perceives no benefit in rehearsing these nationally generated proposed Best 
Practices here but will from time to time refer explicitly to them. The entire set of 
recommendations should be consulted—both the College poll worker study, undertaken 
by Cleveland State University’s Center for Election Integrity, and the more general poll 
worker study, conducted by the Poll Worker Institute. 
4.6  Finding: The number of names the CCBOE uses for poll workers confuses the 
public and the poll workers, and retards the ability of the CCBOE to define and clarify 
roles. As noted below, some names are also inconsistent with the statutes, which also 
fails to remind the CCBOE and the public that Ohio statutory law governs this area. 
4.7  Recommendation: The range of names the CCBOE uses for poll workers should be 
reduced. The Ohio statutes refer to precinct “Judges” and the “Presiding Judge.” The 
term “Booth Official” should be eliminated entirely, including from the name of the 
department in charge of the polling personnel. The generic “poll worker” encompasses all 
who work at the polling place under the auspices of the CCBOE. The “Judges” are the 
statutorily mandated precinct personnel who have particular legally imposed duties. The 
“additional personnel” are discretionary with the BOE; we recommend that the titles 
chosen have some permanence. Also, any new position should not replicate a title 
previously used that is now assigned a different set of duties. The legal standards should 
be consulted and obeyed when enunciating tasks at the polls. See ORC §3501.22. 
4.8  Finding: Several hundred poll workers (Precinct Judges and EDTs) did not appear to 
work at the polls on May 2nd. Many of these absences were documented at the required 
precinct poll worker meetings on Monday evening and called in by attending poll 
workers. Other absences were the subject of early morning calls to the CCBOE. 
[Interview with Booth Officials Department Managers and staff] 
4.9  Finding: No reliable data exist on exactly how many poll workers attempted to 
withdraw from being assigned to work on May 2nd. Data and personal testimony 
demonstrate that many did call and withdraw, or attempt to mention as they left the 
training session that they would not work on May 2nd. But names were not necessarily 
removed from the precinct assignment list, even when CCBOE Booth Officials staff 
received the call themselves. Additionally, the practice of the Booth Officials Department 
has been to assign to a precinct anyone who attended poll worker training without the 
trainee having to indicate in some declarative fashion that she/he desired to work in a 
particular election. The same practice was followed for the May 2nd Election Day. 
Although the department manager stressed to our investigators and repeatedly internal to 
the CCBOE that he knew the CCBOE would experience higher rates of dropping out 
after training, the department did not institute procedures to accurately identify those who 
were dropping out and those who intended to work. Thus, the department was able to lull 
itself into a false sense of security about the numbers of poll workers intending to work 
on May 2. [Interviews with Booth Officials Manager; with Booth Officials Department 
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staff; with former Booth Officials Managers and staff; with Administrative Assistants; 
Public Hearing testimony] 
4.10  Finding: All poll workers, including Judges and EDTs, were required to complete 
CCBOE-sponsored training in the new e-voting procedures. After the first two weeks of 
Booth Officials training, Director Vu requested that the Registration Assistant Manager 
conduct a telephone survey (using staff in her area) of those poll workers who had been 
retrained thus far to determine their confidence level in the new training and e-voting 
procedures. The Booth Officials Department received the results of this survey on an 
almost daily basis. The survey results showed that fully 80% of the poll workers felt that 
their training was deficient. [Interviews with department managers]  
4.11  Recommendation: This survey should have been another early warning signal that 
the drop-out or no-show rate would be high, and that additional poll worker recruitment 
and training needed to occur. Unfortunately, as discussed in the Management and 
Personnel chapter below, the Director and Deputy declined to assign the Booth Officials 
Department manager additional personnel to handle the logistics and supplies for the poll 
worker training sessions, and so Mr. Thomas spent his time as a just-in-time delivery 
person instead of trouble-shooting and managing the polling place recruitment and 
staffing situation. The CCBOE Executive Managers should have authorized sufficient 
staffing so that the department manager could perform his managerial tasks for May 2nd 
polling place staffing. 
4.12  Finding: Several different CCBOE offices were involved in recruiting the various 
types of poll workers for May 2nd. The Administrative Assistants of the Board Members 
were placed in charge of recruiting the Election Day Technicians (EDTs) and scheduling 
them for training. The Booth Officials Department continued with its normal function of 
recruiting and assigning the Precinct Judges. The Community Outreach Department 
assisted in the recruitment of Precinct Judges and took a larger role in High School 
Assistants recruitment. At least some Outreach staff refused to help recruit for the EDTs. 
Some Booth Officials Department staff and managers perceived the assignment of EDT 
recruitment as an attack on their competency. The Administrative Assistants 
acknowledged feeling embattled; they did not request the EDT recruitment and 
scheduling role, and yet were criticized and felt undermined for seeking to perform the 
task assigned by the Director. [Interviews with Booth Officials employees and 
Administrative Assistants, reports of several EDTs affected] 
4.13  Finding: The new role of the EDT created various staffing and recruiting 
competition and conflicts. The Booth Officials Manager warned that any Booth Official 
choosing to become an EDT would be removed from the Booth Official pool and could 
not return to the polls as a Booth Official in the future. This stance was an attempt to 
discourage the depletion of Booth Official ranks in favor of more highly-paid EDT jobs, 
but was also a competitive move between BOE staff that kept experienced Judges from 
taking on greater responsibilities as EDTs. [Interviews with Booth Officials employees 
and Administrative Assistants, Public Hearings; reports of several EDTs] 
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4.14  Recommendation: A recommendation in the Management and Personnel Chapter 
advises that the Human Resources department should be the primary mechanism for 
developing the recruitment strategies and credentials, including background checks, for 
all temporary and permanent hiring. The Administrative Assistants should continue to 
recruit but should be able to forward all the applicants’ names to the HR Department for 
further development of their credentials. Splitting the recruitment efforts among multiple 
departments and having them compete against one another for filling positions not only 
wastes scarce energies and undermines agency teamwork, but also does not allow the 
CCBOE to put its best foot forward in using sound and creative recruitment strategies. 
None of the CCBOE staff currently involved in poll worker recruitment has special 
relevant expertise. Only one staffer has an educational background relevant to these tasks, 
and as it is not the primary area of her CCBOE work, she does not spend time trying to 
further develop these skills. 
4.15  Finding: The concept and role of the EDT evolved over time before the May 
election and differed between the various instructors and Booth Department officials. 
Different representations to different poll workers about who was in charge of each type 
of function led to role confusion and conflicts at the polling place. According to some 
EDTs participating in the focus groups the Panel conducted after the election, they were 
instructed simply to support the Judges and told that the Judges would know how to do 
their jobs. Many of the Judges, however, were told that they would “not have to touch” 
the voting machines and all they had to do was sign people in. This inconsistency in 
directions angered many of the Judges, because they felt as though they were being 
deceived by the CCBOE. These issues, which occasionally were grave, could have been 
avoided with more careful planning and conceptualization of the various positions, and 
more consistent and explicit training and materials. [Focus Groups; Public Hearings; 
EDT reports] 
4.16  Recommendation: The polling place staffing should be restructured to achieve 
several objectives: (1) comply with the Ohio statutes, (2) provide sufficient guidance and 
assistance for voters and the poll workers, and (3) be able to deal with any emergency 
situations. All personnel for a given polling location should undertake their initial 
training as a group, at the same time. The EDT position should be eliminated, with the 
skills and expertise of that position replaced by appropriate training of Precinct Judges as 
described below. All Election Day positions that are designed to provide support to the 
Precinct Judges should be filled with those who have had experience (and good reviews) 
as Judges. In addition to the Judges, and forming a hierarchy of knowledge and 
experience, positions should be created for Polling Location Supervisors and Rovers. 
Zone Call Centers should be created and dispersed throughout the County, so that any 
missing supplies and information can be provided without long telephone queues, busy 
signals and long delivery wait times. An outline follows. 
Precinct Judges: As mandated by statute, there should be four Judges in each 
precinct with one designated to be Presiding Judge on the basis of membership in the 
dominant political party. See ORC §3501.22. Generally, the statute has been 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 91 of 398 
interpreted and applied at the CCBOE as requiring the Judges to be two Democrats 
and two Republicans (or 1 Republican and 1 Independent/Not Affiliated). 
The Panel recommends that the CCBOE adopt a practice that has well served 
other Ohio BOEs: require all four Judges to attend the same one day “core training.” 
This training should be designed to cover the basics of all polling place tasks. (This 
joint training also allows trainers to identify any personality conflicts so that poll 
workers can be reassigned before Election Day.) After the core training, each Judge 
should choose a specialty, either “paper/administrative rules” or “voting 
machines/tech” so that two Judges in each precinct become expert in each side of the 
tasks. The Judges must choose specialties so that one Judge from each political party 
is an expert on each side (meaning that the Republicans cannot choose to be technical 
specialists and the Democrats the administrative specialists.) Following the core 
training, the Judges should be required to attend in-depth training in their specialty 
area (preferably on a different day). 
This approach will mean that the EDT position can be eliminated, and role 
confusion and conflicts can be greatly reduced. The Ohio statutes appear to require 
that any polling place personnel other than the Judges must be paired by party 
(instead of having one R or one D, one of each must be assigned. Clarification should 
be sought from the SOS Election Division.) On the basis of the statutory criteria, the 
interactions of the Judges at the training session, and the evaluations of the trainers 
and Booth Officials staff present at the training session, the CCBOE selects the 
Presiding Judges. Further, given that the responsibility for memory cards rests with 
the Lead Precinct, the CCBOE can select the Presiding Judge who, on the basis of 
experience and leadership seems best suited for being the lead Precinct Judge and for 
handling the Memory Card bag(s). 
Location Supervisors: These positions should, over time, be treated as a promotion 
from the Precinct Judge position. Those assigned should be experienced polling place 
personnel, including past political party “challengers” and “observers.” Recruitment 
for this position must occur months in advance. Unless the SOS clarifies otherwise, 
two supervisors must be assigned per location, one Democrat and one Republican or 
nonaffiliated, with one being named the Lead Supervisor and the other the Assistant 
Supervisor. Each of these positions can be treated as a split shift with two people 
trading off after a brief overlap mid-day, working as a pair. (In a paired split shift, 
each person must agree to continue to work if the other in the pair fails to appear, and 
the hours should still overlap slightly so that there can be time for the two people to 
transition.) The Supervisors will handle specific duties as well as serve as 
troubleshooters. 
Those assigned to the Supervisor position must train with the Judges in their 
polling locations, and then receive the additional job-specific training that the 
Training Coordinator or consultant prescribes. The specific duties of a Supervisor 
should include: greet the voters and help direct them to their correct precinct; assist 
with voting machine set up and be in charge of the machine placement that will best 
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assure voter privacy and safety from tripping on cords; manage the Monday night 
meeting of poll workers at each polling place; determine appropriate precinct table 
placement; check for correct signage/flags; place orders for missing supplies; identify 
and eliminate voter intimidation tactics; ensure that the payroll cards are completed 
and returned; check for correct security seals on supply bags after closing; assist in 
take down of the machines; serve as a consultant on Certificate #1 and any other 
matters that the Judges request; evaluate the poll workers; and assure that incidents 
are properly reported. The Supervisors may assist the Judges and substitute for them 
during breaks. The Supervisors may also reassign Judges if certain precincts have 
more difficulties than others, or if personality conflicts occur. The Polling Place 
Supervisor must have a personal cell phone to facilitate communication with the 
CCBOE. 
Rovers: Rovers should be the most highly trained and competent personnel fielded 
on Election Day. Each Rover should be assigned eight to ten polling locations (or 
perhaps a Ward) and should rotate the whole day between his or her assigned 
locations. The Rovers must have prior experience and excellent reviews working in 
the polls as a Judge, EDT, Inspector, Rover, or Challenger. Each Rover must have 
personal transportation. Rovers can also work half-days, splitting the jobs, so as to 
permit a broader number of persons to be involved. 
Training and Evaluation Essentials: As mentioned above, all polling place 
personnel should be assigned to the same training session for team building and 
evaluations for lead roles. At the end of training, all personnel should have to take 
and pass a two-part test. The written portion should be a test (for instance, graded by 
an optical scanner) having 20 questions (but with numerous versions — reordering 
the same questions so it is both fair but cheating can be largely defeated). In addition, 
there must be a dexterity and basic literacy evaluation, where each Judge and other 
official can be evaluated for basic ability to read, to hear and to write effectively since 
each of these skills is required of a Judge, Supervisor, and other personnel. These 
evaluations need to be designed to preserve maximum dignity and yet also identify 
those who lack the skills for the tasks to be discharged on Election Day. If an 
applicant does not pass the test, the CCBOE should provide another opportunity to 
complete the training and retake the test (with no additional pay for the second 
training). If a Judge fails the test two times, the person should not be allowed to work 
at the polling place on Election Day but might be offered a position in the CCBOE 
offices in another temporary position such as opening absentee ballots. 
The Lead Precinct and all Presiding Judges will be selected at the training. The 
Lead Precinct will be in charge of the Red Supply Bag containing the memory cards 
and special supplies for use by the entire polling location. 
Substitutes for Judges: The substitute Judges must attend the entire training 
program, including the specialty training. Substitutes should be recorded by specialty 
so that they can be assigned according to the specialty that is needed by a particular 
poll worker absence. The CCBOE must recruit at least as many substitute Judges as 
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in previous years. The substitute Judges must be available for call between 5:00 AM 
and 11:00 AM on Election Day, and their phone numbers must be confirmed before 
Election Day. 
Reserve Poll Workers, Formerly Called “Pool Workers”: We recommend the 
elimination of the “pool worker” term as it is confusing. Ideally, the former “pool” 
will be eliminated and students — both high school and college — will be recruited 
to be the reserve workers. Those who desire to be placed in reserve must still be 
interviewed, selected, and trained. While the CCBOE has generally filled the former 
“pool” with individuals currently undergoing rehabilitation for crimes and drug 
abuse, the evidence before the Panel suggests these sources of poll worker reserves 
should end. Complaints and concerns have been raised repeatedly by fellow poll 
workers and by voters. 
Zone Support: The CCBOE should create 8 -12 zones stations across Cuyahoga 
County, each complete with supplies, support, telephone lines and staffing. Each 
voting location should be given one phone number to call to reach their Zone 
Support, with one back-up (nearby) Zone Support number provided. Each Zone 
Support station should have knowledgeable, trained staffers who can (1) answer 
questions regarding voting location issues that are not successfully resolved by the 
Supervisors such as voter IDs and provisional ballots voter access, security and 
electrical outlet problems; (2) dispatch needed supplies using their own zone delivery 
personnel; (3) contact substitute poll workers and assign them to a an understaffed 
precinct; (4) dispatch replacement DRE units and technical personnel. The zone 
workers can be hired to work split shifts, rotating for alertness and to reduce stress. 
Each of the zone workers who answers calls must receive specialized training in 
the various categories of possible questions/problems. Each call should have an intake 
procedure that allows for its speedy redirection to the appropriately trained personnel. 
The zone stations should be designed only to respond to poll worker calls and to 
requests for action that are made from the voter hotline personnel who believe a 
matter (such as late opening) requires the zone’s attention. Delivery personnel must 
be trained in the parking options for all voting locations and in all duties of their 
position. These delivery personnel should also be reassigned over the election cycle, 
if possible, to the same geographic area so they can build relationships and 
knowledge of an area.  
The Board of Elections has persistently underestimated the volume of phone calls 
on major election days or has not sufficiently resolved the problem with temporary 
phones. This must be resolved before November 2006. Well-trained voting location 
supervisors would relieve some of the zone back-up, but not all of it.  
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The new technology requires more time for polling location set up and break down. 
4.17  Finding: Insufficient staffing was provided for setting up the DREs on Election 
Day morning. Additionally, closing down the machines and other tasks when workers are 
tired requires a better staffing approach. 
4.18  Recommendation: The proposed new structure of half the Judges fully trained in 
the technology aspects, plus the location supervisors assisting in setting up machines, 
supplemented by an expanded High School Assistants program (discussed below), should 
solve the set-up and closing down problems. 
Recruitment efforts 
4.19  Finding: Recruiting adequate numbers of poll workers has been difficult for the 
Booth Officials Department staff (both temporary and permanent) charged with this task. 
Poll worker recruitment efforts have occurred predominantly on an ad hoc basis. This 
past spring, the severe shortfall below the required number of workers became apparent 
by the third week of April, with little time left for recruiting and training additional poll 
workers before the May 2nd election. The CCBOE staff currently make few efforts to 
recruit a competent and diverse demographic of people to run the polls. Recruiting is 
often done at the last minute. Ward leaders play a large role in the recruitment and 
assignment of poll workers, as they have been accorded the authority by the Board to 
nominate and essentially place in precincts those whom they select to work. [Interviews 
with Booth Official Department employees] 
4.20  Finding: A troubling, false presumption runs through the CCBOE staff who recruit 
for polling place positions: there is little public interest in these poll worker “jobs,” that 
any “warm body” is all one can expect. Staff consider ward leaders an important source 
for filing these unwanted jobs. No significant creative effort has been expended on 
recruitment strategies, and qualified experts have not been retained to assist in developing 
better recruitment strategies. [Interviews with CCBOE staff and managers] 
4.21  Recommendation: CCBOE staff involved in Election Day staffing recruitment 
should cease thinking of poll worker positions primarily as jobs for those who are 
unemployed. These roles are closer to being volunteer positions with a relatively low 
expense stipend or monetary contribution offered for giving up one’s time and for 
helping to defray costs of transportation and food. Although this extra money is 
unquestionably very helpful to individuals who are economically stressed, the CCBOE 
needs to be more broadminded about who is available and potentially interested in filling 
these Election Day positions. The CCBOE staff need to think of this position as a public 
trust that many Ohioans are interested in fulfilling, especially given that our State has 
been under fire for its election practices. It is laudable for the CCBOE to offer these 
positions to those who have an economic need for the compensation, but only if the 
persons are capable of fulfilling the duties assigned to them. The first and non-negotiable 
requirement for filling poll worker positions of any kind must be whether the person can 
handle the duties imposed by law and assist valid voters to cast ballots correctly. 
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4.22  Finding: The Administrative Assistants came the closest to having a project plan 
for recruitment of EDTs, but their efforts were undercut by a short period for recruitment 
and by competition with the Booth Officials Department They sought a meeting with the 
Center for Election Integrity early on, and included the Manager of the Booth Officials 
Department, so that coherent, creative strategies could be explored. [Interviews with 
Administrative Assistants; with Booth Officials Department Manager] 
4.23  Recommendation: The CCBOE staff charged with poll worker recruitment and 
placement need to study the range of recruitment strategies that can be found in the EAC 
College Poll Worker Guidebook (draft) and the EAC general Poll Worker Guidebook 
(draft). Some strategies to be adopted include partnering: with colleges and universities; 
with businesses; with civic and charitable organizations; and with other government 
entities. Some potential partners could “adopt” a polling location and commit to staffing 
it (or assisting in staffing it) every election. Other entities may be willing to use their 
considerable energies to promote employees and others to volunteer for these positions, 
as President Michael Schwartz of Cleveland State University did just prior to the May 
election. At the time the CCBOE Board made its request for the University’s assistance, 
it had just learned that perhaps as many as 200 poll worker positions were unfilled 
because of late drop outs. President Schwartz sent out a broadcast email to the entire 
university community within 24 hours of the request, and University employees and 
students filled all remaining training slots with a 100% show rate. This response 
underscores that the public interest exists; it just needs to be tapped in the right way. And 
the CCBOE staff needs to become more creative and enthusiastic about building new 
recruiting relationships and strategies. The public is interested in these positions. 
4.24  Recommendation: Another site for new recruitment may be found at the polling 
places, where information should be provided on how to become a poll worker. One 
Panel member recruited four persons on May 2nd at one voting location. With more 
polling location positions and a ladder for promotion, Judges will be more open to 
recruiting others as precinct workers. They can be encouraged to replace themselves so 
they might move up the ladder into a supervisory role or to work less frequently. 
4.25  Recommendation: When undertaking new recruitment efforts to expand the pool 
of workers, it is important to show CCBOE interest in all citizens of any age, of any 
background, and of all ethnicities. The CCBOE needs to ensure that while seeking to 
expand the base of interest in these positions, the highly knowledgeable and very capable 
current Judges (who might be retirees) do not mistake the new recruitment efforts as a 
rejection of them and their contributions. Clear CCBOE appreciation of them, and the 
request that they remain part of the poll worker system, is essential. Unless care is taken 
to develop a clear and appreciative message, it would be easy for some of these highly 
experienced poll workers to assume that they are being pushed out. 
4.26  Recommendation: Much more active recruiting initiatives must be developed, 
involving greater numbers of creative and skilled staff. Some other Ohio counties nurture 
corporate partnerships for poll worker recruiting, where the firms view Election Day 
service as not unlike jury duty and compensate workers at their regular pay rate. Such 
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firms should receive special recognition in newspaper announcements for this community 
service. Franklin County's aggressive corporate recruiting effort attracted 350 poll 
workers from two major businesses alone, and that County’s director expressed a goal of 
50% non-traditional (corporate and student) poll worker staffing by the fall of 2006. 
Franklin County has been drawing on the strategies in the draft EAC guidebooks, as 
should the CCBOE. 
Other Ohio counties undertake poll worker recruiting at events such as fairs and 
festivals. Many counties are targeting government agencies, schools and churches, and 
utilize radio, newspaper and television advertising as well as poll worker newsletters. 
Franklin County is moving toward a year round recruitment effort. A number of Lorain 
County staff members recruit poll workers in addition to their other assigned duties. 
The CCBOE should identify and strive to meet a concrete recruitment goal from 
nontraditional sources for the November 2006 election. 
4.27  Recommendation: Offering additional paid training opportunities can serve as 
recruiting incentives. Franklin County has a Certified Precinct Judge program which 
offers a certificate when a worker completes eight (8) additional hours of paid training 
and a successful evaluation. Its director reported that the extra money earned for the 
training is a strong incentive. Creative methods can be used to provide additional 
compensation to poll workers while complying with the statutes. [Interview with Director 
Damschroeder] 
4.28  Recommendation: Ward leaders should be encouraged to continue to suggest poll 
workers, but candidates for poll worker jobs will have to satisfy the requirements for 
training and evaluation. After training, they must be able to qualify at certain basic levels, 
perform adequately on post-training evaluations, and accept assignments to precincts 
where their skills are most needed. Please see the Quality Assurance and Continuous 
Improvement proposal for more details, Appendix F. 
College poll worker recruiting 
4.29  Finding: Colleges are an underutilized recruiting resource. The high school poll 
worker program (discussed below) is growing slowly, but a similar program at local 
universities and colleges (including community colleges) has yet to be developed.  
4.30  Recommendation: The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has funded A 
Guidebook for Recruiting College Poll Workers, which is currently being test run in pilot 
programs across the nation. The guidebook offers guidance on issues of recruitment 
methods, incentives, training, and retention. Many colleges exist within the County where 
recruiting can occur. At the very least, colleges should be informed of the need for poll 
workers and asked to contact their student population through the volunteer services 
office and various other applicable departments. The Center for Election Integrity’s draft 
Guidebook for the EAC suggests that these efforts should start early, at least ten months 
before an election. The Guidebook also recommends working with campuses that have 
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large numbers of in-state residents so that the students can fulfill the poll worker 
residency requirements. Director Vu has agreed that the CCBOE will serve as a Pilot 
Program for the College Poll Worker Program this fall. This participation entails 
implementation and close evaluation of the draft Guidebook containing emerging 
national Best Practices. [Interviews with Abigail Horn and Director Vu] 
4.31  Recommendation: When parity between political parties must be achieved for 
certain poll worker duties, the CCBOE has had difficulty filling Republican positions due 
to County voters being more heavily Democratic. Here again the colleges might prove to 
be a useful resource. Many colleges offer student-run Democratic and Republican clubs. 
These sources might be particularly valuable for locating Republican poll worker 
personnel.  
High School poll worker recruiting 
4.32  Recommendation: State law permits 17 year olds to register to vote in primaries 
where the general election will occur after they turn 18. See ORC §3503.011. State law 
also permits these registered 17 year olds to act as precinct officials if positions otherwise 
remain unfilled. See ORC §3501.22(C & D). This program has received applause from 
both poll workers and voters and should be expanded. The program not only supplies 
precinct workers but also functions as an educational program for young voters who are 
introduced to the electoral process through their poll worker experiences. These younger 
individuals working at the polls were described by many poll workers as being especially 
helpful with the new machines due to their generally strong technological aptitude and 
comfort level.  
4.33  Recommendation: Recruitment of high school poll workers needs to be both 
ongoing and aggressive. Retention can be a problem because students often move out of 
the area to go to college. In other counties, a local organization has partnered with the 
county’s BOE and then has handled recruitment and placement of high school workers 
completely. We recommend that the CCBOE seek to partner with nonprofit organizations 
that already have a presence in the high schools locally. An organization should be 
sought that is willing to take over recruitment and placement, with a commitment to 
expand the program into all County high schools. Franklin County recently partnered 
with a local chapter of the organization Kids Voting for a recruiting effort in high schools 
called “Youth at the Booth,” which garnered 500 student poll workers. Younger 
populations also can be targeted through different media, such as radio stations and 
public service announcements on television programs serving their age group. 
4.34  Recommendation: A genuine overture should be made to every high school, both 
public and private, for participation as poll workers so that students from every school 
and area can participate in this civic opportunity. Each school could be assigned 
particular polling locations for its students to support. As is the case now, the students 
would be trained at the schools. The duties of the students would replicate the duties of 
the Judges who have specialized in the technical precinct work. The students should be 
paired up so that each can work a half-day. In addition to the students who are assigned to 
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work half-days, the program should be structured to include groups of students who (1) 
pledge to be on-call, (2) are assigned to come in and assist specifically with closing up 
the polling place, or (3) have fluent language skills (Spanish and Chinese, for instance) 
and can be placed as translators at the locations where these languages are spoken by the 
voters in those precincts.  
4.35  Recommendation: The High School Assistant program should be a part of the 
Booth Officials Department The Community Outreach Department should facilitate 
recruitment for all types of temporary positions in the CCBOE but have no ongoing or 
primary responsibility for the High School Assistant program. 
Emphasis in recruiting of civic participation aspect of poll work 
4.36  Finding: The limits on pay for precinct workers which are mandated by Ohio law 
can make recruitment of qualified individuals difficult. Recruitment efforts currently lack 
much emphasis on the importance of civic participation; they simply state a job 
description (in a relatively uninteresting manner) and the pay rate. The manager of the 
Booth Officials Department indicated that those who participate in the process because of 
civic concern are more capable and reliable poll workers. [Interview with Dane Thomas] 
4.37  Recommendation: Recruitment messaging should be altered to emphasize public 
service aspects of the work in addition to the opportunity to earn some money. CSU used 
this form of recruitment which produced a 100% turnout rate for training compared to the 
low turnout rate for others. This example demonstrates that when the CCBOE urges 
people to “help improve Ohio elections,” instead of just approaching recruitment as a 
temporary job offer for low pay, the type of commitment and the range of interested 
persons can be quite different. [See President Schwartz’s broadcast email to the CSU 
community a few days before the election] 
Background checks of candidates for poll worker jobs 
4.38  Finding: The CCBOE has hired workers from temporary agencies to perform poll 
work and other jobs at the CCBOE offices. The temporary agencies impose a fee per 
person to conduct background checks for any legal violations that would render a 
temporary employee unqualified to work for the CCBOE on Election Day. HR 
Administrator Platten noted that the CCBOE does not conduct background checks on any 
temporary workers. For the May 2nd election, temporary agency invoices logged no 
charges for background checks. [Staffing agency invoices; interviews with Administrator 
Platten and Lisa Durkin] 
4.39  Recommendation: Background checks must be performed for poll workers. If 
adequate staff resources do not exist to do so in-house, the CCBOE should contract with 
an outside agency to conduct background checks on all prospective poll workers in order 
to comply with the legal qualification that no person convicted of a felony may act as a 
precinct election worker. ORC 3501.27(A). Alternatively, the law enforcement agencies 
should be contacted for guidance on procedures to follow (see Management and 
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Personnel). This will require recruiting early enough for the checks to be completed prior 
to applicants being offered positions and before the commencement of training. 
Reducing poll worker absenteeism on Election Day 
4.40  Finding: Preceding the election, the Booth Officials Department predicted that an 
unusually large number of poll workers, over 300, would not report to work on Election 
Day. In anticipation of this problem, the Booth Officials Department attempted to recruit 
extra workers, and additional training was offered to help deter drop-outs, but the steps 
taken were not as successful as had been hoped. The foreign or complex nature of new 
technologies and procedures, coupled with perceived inadequacy of training, scared away 
many poll workers who did not report for duty on the day of the election. [Incident 
Report analysis; EDT reports; Telephone surveys] 
4.41  Recommendation: Improved recruiting, additional higher-quality training, and 
objective evaluations following training should prepare workers more fully and screen 
out unqualified candidates or workers unable to make the transition to new voting 
technology. All of these measures will instill in poll workers a higher degree of 
confidence and decrease absenteeism. Although Lorain, Franklin, and Montgomery 
Counties recently instituted new voting processes, they reported no significant increases 
in no-shows among poll workers on Election Day. Among the actions undertaken in these 
other counties that have not been done either at all or to a comparable degree in 
Cuyahoga County are: 
• Careful evaluation of poll workers during and following training; 
• Remedial training or discharge of candidates who are not performing at adequate 
levels; 
• Additional training and practice opportunities, including certification programs; 
• Year-round communication through newsletters. 
Polling place work issues  
Length of Work Shift 
Finding: Some poll workers desire to have shorter work days than 15 hours. [Public 
Hearings] 
4.42  Recommendation: The BOE should experiment with having paired workers who 
apply together. The EAC Poll Worker Guidebooks offer some concrete suggestions for 
operationalizing this approach. 
Pink Sheet/Incident/Security 
4.43  Finding: Incident Reports, or “Pink Sheets,” are the primary mechanism by which 
the CCBOE has tracked problems at the polling places. All precincts are supposed to 
document the range of problems experienced on Election Day, and each poll worker and 
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Presiding Judge is required to sign the resulting report. The Pink Sheets should be an 
invaluable documented record of supply problems, voter registration problems, and 
operational difficulties. 
Numerous problems, however, regularly arise with using this procedure to collect 
critical information. First, the CCBOE could only manage to produce 1,260 of the 1,434 
total precinct Incident Reports. Many of these pink sheets were incomplete or blank. A 
number of these reports had not been signed by all poll workers, and several were 
completely unsigned. It is possible that precincts plagued with poll worker and EDT 
absences, mechanical failure, poor training, and inadequate supplies for the election were 
too overwhelmed to fully document the deficiencies. Even precincts with serious reported 
problems, such as failures to open the polls on time and long lines at the polls, neglected 
to include opening times or average wait times of voters. Often poll workers neglected to 
include whether an absent poll worker or EDT arrived or was replaced, whether a broken 
DRE or printer was repaired, or what steps were taken with any failure or success to 
remedy a problem. [Incident Reports analysis] 
4.44  Recommendation: The Pink Sheet should be replaced with quality control 
mechanisms that are generated by the Quality Control Manager (see Appendix F). Poll 
workers must be given sufficient motivation to document problems at their polling 
places. That motivation can come in the form of positive or negative reinforcement for 
their performance on this measure. 
Evaluations and remedial actions 
4.45  Finding: At present, no effective evaluation system has been established for poll 
workers. Moreover, the Booth Officials Department does not have a mechanism or 
database for retaining negative or positive information on the performance of Judges, and 
it rarely takes any remedial action to replace sub-par Judges. Mr. Thomas, the Booth 
Officials Department Manager, explained that ward leaders have tried to block remedial 
actions that he has taken. Mr. Thomas recognizes that the poll workers have varying 
commitments and capabilities for handling the poll worker job well. He also believes that 
strengthening the Department’s hand in removing underperforming poll workers would 
be a benefit for the voters, the CCBOE, and the poll workers. [Interviews with Dane 
Thomas] 
4.46  Finding: Other counties’ BOEs not only keep records on performance, but they 
also analyze the types of errors committed by poll workers at each precinct. Then they 
bring in these poll workers to the BOE offices for discussion, correction, and retraining. 
Cuyahoga’s BOE does not employ any of these corrective strategies. 
4.47  Recommendation: An effective evaluation process for poll workers must be 
developed. Until a Quality Control Manager can be hired to develop this process more 
fully, the CCBOE must create a simple list of criteria for evaluating Judges. The 
evaluation must be able to be completed quickly and in a manner ensuring that Judges are 
evaluated on the basis of consistent criteria. An area on the form should be provided for 
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discursive comments. The voting location Supervisors should evaluate each Judge. The 
Supervisor should be charged with handling the payroll cards and also placing this 
evaluation form in the same sealed envelope. At a later point, voters and other Judges 
should also be encouraged to evaluate all polling place personnel, with all the information 
logged for reference in deciding whether to rehire or promote a Judge or other official. 
4.48  Recommendation: Managerial consideration needs to be devoted to creating 
concrete performance structures and targets for CCBOE staff involved with poll worker 
recruitment, placement, and evaluation. If the staff is to start stressing capable 
performance from the poll workers they recruit, they must also be rewarded for their 
successes. Quality control checks must also be established so that staff will move 
assiduously toward generating high quality polling place performance. The new Quality 
Control Manager should be involved here, but until that person is hired, the department 
managers should work with staff to create a team approach to institute higher standards 
for poll worker performance. 
Election Day Support Structure for Polling Places 
CCBOE’s approaches 
4.49  Finding: In no interview with any CCBOE manager were Panel investigators able 
to obtain a complete list of the entire Election Day support apparatus. The lack of 
consistent knowledge demonstrates that the planning for the support system has not been 
a subject for careful thought and planning. Speaking with the executive managers in July, 
they were still not aware of the range and depth of nonperformance of the support 
structures on May 2nd. The Director and Deputy are aware of the CCBOE’s telephone 
queues and busy signals as a persistent problem on major elections, but they have not 
moved decisively to solve the problem — despite its existence on every major Election 
Day for several years. [Interviews with Managers, Executives] 
Ineffective CCBOE responses to requests from polling locations 
4.50  Finding: Various departments spread throughout the CCBOE handle different call 
centers and support functions. Departments involved include the Booth Officials, 
Election Support, and CVS (especially Registration workers). No coherent structure and 
plan integrates these activities and ensures that essential information is transferred to the 
personnel who can act effectively on the information to solve polling place problems. 
Thus, on May 2nd, rooms of EDTs sat without assignment although scores of polling 
places were missing personnel; the calls for these replacement staff did not arrive at the 
proper place for dispatch. Call centers politely received reports of missing but needed 
supplies, then stacked up the reports but did not act on them. CCBOE personnel handling 
calls were not effectively trained. In one center, staff were given a black binder but had 
not been alerted to their task—whether to record calls or to attempt to solve the problems. 
[Interviews with Managers] 
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4.51  Finding: Some Garden Valley poll workers, whose location did not open until 
nearly 1:00pm, claimed that they had called in information about their problems early on 
Election Day but no CCBOE staff responded. Although no record was found of such a 
call, one Panel member who acted as an election EDT noticed that the calling records 
also did not report a single one of her five calls spanning Monday night and Tuesday 
morning when she reported missing supplies, a printer problem, and missing poll workers 
(only five of eight present). It is conceivable but not capable of proof that the Garden 
Valley poll workers’ made efforts to obtain assistance but that they fell on deaf ears or an 
incompetent support system. [Interviews with poll workers; call center Logs] 
4.52  Finding: Poll worker calls to the CCBOE were not answered by knowledgeable 
officials on May 2nd. The calls from Election Day Technicians and Booth Officials were 
not directed to the proper authorities who could remedy the complaints. Staff assigned to 
the various CCBOE command or call centers have stated that they were not trained 
before being assigned the task of taking calls that came in. The roll over phone system 
was the only measure of directing the calls, which simply meant that if someone did not 
pick up the phone it would go to the next phone line in alphabetical order. Staff also 
indicated that on May 2nd when they answered the phones, they lacked the knowledge 
necessary for dealing effectively with the problems presented. They also commented that 
managerial backup was similarly befuddled by questions and problems that arose, 
especially concerning DRE problems. Touchscreens freezing, printer paper jamming, 
voter access cards sticking, DRE legs breaking, and other unfamiliar and unexpected 
events caused the staff to feel ineffective in their assigned roles. [Interviews with Booth 
Officials] 
4.53  Recommendation: The people answering phones at the command center need to be 
properly trained to respond to questions and problems called in by the poll workers. The 
Board of Elections may have to hire and train additional staff that will allow them to have 
enough people on the phones on Election Day who are competent enough to help poll 
workers with their questions. Logs should also be kept recording these problems, so that 
recurring questions and complaints can be addressed prior to the next election, and 
problems with e-voting equipment can be documented for vendor relief. 
4.54  Recommendation: To check on voters’ correct precincts, poll workers should be 
provided a separate phone number connecting to CCBOE staff where the CCBOE staff 
can access the registration database and provide accurate information. 
4.55  Finding: Zone stations, the central supply stations for polling places, were 
understaffed and insufficient in number. EDTs and Booth Officials experienced great 
difficulty in reaching the zone phone numbers, and the zone stations were incapable of 
promptly responding to the complaints that reached them. [Hearings, Incident Reports] 
4.56  Recommendation: All zone locations should be open the night before the election, 
staffed and ready to deliver missing supplies and equipment that night. In a major county-
wide election, the Panel recommends that 8-12 zone stations should be well dispersed 
around the county. This would help with the amount phone calls any one zone receives. 
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More zone stations would also assist a quicker disbursement of supplies and support, so 
that voting machines would be down for a shorter period of time and Judges and EDTS 
would need to spend less time on the phone. 
4.57  Finding: The zone stations had “Rovers” who were supposed to be on call to 
correct any problems at the polls, such as lack of supplies or technical problems. The 
staffing of the Rovers at the zone stations occurred primarily from the pool of EDTs. 
However, many of the EDTs had not been informed until Election Day that they would 
be placed in the zone stations. Even worse, many of the EDTs who were assigned to be 
Rovers did not have cars and could therefore not perform their assigned duties. 
[Interviews with the Administrative Assistants] 
4.58  Recommendation: The Rovers should be selected and informed of their placement 
prior to the day of the election. Under the Panel’s recommended restructuring of poll 
worker positions, the Rover would occupy the top run of the poll worker ladder. These 
positions should be filled by the most experienced and effective trouble-shooters the 
CCBOE has developed. Zone stations should be well staffed, and personnel stationed at 
the zones should be well trained and prepared to handle any issues polling locations may 
face. The zone stations should be placed in central locations within a geographical area, 
so that Rovers may move quickly between the zone station to a polling location. Lorain 
and Montgomery Counties use the Rovers to assist with machine set-up, which might 
help alleviate problems with late set-up times and problems with the new machines. The 
Panel also recommends that Rovers assist in set-up. 
4.59  Recommendation: More regional pick up and drop off locations for supply bags 
(that contained the memory cards) should be designated for Election night. Many poll 
workers reported that they had to drive much too far to drop off the bags Election night. 
Confusion about DESI Support: DESI did not provide on-site staff with expert 
knowledge of voting machines. 
4.60  Finding: Many poll workers had been told that DESI would supply a trained expert 
on site at each polling location to assist with voting machines. However, many poll 
workers reported that no one from DESI was present for most of the day, if at all. 
Additionally, DESI troubleshooters had often received less training and knew even less 
than the CCBOE-trained EDTs. [Interviews with DESI representatives and poll workers; 
Hearings] 
4.61  Recommendation: If the CCBOE has DESI workers assist at polling locations, 
DESI employees or contractors need to be far more knowledgeable about the DRE 
machines. No contracts should be executed with DESI for polling location support 
without explicit terms concerning the training and experience the DESI workers must 
have. 
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Training Issues 
Poll worker training was inconsistent, deficient in content and methods, 
and failed to develop the skills, understandings and confidence needed 
Planning the training for instructors and the poll workers 
As discussed in the Management and Personnel chapter, the CCBOE generated a 
significant drain on managerial staff time when it decided to draft itself two complete 
training manuals for poll worker training, one for Booth Officials and one for Judges. 
This diminished attention to training and recruitment efforts. 
4.62  Finding: The CCBOE Implementation Team, which included top management, had 
in its possession copies of a DESI Poll Worker Training Guide on 10/12/2005. DESI 
mailed copies to all members of the Implementation Team and sent hard copies to the 
Booth Officials Department and Kathy Dreamer at about the same that date. DESI 
contractor Joe Nista had agreed to supply a detailed class outline of the content of 
planned training courses to Deputy Director Dillingham by 10/19/2005. [Notes from 
Implementation Team meetings] 
4.63  Finding: Selected CCBOE staff attended Lorain County poll worker training and L 
& A testing, brought back a copy of Lorain County’s training manual, and reported 
favorably about the training to the Implementation Team at its 11/2/2005 meeting. Staff 
discussion occurred on observations, problems and suggestions relating to the training. 
[Notes from Implementation Team meetings] 
4.64  Finding: The Director and Deputy Director stated during the Panel’s investigation 
that they had never received and never viewed the DESI poll worker training manual that 
DESI and the Ohio SOS prepared for use in Ohio. Yet this was the same manual that 
Lorain County used, and was in the hands of the CCBOE Implementation Team in 
October 2005. [Interviews with Director and Deputy Director; interviews with CCBOE 
staff]  
4.65  Finding: The DESI Master Contract with the Ohio Secretary of State included a 
provision requiring DESI to provide a training manual for its DREs, and to train poll 
workers on its equipment. The CCBOE elected not to utilize these services which DESI 
was required to supply at no cost to the County.  
The Master Contract between DESI and the Ohio Secretary of State provides in 
pertinent part:  
The Vendor must provide: 
1. Extensive training programs for all poll workers and Board of Elections 
staff on all phases of the Voting System(s). Such training shall be 
sufficient to the point that State and Local Election personnel shall be able 
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to operate the system without continuous support by the Vendor. The 
training shall address…. [topics omitted] 
2. A detailed training program for each county, which shall include: 
[an extensive list of topics and services, including:] 
• Training materials for use by election personnel . . . 
3. The Vendor shall provide pre-election training of poll workers and Board 
of Elections staff prior to and through the first County-wide election. 
[Diebold-SOS Master Contract, page C-4 and C-5]  
4.66  Finding: A DESI instructor conducted the technical portion of Lorain County poll 
worker training. Administrative Assistants Linda Steimle and Betty Jones briefly reported 
to the Implementation Team meeting that they liked the DESI training, and recommended 
that Cuyahoga County use a training manual like that in Lorain County. Managers Dane 
Thomas and Betty Edwards reported that the Lorain County training was very good and 
presented the information well, and that if Cuyahoga could do the same thing, they were 
confident about this training. The Team meeting notes show Thomas advised that 
Cuyahoga could not afford to change anything once the training started, as it would have 
to train in excess of 6,000 people. Other comments included that the Cuyahoga training 
manual must be easy enough for a young adult to pick up and conduct an election simply 
by looking at the information with knowledge of what needs to be accomplished on 
Election Day. [Notes from 10/12/2005 and 11/2/2005 Implementation Team meetings.] 
4.77  Finding: Although no written document clarifies exactly who made the final 
decision to reject the DESI standard DRE training manual that was used in Lorain and in 
many other Ohio counties, Booth Officials Manager Dane Thomas stated that he 
recommended that Cuyahoga write its own simpler manual and that he author it. The 
Director clarified in an interview that CCBOE Executive Management approved this 
approach partly because of the philosophical position that the Director and Deputy 
Director had taken about establishing CCBOE independence from Diebold (including 
from Diebold’s trademark). Their objective was to demonstrate to voters that the CCBOE 
had maintained appropriate distance from the voting machine vendor. The Director 
specifically stated that he did not want two separate manuals at the polling locations, with 
one for administrative/legal information and one for technological; he desired one 
combined manual for all purposes. [Interviews with the Director and Manager Thomas]  
4.78  Recommendation: Establishing independence from a voting machine vendor is a 
two-edged sword, however. The CCBOE was not yet ready to fly the nest and 
professionally execute all functions requisite to the transition, including the writing of 
error-free and easy to follow poll worker manuals covering all legal, procedural, and 
technological functions. This is another example of the poor judgment exercised by 
Executive Management. CCBOE managers attempted far too much in the scant six 
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months available to move from punch cards to DREs and optical scanners. They should 
have used the Diebold training manual and focused on creating a firm foundation of 
knowledge and skills with the new technologies before expanding into more secondary 
tasks. The managers spread themselves too thinly and were consequently unable to 
perform any task well. For the August and November elections, the Panel recommends 
that Diebold’s training manual be used, supplemented with checklists and “Quick start” 
guides. 
4.79  Finding: The CCBOE worked with a DESI representative to create a schedule for 
all the “Train the Trainer” classes, where instructors would be trained in how to train 
EDTs and Booth Officials. Prior to the date training began,, the DESI instructor realized 
that she was unavailable for the March 20th EDT trainer class. She assured Booth 
Officials Manager Dane Thomas that someone from DESI would be present to lead the 
training. This did not occur, however; the CCBOE had to cancel the initial EDT classes 
because no one from DESI arrived to conduct the training. DESI’s Project Manager Hiner 
stated that DESI offered and was prepared to supply Cuyahoga a five-day, high quality 
technical training, but that the CCBOE rejected this offer. This offer and the 
performances it supposedly promised is not well supported by the facts concerning 
DESI’s disruptive absence from the EDT Train the Trainers classes. [Email between 
DESI Trainer Linda Merbach and Dane Thomas; Interview with Booth Officials Manager 
Dane Thomas on 6/27/2006; Interview with ITC representative on 6/22/2006; Jessica 
Hiner testimony at 6/29/2006 Hearing] 
4.80  Recommendation: Given that DESI did not provide the professional EDT trainer 
as promised, that EDT trainers as well as the EDTs themselves did not receive the 
professional curriculum taught by DESI’s expert trainers, and that DESI representatives 
have publicly asserted less than the complete truth about their role and nonperformance 
in CCBOE poll worker training, DESI should make amends for its training omissions and 
accusatory misstatements.  
4.81  Recommendation: The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor (or his designee) should 
thoroughly assess what portions of the Master Contract DESI failed to perform. With the 
assistance and support of the Ohio SOS, he should consider whether to demand legal and 
practical remedies from DESI, including specific performance of contractual provisions 
such as training services, and supplemental performances to compensate Cuyahoga 
County voters for the nonperformance of basic duties, and for its less that honest 
presentation of the facts concerning its recommendations and role in the training 
programs. More concretely, the Prosecutor should consider the following remedies: DESI 
to supply free of charge (and without SOS compensation under the contract extension 
that was recently negotiated): (1) a staff of highly competent trainers to assist in 
curriculum development for the Technical side of training (both core and advanced); (2) 
instructors for all Train the Trainers sessions; (3) lead trainers for the technical portions 
of all the Cuyahoga County poll workers training (who will be supported by assistant 
trainers taught in the Train the Trainers sessions); (4) competent, well-trained field 
representatives to assist Cuyahoga County polling locations with the November election. 
In light of past events, it is hardly too much to suggest that DESI should commit to 
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making Cuyahoga County a premier example of the quality of its training and support 
team’s quality by ensuring that the November 2006 election is first-rate in all technical 
aspects. 
Manuals and training procurement — details 
4.82  Finding: The CCBOE received notification of federal funding for improved poll 
worker education at least six months before seeking to write and then procure a poll 
worker training package of manuals and services. The Ohio SOS received over $1 million 
in federal HAVA funds to support Election Official training and Voter Education. In late 
May or June 2005, the CCBOE received notice of its portion of these funds; in round 
figures, the amount totaled $250,000. The CCBOE could have begun initially planning its 
poll worker training programs at that point. The CCBOE received a letter shortly 
thereafter from the CSU Center for Election Integrity. This letter, sent to 20 northeastern 
Ohio counties, suggested various ways to use the HAVA grant monies to upgrade poll 
worker training and voter education. The CCBOE, however, did not start its planning for 
improving poll worker training, even on the administrative guidance that had been 
problematic in past training efforts. Nor did it engage in planning for how to use these 
grant monies most effectively. [Interviews with Lisa Durkin and Administrator Platten; 
SOS notification letter; Center for Election Integrity letter] 
4.83  Finding: The DESI training manual arrived at the CCBOE by October 12, 2005, 
thus supplying an essential resource to begin development of Cuyahoga County Booth 
Official training for electronic voting. The decision to contract for external services to 
develop training materials and curricula is not well-documented. The DESI schedule list 
for the CCBOE May Election Calendar stated that the Request For Proposals (RFP) for 
supplying training and manuals was to issue 1/2/2006. This RFP, which is a formal 
request for outside services or products, issued several weeks after the calendar date, 
when barely 90 days remained before the May 2nd primary election. Only 4-6 weeks were 
available for the preparation and review of bids and the supply of all requested services.  
4.84  Finding: The RFP was sent by email to potential contractors. It was posted for the 
public on February 1. The pre-bid meeting, to explain the needs of the CCBOE for the 
training program and manuals creation, followed on February 2nd. The RFP declared 
February 6th at 11:00 am the close for all bids. This schedule meant that the CCBOE 
provided potential contractors approximately two business days between the time of the 
explanatory meeting and the date and time the proposals were due (for writing two 
training manuals, and detailing the curriculum for two types of Train the Trainer classes, 
plus general poll worker training classes). Poll worker training has been referred to by 
CCBOE Board Members as the “Achilles heel” of the May election. [Notes from 
10/12/2005 and 11/2/2005 Implementation Team meetings; transcript from the 4/3/2006 
CCBOE board meeting, pg. 39 line 5-22 and pg. 42 line 23; interview with Director Vu 
6/16/2006; CCBOE timeline, pg.2; Interviews with ITC and other bidders; RFP acquired 
from ITC; Cleveland Plain Dealer 2/1/2006] 
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4.85  Finding: The CCBOE received four bids ranging from $12,950 to $71,237. The 
standard of evaluation to be applied was “lowest and best” bid. [Interview with Brendan 
Gorman, Procurement Manager] The CCBOE procurement team selected the lowest bid. 
Their documents show that they rated all the proposals/bids. Without exception, the 
report stated the team’s ranked rating order from lowest to highest bid in strictly 
monetary terms. This CCBOE rating report implies that the team’s primary and perhaps 
even exclusive criterion for rating proposals was the bid amount, although the report 
attempts to identify deficiencies in each proposal. 
4.86  Finding: Because the recommended bid fell below the procurement threshold of 
$15,000, the executive management awarded the contract to the Institute of Technology 
Consulting (ITC). Contracts below the $15,000 threshold are exempt from having to be 
presented to the CCBOE Board, and thus it did not formally act on this contract. Manager 
Gorman stated that ITC had been in charge of training the CCBOE staff in its transition 
to a new telephone system, so the CCBOE team had confidence in the firm’s training 
skills. [Interviews with Gorman and ITC personnel] 
4.87  Recommendation: While saving the taxpayers’ money is a laudable objective, 
State law mandates that procurement decisions are to take into account more than simply 
the lowest bid. Ohio’s law reflects the common sense consumer understanding that “you 
get what you pay for.” Economies must be sought in public expenditures but by 
deploying wise, strategic judgment. The quality of services and materials must be taken 
into account in procurement and careful judgments made, especially on crucial items. The 
CCBOE executive management should have perceived effective training of poll workers 
as an investment not only in the May 2nd election but also as the opportunity for 
upgrading and rethinking poll worker training in a manner that corrected past, well 
publicized problems. By not beginning the planning, budgeting and procurement of these 
services in June 2005, the CCBOE lost crucial time and the value of the substantial one-
time-only federal funding. By leaving only 4-6 weeks for the manuals and curriculum 
development, no more than mediocrity could have been obtained from even the best 
contractor for these services. All procurements for elections must be researched and 
services/materials obtained on a schedule that permits high quality performance and 
quality control assurance (with penalties for nonperformance) by the procurement office. 
4.88  Recommendation: In contrast to the CCBOE’s approach to poll worker training, 
planning, and procurement, the Director started planning for additional DRE voting 
machine procurement in May 2005. By these actions, Director Vu’s relative valuation of 
voting technology versus the poll worker/human services factor comes into sharp relief. 
Vu demonstrated aggressive willingness to seek millions more for expenditure on voting 
technology but then disregarded the essential role of poll workers in allowing those 
voting machines to be used efficiently (or at all) at the polls. This set of values and 
priorities meant that the CCBOE has neglected to developed the human skills side of the 
Election Day equation. Successful Election Days depend on both the human and the 
technology factors; the CCBOE neglects either at its (and the voters’) peril. 
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4.89  Finding: No member of the CCBOE management team or its staff supplied the 
Panel with a copy of the initial draft of the Booth Officials Manual developed by ITC. 
The contractor was able to locate and supply to use the ITC initial draft. Managers and 
executive managers correctly reported that the draft Manual contained grammatical, 
spelling, and punctuation errors, as well as administrative procedure and technical errors. 
The RFP had specified that the Manuals were to be supplied in camera-ready condition. 
The Manual drafts also highlighted that the CCBOE had not developed certain essential 
policies and procedures to be used on Election Day. The situation so concerned Director 
Vu that he “took over” the revisions of the Manuals. [Interviews with Managers and with 
Platten; ITC draft] 
4.90  Finding: Pam Heschel of ITC stated that she spent three (3) times the amount of 
time she had predicted in her bid in attempting to perfect the two manuals. [Notes from 
10/12/2005 and 11/2/2005 Implementation Team meetings; transcript from the 4/3/2006 
CCBOE board meeting, pg. 39 line 5-22 and pg. 42 line 23; interview with Director Vu 
6/16/2006; CCBOE timeline, pg.2; Interviews with ITC and other bidders; RFP acquired 
from ITC; Cleveland Plain Dealer 2/1/2006] 
4.91  Finding: At a great cost to management time during the critical pre-election period 
in March 2006 when managerial attention was needed elsewhere. Director Vu informed a 
large proportion of the departmental managers (and their assistant managers) that their 
presence was required for developing the Manuals’ revisions and rewrites. The Director 
estimated in an interview that the CCBOE spent approximately $10,000 in staff time 
perfecting the manuals. The Panel estimates, however, that the revisions cost the CCBOE 
far greater costs than $10,000 because of the amount of time upper level management 
spent working on the manuals. Booth Officials Department Manager Dane Thomas stated 
that he personally spent at least sixty (60) hours rewriting the Manuals, and CCBOE 
documents show that top management held numerous long meetings to change the 
manual. At least 9 managers (and executive managers) attended the two 12 hour 
meetings, plus the additional 6 hour meeting in which the Manuals were jointly rewritten, 
and Executive managers were involved in further revision and editing throughout March 
and part of April. [Interviews with Dir and Dep; Depart managers] 
4.92  Finding: The Booth Official Manual was not available for use in the Train the 
Trainers sessions or were available in photocopied format. Despite numerous revisions 
extending past the commencement of training sessions for Booth Official training, the 
primary Manual went through at least six revisions. Early training classes were conducted 
using versions which later were superseded because errors were discovered and some 
initial polling place procedures were reconsidered. [Interviews with Pam Heschel; Dane 
Thomas; EDT Trainers]  
4.93  Finding: Despite these repeated revisions, the final version of the Booth Officials 
Manual contained both grammatical and functional errors. It conflicted both with the 
DESI reference guide and with the training DVD sent by the CCBOE to Judges and 
EDTs a week or two before the election. Further, the Manual contained internal 
contradictions. A number of Booth Officials described the training manual as inaccurate 
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and extremely difficult to understand. The final manual provided for use on Election Day 
contained substantial errors which affected Booth Official’s ability to set up and 
configure voting machines for voting on Election Day, creating delays and frustrating 
both voters and poll workers. [Interview with Director Vu 6/16/2006; Email sent from 
Director Vu to all managers and assistant managers on 3/8/2006; Transcripts from 
CCBOE Monday meeting on 4/3/2006, pg. 39 line 5-22; Interview with Dane Thomas 
6/27/2006; Staff interviews; Final Booth Official Manual pg. 67 and pg. 55; Telephone 
Surveys; Incident Reports; Public Hearings] 
4.94  Recommendation: Given the need to develop a training program for over 6,000 
non-technical people on new technology and technical procedures, and the early 
availability of initial information resources, the process of training development should 
have begun far in advance of 90 days before the election. Training development should 
be overseen, and its delivery coordinated, by the recommended new CCBOE Training 
Coordinator. Outsourcing these services as a transitional matter may be wise so long as 
careful consideration of appropriate expertise and other qualitative factors is a major part 
of the ultimate procurement decision. Impaneling a small group of external advisors to 
evaluate the bids with an independent, critical, professional eye might be a wise move. 
An early timetable is essential to the outcome. 
4.95  Recommendation: Where development will be outsourced, the CCBOE should 
establish a longer minimum timeframe for submission of bids of this magnitude. Future 
RFPs should be detailed in a manner that communicates far better what skills and 
expertise will be needed to complete the job. Contractors should be selected on the basis 
of CCBOE requirements, the quality of the personnel and expertise offered by the 
prospective bidder, and proven ability to fulfill those needs — rather than with undue 
weight given to bid amount. 
4.96  Recommendation: For polling place use, we recommend use of the DESI manual, 
supplemented with checklists for the steps to be taken at the polls on each Election Day 
for each type of ballot or major function. A checklist is simply a short reminder list of 
points that should be broadly and deeply developed in an excellent poll worker training 
course. The checklist for use at the polling place cannot substitute for the training or for 
quality training materials. Checklists are valuable only if the poll worker has developed 
significant knowledge about what each checklisted step indicates.  
The checklists should be reviewed and revised in light of the specifics of each 
election, because the technical steps may change depending on the type of election. 
Administrative checklists need to be reviewed and updated in light of changes in 
Directives and federal and state election law. These steps cannot be skipped, and the 
materials produced must be reviewed by a qualified election attorney.  
Ideally all these materials (training materials keyed to Cuyahoga procedures plus 
checklists) will be prepared so far in advance of Election Day that they can be posted on 
the CCBOE website for comment. The process that we contemplate would also allow, as 
it must, the materials to be checked and rechecked for accuracy. Beginning their 
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production well in advance also permits the CCBOE to vet its drafts with poll workers, 
then correct them, and then vet them again. Election advocacy representatives can also 
provide useful commentary and guidance, which should be solicited.  
Issuing a contract for developing training materials, the checklists, and managing this 
review process would free up CCBOE managers to focus on other activities. 
Development should be started at the earliest possible date to allow adequate time for 
proofreading, content revision and testing with poll workers and advocacy groups. All 
materials must be developed and completed well in advance of training schedules (except 
for late-issued legal changes) so that poll worker training can be consistent and 
instructors are well-prepared. 
Train the Trainers: Ambiguous and confusing directions from DESI 
4.97  Finding: In a meeting between Manager Dane Thomas, Linda Merbach of DESI, 
and Pam Heschel of ITC, DESI required that CCBOE “halve” the training of trainers 
program which the department manager had scheduled for 50 individuals for five days. 
DESI did not clarify orally or in writing that its lead trainer meant that the number of 
trainers should be reduced to 25 and that all trainers should be present for five full days. 
The Manager shortened the training period to two and a half days for 25 each session in 
reliance on Merbach’s oral directions. [Interviews with Thomas and Heschel; Merbach 
email] 
4.98  Finding: At the Public Hearing (6/29/2006), DESI’s Hiner stated that Diebold’s 
consistent position has been that all poll worker trainers must be present for a full 5 days 
of training in order to be properly equipped as trainers. Hiner stressed that DESI flagged 
this problem for the CCBOE but Managers refused to accede to her advice. Although the 
Panel requested written documentation for Hiner’s claim that she warned the CCBOE 
that it was making a grave mistake, Diebold did not produce any written support. We 
have only an electronic message from DESI’s Merbach restating the training schedule 
that had been agreed (among her, Dane Thomas, and Heschel) of two and a half days for 
two sets of trainers to receive instruction. This DESI message fails to intimate in any 
manner DESI concern over the halving of training sessions for the trainers. [Merbach 
letter; 6/29/2006 Hearing Transcript] 
4.99  Recommendation: DESI should have advised the CCBOE immediately that grave 
problems would result from such abbreviated training of trainers. 
4.100  Finding: On the basis of Merbach’s ambiguous directions, the individuals to be 
trained to conduct Booth Official classes were divided into two groups. The CCBOE 
scheduled them for two and a half days of training that Merbach would conduct. The 
electricity went out during the first day of training, so the CCBOE had to extend training 
on the second day. When an extra day of training was offered as a refresher for all 
trainers, only about 20 of the total of 43 attended. Most of the trainers the CCBOE hired 
were retired teachers, many of whom had never served as poll workers themselves. 
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[Schedule list from Booth Officials Department Manager Dane Thomas 6/27/2006; DESI 
testimony, 6/29/2006 hearing; Interviews with trainers and Dane Thomas] 
4.101  Recommendation: It is unknown how vigorously DESI resisted this training plan 
in its oral comments by Merbach, or whether it offered an additional five days for 
Merbach to be available for the other half of the class. The Panel believes that by his 
actions and his documentation, the Booth Officials Manager had evidenced concern for 
establishing the highest quality training program, and was relying on DESI to advise him 
on what the program should include. The ambiguity in the DESI oral directive to halve 
the train the trainers program should have been clarified by Merbach instead of DESI 
taking advantage of the reliance and good faith of the Booth Officials Department 
Manager and his relative inexperience in the area of e-voting transition. 
If DESI was serious and consistent in its training recommendations for the Train the 
Trainer, it should have scheduled two five-day training classes. Each training class would 
have had 25 participants and received the full five days of training. This would have 
ensured that one group of trainers was prepared to begin training the initial groups of 
Booth Officials and that another group of trainers would be ready one week later. If, as it 
appears, DESI did not allocate an appropriate number of days for its poll worker trainers 
to be in Cuyahoga County (given its immense size with over 6000 poll workers), the 
failure should lie with DESI and not the CCBOE. Responsibility for DESI tightly 
scheduling its trainers and not taking into proper account Cuyahoga’s size and obvious 
needs for more than one 25 person Trainer class should rest on DESI and not the 
CCBOE. 
DESI should remedy its nonperformance/underperformance in March 2006 by 
providing, free of additional charge, two five-day training programs for trainers. 
4.102  Finding: A separate Train the Trainers issue concerns the EDT trainers. While 
DESI promised to have trainers present for this training session, no DESI personnel 
arrived on the appointed day. The EDTs were sent home and requested to return the next 
day. On that subsequent day, again no DESI personnel arrived, and a CCBOE manager 
tried to provide the training. 
4.103  Recommendation: A full-time agency-wide Training Coordinator position should 
be created. This position should be staffed by a professional with education and 
experience in instructional development for adult education, to coordinate training 
throughout the CCBOE including the training of Judges and other poll workers and 
temporary and permanent employees. The Training Coordinator should develop 
comprehensive training plans and outlines in accordance with established standards for 
training development. These plans should provide for the temporary teams of instructors 
the guidance they need to properly and consistently teach poll workers all that is needed 
for operating polling places on Election Day and upholding election laws. The manager 
of the Booth Officials Department concurs as to the value of professional training staff. 
See the Management and Personnel section for other recommendations about this 
position. 
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Curriculum and pedagogical considerations 
4.104  Finding: Two distinct types of activities and requisite information fell within the 
Booth Officials/Judges roles for the May 2nd training sessions: (1) technology 
information for e-voting and (2) administrative rules for processing voters, different types 
of ballots, the provisional ballot paper work, disabled voters, and certificate #1 
accounting, and other rules. Approximately 90% of the training time for Booth officials 
classes was devoted to technology issues, even thought the CCBOE conception was to 
turn over a good deal of the tech issues to the EDTs. The administrative rules were 
largely ignored. Worse, some instructors stated a falsity, that “nothing has changed” with 
regard to anything but the voting machines, and so there was no need to handle any task 
differently from other elections. [EDT and Booth Officials testimony; Coalition 
submission on training problems] 
4.105  Finding: Concerns about training were not limited to training on machines. 53% 
of election workers also expressed concern that training on election law and 
administrative procedures was inadequate [ESI poll worker survey, Q16F]. Only two 
hours of the Train the Trainers training was devoted to teaching administrative process, 
and these two hours were the last hours prior to the completion of the training. [Schedule 
list from Booth Officials Manager Dane Thomas 6/27/2006; DESI testimony, 6/29/2006 
hearing; interviews with trainers; interview with Thomas] 
4.106  Finding: Poll worker training classes were not well structured for conveying 
information clearly in a manner for high retention. Poll worker skills development and 
confidence did not increase. A variety of problems with the training can be identified: 
• classes were too large 
• individual practice time with DREs was insufficient 
• classes did not adhere to professional standards for delivery of adult education. 
[Judgments based on applying IBSTPI standards to the information gathered from 
ESI poll worker survey, poll worker reports] 
• provided contradictory information depending on trainers 
• lacked sufficient procedural and administrative training (in such matters as 
provisional ballot rules) 
[Focus Groups with poll workers; Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition paper] 
4.107  Recommendation: Trainings should be planned so that for technology portions, 
each person has sufficient time and is required individually (and without partner help) to 
attempt to apply the lessons and processes being taught. Professional advice should be 
sought from those with the appropriate expertise so that the classes can be efficiently 
structured and sufficient one-on-one instruction can occur. 
4.108  Finding: Even though DESI professional trainer Merbach was heavily involved, 
no standardized course plans and outlines for training sessions were created for the 
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Spring 2006 classes. Instructors of poll workers for the May 2006 Primary were required 
to develop their own courses from the training they received and from the error-filled and 
oft-revised training manuals. The result was inconsistent instruction, false information, 
disagreements between trainers during the training sessions, skipped material, varying 
emphasis of topics, and other problems. [Interviews with CCBOE staff; trainers’ plus poll 
workers’ testimony; Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition submissions]  
4.109  Recommendation: Standard curricula and course materials must be created, and 
little discretion can be accorded to trainers as to coverage. The approach used in March-
April 2006 left far too much discretion to individual instructors, resulting in inconsistent 
instruction, missed material, varying emphasis of topics, and poor use of time in some 
classes. 
4.110  Recommendation: Checklists and quick start charts should be developed for use 
on Election Day. The training materials can and should be far more detailed and 
explanatory but should not be expected to substitute for the checklists 
For example, for use on Election Day the Training Coordinator should consider 
creating three large illustrated posters with step-by-step instructions — one (1) for 
Monday evening DRE setup, one (1) for Tuesday morning DRE setup, and one (1) for 
Tuesday evening DRE reporting, shutdown and repacking. The posters should include 
large diagrams, color-coded illustrations and photos such as are commonly provided on 
posters accompanying computers and consumer electronics equipment. [Dane Thomas; 
Trainer interviews] 
An Election Day set of checklists is needed to guide poll workers on how to check 
voter ID, process regular, provisional, curbside, and 17-year-old votes, assist visually-
impaired voters and those requiring special physical accommodations, reconcile and 
complete end-of-day paperwork, manage the polling place, and perform certain other 
duties. The materials should also include a glossary. The reminder checklists must 
appropriately balance the need to be concise with the need to be user-friendly, accessible 
and understandable by a range of poll workers. 
4.111  Recommendation: A guide to help with DRE trouble shooting is needed. One 
suggestion is to have a “cheat sheet” with a list of major problems and the way to solve 
them. According to one of the poll workers, a Top 10 List of DRE problems and solutions 
would be a great asset. 
4.112  Recommendation: It should be obvious without having to say it: all training 
material must be consistent in its directions. Consistency must exist between the 
instructions given in the Manuals, training sessions, any DVDs/videos, and the DVD 
prompts and screens.  
4.113  Recommendation: The CCBOE must do a better job in seeking to ensure that the 
policies and procedures it enunciates for poll workers and staff to follow accord with the 
governing law—both State and Federal. All procedures, checklists, and any policy 
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Manuals and training curricula must be checked to ensure that they operationalize the 
federal and State election law mandates. These should also be vetted by election 
advocacy organizations, and ultimately any differences of opinions should be resolved by 
the SOS or the County Prosecutor. Components should include, for example, whether 
political party partity is required for certain activities; what the restrictions are in helping 
a disabled voter. Providing this information would help the poll workers make decisions 
based on what is fact and not what they think is fact. 
4.114  Recommendation: The EAC’s guidebooks on poll workers (mentioned above) 
provide extensive suggestions are offered for structuring and delivering effective poll 
worker training programs. These should be consulted for tested recommendations. 
Instructors selected for training poll workers; Training for instructors 
4.115  Finding: On top of his other managerial duties for recruiting and organizing the 
training and deployment of over 6000 poll workers for May 2nd, Manager Dane Thomas 
became the ghost writer for the poll worker training manuals. Thus the drain on his 
managerial time was substantial, and he was unable to turn to the project of securing 
trainers for the poll workers until relatively late. He secured commitments from some 
trainers who were well qualified and experienced, and from others who had proven 
inadequate in past poll worker training efforts. He also turned to a variety of retired 
teachers, many if not most of whom had never served as a poll worker. Thomas was 
unable to evaluate the teaching skills of this cadre of individuals before he secured their 
services, but he did remove some who later proved ineffective. [Interviews with Thomas; 
with Booth Department staff] 
4.116  Finding: Trainers were paid differently according to whether they were training 
Booth Workers or EDTs, and whether one was the lead trainer or an assistant trainer for a 
given class. 
• EDTs Lead: $100 per 5-hour class 
• EDT Assistant: $70 per 5-hour class 
• Booth Official Lead: $80 per 3-hour class 
• Booth Official Assistant: $30 per 3-hour class 
The CCBOE ultimately hired 37 trainers; each trainer could be assigned any one of 
the four above listed jobs. This practice caused a problem for Administrator Platten, 
because she had to pay the trainers different hourly rates depending on which group they 
were training. For example, one trainer could be a Booth Official Assistant in the 
morning and an EDT Leader in the afternoon. In that situation, the Administrative 
Department has had many problems inputting payroll correctly. The County system does 
not allow the computer to set different wage scales for an individual. Therefore, the 
Administrative Department had to override the system each time it had to input a 
different salary. This system may become extremely problematic in the case of an audit. 
[Interviews with Platten; with other CCBOE employees; CCBOE meeting Transcript 
4/3/2006, pgs. 31-32] 
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4.117  Recommendation: The public Universities and community colleges of the State 
of Ohio should undertake the role of creating a training program for poll workers and poll 
worker instructors, as recommended to the Secretary of State by representatives of the 
Center for Election Integrity in June 2005. A core curriculum should be developed with 
SOS involvement. This could also be the umbrella under which greater coordination and 
consistency is obtained between Ohio counties in their administrative and legal 
procedures, and could promote the sharing of ideas and procedures regionally within the 
State. The approach would provide an efficient low cost mechanism for the SOS to 
operationalize changes in election laws rather than leave it up to each county to try to 
fathom complex legal changes and Directives/Advisories. 
4.118  Recommendation: Until and unless the public higher educational system 
undertakes these training efforts, the CCBOE should establish a single hourly rate for 
lead trainers, and one for assistant trainers. It must assign and train instructors for one 
position or the other, depending on their qualifications and aptitude, as evaluated using 
objective means.  
4.119  Recommendation: Persons hired or contracted to perform poll worker training 
should have suitable professional competency for training adults; some recent experience 
working at the polling places in some capacity; and knowledge of the general tasks or 
areas covered by the training. They should be competent in the specific material they will 
be responsible for teaching, including both technical and non-technical subjects, if the 
same trainers will teach both types of materials. We recommend, however, that a 
specialist in each side of the instruction be paired rather than attempt to have one person 
teach it all at a mediocre level. 
4.120  Recommendation: The recommended CCBOE Training Coordinator should 
determine in conjunction with qualified experts what the content and coverage, and even 
the teaching methods, will be for each type of poll worker training (core and advanced). 
Complete standardized outlines, improved training materials, visual aids, slide shows, 
and prepared evaluation forms should be standard throughout all trainings. Little 
discretion can be permitted as to course coverage and materials. Individual trainers must 
follow the path set out, but should be encouraged to offer feedback for improvement of 
the course. 
4.121  Recommendation: A member of the Board of the CCBOE labeled training the 
“linchpin” of the elections; therefore, it should not be rushed. The CCBOE should ensure 
that the trainers not only learn to operate the DREs, but that all involved understand the 
procedures and are fully trained independently of the DRE operation. 
4.122  Recommendation: The International Board of Standards for Training, 
Performance and Instruction (IBSTPI) prescribes sets of competencies as standards for 
instructors and for instructional design. The competencies apply as guidelines for course 
planning, curriculum structure, selection and evaluation of instructors, selection and 
preparation of appropriate physical environments for learning, instructor presentation, 
instructor management of learning environments, application of visual and auditory aids 
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and media, evaluation mechanisms, etc. Plans and outlines for training of Booth Officials 
and EDTs, and methodologies for evaluation and discharge, should be developed 
according to IBSTPI and or other professional standards and the requirements of the 
CCBOE. See IBSTPI standards, Appendix I. 
Location of classes in environments conducive to effective training 
4.123  Finding: Training classes were held at various locations around the County, as 
well as at the CCBOE. In some cases actual classrooms were used, but in most cases 
chairs were set up in multi-purpose rooms, either in a circle or theater-style. Rarely were 
tables provided for note-taking, and some conditions were described as uncomfortable or 
crowded. [Staff interviews; poll worker and EDT reports] 
4.124  Recommendation: A proper training environment is essential for effective 
learning. Distribution of training into the community close to poll workers' homes is a 
laudable goal, but should not be done to the exclusion of suitability of the facility. 
Thoughtful and appropriate attention should be given to planning of training locations, 
since that election schedule is known years in advance. Good training locations should be 
consistently provided for each class with appropriate setup to support the learning 
experience, including writing surfaces for each learner, comfortable chairs, good lighting, 
an absence of distractions, and good ventilation. It might be prudent to contract with 
educational institution(s) that can offer multiple sites with classrooms, and a secure room 
for storage of DREs and other materials used for training. 
Use of visual and auditory aids 
4.125  Finding: Trainers used easels or other visual aids in very small rooms that lacked 
blackboards. No computerized slide presentations were used to reinforce key concepts or 
to provide clear views of items being discussed in class. [Booth Official and EDT 
reports] 
4.126  Recommendation: Each of the five next-largest counties in Ohio either already 
uses or plans to implement computer-based presentation support (PowerPoint) for poll 
worker classes. This should be done in Cuyahoga as well, with the presentation 
supervised or developed by the Training Coordinator. The benefits of slide presentations 
include: control for consistent curricular coverage; broad knowledge of the class outline; 
and key points that can be reinforced in bullet points. Consistent with good training 
delivery, instructors should not simply read their slides, but rather, use them as an outline 
and mechanism for illustrating key materials and concepts, and expand on each point 
contained in the presentation as is appropriate to deliver a full understanding of the topic. 
Microphones with small loudspeakers should be used in all classes, since many of the 
learners are older people with diminished hearing ability. Auditory enhancements should 
always be used, whether requested or not, since those with hearing problems often are not 
comfortable mentioning these issues. 
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Training of poll workers together in their polling place or precinct teams 
4.127  Finding: No formal mechanism has been used in the CCBOE for training poll 
workers of a given location at the same session so they can develop a sense of serving as 
a team. Other counties report great success by using the team training approach. 
4.128  Recommendation: Teamwork is key to the effective functioning of a polling 
place. Familiarity among team members, attention in training to the specific needs of a 
given polling place, and special attention to specific teams of individuals who may have 
had trouble in the past are all important. As recommended above under Poll Worker 
Staffing Structure, all poll workers assigned to a given voting location should be trained 
together, and special team building activities should be a part of training 
Teams also should report for paid dry runs, or "Practice Makes Perfect" days, as they 
are called in another Ohio county, to go through all functions they will perform together 
one last time just before Election Day. This is especially important for poll worker teams 
with split precincts, and when new technology or significant new procedures have been 
introduced, such as the voter ID requirements that will take effect in November 2006. 
This practice is also essential for those precincts that have been trouble spots in past 
elections. The practice sessions would allow the CCBOE to make strategic personnel 
changes, if needed, or engage in retraining on key points before Election Day and its 
exigencies. The dry runs would communicate the CCBOE’s new approach that “warm 
bodies” are not enough; performance matters. It would also promote higher quality 
outcomes on all tasks on Election Day. 
Special training for new poll workers and problem precincts 
4.129  Finding: In Cuyahoga County, individuals serving as poll workers for the first 
time received no special training but rather were placed in classes with experienced poll 
workers. The learning curve of a new poll worker varies considerably from one who 
needs to learn only what has changed since the last time of service, or to take a refresher 
course or determine if continuing service will be possible in light of advancing age. 
Portions of the training dealing with newly-introduced technical matters would be 
applicable to both groups. [Interviews and focus groups] 
4.130  Recommendation: The Training Coordinator should consider specially designed 
training sessions for the newest poll workers. 
4.131  Finding: The CCBOE held training sessions for all poll workers, but did not cover 
the specific procedures for working a “split precinct.” Split precincts are those which 
cross boundaries of other jurisdictions such as school districts, with resultant distinctions 
between ballots required for voters who live in different sections of a single precinct. Poll 
workers must determine what the correct ballot is for voters on the basis of their address 
within the precinct. The Director told the Panel that special training was provided for 
split precincts, but the department manager stated that these workers receive on Election 
Day only a special sheet of written instructions. On May 2nd, poll workers at Woodbury 
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School experienced many problems with the split precinct, as has occurred many times 
previously. [Interviews with poll workers; Public Hearings; Incident Sheets; Interview 
with Director] 
4.132  Finding: The Shaker Heights School District had placed on the May 2nd ballot a 
school levy. At Woodbury, one precinct included some voters entitled to cast votes on 
that question plus others who lived outside the school district. The Booth Officials 
Department elected to provide a separate encoder for each split of a precinct, rather than 
to program a single encoder to produce the required number of different ballots. In many 
instances, the Judges did not fully understand the process and gave voters a wrongly-
encoded ballot. [Interviews with poll workers; Public Hearings; Incident Sheets] 
4.133  Recommendation: Although separate encoders were intended to simplify the 
process for poll workers, split precincts and different encoders add greatly to the 
complexity of operating a polling place. For all poll workers at split precinct locations, 
such as at Woodbury School, the CCBOE must provide special training and Election Day 
support given their unusual duties. Poll worker assignments to split precincts must take 
into account the added complexity and the special alertness needed for these tasks, and 
reassign workers as needed before the next election. 
4.134  Recommendation: To promote teamwork and voter recognition of their precinct, 
the CCBOE tries to maintain consistency in the precinct it assigns a poll worker. This 
practice provides a value and benefit to all. But reassignment should also occur according 
to the needs for good balance of skills within each precinct and polling place. In hands-on 
training with voting equipment, the same people should be working together who will be 
working together on Election Day. This complicates scheduling logistics and will not be 
possible to implement 100%, but since required training timelines are known far in 
advance, training should begin and be scheduled early enough to provide significant 
notice to poll workers of when their team will be trained. When first initiated, the 
CCBOE should also explain why it is pursuing joint training instead of offering a variety 
of training options. 
Structure and length of classes 
4.135  Finding: The CCBOE managers do not seem to have recognized that classes 
longer than two hours tend to be ineffective for retention. For Spring 2006, the agency 
alloted three hours for Booth Official classes, and five hours for EDT classes. This time 
was to be split between training on revised procedures and on newly-introduced 
technology, which reasonably should be expected to be foreign to many of the learners. 
Instructor allocation of class time between topics varied widely. Booth Officials training 
focused primarily on the setup of DREs and how to use the encoders. Trainers spent little 
time on administrative issues and the procedures for filling out paperwork, because they 
assumed that returning poll workers would remember what they did in the past. But some 
of these procedures, such as handling provisional ballots, had changed dramatically and 
poll workers were not warned of this or taught correctly. [Poll worker reports, Public 
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Hearings; Telephone interviews with poll workers; Interview with Booth Officials 
Manager Dane Thomas on 6/27/2006; Incident Reports] 
4.136  Recommendation: We recommend that core training be shared by all poll 
workers and that specialized advanced training sessions be required thereafter. This 
approach has been used successfully by other counties. These counties generally 
separated training classes into two sections: one covering procedures, legal requirements 
and paperwork, and another covering hand-on training with voting hardware. This 
ensures that one area is not covered to the exclusion of the other, and allows better 
structuring of classes for the specific requirements of each section. For example, a section 
on procedures, paperwork and law can be delivered effectively to large groups, with the 
use of suitable visual aids and sound reinforcement by good training manuals. One large 
Ohio County effectively teaches this material to groups of 70 poll workers at a time. That 
same county, however, recognized the need for intensive hands-on training with new 
equipment, and broke up its hands-on section into many break-out groups with just three 
to five poll workers per instructor. 
We recommend that a similar bifurcated approach be pursued here in Cuyahoga for 
the core classes, and that each small group break-out be comprised of the Judges for a 
given precinct. This would allow instructors to work closely with each team, ensuring 
good attention to questions and clarification, and would also allow the instructor to 
evaluate learner performance in class. Follow-up can occur with any learners who are not 
grasping the material adequately, with strategies including additional training, assignment 
to a different team to better balance the respective skill sets, or, as a last resort, respectful 
discharge with a special note of thanks for time served. Advanced training should also 
take account of the same norms, with larger class size being permitted for administrative 
procedures and much smaller for the advanced technical hands-on skills mastery. 
4.137  Finding: EDT training varied widely, with some not receiving the full five hours 
of training. For example, according to one of the EDTs, a half-hour after a training 
session had started, people were still coming in and the trainer allowed them to remain 
for the rest of the training session. [Hearings and Focus Groups] 
4.138  Recommendation: Trainers must enforce coverage and attendance rules. Advance 
notices to poll workers must advise them that if they are more than 5 minutes late, they 
will be excluded from the class. 
4.139  Recommendation: As recommended above, one complete set of voting 
equipment and supplies should be available to each hands-on group, which we 
recommend be comprised of a single precinct team of four to six poll workers (depending 
on precinct size). As is the practice in another Ohio county surveyed, the hands-on team 
should go through the complete setup of Election Day, including mock voting. Hands-on 
training should cover every single step from supplies unpacking, inventory and proper 
use, machine setup, paper loading and threading, zero report printing, start of election on 
the DREs, mock voting (including all paperwork and special focus on proper ID 
requirements), election shutdown and final report printing, accumulation if it is to 
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continue to be performed in the polling places, and machine shutdown, paperwork 
reconciliation, and repacking of all supplies and equipment. Classes should cover the “big 
picture” needs for the various types of reports and how they are used. They should stress 
all security procedures and recording, and the reasons why this is crucial. Flow charts 
should be developed and printed to serve as a visual aid, so learners understand how the 
functions they are being asked to perform fit into the overall whole Election Day process. 
Allocation of equipment for hands-on training sessions 
4.140  Finding: The number of DREs available for use in hands-on training varied from 
class to class. Some classes allocated one machine per every two poll workers. For extra 
or make-up classes, only a few DREs were available, which did not provide the required 
opportunity for hands-on learning. Not all classes emphasized the same topics, with some 
covering the inventory and use of supplies, and others not doing so. Memory cards did 
not consistently function because they had not been properly cleaned, and thus some 
machines were unusable. [Interviews with poll workers; Public Hearings; interview with 
Booth Officials Department Manager Dane Thomas on 6/26/2006] 
4.141  Recommendation: Prior to delivery at the training sites, the CCBOE should test 
the DREs and the other necessary supplies to ensure that they are functioning properly. 
Additionally, the CCBOE should teach the trainers how to clear the memory cards 
correctly, and require the trainers to do so after each training session. Fewer training 
sites, though still spread throughout the County, would augment the ability of the 
CCBOE to secure the DREs and supply these training sessions while avoiding logistical 
nightmares. 
4.142  Finding: Some logistics issues for training classes occurred because the Trainers 
were not sufficiently scrupulous or well trained to handle security items correctly. Some 
voter access cards, supervisor cards, encoders and keys were all lost, misplaced or ruined 
in some manner.  
4.143  Recommendation: The Panel has not been impressed with the level of regard for 
security issues that CCBOE Executive Managers have manifested. They evidently have 
little concern for the security risks, and thus have not ensured that their departmental 
managers, in developing policies and procedures, have translated those concerns into 
appropriate procedures. We have not been able to identify any managers who understand 
and respect the potential threats to the security of our election results, and the accuracy of 
the system more generally, by failures to account for and protect all security equipment. 
It is also not clear what role DESI may have played in understating the security risks 
presented by failure to protect security equipment. The CCBOE managers at all levels 
and the CCBOE Board should retain a reputable expert on DESI security issues to advise 
and consult on setting up appropriate security procedures and systems, and also consult 
on security training issues for the CCBOE staff and the poll worker trainers so that all 
understand fully the risks for the integrity of Cuyahoga’s votes and vote tabulation, and 
for the taxpayers’ financial investment in the equipment. 
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Training in provisional voting procedures limited by supply of code numbers 
4.144  Finding: Trainers currently have no way to properly train poll workers on 
provisional ballots because the Secretary of State issues only limited numbers of 
provisional ballot codes that can be entered into encoders for these types of votes. Every 
time a voter is to vote provisionally, the Booth Official needs to enter a code number 
from the hard-copy provisional application into the encoder specifically for provisional 
ballots. These codes can only be used one time. Thus, if they were used in training they 
would not be available for use on Election Day. [Interview with Booth Officials 
Department Manager Dane Thomas 06/27/2006; Secretary of State Codes in the DESI 
training manual] 
4.145  Recommendation: The Panel recommends that all provisional ballots be voted on 
optical scan paper ballots rather than on DREs. 
Poll worker evaluation following training 
4.146  Finding: No effective evaluation tool post-training has been created by the 
CCBOE. The trainers who worked this spring reported approximately 1% of the poll 
workers had not mastered training or were having trouble. This percentage is radically 
different from the interviews with poll workers and focus groups. Many attendees left 
training with incomplete or faulty understandings of their responsibilities and considered 
the training to be confusing. (Some poll workers stated that they were more confused 
after attending training than they were before the session.) The evaluation tool used by 
Spring 2006 trainers appears to have been self-serving, to try to convince the CCBOE 
that the trainers were doing a good job in their assigned tasks. [Incident Reports; Public 
Hearings; EDT logs; Interviews with Booth Officials Department; Excel chart of 
evaluations] 
The CCBOE knew that some Judges would not be able to operate the DREs, but the 
Booth Officials Department did not have adequate procedures in place to identify these 
individuals. Training did not include any quiz or test, but only the hands-on opportunity, 
for some, to practice what they had learned about machine set-up. [Incident Reports; 
Public Hearings; EDT logs; interviews with Booth Officials Department] 
4.147  Recommendation: As described more fully above, each portion (core and 
advanced) of a Booth Official or EDT training class should end with a quiz, where results 
are collected, compared to an objective standard, and used to evaluate the suitability of 
each poll worker for the role for which he or she is being trained. Poll workers 
performing below the acceptable standard should be required to attend remedial training 
and take another test, or to resign from the poll worker program. 
Rebuilding poll worker morale and participation 
4.148  Finding: Because of various DIMS database problems, poll worker payroll 
processing and paychecks were delayed. 
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4.149  Recommendation: Speedy payroll processing has to be a priority. This 
communicates the CCBOE’s value of the poll workers’ services. 
4.150  Finding: Feedback and recommendations have not been solicited from the poll 
workers. 
4.151  Recommendation: An efficient mechanism for feedback must be established. The 
Quality Manager and Training Coordinator should both receive summaries of these 
reports. 
4.152  Finding: Respect for the Judges, who are paid a flat rate for service on Monday 
night and Election Day, can be shown by properly training and supporting them in their 
election activities, and by packing the supply bags carefully so that all items needed are 
correctly and completely provided. This small but crucial step would make a great 
difference in how the Judges approach their task—and would facilitate their using their 
time efficiently instead of making repeated searches for supplies and calls for substitutes. 
4.153  Recommendation: Top management should establish and enforce policies at all 
levels of the agency which build and communicate respect for Poll Workers. These 
policies should be structured to alleviate all the deficiencies identified in this chapter and 
elsewhere in this Report, and any others which counteract the goal of a motivated, well-
educated, reliable force of temporary polling place employees. Year-round 
communications and training/development opportunities should be sustained. This should 
include a regular newsletter which provides opportunities for development, glimpses of 
changes, new requirements, and new opportunities which may be forthcoming. Small 
gestures should be made to show care and appreciation for this critical team of thousands 
who make each Election Day function and, notably, who serve as the county's direct 
contact with each voter. Additional ways to show respect should be considered by a 
creative human resources manager. (Other counties make such gestures as birthday cards 
for poll workers and special certificates of appreciation.) 
4.154  Recommendation: Pointing to public statements by the Director, many of the poll 
workers feel that the BOE has blamed them for all the problems on May 2nd. The CCBOE 
executive management has still not publicly acknowledged its own mistakes and 
misjudgments in training the poll workers and equipping them with error-filled and 
confusing Manuals. Many poll workers feel they are owed a very public apology for the 
negative way the BOE has portrayed the poll workers in the media. The Panel believes 
such an apology is overdue. It would also help repair relations with poll workers and 
assist in their continued Election Day participation. 
4.155  Recommendation: If any other problems arise on an Election Day, CCBOE 
executive managers and Board Members should not rush to judgment and make public 
announcements as to the causes of any problems that might be complex and not obvious. 
The Director should take full responsibility publicly and apologize promptly to the 
public, pledging a quick and impartial inquiry and remediation with a full public report. 
The Director should seek to establish such candor and impartiality that the public can 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 124 of 398 
trust that an internal investigation will get to the full facts quickly, and that another 
independent Election Review Panel will not be needed in our lifetimes. 
Voting Locations Issues 
Poll worker competency in opening and maintaining the polls is, to some degree, 
dependent upon the adequacy and readiness of the voting location. The voting locations 
tasks are similar to those of the Booth Officials: early and complete preparation, and a 
support network that facilitates their efficient functioning throughout the day. Much 
greater coordination between the current Booth Officials and former voting locations 
departments must occur. 
4.156  Finding: Many polling locations cannot be secured after delivery of machines but 
before the election (e.g., a basketball game scheduled for the gym which will be used for 
the election). 
4.157  Recommendation: The lack of security for the DREs must be faced and remedied 
so that the security of the elections and the financial investment in the voting machines 
can be properly protected. The punch card system deliveries were far less vulnerable to 
unsecured locations than are the DREs. 
4.158  Finding: The demands of preparing voting devices for May 2nd were so intense 
that the voting location analysis and checking could not be done nearly as thoroughly as 
in other elections. The duties imposed great stress on the department manager who had 
expertise and high standards for qualifying voter locations. Normally the last two weeks 
before an election allows for a series of QC (quality control) steps for voting locations, 
but this was not possible given L&A testing, low staffing, and other demands. 
4.159  Recommendation: The Voting Locations Department should be separated from 
the Voting Devices Department and returned to the CCBOE offices. It should have 
adequate staffing for fulfilling its duties. It should closely coordinate its activities with 
the Booth Official Department 
4.160  Finding: The Voting Locations Department has the primary duty within the 
CCBOE of ensuring that agencies in the County that are covered by the National Voter 
Registration Act (NVRA) are sufficiently supplied and informed of their duties. 
Unfortunately this is another task that has received low CCBOE priority. [Department 
handout of duties; Interviews with Managers and Coalition] 
4.161  Recommendation: The Manager of the Voting Locations Department and the 
CCBOE Director should set up a meeting with interested representatives of the public 
(such as the Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition) and with the county agencies covered by 
the NVRA to discuss allegations of noncompliance and strategies for better compliance 
with this Federal Act. Performance objectives should be created and monitored so that the 
CCBOE can greatly improve its compliance. 
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Chapter V: Election Day Management 
Election Night transmission of voting data 
5.1  Finding: One of the major potential advantages of electronic voting is the degree to 
which it could speed up transmission and tabulation of voting results on election night. 
Data can potentially be relayed from the polling place to the CCBOE at the speed of 
light, and the votes can be counted in minutes rather than hours. When the transmission 
of electronic voting data is poorly planned, tested and executed, however, it can slow the 
computation of election results and introduce opportunities for error, delay and 
tampering. [GAO report to Congress, Sept. 2005, #GAO-05-956, p2] 
5.2  Recommendation: To realize the potential of electronic voting, the CCBOE needs a 
well-orchestrated election night protocol for getting data from the polling places to the 
CCBOE efficiently, securely and without loss. Such a protocol was not in place on 
May 2nd. The Panel recommends the elimination of polling place accumulation and 
transmission of voting data, and the implementation in its place of a sound and secure 
process for physical delivery of memory cards to the CCBOE for direct uploading. 
Cuyahoga County’s Election Day plan 
5.3  Finding: For the 5/2/2006 election, CCBOE chose to implement a multi-stage 
process for accumulating precinct vote data as soon as the polls closed and transmitting 
those data to the GEMS server at the CCBOE for tabulation. 
The steps to be taken were as follows: 
1. Before the DREs were delivered to the polling places prior to the election, one 
DRE at each polling place was designated the “zero machine” and marked with a 
sticker. 
2. Once the polls were closed, polling data from each DRE at a polling place were to 
be loaded (accumulated) into the zero machine. The accumulated data were then 
to be transferred to a single card (the “zero card”) which would contain all of the 
voting data for that polling place. 
3. The zero cards were to be transported to one of 45 designated upload stations 
scattered throughout the county. 
4. One DRE machine at each upload station was to be configured to use a telephone 
modem to transmit the election data contained on each zero card to the CCBOE 
for tabulation. 
5. All memory cards were then to be transported, along with the election materials, 
to the CCBOE. The upload stations were to be vacated by 11 pm, so the window 
during which all cards had to be transmitted was approximately three hours or 
less. 
[CCBOE Booth Official Training Manual, May 2006; staff interviews] 
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Transmission testing procedure 
5.4  Finding: Immediately prior to the May 2nd election, the CCBOE performed the final 
testing of the election night data transmission procedure they had designed. The CCBOE 
facilities did not have a sufficient number of telephone lines to test the modem 
transmission procedure prior to the election. Due to this limitation, approximately 60 
CCBOE employees were selected to take one or more DREs home with them for the 
weekend before Election Day. They were to connect their home telephone lines to upload 
test voting data to the CCBOE computer. This testing was problematic on a number of 
grounds. [Interviews with CCBOE staff; IS staff; Deputy Director Dillingham; Director 
Vu] 
Releasing DREs to employees to take home was a troubling breach of security. It 
created an opportunity for tampering and raises doubts about the CCBOE’s commitment 
to election security and to promoting public confidence. Even without any malfeasance 
on the part of the CCBOE staff who took DREs home, the potential for tampering existed 
by others with access to the workers’ homes. Given the CCBOE’s rules mandating the 
presence of representatives of both major political parties at each step of the election 
process, it is hard to imagine that they did not see the problems created by letting 
individuals take the machines home. [Interviews with CCBOE staff and election workers; 
See also: Tracy Warren, Kelly Ceballos, Lloyd Leonard, and Jeanette Senecal, Helping 
America Vote: Safeguarding the Vote (Washington, D.C.: League of Women Voters, 
July 2004] 
5.5  Recommendation: A strict chain of custody must be observed for all election 
systems. DREs should not be taken from the CCBOE facilities except for elections or 
repair, and never be taken to employees’ homes. 
5.6  Finding: The testing was also significantly flawed because it was a very poor 
simulation of an election-night scenario. The test transmissions from employees’ homes 
were staggered over a 48 hour period, while the CCBOE mandated that election night 
modem transmissions be completed before 11pm. This limitation meant that, on election 
night, the modem transmissions from each upload station, consisting of all election data 
from of each of the 584 polling places, had to take place within a window of 
approximately 3 hours. The volume of data transmitted during each test transmission did 
not necessarily reflect the volume to be transmitted on election-day. [Interviews: CCBOE 
staff; IS staff; Deputy Director Dillingham; Director Vu] 
5.7  Recommendation: The CCBOE should attempt to simulate real operating conditions 
when testing its systems and equipment. 
What went wrong on Election Night? 
5.8  Finding: Memory card accumulation was a source of confusion and error at polling 
places. Poor training and instructions led to mistakes. Poll workers unfamiliar with the 
DREs or with computers generally caused memory cards to be left in machines, placed in 
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the wrong bags, covered with tape and never fully accumulated. Some workers got 
frustrated and returned the cards without having accumulated the results at all. 
[Interviews with CCBOE staff and poll workers] 
5.9  Recommendation: Polling place accumulation should be abandoned and all memory 
cards used in an election should be returned to the CCBOE for tallying of results. 
5.10  Finding: The accumulation problems experienced by poll workers delayed the 
delivery of the zero cards to the upload stations, further shortening the original three-hour 
window during which all data had to be transmitted. The failure of poll workers to 
understand and follow mandated memory card security and chain-of-custody procedures 
compromised the security and integrity of the data on the memory cards. [Interviews with 
CCBOE staff and poll workers] 
5.11  Finding: The logging by the CCBOE of tamper seals used to secure the memory 
card door on the DREs at the polling places was inconsistent. Following the election, the 
cards were not properly secured, sealed and logged for transport. The CCBOE’s memory 
card handling procedures for the May 2nd election may have so deviated from approved 
practices as to void the NASED certification of the DREs. [Interviews: warehouse staff 
and Deputy Director Dillingham) (See April 2006 NASED Memorandum on Memory 
Cards] 
5.12  Recommendation: Accumulation should be abandoned and poll workers and 
CCBOE staff should be trained to treat memory cards with the utmost care. 
5.13  Finding: The convoluted transmission procedure chosen for the May 2nd election 
would have been awkward even had everything gone smoothly. With the added factors of 
inadequate worker training, poor testing, human errors and a general lack of familiarity 
with electronic voting procedures, the election night transmission and tabulation of data 
was chaotic and incomplete. Security practices were overlooked in the rush to get the 
voting data from the polling places to the CCBOE central computer. [Interviews with IS 
staff, poll workers] 
5.14  Finding: Some very basic and foreseeable problems at the upload stations led to 
other transmission problems. In one case, the electrical outlet on the wall at the zone 
station was too far from the telephone jack to permit the power cord and the modem cord 
of transmitting DRE to be plugged in at the same time. Workers had to transmit data with 
the DRE running on battery power and hope the battery power would last until 
transmission was finished. A simple extension cord at the zone station could have 
prevented this problem. [Interviews with IS staff, poll workers] 
5.15  Finding: As one might expect, the large volume of simultaneous transmissions 
degraded performance at the CCBOE central computer, increasing connection and 
transmission times as well as the likelihood of dropped connections. Because the testing 
the prior weekend took place over a 48 hour period, the glut of incoming data was not 
identified as a potential problem. CCBOE’s confidence in the soundness of the 
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transmission procedures, based, in part, on the results of the unrealistic tests, contributed 
to the transmission bottleneck and overall chaos at CCBOE on election night. [Interviews 
with IS, Ballot Department, pink room staff, poll workers, former staff, consultations 
with current and former elections officials in California and Washington] 
5.16  Finding: The system performance degradation due to the large volumes of data 
being transmitted to the CCBOE at the same time meant that many zone stations were 
unable to finish transmission. Workers had to return cards to the CCBOE without having 
been able to transmit their data. [Interviews with IS, Ballot Department, and pink room 
staff, poll workers] 
5.17  Finding: Because the transmission problems and delays prevented many upload 
stations from completing the data transmission to the CCBOE within the allotted time, 
many memory cards had to be uploaded upon return to the CCBOE. The CCBOE had to 
spend considerable time searching for all of the un-transmitted cards to upload their data 
for tabulation due, in part, to the fact that the cards were scattered throughout the many 
bags being returned to the CCBOE. Some cards were still in the DREs and some were 
missing entirely. Because all upload stations closed at the same time, taxis from the 
upload stations converged on the CCBOE at the same time, creating a traffic jam and 
delaying the uploading of cards that were not transmitted. [Interviews with IS, Ballot 
Department, and pink room staff, poll workers] 
5.18  Recommendation: Modem transmission should be abandoned and each memory 
card should be transported to the CCBOE for upload and tabulation. The transmission 
process needs to be simplified and tested adequately to identify the weak points. 
5.19  Finding: The numerous media on which voting data were stored (DRE memory 
cards, zero cards, CCBOE central computer, DRE internal memory, VVPAT paper rolls) 
led to general confusion of poll workers and CCBOE staff at to which medium carried 
the official votes. No single medium took on the “precious cargo” status of the paper 
ballots and ballot boxes of old. [Interviews with IS, Ballot Department, and pink room 
staff, poll workers] 
5.20  Recommendation: Voting place accumulation of memory cards should be 
eliminated. The combination of polling-place accumulation, physical transportation of 
memory cards to upload stations, and modem transmission to the CCBOE, entails all of 
the hazards of both approaches with few of the benefits of either. Technical failures 
impeding modem transmission are combined with the risks and delays of physical 
transportation. All DRE memory cards should be transported to regional sites so that they 
can be gathered up and transported to the CCBOE for upload. The CCBOE facility 
should be configured with additional capacity for on-site memory card uploading (either 
by a large LAN of DREs or a collection of EMPs, should they be certified), and staffed 
with CCBOE staff familiar with the uploading process. Testing should be done to 
determine the amount of hardware at the CCBOE that will be needed to upload each 
memory card from each DRE on election night, and how many EMPs would be needed to 
speed the process up should they be certified for use in Ohio. 
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5.21  Recommendation: The memory cards from each individual DRE should be treated 
by all involved as precious cargo akin to paper ballots, and workers should account for, 
transport and secure them with the same care the they would paper ballots. Without the 
accumulation step, there would be no need for zero cards, no partial uploads, and workers 
would know that, whatever mishaps or glitches they encounter in closing down the polls, 
their main duty, above all others, is to get the cards back to the CCBOE. Pink room 
personnel should not accept memory card bags that do not have every card used at the 
polling place accounted for. Resort to the internal DRE memory to download election 
data should be limited to extraordinary circumstances in which a card is damaged or lost 
entirely. The VVPAT rolls should be segregated and secured for use in a recount or audit. 
[SOS Advisory #2006-03 states: “Cards should be treated as ballots and handled with the 
same standard of care…To the greatest extent possible, when defining your card handling 
procedures please give consideration to voter confidence, audit-ability and security”; see 
also GAO Report # GAO-05-956, p41] 
5.22  Recommendation: Testing for any new procedure should, to the greatest degree 
possible, replicate election night condition, and should be conducted on a schedule that 
allows adequate time prior to the election to address whatever flaws are exposed in 
testing. Testing procedures at all levels should be documented and published, with 
specific criteria for passage and failure. 
5.23  Finding: Incident Reports, or “Pink Sheets” are the primary mechanism by which 
the CCBOE tracks problems reported by poll workers. All precincts are supposed to 
document the range of possible problems experienced on Election Day, and each poll 
worker and Presiding Judge is required to sign the resulting report. The Pink Sheets could 
be an invaluable documented record of supply problems, voter registration problems, and 
operational difficulties. 
However, numerous problems regularly arise with the Pink Sheet mechanism. First, 
the CCBOE could only manage to produce 1,260 of 1,434 total Incident Reports. Many 
of these Pink Sheets were incomplete or blank. A number of these reports are unsigned 
by all poll workers, and several are completely unsigned. It is possible that precincts 
plagued with poll worker and EDT absences, mechanical failure, poor training, and 
inadequate supplies for the election were too overwhelmed to fully document the 
deficiencies. Even precincts with serious reported problems, such as failures to open the 
polls on time and long lines at the polls, neglected to include opening times or average 
wait times of voters. Often poll workers neglected to include whether or not an absent 
poll worker or EDT arrived or was replaced, whether a broken DRE or printer was 
repaired, or what steps were taken with any failure/success to remedy a problem. Some 
technical glitches that didn’t appear on Pink Sheets were reported on security event logs. 
5.24  Recommendation: Poll workers must be given sufficient motivation to document 
problems at their polling places. That motivation can come in the form of positive or 
negative reinforcement for their performance on this measure. 
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5.25  Finding: The election night activities of the “Pink Room,” the final destination for 
polling supplies, have been repeatedly described by staff as chaotic. The blue and red 
bags containing supplies from polling locations are too large for the Pink Room. The 
compilation and remote transmission of election results met with mixed success. The 
combination of late closing of polling locations, early closing of the uploading stations 
and the failure of poll workers to comprehend or follow packing instructions resulted in 
missing memory cards and unnecessary work. Many of the 45 uploading stations could 
not complete their work because of the hours of operation of the locations selected. As a 
result the staff stationed in the Pink Room was quickly overwhelmed with materials and 
was not able to readily determine if individual memory cards were uploaded. [Staff 
interviews; walk-through of election night procedures] 
5.26  Recommendation: The CCBOE must call upon the experiences of May 2nd and 
completely redesign the election night processes and the flow of manpower and materials 
in the Pink Room. Emphasis should be placed on separating clear bags containing 
memory cards, voted paper ballots and alphabetical poll books from the red/blue bags and 
moving the red/blue bags into the basement where the remaining contents can be 
removed at some later date. Please see Recommended Election Night Process, Appendix 
D. 
5.27  Recommendation: The CCBOE must commit to either having all memory cards 
uploaded remotely, or none of them. Transmission sites should be selected based on the 
flexibility of their hours, and the need for adequate staffing must be addressed. Staff 
assigned to the sites reported mixed success. Some had no problems but ran out of time, 
while others were not successful and had to ask poll workers to “volunteer” to stay and 
help them. This Panel’s recommended course would be to eliminate the transmission of 
results, and to have all memory cards delivered directly to the CCBOE for processing. 
Eliminating the uploading stations will allow the CCBOE to keep experienced staff at the 
Board office and allow them to participate in the effective movement of materials 
through the Pink Room on elections night. 
5.28  Recommendation: CCBOE staff should also be assigned to familiar areas of the 
county. Staff repeatedly expressed concern that they were sent to locations on the east or 
west side while those living in the area were sent to the opposite side of town. This 
resulted in a delay because staff was either lost or slow to arrive at the location because 
they were not familiar with the area. 
5.29  Recommendation: The location of supplies, especially crucial ones such as 
memory cards, should be made as obvious as possible. This could be easily accomplished 
either by specifying uniform packing locations for supplies with labels on the red and 
blue bags, or by a distinct, easy to follow itemized supply checklist. 
5.30  Recommendation: The CCBOE should begin recruiting election night staff 
immediately after the last election. This will insure that you have sufficient staff to 
maintain partisan balance, check in the precincts as they arrive, load the vans and 
accompany the red/blue bags to the CCBOE. The cabs should leave for the CCBOE at 
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9:00 or when all locations deliver their supplies, whichever is sooner. Any remaining 
bags not arriving at the transfer station will be delivered to the CCBOE by the Board staff 
assigned to that transfer station. 
5.31  Finding: The CCBOE hired 69 taxi cabs from Yellow Cab Company to take 
election observers to various precincts at 6:30 PM on Election Day to assist in loading 
voting bags after voting was completed, and drive the bags (accompanied by Election 
Observers) to a warehouse. After voting concluded, the taxi drivers were told to help load 
the voting bags into the cabs and return to the warehouse to drop off the bags before 
10:30 p.m. As it turned out, only 30-35 of the vehicles were initially accompanied by 
election observers. According to the Cab Company, Election Officials drafted people 
from off the street to fill many “election observer” vacancies. 
Many drivers weren’t given assistance with loading voting bags after the voting 
concluded, and many were treated harshly by precinct workers. Finally, most cab drivers 
didn’t get back to the warehouse until 11:15 or later. As a result, the Yellow Cab 
Company requested an additional $25.00 per taxicab used for transportation on Election 
night. As of 7/6/2006 the CCBOE had not granted the Yellow Cab Company additional 
compensation. [Yellow Cab Company Letter to Procurement and Operations Manager 
Gorman, 5/31/2006; Phone interview with Procurement and Operations Technician Dan 
Trif 7/6/2006] 
5.32  Recommendation: The CCBOE should grant the cab company reasonable 
additional compensation. The CCBOE should provide a list of the Election Day observers 
to the taxi cab company, who can then remind the observers of their commitments. 
Additionally, the CCBOE should engage the cab companies to determine ways of 
improving the process of transporting personnel and voter equipment. Cabs are an 
essential component of Cuyahoga County’s Election Day Operations, and should be 
treated as such. 
The Presiding Judges should post each DRE’s results at the polling 
location 
5.33  Finding: Under ORC §3505.30, “when the results of the ballots have been 
ascertained, such results shall be embodied in a summary statement to be prepared by the 
Judges in duplicate, on forms provided by the board of elections. One copy shall be 
certified by the Judges and posted on the front of the polling place” A 1/7/2006 Secretary 
of State Memorandum, however, referred to this section as “outdated” and stated that the 
“centralized posting of voting requirements at the Board of Elections through the 
centralized accumulation of all ballot results on Election Night” supersedes that statute. 
5.34  Recommendation: Although the SoS does not require election boards to comply 
with that statute, posting results at the polling location would help (1) assure that the no 
one has tampered with the results contained in the DREs or memory cards while the poll 
workers transfer them to the CCBOE and (2) instill confidence in voters. So, the CCBOE 
should require the Presiding Judge to post a signed copy of the Long Report for each 
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DRE at the polling location. The Presiding Judge should also put a disclaimer stating that 
the results are unofficial land subject to change because of absentee ballots and the 
acceptance of provisional ballots. So, the Presiding Judge would not post the results to 
declare a winner. 
The CCBOE should also make available, on its website, a list of each DREs results 
organized by polling location, so that interested parties or voters could verify that the 
results posted at a polling location are the results that the CCBOE used in its official and 
unofficial tallies. 
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Chapter VI: Ballot Count and Post Election 
Hand count and ballot remake into DRE votes  
6.1  Finding: On 5/2/2006 in the early morning hours, Director Vu became convinced 
that the optical scanners would not count optical scan ballots accurately. He then 
proposed to the SOS via phone call to Judy Grady that the CCBOE commence a hand 
count for the initial canvass a/k/a “unofficial count.” The CCBOE did not make any 
effort to ensure partisan balance in counting teams (of readers and recorders). The 
CCBOE used workers from temporary agencies who did not conduct any background 
checks. Although the CCBOE requested literacy skills in the temp workers from the 
agency, the CCBOE did not independently ascertain this capacity.  
The Director prescribed 12 hour shifts for all temp workers involved in the hand 
count. The CCBOE did not generate a written statement of standards to govern what 
marks (such as an X, a partially filled in oval, or underscore of a candidate name) would 
be counted as a vote. Deputy Director Dillingham orally informed the initial CCBOE 
managers who were assigned to supervise the hand count that the only marks that would 
count were those that an optical scanning device would have read; thus, an X in an oval 
would not count. The managers restated these directions as each new shift of workers and 
supervisors arrived. [Interview with Director Vu and Administrator Platten; with 
department managers and other CCBOE acting as supervisors of temporary hand count 
workers] 
6.2  Finding: While the initial hand count was proceeding, Director Vu began to develop 
a proposal for tabulating the optical scan ballots in a manner different for the “official” 
count (that precedes the certification of the vote). At base, this new procedure for 
tabulating the optical scan paper ballots was a type of “ballot remake,” which in the past 
has been used where the original ballot cannot be counted by mechanical means and must 
be “remade’ to be properly counted by machine. Director Vu’s approach was to propose 
converting or “remaking” each paper ballot into a DRE-record that would then become a 
part of the same database tabulation as the votes cast on DRE units in the polling 
locations. [Interview with Director Vu] 
Before May 10, the CCBOE discussed with the SOS representatives its proposed 
procedures for “remaking” the optical scan ballots in the DREs. The SOS orally 
confirmed the CCBOE’s planned procedures. Chairman Bennett’s reference to that 
discussion is the only record of it ever happening: “[c]onfirmation and approval has been 
given, by the Secretary of State’s Office, to record the optical scan ballots using the 
electronic touch screen voting units without printing the voter verifiable paper trail.” The 
CCBOE included, as an attachment, its procedures for remaking the ballot in its 
5/10/2006 letter to the SOS. [Chairman Bennett’s 5/10/2006 letter to Monty Lobb, 
Assistant Secretary of State; interview with Deputy Director Dillingham on 7/18/2006] 
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6.3  Finding: No Ohio statute or SOS memorandum, advisory, or directive details how a 
BOE should count ballots under these circumstances. Under ORC §3506.16, however, 
BOE employees may remake paper ballots in teams of two, one from each major political 
party. SOS Directives and Advisories; ORC §3506.16. 
The CCBOE did attempt to set up DRE remake teams that reflected partisan balance 
(with Republicans and Independents/NonAffiliated balanced against Democrats) as 
detailed in the statute. [Interviews with Linda Steimle and Betty Jones]. The CCBOE 
assigned paired teams of two temporary employees to remake the optical scan ballots by 
manually entering them into DREs. The CCBOE set up ten-hour work shifts where 
virtually all workers had to be standing on their feet for the entirety of the work shift. The 
CCBOE suspended the count for Mother’s Day on 5/14/2006. [Interviews with Linda 
Steimle and Betty Jones; Deputy Director] 
The CCBOE did not run background checks on or give literacy tests to workers who 
remade the ballots on the DREs. The Deputy Director said that the Administrative 
Assistants were in charge of the hiring and that the CCBOE did not hire applicants who 
marked “felon” on their applications. Although the CCBOE had no policy on witnesses, 
it did require party balance during the remake process. [Deputy Director; Administrative 
Assistants] 
The Panel has received conflicting information regarding whether the CCBOE 
distributed any written rules to the worker teams for DRE remake of the optical scan 
ballots. The Deputy Director stated that these procedures governed, and that they were 
distributed. But at least three managers whom the Panel interviewed said that they never 
saw any written handout and that, again, the top managers told them to provide oral 
instructions to the workers: 
1. Review paper ballot to ensure there are no questions regarding voter intent. If you 
have questions about a vote for an office please ask a supervisor;  
2. Insert voter access card;  
3. Ensure that political party (democrat, republican, or issues), municipality, ward, 
and precinct on paper ballot match the political party, municipality, ward, and 
precinct on the TSx unit;  
4. One person will read the office and the candidate choice, and the other will select 
that candidate name/issue by touching the screen next to the name;  
5. Once the entire ballot has been selected, a summary screen will appear;  
6. The person who read the ballot will review the summary screen while the person 
who selected the candidates on the TSx unit reads the names back from the paper 
ballot; and  
7. Once both team members are certain that the TSx unit reflects the paper ballot 
exactly, touch the cast ballot on the TSx unit.  
[Instructions for voting optical scan ballot on TSx unit in teams of Democrat and 
Republican; interview of Deputy Director Dillingham on 7/18/2006] 
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6.4  Finding: Although the DRE units are designed to function only with the VVPAT 
printer units properly installed, and the DRE printer could have created a paper trail 
recording the votes, the SOS instructed the CCBOE not to permit the DREs to print the 
paper receipt. The CCBOE accomplished that instruction by loading the paper backwards 
so that the printers did not have a surface on which they could print. 
The CCBOE did not agree with the SOS's decision, which it had given orally, to have 
the DREs set up so they were unable to create a VVPAT. [Instructions for voting optical 
scan ballot on TSx unit in teams of Democrat and Republican; interview of Deputy 
Director Dillingham on 7/18/2006] 
6.5  Recommendation: The Ohio General Assembly should specify via legislation the 
legal standards for conducting hand counts when optical scanners fail. The statute should 
address not only what marks shall count as “voter intent” but also address how many 
persons shall be involved and in what roles (readers, recorders, supervisors); whether 
partisan balance is required in all roles; what the public’s and candidate’s rights are to 
witness the count; whether, if the BOE uses a DRE system in addition to the optical 
scanners, an optical scan ballot can be remade into a DRE ballot, and with what 
procedures; and what kinds of steps shall be taken for tallying the vote and for quality 
control throughout. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s study on Vote Counts 
and Recounts under the direction of Prof. Thad Hall should be consulted for sister State 
standards and emerging Best Practices for hand counting procedures.  
Until legislation is enacted, the Ohio SOS should issue a Directive specifying the 
interim standards for what shall constitute “voter intent” on an optical scan ballot that is 
subject to hand counting procedure or remakes. Additionally, the interim standards 
should address all the questions listed above.  
In both the legislation and in any Interim standards, we urge the officials to seek to 
establish procedures well designed for achieving the highest standards of accuracy and 
public accountability in hand count/remake procedures.  
Finally, whether by legislation or Directive, this Panel recommends that the VVPAT 
printer units should not be disabled when engaged in vote counting on any DRE units.  
6.6  Finding: The only observed method for tracking Election Day problems and their 
solutions at the CCBOE is the Incident Report, or “Pink Sheet,” a brief listing of issues 
faced by individual booth workers. These Pink Sheets are attached to the inside front of 
each poll book, one for each of 1434 precincts. A space approximately 6 inches long is 
provided for description of any given occurrence. After the election, copies of all 1434 
Pink Sheets are circulated to all CCBOE departments. Each department is to look these 
over and pick out the issues which they feel are theirs to address. When the department 
has investigated and corrected the problem to their satisfaction, someone is to place a red 
check mark, anonymously, next to that problem listing on the original Pink Sheet in the 
poll book. No record is made as to what corrective actions were taken. This system 
provides no accountability for correcting the problems, no assurance that each problem 
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will be addressed, and no method for tracking trends or reoccurrences. This system also 
ignores all problems that appear to regular CCBOE staff at times other than Election Day. 
[Interviews with the Deputy Director; site visit and inspection of poll books; CCBOE 
procedural manuals] 
6.7  Recommendation: The CCBOE should replace the “Pink Sheet” arrangement with a 
comprehensive quality assurance program. This program should involve all areas of the 
Board’s year-round operations, including Election Day, and it should insure that each 
issue will be seen through to permanent correction. 
1. Exhaustive, step-by step procedures should be established and written out for 
every process performed by CCBOE staff or proxies, leaving nothing to the 
imagination. This standardized format would include anything from planning a 
major operation to transferring a single document between departments. 
2. Any observed deviation from these procedures, should be recorded on a 
standardized form and submitted to one person whose primary responsibility is to 
track and correct non-conformances. 
3. This individual should classify the occurrences as to type and source, according to 
established objective guidelines, and then record this information in a database. 
4. The coordinating individual should determine who was involved in the occurrence 
and work with them to insure that they are aware of the procedure and understand 
it. It may turn out that the operating procedure was inapplicable or unfeasible, the 
realization of which could lead to a refinement in operations. 
5. The coordinator and other involved parties should sign off on a mutual 
understanding of the problem’s solution. 
The coordinator of this program would be responsible for compiling, analyzing, and 
interpreting non-conformance data. Periodically, he or she should meet with the Board 
(and ideally a cross-departmental team) to present findings, discuss trends, and evaluate 
solutions. The benefits of such a system include increased transparency for the public, 
heightened awareness for the Board, and continuous improvement of election processes. 
For more details, please see the Appendix F, Quality Assurance and Continuous 
Improvement proposal, with exhibits. 
6.8  Recommendation: The Ballot Department should be managed by a trained election 
official. Though many aspects of ballot creation and handling are now computer 
controlled, this does not mean that they are principally computer issues. They are election 
issues and should be approached as such. 
6.9  Recommendation: The department cannot operate with an obsolete manual. 
Procedures for running a ballot count operation cannot be devised on the fly during the 
course of an election. These procedures should be established and tested on a full-election 
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scale, long before preparations for the real thing begin. Official procedures must be 
written out, agreed upon, checked with code, and published in a new manual as soon as 
possible. 
6.10  Finding: During the official count process in advance of the Official Certification 
of the May Primary election the CCBOE was faced with the prospects of having to hand 
count over 18,000 optical scan ballots cast by absentee voters. After hand counting these 
ballots for the unofficial count the CCBOE was considering the alternative approach of 
“remaking” the ballot by having CCBOE staff transfer the votes recorded on the optical 
scan ballot to a DRE. 
While determining the appropriateness of their strategy the CCBOE in the person of 
Director Vu sought the advice from the Secretary of State as to the appropriateness of this 
option. Director Vu discussed the matter with Judy Grady and Pat Wolfe of the Secretary 
of State’s Office who agreed with the idea of remaking ballots but specifically asked that 
no VVPAT record be printed. The CCBOE was instructed to turn the VVPAT paper 
backwards so the tape would be process through the machine on the unprintable side. 
This action prevented the DRE machine from creating a paper tape that could be used to 
verify the data entry activity performed by the CCBOE staff. [Email from Director Vu on 
7/7/2006; May 2006 primary election Official Canvass Plan; Robert Bennett letter on 
5/10/2006] 
6.11  Recommendation: In the event that the CCBOE should ever find itself in a similar 
position again and is forced to transfer optical scan ballots to a DRE, the CCBOE should 
create a paper tape. This VVPAT tape should be used as a quality control check to insure 
that the votes were recorded accurately and be made available for any recount involving 
absentee ballots. After the official count is complete the VVPAT should be kept as a 
record for a time and in a manner that is consistent with all other VVPAT records 
produced for the election in question. 
6.12  Finding: Auditing at the DRE level is difficult in the GEMS system. Once vote 
totals are uploaded into the server, the smallest detailed breakdown  possible is by polling 
location. In other words, although GEMS can produce a report that shows each DRE’s 
total results, it cannot produce a report that shows the number of votes cast in the DRE 
for each candidate.  No clear reason exists why the GEMS software could not be 
configured to produce a report on demand that would track and/or isolate the detailed 
results from a given DRE based on digital signatures. An audit program that will be used 
for the August election and beyond allows tracking of every Voter Access Card 
transaction on a given DRE, but it still does not allow a detailed breakdown of final 
results by machine in any GEMS output. If a security breach were to be discovered on 
any DRE after an election, it would be difficult to determine which ballots came from it. 
[Interviews with Tyrone Howard 7/13/2006 and 7/14/2006, interview with Brian Cleary 
7/13/2006 and 7/14/2006] 
6.13  Recommendation: Although GEMS cannot print a report that shows a DRE’s 
detailed results (i.e., results for each candidate), interested parties or the CCBOE could 
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audit a DRE by following these six steps: (1) print a GEMS report that shows the detailed 
results for the entire polling location; (2) upload all memory cards except the missing 
memory card's copy from that polling location's DREs into a duplicate data base; (3) print 
a report that shows the duplicate database's detailed results; (4) subtract those results 
from the GEMS report printed in step (1); (5) print a paper tape from the DRE whose 
memory card is missing, or which otherwise is in question; and (6) compare that paper 
tape to the GEMS report minus the results from the duplicate database. The only thing 
that might make it impossible is that this process would have to control for provisional 
ballots cast on DREs, the process for which remains unclear to the Panel.  If at all 
possible, the GEMS server should immediately be modified to allow tracking of detailed 
results by which piece of equipment they came from. 
6.14  Finding: The CCBOE erroneously reported the number of write-in votes received 
by various candidates in the May Primary based on a clerical error by a member of the 
CCBOE Ballot staff. The DRE machines generate a report showing the names of 
individuals receiving write-in votes on the left side of the page and the actual number of 
votes received on the right side of the page. The staff person was instructed to highlight 
the names of any eligible write-in candidate in one color, highlight the name where there 
was uncertainty of voter intent with another color and strike through those write-in 
ballots cast of individuals who were ineligible to receive write-in votes in the May 
primary. 
Those ballots with questions concerning voter intent were decided on by the Director 
and Deputy Director of the CCBOE. The Ballot staff person was then instructed to tally 
the votes and report the results for inclusion in the unofficial vote tally. The staff person 
did as instructed, but rather than counting the number of votes in the right column she 
counted the number of times the name appeared in the left column, significantly 
understating the number of votes cast for write-in candidates on 5/19/2006. For any given 
candidate, only the first vote from each precinct was counted. The error was only 
discovered after a write-in candidate complained that all her votes were not counted. 
As a result of a recount of the write in votes after the official count was certified, one 
democratic precinct committeeman race was overturned (Cleveland 15Q) and a candidate 
who previously did not qualify for the November election as a write-in candidate for 
State Representative in the 13th House District was qualified. A few of the more extreme 
examples include: 
Candidate Office 5/19/2006 6/13/2006 
Roger Kramer Common Pleas Court 105 1,399 
Michael Blumenthal Common Pleas Court 103 1,247 
John P. Hildebrand State Rep 13th District 27 109 
Michael O’Shea State Rep 16th District 65 385 
[Interview with Ballot Department Manager; Examination of Ballot Department 
internal communications] 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 139 of 398 
6.15  Recommendation: In addition to the obvious clerical error by a member of the 
Ballot Department, the failure of the CCBOE to have clear policies and procedures and 
adequate staff training for how to count write-in ballots in advance of the May Primary 
election created an environment that increased the likelihood of errors. In advance of the 
next election, the CCBOE should immediately adopt and promulgate policies and 
procedures for all of the activities related to collecting, counting and recording all votes 
regardless of the medium used to record those votes. The CCBOE should immediately 
contact neighboring counties that have operated in an electronic voting environment 
before this year and ask them for copies of their policies and procedures as a starting 
point. 
6.16  Finding: The Ballot Department went into the May 2nd primary with no clear 
procedure for counting write-in ballots. When Bob Baker started as head of the 
department, his only training for write-ins was being handed a DESI manual with a 
section on the subject. During the unofficial count, it was estimated that the DESI method 
would take up to four or five days, while a hand-count could be completed in half a day. 
The department decided to proceed with the hand-count of write-in ballots. [Staff 
interviews; interview with Ballot Department Manager] 
6.17  Recommendation: The Ballot Department should consult with DESI and 
determine if the procedures in its manual can be sped up or shortened to provide for 
timely reporting of unofficial results. Regardless of what method is adopted, the 
department should work it out in detail, agree upon it, and publish it in an official 
procedure manual as soon as possible. Write-in counts, like all other vote counts, should 
proceed in a uniform and predictable manner. 
6.18  Finding: The Booth Official Training Manual does not instruct poll workers to 
print out the Long Report, the report that shows the results by precinct. In fact, the Booth 
Official Training Manual instructs poll workers not to print out that report. Under a SOS 
directive, for a recount the “board must select one or more whole precincts whose total 
equals at least 3% of the total vote.” By not having an official copy of this report — i.e., a 
copy in the sealed canister — the CCBOE had no way of knowing precinct totals and 
could not fulfill the SOS’s requirement without counting all precincts. [Booth Official 
Training Manual, page 49, step 15; Directive No. 2006-50(F)(3)(b)(3)] 
6.19  Recommendation: The CCBOE should change the Booth Official Training Manual 
to require poll workers to print the Long Report. The Long Report should be printed from 
each DRE used in a location  
6.20  Finding: As of 6/22/2006, 51 days after the May Primary election, the CCBOE has 
yet to recover 12 lost memory cards. Missing cards did not result in votes going 
uncounted. When these cards could not be found, substitute memory cards were prepared 
and used to collect vote data from the DREs in question, which were then uploaded and 
included in tabulated results. 
The missing cards by voting location are as follows: 
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• AJ Rickoff, #8 
• Brook Park Recreation Center, #2 
• Eastman Branch Library, #1 and 8 
• McKinley Elementary, #12, 13, 14, and 15 
• Mt. Olive Baptist Church, #7 
• Orange Village Hall #0 
• Randallwood School, #4 
• Robert Fulton Elementary, #8 
In addition, staff at the warehouse found three substitute memory cards, two for 
Woodbury Elementary and one for Brookview Elementary, in three machines (#239611, 
241468 and 251478) that were assigned to Woodbury Elementary School. The Ballot 
Manager did not know how the cards ended up in the devices or why they were not 
removed before the devices were returned to the warehouse. They are not listed among 
the missing cards because the original memory cards for Brookview Elementary and 
Woodbury Elementary were located and filed. 
When pressed for an explanation, the Ballot Manager suggested that the memory 
cards were placed in the DREs as part of the recount process and left there by accident. 
This possible explanation fails to consider that although the precincts at Brookview 
Elementary were involved in the recount process, those voting at Woodbury Elementary 
were not. On 6/22/2006, the Board did not have a list of all missing memory cards; 
rather, the CCBOE only has a list of all original memory cards that are missing. 
[Interview with Ballot Department Manager; Examination of Ballot Department internal 
communications] 
6.21  Recommendation: The CCBOE must create a process and training that will allow 
the poll workers to understand the exact number of memory cards that must be placed 
into the clear memory card bag at the end of the day and that the memory card bag should 
be sealed and placed in the large red bag only. The memory card bags should be marked 
with a large number to reflect the number of memory cards that should be in that bag 
before the red bag leaves the polling location. Staff checking in Election Day supplies at 
delivered by the Presiding Judge should check to be sure the bag contains the marked 
number of cards. In the case of missing cards, the Judge should be sent back to the 
polling place to retrieve any missing cards immediately. See Appendix D: Election Night 
Proposal. 
6.22  Recommendation: The CCBOE should eliminate requirement that the poll workers 
accumulate the votes from each polling location on to a single “accumulator card” as 
soon as possible and immediately eliminate the uploading stations. By simplifying the 
process the CCBOE can close the voting locations faster and get the memory cards and 
other voted ballots to the CCBOE. This move eliminates the opportunity for memory 
cards to be lost or misplaced by minimizing the number of times they are handled by poll 
workers. 
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6.23  Recommendation: The CCBOE should purchase 48 DESI Election Media 
Processors (EMP) which may be used to feed up to six memory cards at once into the 
GEMS system. At peak load these devices, which are pending ITA certification by the 
Secretary of State for use by Boards of Election, will allow the CCBOE staff to read 288 
memory cards simultaneously and will eliminate the need to accumulate memory cards at 
the polling location and upload the cards at the transfer stations. As an added bonus, these 
devices can also be used to burn memory cards in advance of an election. Eliminating the 
accumulation and uploading will allow the CCBOE to gain custody of the memory cards 
as soon as possible, minimize the number of individuals involved in the chain of custody 
and improve the security of the memory cards and the voted ballots. 
6.24  Recommendation: The CCBOE should keep an inventory of all memory cards that 
includes information to identify the individual memory card, including the serial number 
of the machine, precinct, and polling location to which the CCBOE assigned it. In cases 
where memory cards are used in machines to which they weren’t assigned, a strict 
inventory should be kept to track the machines into which cards were actually inserted. 
6.25  Finding: “Black Binders” are the storage location of numerous polling location 
supplies, most notably DRE keys, voter access cards, card encoders, and supervisor 
cards. After the May 2nd election, the Ballot Department staff began looking through all 
the black binders and cataloging what was missing. At some point during this process, 
they all had to stop and work on something else, and the search area was cleared. By the 
time the department returned to finish the inventory assessment, the original count sheet 
had been lost and no one could tell which binders had already been searched. At this 
point, there is no clear record of what items are missing from the binders. Nonetheless, an 
Official Inventory spreadsheet has been compiled by the department, quantifying the 
missing items. Per that spreadsheet, the missing items include 209 Supervisor Cards, 812 
Voter Access Cards, 215 Encoders, and 313 DRE Keys. The equation used to determine 
missing keys appears to be faulty, because all it does is subtract the number of keys 
assigned to a given precinct from a fixed value of two, without including any variable for 
number of keys actually returned. Reporting requirements require the Black Binder 
content to be returned within a 48 hour time period. [Interview with Ballot Department 
Manager 6/22/2006; examination of Official Card Inventory 05 02 2006 spreadsheet] 
6.26  Recommendation: The Ballot Department should develop and implement an 
inventory tracking system. This system should be coordinated by one individual, 
preferably with prior experience in inventory control. He or she would be responsible for 
all transactions in or out, for pursuing anything that turns up missing, and for compliance 
with reporting requirements. In addition to black binder contents, he or she would also be 
responsible for tracking memory cards and DREs in conjunction with warehouse staff. 
Someone should be personally responsible for custodianship of these sensitive materials. 
6.27  Recommendation: The Ballot Department should consider labeling all sensitive 
inventory with barcodes, including the DREs, memory cards, and other important black 
binder contents. This would eliminate the possibility of lost partial counts, but more 
importantly it would assign a fixed ID number to each individual item. Barcodes are 
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already used to track some items at the CCBOE, so some of the equipment and 
familiarity is already there. Memory cards already have barcode labels attached, but they 
are not used to inventory them. 
Certificate #1 does not facilitate reconciling number of voters with number 
of ballots cast 
6.28  Finding: ORC §3505.26 requires the Presiding Judges to “[c]ount the voted 
ballots,” and states that “[i]f the number of voted ballots exceeds the number of voters 
whose names appear upon the poll books, the Presiding Judge shall enter on the poll 
books an explanation of that discrepancy.” In other words, Ohio statute requires Presiding 
Judges to reconcile the number of voters and the number of ballots cast. The CCBOE’s 
Certificate #1, however, is not set up for the Presiding Judges to reconcile anything; 
instead, it only has spaces for the Presiding Judge to enter data that the CCBOE could use 
for the reconciliation. 
The Booth Official Training Manual also does not instruct poll workers to reconcile 
the number of voters and the ballots cast, nor is Certificate #1 set up to perform that 
reconciliation. Although poll workers should have all of the necessary data to perform the 
reconciliation after printing out each DRE’s Long Report, Certificate #1 only includes 
boxes for data to perform half of the reconciliation — the number of voters who entered 
the polls. 
Certificate #1 requires Booth Officials to certify that the “Accounting Chart of voters’ 
signatures and the number of ballots being delivered to the Board of Elections is true and 
correct for ballots cast for this Election.” Booth Officials, however, cannot make this 
certification without the Long Report, which shows results by precincts, and which the 
most recent Booth Official Manual instructs them not to print. [Certificate #1; Booth 
Official Training Manual] 
6.29  Recommendation: Certificate #1 should be set up to allow poll workers to perform 
a reconciliation (see proposed revised Certificate #1, Appendix H). Requiring poll 
workers to reconcile the number of ballots cast with the number of voters would: 
• Allow those closest to where any discrepancy was created to investigate and 
resolve the discrepancy; 
• Help assure that the poll workers complete the forms because they will understand 
the reason that the CCBOE is accumulating the data; 
• Help assure that poll workers print out each DRE’s Summary Report that will be 
necessary to perform the reconciliation. 
Although DREs are not precinct specific, they are capable of producing reports that 
show results by precinct. The poll workers should print out a Long Report for each DRE. 
Those reports will show the polling location’s results by precinct, which the Presiding 
Judges could then circulate them between precincts to complete their revised Certificate 
#1. 
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6.30  Finding: Locating a specific DRE at the warehouse is time consuming and difficult 
due to an insufficient tracking system. The warehouse is organized into rows, like isles in 
a grocery store, with stacks of eight DREs each lined up parallel, from the middle isle out 
to each wall. All that is tracked on the location spreadsheet is what row a given DRE is 
in. Each row contains over a hundred DREs, and the only way to find a specific one is to 
crawl on hands and knees, searching serial numbers or location stickers. Compounding 
the situation is the fact that DREs from a given location are not kept together, and may be 
split among different sections of the warehouse. For example, it took three people 
approximately two hours to locate fourteen machines from the A.J. Rickoff polling 
location to do a spot audit. Two-level rolling carts from DESI are beginning to arrive in 
large quantities, and a transition to storing DREs on those is underway. Currently, the 
tracking spreadsheet only specifies what row of carts and what level, top or bottom. 
6.31  Recommendation: The warehouse should track not only what row, but also what 
stack (or rack) all individual DREs occupy, and their specific location within that stack 
(or rack). Barcode labels, already on the DREs, could be used to facilitate this tracking 
system. 
GEMS reports are inconsistent and do not always contain needed 
information 
6.32  Finding: The CCBOE has many different versions of the same GEMS reports — 
i.e., some reports that are supposed to show the same data have different totals. Also, 
those reports do not always signify to the user what information they contain. 
Accordingly, the Ballot Department manager could not always explain the differences 
between some of those reports. [Interview of Bob Baker on 6/22/2006] 
GEMS does not allow the CCBOE to export data from a report into an Excel 
spreadsheet, so a Ballot Department staff member had to enter that data manually. The 
column in the Poll Book Justification that is supposed to show the number of ballots cast 
per GEMS does not have a total column that the CCBOE can use to verify that the 
CCBOE (1) accurately copied that information; and (2) took the information from the 
correct report. Although someone could total the column to verify that the CCBOE 
accurately took the data from the other report, doing so wastes time and shows that the 
CCBOE might not have performed this check. 
The Deputy Director said that once the CCBOE activates a provisional ballot in 
GEMS, no way of reconciling the number of voters to the number of ballots cast exists 
because GEMS considers activated provisional ballots to be no different from regular 
ballots. 
The Director could not produce a report or calculation worksheet that supports the 
official total — 202,504 — on the Ballots Cast Distribution Summary. 
The Ballots Cast Distribution Summary, the CCBOE-prepared report that shows the 
number of DRE votes, the number of provisional ballots, etc. and that the Director 
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submits to the board for its approval, showed the total regular DRE votes for the 
unofficial canvas. Although it also showed a total number of votes for the official tally, 
that number was a grand total that did not break out how many provisional votes, 
seventeen year old votes, etc., made up that grand total. In other words, it did not show 
whether the number of regular DRE votes, which should not change, was the same in 
both the official and unofficial tallies. In fact, that number had changed. The Cards Cast 
Report that has the same total as the unofficial canvas in the Ballot Cast Distribution 
Summary does not include totals for four Euclid precincts. Also, the number of ballots 
from at least one other polling location, Schaff Community Center in Parma, changed 
from the official to the unofficial canvas. Although part of that difference can be 
attributed to absentee and provisional ballots that the CCBOE manually entered, the 
entire difference could not be explained. [Interview of Ballot Department Manager Bob 
Baker 6/22/2006; interview with the Deputy Director on 6/8/2006; interview with the 
Director on 7/5/2006; walk-through with Brian Cleary on 6/22/2006] 
6.33  Recommendation: Through meetings with other departments, especially the 
department responsible for preparing the official and unofficial reconciliations (or 
canvasses), the Ballot Department manager should understand those other departments’ 
informational needs — i.e., what kind of reports they will need to perform the 
reconciliation. Then, the Ballot Department should prepare only one version of those 
reports and note on each copy what information it contains. 
6.34  Recommendation: All GEMS reports should have a grand total that can be cross-
referenced to other GEMS or board-produced reports. Here are some examples of the 
kind of reports that the CCBOE will need and might already produce: 
• A report that shows each polling location’s DRE results, less provisional ballots, 
broken out by each DRE that was at that polling location (this report should equal 
the number of regular DRE voters) (the CCBOE should post this report on its 
website so that interested parties can verify that the amounts on the Long Report 
posted at the polling location were the amounts that the CCBOE ultimately 
counted); 
• A report that shows the number of ballots cast at the polls per polling location (the 
CCBOE can use this report to perform a quick, unofficial reconciliation on 
election night and to perform an official reconciliation, especially when the 
number of voters and the number of ballots cast do not reconcile per precinct); 
• A report that shows the number of regular ballots cast at the polls per precinct 
before the CCBOE accepted and activated provisional ballots (this report should 
include all regular ballots, both DREs and optical scans, cast at the polls) (the 
CCBOE can reconcile the results in this report with the number of voters, 
according to the Poll Book and Audit Book, without having to back out the 
number of voters who cast optical scan ballots); 
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• A report that breaks out the number of regular DRE votes, seventeen-year-old 
ballots, curbside optical scan ballots, etc. cast at the polling location (the totals for 
each category on this report should equal the totals on the summary report of vote 
totals that the Director presents to the Board); and 
• A report that shows the number of votes, both provisional and regular, cast per 
precinct and polling location (this report should equal the sum of the report 
mentioned in the third bullet point and a report that shows the accepted 
provisional ballots). 
The CCBOE should show more detail on summary reports that it prepares to allow 
the Board Members and the public to determine whether numbers that should not change 
have changed. All numbers on any report that the CCBOE prepares should be easily 
traceable to supporting documents such as GEMS reports. 
The Board of the CCBOE should review and approve reconciliations of 
voters to ballots cast 
6.35  Finding: To collect data on the number of voters per precinct for the reconciliation 
process, the CCBOE had its employees prepare a worksheet for each precinct that 
showed the number of voters shown in the Audit Book and the number of signatures in 
the Poll Book. When preparing the Poll Book Justification spreadsheet, the CCBOE had 
no control in place to assure the accuracy of the data that it entered into the spreadsheet 
from those worksheets. Specifically, the CCBOE employees preparing the spreadsheet 
entered the data as the worksheets arrived. [Interview with Director Vu and Shantiel 
Hawkins on 7/12/2006] 
6.36  Recommendation: If the CCBOE needs to enter data from employee-prepared 
worksheets or from the Certificate #1’s, it should enter that data in batches, meaning 
groups of twenty or so worksheets or Certificate #1’s. Once a batch is entered, the 
CCBOE employee should run a calculator tape totaling all of the data on the Certificate 
#1’s or worksheets. The CCBOE employee should then compare that total to a total on 
the Excel spreadsheet to make sure that they match. This procedure will help assure the 
accuracy of the data entered onto the spreadsheet. 
6.37  Finding: The Executive Assistant gave the Panel a copy of the CCBOE’s Poll Book 
Justification. After Panel staff used that document to prepare a spreadsheet of 
discrepancies between the number of voters and the number of ballots cast that exceeded 
ten, the Executive Assistant said that the numbers on the Poll Book Justification were 
inaccurate as they did not include corrections that CCBOE employees had made to the 
spreadsheet. The Executive Assistant said that no copy of that spreadsheet with the 
accurate numbers existed. Although the Executive Assistant said that the Board had 
received a copy of that report at its May 20 certification meeting, a Republican Board 
Member’s administrative assistant could not find a copy. Also, the Board’s meeting 
minutes from the certification meeting neither mentioned what reports the Director had 
presented to the Board nor included copies of the reports that the Board had received. The 
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meeting transcript ambiguously refers to reports that the Board Members had received, 
but does not state the name of those reports. Because the CCBOE could not offer the 
Panel a copy of this spreadsheet that it stands behind, Panel staff could not test it. 
[Interviews with Shantiel Hawkins on 7/13/2006 and 7/14/2006; the Board’s 5/20/2006 
meeting minutes; transcript of the Board’s 5/20/2006 meeting; inquiry of Linda Steimle 
on 7/14/2006; CCBOE-prepared Poll Book Justification] 
6.38  Recommendation: The Director should present to the Board the Poll Book 
Justification that shows every precinct and polling location and whether or not they 
reconciled within a board-determined acceptable margin. The Board should review this 
document and accept it into the Board’s minutes. The Board’s clerk should include a 
copy of this document with the minutes on the board’s website. 
6.39  Finding: Although the Ballot Department performed an unofficial canvas, that 
reconciliation was not done on a spreadsheet which an interested party, like a Board 
Member, could review. Instead, a Ballot Department employee quickly compared the 
amounts on the Cards Cast Report with the Certificate #1’s and marked on the Cards Cast 
Report any discrepancies that needed further investigation. The Ballot Department 
employee however did prepare a summary sheet of unacceptable discrepancies which he 
gave to his manager. The Ballot Department manager forwarded those results to the 
Director, the Deputy Director, and the IT Administrator, but the Director did not know 
that he received them or that the Ballot Department performed an unofficial canvas. 
According to the Director, a discrepancy of thirty-five voters was acceptable in the 
unofficial count, and a discrepancy of ten voters and/or votes per precinct was acceptable 
in the official count. Although the board never endorsed an allowable discrepancy of ten 
per precinct, it did not reject that number in the board’s certification meeting on 
5/20/2006 when Director Vu discussed it. 
6.40  Finding: On Monday 7/9/2006, CCBOE staff discovered fifteen uncounted 
absentee ballots in the bottom of a mail tub. Preceding the election, the CCBOE mailed 
out polling place notification cards to voters, some of which began coming back 
“undeliverable” approximately four days after. These cards were equipped with 
scannable barcodes to aid in the tracking of which voters had changed addresses, but it 
was soon discovered that the scanning did not work. The returned cards were then mailed 
to the printing vendor for scanning, and according to Candidate and Voter Services 
Manager DeFranco, this is when the absentee ballots were lost. They were discovered 
mixed in with notification cards to be sent to the vendor. As of 7/14/2006, the CCBOE 
has decided that ten of these ballots are not valid because their original postmark dates 
were too late to be counted for the May Primary. The other five ballots are still in 
pending status, until the CCBOE can determine their validity. 
6.41  Recommendation: The CCBOE must standardize mail room procedures to include 
a confirmation that a mail tub is indeed empty of incoming mail before it is used for any 
other purpose. 
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6.42  Finding: The CCBOE did not have a column in its reconciliation, which it named 
the Poll Book Justification, for adjustments made by the executive assistant or others to 
help the number of voters and ballots cast reconcile. So, the CCBOE employee who 
prepared the spreadsheet adjusted the amount in the Audit Book or Poll Book column or 
both. For example, if CCBOE personnel went to the Pink Sheet and found out that a 
discrepancy at a location was due to five voters leaving before they voted, but after they 
had signed the poll book, the person preparing the reconciliation did not note that 
adjustment to bring the discrepancy within the board determined accepted amount. 
6.43  Finding: Nothing in the transcript from the CCBOE’s 5/20/2006 meeting, during 
which the board certified the election results, shows that the administration presented the 
Poll Book Justification spreadsheet to the board. This spreadsheet shows which precincts 
and polling locations did not reconcile and by how much. [Interview of the Director on 
7/5/2006; CCBOE Meeting Transcript of 5/20/2006] 
6.44  Recommendation: Once the CCBOE receives the Certificate #1’s (i.e., the 
Reconciliation of Voters to Ballots Cast) from the polling locations, a CCBOE employee 
should enter the amount of voters per polling location from the Certificate #1’s on a 
spreadsheet. After the CCBOE has uploaded all of the results into GEMS, the CCBOE 
should import those results by polling location into the spreadsheet and compare them 
with the data from the Certificate #1’s. The CCBOE should investigate any unacceptable 
discrepancies. The Director should review, sign, and date this spreadsheet. The Director 
should then present this spreadsheet to the board for its review and approval. 
The Board should receive an opinion from its legal counsel on whether an allowable 
discrepancy of ten complies with any Ohio laws, SOS directives, or official board 
policies. Even if no mandatory authority exists on this matter, as good practice the board 
should adopt an acceptable discrepancy of one or two or a board-determined percentage 
of the voters who voted at the precinct. The deviation that the Director suggested — ten 
votes per precinct — would allow for a 14,340 countywide discrepancy of votes to voters 
(1,434 precincts x 10 = 14,340). 
After Election Day, the CCBOE should use the GEMS report that shows the number 
of ballots cast per precinct and the revised Certificate #1 which shows the number of 
voters per precinct to reconcile the number of voters and the number of ballots cast by 
precinct. This spreadsheet should include a column for any adjustments that the employee 
who prepared it had to make. The CCBOE should perform this reconciliation on a 
spreadsheet that the Director reviews, signs, and dates. The CCBOE should also prepare a 
summary spreadsheet of precincts where a discrepancy is greater that a board-determined 
accepted amount. The Director should present both of these spreadsheets to the board for 
its review and approval. 
If the Board continues to have voters cast provisional ballots in the DREs, it will want 
to perform the following additional reconciliation procedure. After the election, the 
CCBOE should prepare a GEMS report that shows two totals: the number of regular 
ballots cast and the number of provisional ballots cast. After CVS accepts and rejects 
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provisional ballots, it should prepare a report that shows the number of provisional ballots 
accepted and rejected. Then, after the Ballot Department manually activates the accepted 
provisional ballots, the CCBOE should print another GEMS report that shows the number 
of ballots cast. The difference between that report and the number of accepted provisional 
ballots cast on the CVS-prepared report should equal the number of regular ballots cast. 
Also, the total of the rejected and accepted provisional ballots in the CVS-prepared report 
should equal the number of provisional ballots on the initial GEMS report. The CCBOE 
should be able to perform these reconciliation procedures at the county, precinct, and 
polling location levels. 
6.45  Finding: The CCBOE inconsistently applied Director Vu’s acceptable margin of 
error. The CCBOE used ten as the acceptable margin of error when determining whether 
polling locations that had precincts that did not reconcile within ten reconciled. The 
CCBOE, however, did not subject all polling locations to that standard. So, many polling 
locations that had all of their precincts reconcile within ten did not reconcile within ten. 
For example, Columbus Intermediate School, a Bedford Heights polling location, had 
four precincts each of which reconciled. The polling location, however, had a total 
discrepancy of twenty-five. Because none of that polling location’s precincts exceeded 
Director Vu’s margin of ten, it passed the test, and Director Vu did not present it to the 
Board as a problem polling location. [Interview of Shantiel Hawkins and Director Vu on 
7/12/2006; Poll Book Justification; and the transcript from the Board’s May 20 meeting 
minutes] 
6.46  Recommendation: The Board must adopt an acceptable discrepancy for polling 
locations and precincts. The Director should present to the Board, along with the Poll 
Book Justification, a summary of that document that lists all precincts and polling 
locations that did not reconcile by a board-determined acceptable margin. The Director 
should include polling locations on that list regardless of whether each of their precincts 
were within the acceptable margin. The Board’s clerk should include a copy of this 
document with the minutes on the board’s website. 
6.47  Finding: Director Vu represented to the Board that only five precincts did not 
reconcile by ten votes or fewer. The Panel staff’s 100% test of precincts shows that 79 
precincts did not reconcile by ten votes or fewer. In order to test whether this failure to 
reconcile was due to poll workers giving voters access cards with ballots for the wrong 
precincts, Panel staff looked at combined totals for precincts within each polling location 
that had precincts that did not reconcile, and found that fifteen did not reconcile within 
Director Vu’s acceptable margin. The Director reported to the Board that just two polling 
locations did not reconcile when combined in this way. 
Board Member Ed Coaxum and Director Vu had the following conversation during 
the Board’s 5/20/2006 meeting, during which the Board certified the county’s election 
results: 
Mr. Coaxum: And but for Spring Villa Apartments and Shaker Community Building 
the remaining precincts were within the standard deviation, is that correct[?] 
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Mr. Vu: That’s correct. And I think — 
Mr. Coaxum: On a precinct basis, is that correct? 
Mr. Vu: Yes. 
Mr. Coaxum: Thank you. With respect to Shaker Community Building you have an 
issue with respect [to] three precincts within Shaker Community Building, and within 
Spring Villa you have — we have issues with respect to two precincts. So out of 
1,434 precincts we have questions, not about ballots cast, but we have questions 
concerning five precincts, is that correct? 
Mr. Vu: That’s correct. 
[Transcript from the Board’s May 20 certification meeting] 
Assuming that the standard deviation that Director Vu and Mr. Coaxum are talking 
about is ten, which the Director refers to later in the same meeting, the Panel’s 
reconciliation of the votes cast and voters was greater than the standard deviation more 
than five times. The number of votes cast per the Cards Cast Report and the number of 
voters per the Certificate #1, the Audit Book, and the Poll Book, depending on which of 
those sources were available, vary by more than ten in the following eighty precincts (the 
number in parenthesis is the lowest discrepancy between the Cards Cast Report and the 
precinct’s Certificate #1, the Audit Book, and the Poll Book; a negative number means 
that more ballot were cast than voters, while a positive number means that less ballots 
were cast than voters): 
• Beachwood 00-A (78); 
• Beachwood 00-L (-62); 
• Beachwood 00-M (57); 
• Bedford Heights 01-A (11); 
• Bedford Heights 03-B (-16); 
• Brecksville 00-K (45); 
• Brecksville 00-O (-45); 
• Broadview Heights 02-K (204); 
• Broadview Heights 02-C (-207); 
• Cleveland 01-Q (12); 
• Cleveland 01-R (12); 
• Cleveland 02-S (-11); 
• Cleveland 03-P (-11); 
• Cleveland 05-A (-13); 
• Cleveland 05-U (-29); 
• Cleveland 06-A (22); 
• Cleveland 06-E (-13); 
• Cleveland 06-O (39); 
• Cleveland 06-R (-40); 
• Cleveland 08-F (-47); 
• Cleveland 08-O (42); 
• Cleveland 08-Q (72); 
• Cleveland 08-R (-83); 
• Cleveland 09-Q (19); 
• Cleveland 09-R (-25); 
• Cleveland 11-C (27); 
• Cleveland 11-D (-16); 
• Cleveland 16-L (-24); 
• Cleveland 16-N (21); 
• Cleveland 19-I (-12); 
• Cleveland Heights 04-K (-60); 
• East Cleveland 02-D (-40); 
• East Cleveland 02-H (36); 
• Euclid 04-H (-14); 
• Euclid 04-I (15); 
• Fairview Park 03B (-73); 
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• Fairview Park 05C (69); 
• Highland Heights 01-A (11); 
• Highland Heights 01-B (11); 
• Highland Heights 02-A (-14); 
• Highland Heights 02-B (-42); 
• Highland Heights 04-A (164); 
• Lyndhurst 01-D (61); 
• Lyndhurst 01-E (-68); 
• Lyndhurst 03-A (-11); 
• Lyndhurst 03-D (-14); 
• Mayfield Heights 00-B (176); 
• Mayfield Heights 00-L (-176); 
• North Olmsted 03-E (54); 
• North Olmsted 04-E (-11); 
• North Olmsted 04-H (-22); 
• Oakwood 03-B (-13); 
• Olmsted Falls 01-A (-105); 
• Olmsted Falls 01-B (20); 
• Olmsted Falls 02-B (26); 
• Olmsted Falls 03-A (78); 
• Olmsted Township 00-F (22); 
• Olmsted Township 00-H (-29); 
• Parma 03-I (42); 
• Parma 05-D (15); 
• Parma 05-F (-12); 
• Parma 09-D (-16); 
• Pepper Pike 00-A (13); 
• Pepper Pike 00-G (-14); 
• Rocky River 04-A (32); 
• Rocky River 04-C (34); 
• Seven Hills 02-B (149); 
• Seven Hills 02-C (201); 
• Shaker Heights 00-E (-17); 
• Shaker Heights 00-H (15); 
• Shaker Heights 00-I (-111); 
• Shaker Heights 00-P (74); 
• Shaker Heights 00-GG (14); 
• South Euclid 01-B (142); 
• South Euclid 01-C (-137); 
• South Euclid 02-A (-14); 
• South Euclid 02-E (15); 
• Westlake 01-F (89); and 
• Westlake 02-D (-92). 
 
[CERP’s reconciliations of voters to ballots cast per precinct; GEMS Cards Cast 
Report] 
Although some of the above precincts reconciled when combined with the other 
precincts at their polling locations, many did not. In the CCBOE’s Poll Book Justification 
summary, which it included with the Ballots Cast Distribution Summary that it presented 
to the Board at the 5/20/2006 meeting, the CCBOE reported that it could not reconcile 
two polling locations within the standard deviation of ten. The following fourteen 
precincts did not reconcile within a range of ten when combined with the other precincts 
at their polling locations (the number in parenthesis is the lowest discrepancy between the 
Cards Cast Report and the Certificate #1, the Audit Book, and the Poll Book for the entire 
polling location; a negative number means that more ballot were cast than voters, while a 
positive number means that less ballots were cast than voters; the precinct’s polling 
location is in the second parenthesis): 
• Cleveland 02-S (-12) (Miles Elementary School); 
• Cleveland 03-P (-13) (A.J. Rickoff); 
• Cleveland 05-A (-11) (Merion Sterling Elementary School); 
• Cleveland 06-A (22) (Rainbow Place); 
• Cleveland 08-Q (72) (none noted); 
• Cleveland 08-R (-83) (Empire Computech School); 
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• Highland Heights 02-A (-12) (Wellington Catering); 
• Highland Heights 01-A, 01-B, 02-B (-14) (Highland Heights Community Center); 
• Lyndhurst 03-A (-11) (Sherri Park Apartments); 
• North Olmsted 03-E (48) (North Olmsted City Hall); 
• Olmsted Falls 02-B (30) (Olmsted Community Church); 
• Parma 03-A, 03-C, 03-I (141) (Schaaf Community Center); 
• Seven Hills 02-B, 02-C (342) (St. Peter United Church of Christ); and 
• Shaker Heights 00-GG, 00-I, 00-P (-20) (Shaker Community Building). 
[CERP’s reconciliations of voters to ballots cast per polling location; GEMS Cards 
Cast Report] 
6.48  Finding: The number of voters and ballots cast reconciled in 65 precincts that did 
not reconcile by themselves, after Panel staff reconciled the number of voters and ballots 
cast in those precincts’ polling locations. Also, the following eight precincts had a total 
number of ballots cast that exceeded the number of the precinct’s registered voters (the 
number in parenthesis is the percent of registered voters that cast ballots in the precinct): 
• Beachwood 00-L (1119.85%); 
• Cleveland 05-E (1650%); 
• Cleveland 06-E (700%); 
• Cleveland 13-V (107.9%); 
• Cleveland 13-Y (200%); 
• Cleveland 14-D (900%); 
• East Cleveland 02-D (111.59%); and 
• South Euclid 01-C (109.03%). 
One possible explanation for these problems is that poll workers shared access-card 
encoders without realizing that the encoders were precinct specific. Doing so threw off 
the reconciliation and resulted in many voters not receiving the correct ballot for their 
precincts [The Panel’s reconciliations of voters to ballots cast per precinct and per polling 
location; GEMS Cards Cast Report] 
6.49  Recommendation: The CCBOE must train Booth Officials to understand that 
encoders are precinct-specific. A long-term solution would be having the poll workers 
enter a number off of a pre-numbered card to encode the ballot. More specifically, the 
poll worker filling out the Audit Book would hand a voter a numbered card off a packet 
with a Card A and Card B. Card B would bear the same number as Card A and would 
remain with the packet, after the poll worker tore off Card A. After receiving Card A, the 
voter would hand it to the poll worker encoding access cards, and that poll worker would 
enter the number on the Card into the encoder to encode the voter’s access card. Because 
the numbers would be precinct specific, by entering the number on the card, the poll 
worker would be encoding the access card with that precinct’s ballot. The numbers on the 
Cards would only be able to create one ballot — i.e., they could not be reused. This 
process would not only make sure that voters receive the correct ballot, but also help 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 152 of 398 
prevent someone who entered the access-card-encoding line without signing in from 
voting. Furthermore, this process would help Presiding Judges count the number voters 
and, thus, facilitate their reconciliation of voters to ballots cast. So, after the polls close, 
the Presiding Judges could use the packet to determine the number of voters by 
subtracting the lowest numbered Card B from the number on the lowest remaining Card 
A. 
6.50  Finding: A number of poll workers started listing all voters, regardless of party, in 
the Audit Book’s Democrats section — the first section in the Audit Book. Once they 
realized their mistake, the poll workers crossed out the Republican and Issue voters and 
wrote them in the correct section. This made counting the number of voters in the 
Democrat section harder and increased the chance for miscounting. Also, having three 
categories requires the poll workers to perform another step when performing the 
reconciliation: adding the Republicans, Democrats, and Issues, instead of just placing one 
total for the number of voters on the reconciliation. 
6.51  Recommendation: The CCBOE should eliminate the Republican, Issues, and 
Democratic distinctions in the Audit Books. The poll workers should just list all voters, 
regardless of party, in the Audit Book in the order in which they arrive. If the CCBOE 
still want to track the number of Republican, Democratic, and Issues voters, it should 
have the poll workers note that in a space next to each voter’s name. 
6.52  Finding: Deputy Director Dillingham indicated that the Voter Verified Paper Audit 
Trail (VVPAT) was the only true “official ballot” produced by the system. Ballot 
Department Manager Baker indicated that some VVPAT printouts from May 2nd were 
unusable because the paper did not advance and multiple ballots were printed on top of 
each other. These two statements together indicate that official ballots were inadvertently 
destroyed as they were being created on election night. Many voters did not look at the 
VVPAT printout, and this allowed long strings of unreadable ballots to print because no 
one was aware of the paper jam. Numerous complaints that printers failed regularly were 
also cited in Public Hearings, Incident Reports, EDT logs, telephone surveys, and 
comments by telephone to the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel. 
The CERP staff conducted a test of the DESI voting machine using high school 
seniors. One of the troubling observations was that when the paper jammed in the printer, 
the person’s vote was rendered unreadable. Furthermore, the person who voted next in 
line got the report of the paper jam after the previous voter had walked away. 
The Ballot Department Manager Bob Baker said that these compromised paper 
records were recreated from the DRE flash drive and/or card memory. However, voters 
did not have the opportunity to confirm that these printouts were valid representations of 
their choices, an apparent violation of Ohio law ORC §3506.10. [Interviews with Deputy 
Director Dillingham and Interviews with Ballot Department Manager Bob Baker 
6/20/2006, 6/22/2006, 6/23/2006; Telephone surveys; Incident Reports; Testing 
performed by Daniel Thiel and Gabrielle Kelly on 06/26/2006; Interview with Manager 
Dane Thomas 6/27/2006] 
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6.53  Recommendation: The CCBOE should, in writing, settle the question of what 
record or combination of records constitutes an official ballot in this system. If an official 
ballot is defined as a paper tape, additional training and procedures will be needed to 
ensure that official ballots are not destroyed by printer malfunctions. Each voter must be 
made aware of the VVPAT, its purpose, and its importance and some mechanism must 
exist to confirm that it is printing a useable record. Whether or not the VVPAT is the best 
way to ensure accuracy, it becomes useless when it is allowed to malfunction repeatedly 
during an election. 
6.54  Recommendation: The CCBOE should examine the printer failure as a possible 
breach of contract by DESI. 
6.55  Finding: During the May 2006 Primary Election, the CCBOE decided not to count 
seven absentee ballots because their secrecy envelopes were filled out in pencil rather 
than in ink. Pat Wolfe of the Secretary of State’s office subsequently advised the CCBOE 
that “R.C. 3509.05 requires the person to sign the envelope, but is does not state it must 
be signed in ink unlike R.C. 3501.38(B) which requires signatures to be affixed in ink on 
petitions.” [Email communications from the CCBOE and Pat Wolfe of the Secretary of 
State’s office] 
6.56  Recommendation: The CCBOE should amend their policies and procedures to 
accept absentee ballots as long as the secrecy envelope is completed and signed and the 
absentee meets all other requirements as stated in ORC §3509. 
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Chapter VII: Management and Personnel 
Management & Administrative Issues 
Background 
The CCBOE originally hired Michael Vu to serve as Director of the CCBOE in August 
2003 and reappointed him by unanimous vote in March 2006. The CCBOE Board 
specifically sought a Director who would professionalize the CCBOE and upgrade its 
performance and staff. They expected a sound, strategic downsizing and reorganization to 
achieve professional norms of performance. The Board recognized patronage had often 
been the basis of CCBOE hiring decisions, not just in the temporary employee ranks but 
also for permanent managerial and staff positions. The Board also recognized the deficits 
of patronage hiring in the increasingly complex requirements for election administration. 
Board Members expected and desired that the agency would move toward a having a 
permanent staff with appropriate professional credentials, skills and experience. 
Mr. Vu was hired after a national search, relocating from Salt Lake City, Utah. He was 28 
when he arrived, and had technical training as a GIS specialist (a type of demographics 
database). As the elections manager in Salt Lake County, his office was a part of the 
County Clerk. Salt Lake did not use e-voting technologies, and no significant technical 
transitions occurred while he managed the office. Mr. Vu lacked experience with e-voting 
but was fascinated by its possibilities. [Director Vu interviews and resume] 
Early in Director Vu’s tenure, Deputy Director Powell retired and Gwen Dillingham 
moved from Elections Coordinator to Deputy Director. Ms. Dillingham had served in this 
capacity previously, in the 1990s. 
By State statutory law, the Board Chairman’s political party affiliation must differ from 
the Director’s. In Cuyahoga, Chairman Bob Bennett is a Republican so the Director 
affiliated locally as a Democrat. The Deputy Director is selected from the same political 
party as the Chairman. 
Early in Director Vu’s tenure, the Director announced that he would initiate a bifurcated, 
two-stage reorganization of the agency. The initial reorganization was designed to 
address “the Fourth Floor” — the administrative offices within the CCBOE that included 
the Director/Deputy Director, the Procurement, Human Resources, Board Member 
support, and media support offices. The second reorganization, planned for 2005, was to 
reorganize the “election side” — the offices that undertook all the responsibilities for 
holding an election and tabulating the results, including the departments and divisions 
concerned with: candidate and issue petitions, voter registration, ballot preparation and 
proofing, absentee ballot applications and processing, provisional ballot validation, 
voting devices and voting locations preparation, poll worker recruitment and training, 
Election Day management, tabulation of election results, and the numerous other tasks 
involved in conducting elections. 
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Director Vu, Deputy Director Dillingham, and Administrative Services Administrator 
Platten and Elections Administrator Maiden (often still referred to as the “Elections 
Coordinator”) are charged with the exercise of top managerial powers within the agency. 
The Fiscal Services officer directly reports to the Director, as does the Information 
Services and Ballot Division Administrator, who has been with the CCBOE a little over 4 
months. Under the Administrators are arrayed a variety of departments charged with 
different election tasks or administrative services. 
Management decisions and directives that have impaired the CCBOE’s 
elections performance 
Executive managers not conveying important information to the Board 
7.1  Finding: The Director and the Deputy Director have, from time to time, 
troublesomely omitted notifying the CCBOE of classified information concerning major 
problems of vital interest during the Board’s public meetings. In some cases, it is clear 
that the Director and Deputy Director had first hand knowledge of the problems because 
they attempted to manage those problems. In other cases, managers say they either 
related the information to Director and Deputy orally, and/or also wrote it in email 
messages and departmental reports. Some examples include: 
• Optical Scanning Defects: For a week before May 2nd election, the central count 
optical scanning devices were not testing accurately. But the Director and Deputy 
Director omitted reporting this failure to the Board in the last two meetings before 
the May 2nd election (on May 1st and April 27th). The Director withheld the 
information about these failures until the early morning hours 2:00-5:00am of 
May 2nd Election Day. [Interview with Director Vu; with Board Members; Board 
transcripts.] On May 8th, the Board queried the Director about why the “devices” 
and “ballots” tests had not occurred and been completed earlier. Director Vu 
responded that “[t]hey were tested throughout the election in preparation of this 
election.” (Board Transcript 5/8/2006) 
• Zone Transmission Staffing and Performance: Transmission (including at the 
DRE level) was still failing in various ways on the weekend and day before the 
May election. Despite the Board having requested that the zone electronic 
transmission plan not be put into action unless it was fully operational, the 
Director went forward with the zone plan instead of going to a contingency plan. 
This decision created a cascade of additional problems on election night. Director 
Vu did not relate accurately the continued transmission problems to the Board at 
the meeting on Monday, May 1. [Board Transcript 5/1/2006; Board Member 
Interviews] 
• DIMS Problems Affecting Absentee Voting Rights: The Director and Deputy did 
not report to the Board the DIMS problems that began shortly after installation of 
the system (Fall 2004, before the presidential election). Registration, Booth and 
Ballot Department managers report that Deputy Director Dillingham and the HR 
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Administrator described DIMSnet problems as simply “training problems” 
attributable to staff members’ data entry errors. [see Dane Thomas report; 
Interviews with CVS managers] But no high level internal investigation was 
ordered to ascertain whether their assertion was accurate, and the Director and 
Deputy did not report the problems to the Board and the public. [Board 
interviews; Director Vu interview] Some of these problems were quite serious for 
voters’ rights. For instance, in the November 2004 presidential election that 
occurred shortly after the DIMSnet system was installed, DIMSnet reports 
confirmed that it had generated absentee ballot labels for thousands of voters as 
the CCBOE personnel had commanded. But thousands of voters never received 
their absentee ballots. Upon departmental investigation, managers discovered that 
the orders for these voters’ ballots were stuck almost invisibly inside the DIMSnet 
database and, despite DIMSnet’s reporting their completion, they were not 
completed and seemed to be in a “phantom” hold. Moreover, the DIMSnet system 
did not provide an archive or any way to track or replace these ballot orders which 
were lost in the system. The Director and Deputy did not and have not reported 
the problem to the Board or to the public in any public meeting, nor other 
DIMSnet issues including statistical tabulation errors in provisional ballot 
validation/rejection. [Interviews with CVS Department Manager; Administrator 
Maiden] 
• DIMS Problems Affecting Voter Registration: The Director and Deputy have not 
reported to the Board in a public meeting departmental-documented unexplained 
loss of voter registrations from DIMS. Additionally, despite the frequent 
testimony about these issues to the Board from the Greater Cleveland Voter 
Coalition and other watchdog groups since 2004, Director Vu has not reported on 
the departments’ experience and frustrations with DIMS. The department 
manager expressed his frustration that until the Board Chairman directed the 
Director to place on the Board Meeting Agenda in June 2006 the DIMS data loss 
of payroll entries for temporary election workers, the Director and Deputy did not 
discuss DIMS data loss problems at Board meetings. [Interviews with CVS 
managers and Board Members; Board transcript] 
• DIMS and GEMS Compatibility Issues: Soon after GEMS was installed, Ballot 
Department workers and IS Department staff experienced and started 
documenting the incompatibility of DIMS and GEMS despite DESI having 
marketed these systems as a “seamlessly integrated” election management 
information system. Although the “domino effect”— a broad range of delays and 
problems cascading down to all election departments — generated by the 
database incompatibility problems could easily have been foreseen even though 
not easily solved, the Director and Deputy chose not to mention these problems to 
the Board at any public meeting from February through May 2006. [Interviews 
with Board Members and with Managers; Board Transcripts] 
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• Problems with GEMS Software: Although major problems with the GEMS 
information system (which governs, e.g., ballot creation, burning of memory 
cards, uploading of election results from memory cards and optical ballot 
scanners, creation of reports with election results) were occurring by February 
2006, the Director and Deputy did not bring these problems to the Board’s 
attention in any public meeting (such as the limitation of the one keyboard/server) 
or the grave implications for the election management schedule that depended 
upon the Ballot Department’s meeting its schedule. It appears that Director Vu 
had knowledge of these problems because, in the words of Administrator Platten, 
he “took over” the Ballot Department from December through February, and 
continued to exercise close supervision over it through May. [Interview with 
Administrator Platten; Director Vu written statement, July 2006] 
• Inconsistent GEMS Reports: Managers who work with GEMS advise that when 
they requested an absentee ballot report from GEMS in Spring of 2006, the 
resulting report differed each of the four times they requested it. The inconsistent 
reports have not been an issue that Executive managers have placed on the Board 
agenda. [Interviews in the IT/Ballot Division/CVS Department; Board transcripts]  
• Excessive Work Demands Placed on Staff: The Director and Deputy did not report 
to the Board the excessive work demands imposed on staff (daily 12 hour shifts 
for 7-10 days for Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing of DREs), plus other 
overtime, until Board Members expressed concern. Nor did they mention fatigue 
owing to the GEMS problems, the rewriting of the Poll worker manuals and the 
L&A test delays they had unexpectedly encountered. These were paramount 
issues for CCBOE staff at all levels. [Board Members interviews; Board 
transcripts] 
• Completion of Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Tests for the DRE Machines: A Board 
Member visited the warehouse to view the testing operations and asked the 
Director when the testing would be finished. The concern was that the testing 
would not be completed in time for the voting machines’ delivery to the polling 
places. While they were both at the warehouse with CCBOE staff present and 
listening, Director Vu is reported to have answered, saying that “by the end of the 
week” (Friday) the testing would be “complete.” But at the time the conversation 
occurred, less that 20% of the DREs had been tested. Thousands of these DRE 
units still remained in their original shipping wrapping. Because the initial 20% 
had consumed almost one full week of L&A testing, the remaining 80% could not 
have been tested in the remaining 4 days. A different Board Member followed up 
by visiting the warehouse on Friday at 5pm to check on the completion of the 
L&A testing, and discovered that the testing was not nearly complete. [Board 
Members interviews; warehouse staff interviews] 
• Legal Standards for the Hand Count of Optical Scan Ballots: At the 5/8/2006 
Board meeting, Director Vu offered a few general points concerning the standards 
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governing the hand count for the “unofficial” initial count and for the later 
“official count.” The Director stated the CCBOE 
“will begin reviewing all information and map out our intentions in 
conducting the official count and... the Secretary of State has requested of 
the Board as to what our plan is for the official count. [Transcript at p.72]. 
During this process of manual counting, we have already beg[u]n discussion 
with Thad Hall, professor of the University of Utah, who is the principal 
[investigator] of the [U.S.] Election Assistance Commission who has been 
commissioned on analyzing the proper procedure for manually counting of 
the ballots.... We will mirror the [new Ohio HB 3 standards] as well as have 
Professor Hall involved in that process. He has on a national level been a 
professor that has discussed elections and best practices....[p.73].” 
• The Director’s presentation intimates that the CCBOE will be seeking to follow 
national best practices that accord with Ohio law, and that a policy will be 
map[ped] out” and supplied to the SOS. Yet no written CCBOE policy and 
procedure guide was issued to govern the hand count — the “ballot remake” was 
the subject of a letter and policy statement to the SOS, but the managers who 
supervised the “ballot remake” stated that no written instructions were provided to 
them or to the workers. Many of the hand count practices that the Director and 
Deputy issued to govern the hand count and ballot remake depart markedly from 
the Hall set of recommendations. We continue to have questions concerning 
whether the Director promptly requested CCBOE legal counsel to supply legal 
guidance. The Director left the impression with the Board that he would be 
seeking to follow the professional advice offered on national best practices, but 
the procedures were deficient in numerous respects. [Interviews with department 
managers; Director Vu; Board Members]. 
7.2  Recommendation: The Board and its Director must create a method for 
communicating each week through the preparation of a weekly report. The current format 
does not suffice. Managers should collaborate on creation of a standardized weekly report 
detailing any problems in their departments and any significant milestones that will need 
to be met in the coming weeks. These reports should include technology issues, such as 
DIMS problems. The Director should forward these reports in their entirety along with 
his own detailing the highlights of the manager reports and the course of action that will 
be taken to remedy any problems identified by the managers. All reports generated 
should be considered public records and a portion of the monthly CCBOE meeting 
should include a discussion of the items contained in weekly reports for the previous 
month. 
7.3  Recommendation: During an election cycle, the weekly reports for both the 
manager and the Director should include a two page progress report on achieving the 
milestones necessary to successfully conduct an election. These reports should be based 
on an election plan created by the Director and approved in advance by the Board. The 
reports should highlight deviations from the schedule, areas of concern for the coming 
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election, plans for addressing these concerns and any contingency plans that need to be in 
place to ensure a successful election. As a guide, the CCBOE should consider the format 
used by Joe Nista to report progress with GEMS implementation. 
7.4  Recommendation: The Board and the Director must clearly and publicly declare 
their respective roles in the administration of the CCBOE. These statements should be 
reduced to clearly defined policies, approved by the Board, detailing the respective roles 
of the Board and Director in the areas of personnel, procurement and election 
management. 
7.5  Recommendation: The Board and the Director should create an avenue for CCBOE 
staff with concerns about the overall administration of the agency to raise issues and 
concerns through a confidential channel so that their concerns can be aired directly to the 
Board without fear of recriminations. A new independent office lateral to the Board 
should be created called the Ombudsperson’s Office (hereinafter “Ombuds Office”). One 
duty shall be to track all Board directions to any member of management and to provide 
updates to both the Board and management on their completion. 
Management directions to CCBOE employees concerning communications with Board 
Members 
7.6  Finding: Occasionally, including twice in May-June 2006, the Director has 
specifically directed CCBOE managers that they should not relate certain 
information/problems to Board Members, advising that “the Board doesn’t need to know 
that” or chastising them for relating information that revealed a performance problem that 
might reflect poorly on top management. One such issue concerned difficulties in 
reconciling certain precincts’ number of voters with the number of ballots cast, and the 
other telephone complaints from election workers who had not been paid owing to 
unreported and unexplained DIMS data losses [Interviews with managers and staff]. 
Some managers report that they have been barred from communicating with Board 
Members via email messaging. Although the Director reports there is no foundation to 
this charge, some department managers specifically mentioned this policy to us as a 
matter of concern [Interviews with managers and Director]. 
7.7  Recommendation: The Board and the Director should create an avenue for CCBOE 
staff, with concerns about the overall administration of the agency, to raise issues and 
concerns through a confidential channel that will allow their concerns to reach the Board 
without fear of recriminations. A new independent office lateral to the Board should be 
created called the Ombud’s Office [see below]. 
7.8  Recommendation: CCBOE employees should answer questions concerning their 
work and any aspect of the CCBOE’s activities truthfully and completely whenever a 
Board Member inquires. Further, if it comes to the attention of a CCBOE employee at 
any level that inaccurate or misleading information has been transmitted to the Board 
and/or public, any employee with different or more complete information should send 
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that information to a new Ombudsperson’s Office. This policy should be recorded in the 
CCBOE employee personnel policy manual. 
7.9  Recommendation: The CCBOE Board should perform an annual performance 
evaluation of the Director and Deputy Director prior to reappointment and at the mid-
point of their term. In advance of these evaluations the Board shall ask the Director and 
Deputy Director for a self evaluation and ask the staff to perform a confidential “upward 
evaluation” of the Director and Deputy Director. 
7.10  Recommendation: In order to resolve the on-going concerns about 
communications with staff, the Director should provide a quarterly memorandum to staff 
reflecting on the past quarter and forward to the next. In addition he should answer in 
writing any questions submitted, with or without attribution, by staff. A copy of the 
memorandum should also be shared with the Board and be held open as a public record. 
Executives’ requests to discuss the Board’s concerns with its management team only in 
Executive Session  
7.11  Finding: The Deputy Director has requested that the Board not discuss their 
displeasure with managerial performance or otherwise “embarrass” the top managers in 
the Public Session of Board Meetings. The Board’s practice of generally abiding by this 
request may be not only a violation of the Ohio Sunshine laws (an opinion on which 
should be requested from their legal counsel) but also impairs its ability to hold CCBOE 
top management accountable and responsive. By avoiding public discussions of 
managerial priorities and leadership within the CCBOE, the Board also loses one of the 
biggest “sticks” it has for compelling managers’ responsiveness to their directions short 
of threatening a formal personnel action [Interviews with Director and Deputy; Board 
Members]. 
7.12  Recommendation: The Board should strictly adhere to the Sunshine laws and not 
enter Executive Session unless and only for the express purposes listed in the statutes and 
case law. The Board should seek legal guidance on interpreting and applying these 
statutes, but in ambiguous situations we urge erring on the side of full public disclosure. 
Especially now, when public trust and confidence must be rebuilt in the Board and the 
CCBOE’s performance, every lawful step toward public accountability and fullest 
disclosure should be taken. By our lights, for instance, “personnel actions” do not include 
discussions of proposals for administrative restructuring of the CCBOE. Additionally, it 
seems that the June 2006 Board discussion with top managers concerning their 
management decisions and omissions in preparing for the May 2nd election should have 
been conducted in public, on the record. The Board should instruct its legal counsel to be 
present at all Executive Sessions and scrupulously instruct the Board when it ventures off 
into matters that are properly, or arguably are, part of the Public Record. 
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Problems resulting from reorganization of Election Administration Division 
7.13  Finding: Within a few months after Director Vu’s arrival (in 2003), the Director 
presented for Board action the first reorganization — of the 4th floor. The Board approved 
the proposal. It resulted in the discharge of five staff members per the recommendation of 
the new Director (and former Deputy Director Powell). Elements of this first 
reorganization included re-classification of some line staff positions (i.e., demotions of 
the work and persons in the positions) and the reduction of their compensation. 
[Interviews with Administrator Platten and managers] 
Before this first “administrative reorganization,” and repeatedly thereafter, Director 
Vu stated that he was dedicated to downsizing the agency’s staff significantly. He 
volunteered that he believed the agency could be more effective with a staff totaling 50-
60 employees at a time when approximately 11014 were then employed. Director Vu 
offered these assessments before learning the practical complexities of conducting 
Cuyahoga elections (e.g., the frequency of elections, the 59 separate municipalities, 
Ohio’s candidate rotation rules; Ohio’s conferral on public officials broad powers for 
intra-municipality and intra-county redistricting), and before actually managing a major 
election in Cuyahoga. [Interviews with managers] 
Primarily conceived and co-authored by Director Vu, Administrator (over Human 
Resources) Platten and Deputy Director Dillingham, (and with a lesser role played by 
Administrator Maiden), Executive Managers’ proposal for the “second reorganization” 
— of the election management side — was finalized in June 2005. The executive 
management sent their proposal to the Board for immediate action. It did not receive the 
Board’s sustained consideration and eventual action until November-December 2005, 
with the final reorganization plan becoming effective in December 2005. 
Managers (primarily in departments) said executive management did not consult them 
in any meaningful manner, and that executives had manifested no sincere interest in 
department managers’ comment on the proposed restructuring plan. The middle 
managers viewed this to be a “done-deal.” [Interviews with managers] Administrator 
Platten and Deputy Director Dillingham confirmed that manager’s involvement was not 
sought or perceived necessary. [Interviews with Director Vu, Deputy Director 
Dillingham, and Administrator Platten] 
As approved in December 2005, this second restructuring merged some departments 
and refashioned reporting structures for the election management side of the agency. The 
ultimately approved plan reduced the overall number of managerial positions, eliminated 
certain job titles (e.g., “Senior Clerk”) and effectively demoted these individuals to 
lower-classified positions such as “technician” or “specialist.” The concept behind the 
Phase 2 reorganization was for employees to have “more global knowledge and cross-
training.” Executive managers viewed the former job titles as impeding workflow and 
                                                 
14 Orally in an interview Director Vu said 100 CCBOE staff members were employed when he first 
arrived, plus ten more full-time temps. 
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coordination. The Human Resources Administrator did not perceive the value of 
specialized expertise as at odds with cross-training. The prime managerial commitments 
shared between Director Vu and Platten were organizational restructuring and 
downsizing of the agency. [Interviews with Director, Deputy Director, Administrator 
Platten, and managers] 
The Board met in many Executive Sessions to discuss and revise the election 
management reorganization. Board Members also heard many concerns from CCBOE 
staff and managers about the proposal and the jobs available to be filled. The Board 
eventually determined that no one would lose their job in the reorganization, and that 
they would “find a place for everyone” at least as a probationary employee. Thus, the 
Board did not accept the recommendations for eliminating staff positions, or for 
discharging some current employees. It also declined to reduce the pay of any employee, 
even if the positions’ titles were downgraded. The Board disagreed about the degree and 
wisdom of downsizing immediately before the new e-voting system was launched. As a 
compromise, the Board placed all the reorganized employees on probationary status for 
six months, with reviews expected to determine whether they remained in their positions 
and at what compensation (increased or reduced). Low employee morale also played a 
role in the Board’s effort to find a place for all staff. [Interviews with Board Members; 
with Deputy Director and Administrator Platten] 
The ultimately approved reorganized management structure and the assignment of 
middle managers did not primarily and exclusively focus on how to achieve the highest 
quality election performance with regard to ensuring the accuracy of election results, 
valid voters casting valid ballots, and other objectives integral to election performance. 
The plan did not consider as a primary contention, backed up by empirical assessments, 
what amount of work was reasonable to expect of salaried managers. It did not appear to 
take into account the facts of the election cycle, when managers must be present for 
certain tasks that consume many hours, and where untoward events (such as 
technological failures) can require extremely long hours. 
Executive management dissented from the Board’s policy and restructuring decisions, 
including their decision to create three assistant manager positions for the new CVS 
mega-department instead of only one. They also were concerned that the Board waited so 
long to act and involved itself in revising details of the proposal instead of simply 
approving management’s recommendation. The Board seemed motivated by their 
perception that the CCBOE needed experienced personnel to assist the CCBOE through 
the May 2006 election and in the transition to e-voting. By contrast, top managers had 
long represented within the CCBOE and externally that e-voting would require many 
fewer staff members. The Board, however, chose not to take this risk immediately before 
the e-voting transition. [Interviews with Board Members, managers, Director, Deputy 
Director, and Administrator Platten] 
The December 2005 restructuring of departments and administrative divisions, and 
reassignment of managers, was deeply flawed — in conception, in timing, and in 
execution. This reorganization constituted a significant causative factor for the problems 
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experienced on May 2nd. [Staff interviews, direct reports from early voters and 
independent observation] 
7.14  Recommendation: Strategic restaffing of the CCBOE needs to occur with careful 
consideration of what positions (both managerial and staff) are needed in light of the 
technology that the CCBOE chooses to use. 
7.15  Recommendation: The CCBOE should hire a consultant to independently evaluate 
the organizational structure and systems to determine if it is the best model to efficiently 
and effectively administer the election process in Cuyahoga County. It should also 
evaluate the decision to move the ballot preparation and ballot count functions out of the 
control of the Election Coordinator and into an Information Technology Department 
populated with very qualified IT professionals with little or no election experience. 
7.16  Recommendation: The CCBOE should either supplement or replace some of the 
current staff by allowing the administration to hire skilled staff by selecting the best 
qualified individuals vetted through an open recruitment process. Partisan balance, which 
is required under Ohio election law, should not be confused with partisan patronage by 
the Board in hiring at the CCBOE. 
7.17  Recommendation: The CCBOE should reconsider the merger of the old warehouse 
and the Voting Inspectors into the Election Support Department. The current 
configuration does not allow the CCBOE to verify telephone connections and allow for a 
speedy resolution of last minute issues that always arise concerning polling locations. 
The functions of the Voting Inspectors is more akin to the functions performed by the 
Booth Officials Department rather than those functions that support the preparation and 
delivery of voting devices. 
7.18  Recommendation: The CCBOE should return the responsibility for Campaign 
Finance reporting and auditing to the Fiscal Department. The Fiscal Department is staffed 
by skilled and professional financial staff that is very capable of reviewing the finance 
reports and helping the candidates and their campaigns resolve any discrepancy. Where 
appropriate, the Fiscal staff is capable of preparing an effective referral to the Ohio 
Elections Commission. 
7.19  Recommendation: The CCBOE Board should reevaluate, perhaps as a part of the 
consultant study, the structure (including management positions) of the CVS Department 
While the CCBOE should respect the concerns for partisan balance, it should not come at 
the expense of having the best available person fill positions. The study should consider 
how to ensure sufficient managerial supervision of temporary employees during periods 
of expansion. 
Ineffective deployment of managers 
7.20  Finding: The CCBOE deployed its managers and managerial time during the 
election preparation cycle for May 2nd in a counterproductive and inefficient manner. For 
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example, instead of having a skilled IS staffer work on the GEMS server engage in copy 
editing (correcting punctuation, case and spacing errors caused by faulty DESI database 
interfacing), a good deal of this work was performed by the newly hired Ballot 
Department Manager, who had a broad range of crucial managerial responsibilities. But 
this is hardly the most troubling example of wasted managerial time. The list includes: 
• Sending managers to L & A testing for the better part of ten days, for 12-hour 
shifts. 
• Dispatching managers (more than half of managerial personnel) to the zone 
transmission centers for uploading memory cards on election night. 
• Assigning managers away from their own departments to other locations and 
departments on Election Day despite their home departments being short-staffed 
with an important Election Day role. 
• Assigning managers to be supply bag carriers when insufficient staffing was 
present in the parking lot. 
• Serving as an R or D to ride in cabs with memory cards and voted ballots being 
transported from the polls. 
• Staffing pink room tables receiving and processing supply bags instead of the 
normal temporary staff who are hired. 
• Requiring all CCBOE employees — even managers in other departments — to 
attend poll worker training classes. 
• Requiring a manager to create an Excel data entry form for poll worker training 
evaluations and assigning him to key in all the data on nearly 6000 poll workers 
being trained. 
• Failing to provide sufficient logistical staffing for delivery of training supplies for 
poll worker training sites, so permitting this duty to devolve upon the Booth 
Officials Department Manager to deliver supplies and replacement DREs to these 
sites. 
• Compelling multiple 12-hour meetings of large numbers of key managers to read, 
revise and rewrite the poll worker and EDT training manuals as a drafting 
committee in the midst of the election preparation cycle. 
• Assigning Implementation Teams to perform redundant responsibilities (such as 
researching procurement needs for the transition to e-voting) without an 
integrated approach or leadership. The main Implementation Team met weekly 
for long hours (Director Vu, Deputy Director Dillingham, Administrator Platten, 
Shantiel Hawkins, Mike DeFranco, Dane Thomas, Betty Edwards, Brent Lawler, 
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Brian Kaluscek, Joe Dennis, Administrator Maiden, Joe Nista, Brendan Gorman), 
which for some departments meant their entire leadership was absent for extended 
periods; these Team meetings were scheduled sometimes for as often as with 2-3 
times a week, with ambiguous agendas, no ownership, no direction and few 
concrete results other than wasted managerial time totaling approximately 4 hours 
a week. 
• Requiring managers to be present as trainers and supervisors of temp workers for 
the hand counts, ballot remakes, and recounts. 
• Assigning the Assistant Manager in charge of Voter Registration to conduct a 
series of telephone surveys using her Registration staff to check on the poll 
worker training success rate — which was the busiest time in Registration; 
• Sending staff candidates to interview with managers and then scuttling the import 
when the Board decided to hire on the basis of patronage. 
7.21  Recommendation: The CCBOE must make far better use of their management 
staff. Due to staff shortages, poor planning, poor training and delays during the election 
implementation phase, management staff was forced to perform basic tasks which took 
them away from the effective execution of the election plan. 
Director’s bar of CCBOE staff obtaining legal compliance information 
7.22  Finding: The Director specified that all employee requests for legal compliance 
information must travel up the chain of command. Employees are barred from asking the 
CCBOE’s legal counsel any questions. This would be an acceptable approach if some 
other mechanism were established by which employees who are worried that their 
supervisors have directed them to break the law could obtain information so that they are 
not personally placed in jeopardy. (See Director’s Memo dated 9/15/2004) 
7.23  Recommendation: At least as a transitional measure and perhaps permanently, the 
Board should create an Ombudsperson Office in the CCBOE so that both employee and 
public concerns can be investigated and rectified in a prompt, complete, and where 
appropriate, confidential manner. This county officer should be empowered to request the 
requested consultation and direction from the County Prosecutor, the Secretary of State, 
or Attorney General, yet protect the employee’s identity. If a permanent Ombudsperson 
Office is not made available in the CCBOE, the BOCC should clarify that the County’s 
Ombudsperson Office is available on a confidential basis to employees who are 
concerned about legal compliance issues. 
Executives’ failures to complete Board-directed activities 
7.24  Finding: In its Public Meetings, the Board issued directions to the executive 
managers, and have often specified an exact time for them to report back. The Director 
and Deputy have not put into place any mechanism for collecting these explicit Board 
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directions and concerns and have not, at least some of the time, reported back to the 
Board and public at the time specified. Some examples include: (a) to investigate why the 
Garden Valley polling place (which Congresswoman Jones, by court order, arranged to 
keep open extra hours at night because it opened for voting after 12 noon), had opened 
late and to interview all the Election Day workers who staffed the polling location; and 
(b) for Director Vu to correct record concerning the erroneous affidavit that Deputy 
Director Dillingham had given in a New Jersey litigation where she discussed Cuyahoga 
provisional ballot procedures. Public watchdog groups have testified, including on the 
missing voter registrations and some administrative performance issues, with the Board 
Chair responding by requesting Director Vu to investigate and report back to the Board. 
The Panel could not find any evidence that the Director or Deputy ever reported back to 
the Board on any of these matters in a public meeting. [Board transcripts; Board 
interviews; interviews with Garden Valley poll workers] 
7.25  Recommendation: The Board must create a mechanism to track questions from the 
Board Members at a public meeting. Part of the mechanism must include the rule that the 
Clerk to the Board will place these items on the next Board agenda automatically, 
without any further direction needed. The answers to questions posed by the Board at a 
public meeting should be answered in a public meeting and reduced to writing as an 
attachment to the minutes of the prior meeting. 
Interactions with CCBOE employees and others 
7.26  Finding: Panel interviews of employees at all levels revealed an “us versus them” 
executive managerial style. The Director and Deputy and their management team have 
been repeatedly identified as “arrogant” and lacking basic “people skills” requisite for 
dealing effectively with employees of widely varying backgrounds. Operationally, this 
style has led to the perception of administrative condescension when they speak with 
departmental managers, other staff, and even Board Members and the general public. The 
attitude that has been criticized is consistent with the position expressed by the Director, 
Deputy and Administrator Platten that discussions with departmental managers to 
consider issues even as vital as election side departmental reorganization wasn’t 
necessary or desired; they already knew and had taken account of any points that 
managers might have expressed. [Interviews with managers, executive managers, and 
line staff; Public Hearings] 
7.27  Recommendation: While top managers must manage their time well, they must 
also take the time to demonstrate sincere interest in hearing from other staff. They must 
take care to listen to others’ concerns in a respectful manner. These managerial attitudes 
and styles keep essential lines of communication open. Without these orientations and 
attitudes, managers cannot function effectively and critical information will not be shared 
with them for they have already severed lines of communication.   
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Poor timing and unrealistic expectations for launching new technologies: 
7.28  Finding: The CCBOE’s historic record for implementation of new technologies has 
been at best problematic. These tasks have been approached in an overly optimistic 
manner with insufficient planning, time, staff or training to insure a successful roll-out. 
Examples include: 
(a) The Director and Deputy chose to adopt two new e-voting technologies (one 
for the polling places and a different system for mailed absentee ballots) in a 
decision making process that failed to take into account the urgency of launching 
e-voting in an election prior to the May 2nd primary. Choosing to schedule initial 
use of two e-voting systems in a county as jurisdictionally complex as Cuyahoga 
with only six months of sustained preparation time during the single most 
complex election in the entire 4-year cycle — the even-year May primary — was 
not wise. This primary always requires the CCBOE to create 3 ballots for most 
precincts (1434 Democratic, Republican, and issues-only), plus a multitude of 
other special ballots. The even-year primary also requires the processing of 
petitions for 3-5 times more candidates than any other election — a process which 
involves checking the voter registration records of every signatory to a petition. 
(b) After the Ohio state law had been amended to require paper trails and the SOS 
had responsively excised DREs from the menu of approved e-technology options, 
the Director did not study the optical scan options with an open mind and desire 
to move forward expeditiously. He persisted in pushing for SOS certification of 
DREs with paper trails. This approval eventually issued in April 2005. Without 
undertaking an independent comparative fiscal and 
performance/staffing/maintenance analyses of the SOS-approved options 
available at the time, the Director decided that the DESI DREs would be the 
primary technology employed at the polling places. [Interviews with Director Vu; 
with County Commissioners; County fiscal correspondence] 
(c) CCBOE executives gravely underestimated the staffing required for the e-
voting transition, and the degree of complexity and difficulties that would be 
introduced into the CCBOE by adopting two new systems (optical scanning and 
DRE touch-screens) for virtually simultaneous launch [Interviews with Board 
Members, Administrator Maiden; managers; staff overtime records] 
(d) The Director and Deputy refused to permit DESI to supply certain prepaid 
services to the CCBOE to prepare for the May 2nd election that were included as 
part of the Master Contract the SOS negotiated. The Director and Deputy were 
adamant that DESI teach CCBOE employees all requisite knowledge and skills so 
that they would be completely prepared not only for the May 2nd election but also 
all later elections without having to pay for any additional consultant services 
from DESI or other firms. Given the CCBOE’s late launch of the e-voting 
systems (in the last possible election that would be in compliance with federal 
law), a multitude of factors should have indicated that seeking staff proficiency in 
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all e-voting tasks manifested poor judgment. Factors militating against the 
possibility of proficiency include the County’s inexperience with e-voting 
technologies, its decision to use a dual system, its newly decided and effectuated 
CCBOE reorganization plan, and the indictments against three CCBOE elections 
administration managers. By rejecting prepaid services, the Director and Deputy 
significantly increased the burden on the CCBOE. [Interviews with Deputy 
Director and Director; DESI testimony and documents; SOS-DESI Master 
Contract] 
(e) It appears that Cuyahoga County may have been one of the last Ohio counties 
to resolve its ancillary equipment and contract issues so that the DREs and 
scanners could be launched in time for the May election. Cuyahoga dealt with 
these issues from April 2005, when the SOS approved the DREs with paper trails, 
through mid-March 2006. Many other counties, however, quickly resolved their 
ancillary equipment and contract issues and were able to complete the launch of 
their new e-voting systems in 2005, even with the exact same vendor and 
technologies that Cuyahoga had selected. Especially since the timing was critical 
to success, it is difficult to understand the Director’s haggling with both the Board 
of County Commissioners (for additional DRE units) and DESI given that it 
dramatically delayed Cuyahoga’s e-voting launch. Director Vu explained that the 
CCBOE was attempting to gain far stronger DRE testing and performance 
standards than in the Master Contract, and that it wasn’t simply a matter of 
ancillary equipment price haggling. Given the federal HAVA deadlines for 
launching the DREs, which DESI undoubtedly knew as well as Cuyahoga, the 
time factor favored DESI’s position however unreasonable or unfair this situation 
may have seemed to the Director and Deputy. The clock eventually ran out and 
Cuyahoga had to make the deal for many single source items whose late shipping 
date (some items have still not arrived, and DESI insisted that to order them it 
have no liability for delayed shipping) delayed other essential election preparation 
functions. [Interviews with Director; with other county BOE Directors] 
(f) Even when the manager of Election Support flagged at the management 
meeting approximately 12-15 days before the election that the memory cards had 
still not been supplied and that it was increasingly doubtful that L&A testing for 
over 5000 DREs could be completed before the election, the Director kept 
insisting that “no additional staffing” for L&A testing was needed. The 
department manager had to keep pushing until temps were finally hired. It then 
required around-the-clock shifts of workers to complete the tasks. Department 
managers contend that there has been a constant lack of attention, judgment, and 
decisions made in a timely manner. [Interviews with managers] 
7.29  Recommendation: Procurement for an election must be pursued and completed 
early in order to maintain leverage for fair pricing, shipping dates, and adequate service. 
The CCBOE must schedule its procurement so that all items needed are in its warehouse 
several months before an election, so all services sought can be researched, and 
deliberative weighing of credentials and fit can occur. Election supply vendors are well 
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aware of the election calendar. The CCBOE must ensure that it handles its procurement 
with sufficient alacrity and completeness that it cannot be exploited by a company 
running out the clock for single source or other hard to obtain items. 
7.30  Finding: The Director and Deputy chose to install DIMS voter 
registration/absentee ballot database close to a major election (August-September 2004), 
well within the crucial ten week election preparation cycle for the presidential election 
and at the time of the largest influx of voter registrations and absentee ballot applications 
in the CCBOE’s history. This installation and retraining of employees interrupted the 
entry of voter registration data and other time-sensitive tasks before the 2004 presidential 
election. The Registration and Absentee Ballot managers were not consulted about 
scheduling an appropriate time for its installation. Thereafter, shifts staffed by unevenly 
qualified temporary workers were tasked with the data entry of registration and absentee 
ballot applications — and committed numerous errors that ultimately may have cost 
citizens their right to vote. Yet the Annual Report 2004-05 does not acknowledge the 
poor choice of timing for the DIMS installation or any of the other DIMS issues that had 
come to light, and instead characterizes the entirety of the problem as one of “capacity.” 
[BOE Annual Report 2004-05 at 5; interviews with managers] 
7.31  Recommendation: All future implementation plans for technology installation or 
upgrades must be timed in such a way as not to interfere with the efficient and effective 
execution of a major election. 
Lower, rather than higher, standards of accuracy in election results were applied 
7.32  Finding: The Director sought and received permission, on a temporary basis, to use 
a lower standard for accuracy in the “unofficial” count on May 2nd than ever before, a 35 
vote variance per precinct (as opposed to 25 from previous years). In essence, this meant 
that so long as the number of votes cast fell within 35 votes of the number of electors 
who had signed in, that precinct’s vote totals could be accepted without further 
investigation. Given that few County precincts would even total 350 votes in a primary, 
this request was implicitly requesting a permissible margin of error that, generally, 
speaking was higher than 10%. This should be compared to the punch card average of 
2%. [Board transcript] 
7.33  Recommendation: The goal for the successful implementation of electronic voting 
should be to meet or exceed the standards for accuracy established using the punch card 
voting process. The CCBOE should not sacrifice performance on the altar of technology. 
Election preparation planning deficiencies 
7.34  Finding: The CCBOE failed to anticipate some of the most crucial areas for 
generating plans and procedures for e-voting. A few critical points: 
1. Despite the security and custody of memory cards being one consistent issue 
about which a great deal has been written, no effective planning occurred for 
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capturing and inventorying memory cards and other security equipment early — 
and no search process was delineated for any missing equipment. Memory cards 
and ballots were still being recovered in early July — almost 8 weeks after the 
election. No inventory of security equipment was conducted until this Panel 
requested it [Run-throughs in the Pink Room; Interviews with staff]. 
2. Other problems included inadequate staffing in many Election Day roles and 
functions, unacceptable poll worker training, confusing and erroneous poll worker 
manuals, an ineffective structure for Election Day support for voters and polling 
locations (such as call center operations, zone-based supplies availability and 
delivery, supply bag return and unpacking, logistical support in the parking lot, 
and under trained staff at zone transmission sites). [Hearings; interviews with 
managers and staff] 
3. The Ballot Manager was ordered to deliver the memory cards to the warehouse 
before he had time to permanently affix labels on them designating the proper 
polling location. The labels were bundled with the memory cards by rubber band 
which led to some cards being sent to the wrong location. This lack of labeling 
was ordered was ordered by the Director in order to supply the cards for L&A 
testing. Ironically, delays in creating the scripts for the L&A test delayed the need 
for the memory cards for a number of days, which would have given the Ballot 
Manager sufficient time to securely affix labels to the appropriate memory cards 
before they were needed at the warehouse. [Interviews with managers and 
Director] 
4. The absentee ballot informational flyer sent out with the ballots failed to caution 
voters not to remove the stub or their ballot would be invalidated. An estimate of 
“hundreds” of absentee ballots were invalidated (not counted) for this reason 
[interviews with department managers and Deputy Director] 
Given the short period of time available for planning and implementing the transition 
after running the last punch card election in November 2005, top managers failed to 
exercise sound judgment about how much the CCBOE could undertake independent of 
DESI and what areas DESI should have handled, e.g., training PW trainers and writing 
technical manuals. 
Transitioning to a new voting or information system is obviously a major 
undertaking. Experienced consultants were available, and could have been included as a 
part of the budget to ensure a higher quality transition. But the Director and Deputy 
considered professional planning and consultation a prepaid part of the SOS Master 
Contract with DESI, and not a matter of a separate agreement for specialized services. 
DESI maintained that comprehensive transitional planning was a set of services they sold 
for a separate fee and would not provide free of charge. DESI, though, was only one of 
many firms available to supply these services. [Vendor Hearing; common knowledge of 
election consultants] 
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7.35  Recommendation: Given the risks — which materialized — the CCBOE managers 
should have chosen to hire highly qualified consulting firms or individuals to expertly 
guide the CCBOE in the various transitional tasks they faced in the exceptionally short 
period of time they had for retooling every aspect of their election management (from the 
beginning of December 2005 to May 2nd). When implementing any new technology in 
the future the CCBOE should retain outside expertise in project management and systems 
implementation to ensure that they have sufficiently planned for the roll-out of the new 
system and taken into account contingency planning for all possible outcomes. The 
consultant should also review all policies, procedures and staffing models to insure that 
they are sufficient to successfully operate the new technology once installed. 
7.36  Finding: Implementation team meetings and department management meetings 
used for planning and advance troubleshooting of the election consumed tremendous 
numbers of hours but failed to plan in an operational manner for essential aspects of the 
May 2nd election. Numerous managers commented that the Director and Deputy were 
making the decisions on their own, without regard for managerial input. 
7.37  Recommendation: The CCBOE management needs to improve their short and 
long term planning skills. All future project planning should be inclusive, participative 
and make efficient use of staff time. 
Other judgment and planning issues 
7.38  Finding: Attending SOS conferences allowed managers and assistant managers to 
share info with peers in other BOEs. This informal sharing of information and problem-
solving was especially important when facing the huge transition to e-voting. But the 
Board and top managers often restricted those who could attend these meetings to the top 
administrators — primarily Director, Deputy Director, and Administrator Platten. 
[Personnel records; interviews with Managers] 
7.39  Recommendation: The CCBOE should make arrangements to allow the middle 
managers (including assistant managers) to attend the Secretary of State Conference for 
those portions of the program that relate directly to their work. 
7.40  Finding: As late as June 9, when asked to use hindsight and consider what he 
wished he had done differently in preparation for May 2nd, the CCBOE Director had yet 
to grasp the enormity of the issues confronting the CCBOE as a result of the May 
election. During a recent interview with panel members he said, “there’s not much that I 
would change at all. We had a singular issue, the absentee ballot scanner problem, which 
led to the hand count.” [League of Women Voters & CSU Center for Election Integrity 
Conference: Lessons Learned, BOE Directors Panel]. More recently, neither the Director 
nor the Deputy have publicly accepted responsibility for May 2nd problems but instead 
have blamed middle managers and DESI for the problems that occurred. [Interviews with 
Board Members; Conference transcript; interviews with Managers]. As of mid-July, the 
Director has acknowledged that they “did not run a good election.” [Interview with 
Director] 
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7.41  Recommendation: Executive Management must come to grips with the challenges 
going forward toward November by drafting a plan (with inclusive participation of 
department managers) to remediate all of the issues arising from the May 2nd election. 
7.42  Finding: The CCBOE top managers do not seek legal advice in a timely manner. 
Instead, they tend to believe that they can read statutes as well as any attorney and so 
such consultation is a waste of time. Examples of recent legal questions that, with proper 
and timely advice, might have eliminated many ensuring problems include: 
• Whether pencil used on absentee ballot envelopes voided the ballot. 
• Whether a BOE Director can independently generate the processes and standards 
for a hand count or DRE remake of absentee ballots and other optical scan ballots. 
• Whether the CCBOE’s provisional ballot errors that were determined after the 
official count but before the Presidential recount commenced should have been 
accounted for in the recount. 
• Whether CCBOE workers were permitted to pre-sort and pre-count ballots outside 
of witnesses during the 2004 recount. 
[Transcripts of Board meetings December 2004-June 2006] 
7.43  Recommendation: The Board and the Director should create an avenue for 
CCBOE staff, with concerns about the overall administration of the agency including 
legal questions, to raise issues and concerns through a confidential channel to air their 
concerns directly to the Board without fear of recriminations. A new independent office 
lateral to the Board should be created called the Ombudsperson’s Office. 
Consequences of management decisions and systemic problems 
7.44  Finding: Executive Management has lost respect broadly within the managerial 
ranks and also among some line staff. The reasons for this vary but include: managerial 
and staff conviction that Director and Deputy withhold from the Board crucial 
information regarding problems that have arisen; the reports they have heard that the 
Director has directed some managers not to relate problems to Board Members who ask 
them direct questions; the failure to demand and obtain timely corrective action from 
DESI for database defects; blaming of others for CCBOE performance problems rather 
than taking responsibility with the attitude that “the buck stops here”; the recent 
restructuring that most managers criticize heavily as crippling employee morale and 
performance; and the extreme work hours demanded by management at various points 
from February-May, which some assert to have been avoidable with proper planning and 
management. [Interviews with Managers & line staff] 
Many managers have Judged the executive management as placing values such as 
cost factors ahead of accurate, verifiable, prompt, and honest reporting of election results. 
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Line staff report a culture of “see nothing, say nothing” for survival. Many employees 
feel they are caught betwixt and between, with no acceptable recourse. [Interviews with 
Managers and line staff] 
7.45  Recommendation: The Board and the Director should create an avenue for 
CCBOE staff, with concerns about the overall administration of the agency, to raise 
issues and concerns through a confidential channel to air their concerns directly to the 
Board without fear of recriminations. A new independent office lateral to the Board 
should be created called the Ombudsperson’s Office. 
7.46  Finding: The ultimate management and departmental reorganization approved in 
December 2005 seems to have been heavily influenced by the fact of criminal 
indictments against two CCBOE employees. The CCBOE had already decided to keep 
the two paid in full until the conclusion of the trials, but each was allowed to take paid 
administrative leave whenever she chose — in other words, to absent herself at her own 
choosing. After the reorganization, in January 2006, a third employee, Administrator 
Jacqui Maiden, was indicted. By placing and retaining these three employees in 
management positions, it meant that critical functions were not fully attended at the time 
and in the manner most needed by the CCBOE in preparing and conducting the May 
2006 election. Further, the employees who had to pick up the slack for these managers 
often lacked the authority, knowledge, or time to complete the duties in the manner 
needed, for the prescribed staffing levels had not taken account of the extended absences 
and reduced attention of these employees. These choices greatly retarded the agency’s 
ability to be prepared for May 2nd. 
By striving to keep each of these indicted employees in management positions but 
external to the departments where their alleged actions have led to indictments, the 
CCBOE was faced with moving those managers with developed expertise and strong 
working relationships to new departments whose tasks were largely unknown to them. 
This meant that when attempting to meet the greatest transition the CCBOE had perhaps 
ever faced, the agency could not capitalize on the developed knowledge and experience 
of some managers and was faced with new assistant managers who were ignorant of their 
new departments and duties.15
Compassion for the indicted employees, especially if they are innocent of the charges 
levied against them, can be laudable. But given the tremendous impact on the agency in 
its ability to prepare for and manage the May 2nd election, it is hard to understand why 
                                                 
15 In the Ballot Department, former Manager (Dreamer) and Assistant Manager (Grier) both were 
indicted and thus were not returned to their department. In the restructured CVS Department, 
Dreamer was assigned to be Assistant Manager for Absentee Ballots; in Booth Officials, Grier 
was assigned to be Assistant Manager for Booth Officials. To make way for Grier, the Booth 
Officials’ highly experienced Assistant Manager Betty Edwards was transferred to CVS to be 
Registration Assistant Manager. To make way for Dreamer, other more knowledgeable 
employees were moved. To fill the vacant Ballot Department Manager position, the CCBOE hired 
externally and filled the Assistant Manager position internally. 
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they were retained in management. These employees were inevitably distracted and took 
time off frequently. [Board Member interviews; Department manager interviews; 
Administrator Platten interview] 
7.47  Recommendation: The indicted employees should be immediately reassigned from 
their managerial positions, and qualified interim managers appointed. This should occur 
with the proviso that following the verdicts in the trial court, a reassessment will occur of 
whether the employees should be returned to any (and which) position within the 
CCBOE. 
Election Division Administrator 
7.48  Finding: Many components of the Election Day support system set up to provide 
information and assistance to poll workers and voters did not function well or at all on 
Election Day. Staff who were assigned to the command center were not told what its 
purpose was, and were not trained in what they were supposed to do. Thus, when calls 
came in from polling places and voters, many received no response or any corrective 
action. Information was being recorded and stacked up in the belief someone would come 
and act on the problems, but no one did. 
Numerous managers and line staff in her division commented that Administrator 
Maiden has been non-responsive to inquiries within that division concerning election 
management. Reportedly, since her indictment, the Administrator does not answer most 
of her email, including email from those she is to supervise and direct. 
7.49  Recommendation: If Administrator Maiden desires to remain at the CCBOE as 
Election Division Administrator, her leadership and responsiveness will need to improve. 
Departmental performance standards and quality controls 
7.50  Finding: The Ballot Department functions include: preparing ballots, including 
races and candidate names, issues, questions; editing and proofing duties, before sending 
absentee ballots to the printer; burning memory cards; Election Day uploading of 
memory cards; scanning of absentee ballots; providing unofficial election results; 
providing official results; inventorying all items of a security nature, e.g., memory cards, 
encoders, keys; rectifying the poll books; some provisional ballot activities; for questions 
and issues that will appear on the ballot, providing legal notices and proclamations and 
arranging for the printing thereof. 
The current Ballot Department Manager’s knowledge and comfort zone lie in 
Information Technology and technical areas. He had no experience in the processes and 
administration of elections when he joined the CCBOE. 
After taking the position, executive managers directed the new Ballot Department 
Manager to answer his own questions by reading ORC Title 35 (the Ohio Statute on 
Elections). Problems affecting Ballot Department decision-making were significant, 
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including a failure to request sufficient temporary staff for conducting the unofficial and 
the official count. It is also unclear whether all required proofing of ballots, including 
rotations, were undertaken prior to the May 2nd election. The pink room operation was in 
full chaos by 8:30pm on the day of this election. The Ballot Department had to depend on 
temporary hires who were not subject to sufficient supervision. 
7.51  Recommendation: It is unclear whether the Ballot Department Manager has the 
interest and dedication to practical election management and the passionate concern for 
voting integrity that are essential prerequisites for the Ballot Department Manager 
position. The CCBOE should evaluate the department’s performance and, if the manager 
is retained, provide him with the training and assistance necessary to avoid a repeat of the 
problem of May 2nd. 
7.52  Finding: In seeking to discover whether management had set concrete performance 
targets, undertaken meaningful reviews of actual performances in light of targets (e.g., 
poll worker performance; voter registration entry with accuracy and speed; polling place 
supply bags packed with all needed voting location supplies), we found a dearth of 
concrete managerial objectives and performance standards. It appears that technological 
objectives (e.g., having sufficient DRE touch screen voting units at the polling places) 
displaced managerial attention from other aspects of the May 2nd election. 
Further, looking backward, from 2004 to the present, we also find little indication of 
concrete performance improvement goals even after broad public dismay and well-
documented deficiencies at certain polling locations. For instance, despite significant 
public concern over certain poll worker deficiencies in the November 2004 and 2005 
elections, the CCBOE did not undertake a critical assessment and improved performance 
plan for training poll workers. While these problems are mentioned in the CCBOE 
Annual Report 2004-05 (p7) with strategies for improved recruitment, upgraded 
qualifications, expanded training, and evaluations, the record shows virtually nothing was 
done on any of these points. Until the May 2nd primary debacle, the top managers 
(Director, Deputy Director, Election Administrator Maiden) and the department manager 
judged the election performance of the polling places, and their training programs for poll 
workers, to be relatively satisfactory and not requiring systemic improvements in the 
departmental functions. 
Departments are required to file “Weekly Reports” that document the work occurring 
in preparation for an election. These do not follow a common format, and vary greatly in 
the information they report. This report is the primary mechanism for sharing information 
between departments and with the top managers, and they also are discussed at the 
weekly management meetings. Some reports, notably the Booth Officials Report, tend to 
be well written, well-structured reports that flag problems and potential problems, 
including those on which higher management decisions will be required. Other 
Departmental reports filed in the period between January-April 2006 are vague and fail to 
note even glaring problems such as major delays (e.g., producing all the memory cards 
needed for L & A testing) that will cascade into causing delays for other departments. 
The Director and Deputy both report that the Weekly Report “format” has been in 
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existence for many years and they have not seen any reason to modify it. [Weekly 
Departmental Reports; Interviews with Director and Deputy; with managers] 
“Wrap Up Reports” required after most election cycles feature the same problems as 
the Weekly Reports. If these tools of self evaluation are to function as a mechanism for 
constant improvements, the direction needs to be fully revised and include performance 
measures. [Wrap Up Reports] 
7.53  Recommendation: The weekly reports and wrap up reports must be reconceived so 
that essential information is able to be discerned immediately. Some Reports, such as the 
Procurement Department, are full of minutia and are vague on what needs to be done. 
The Reports provide so little useful information that they actually give the reports a 
“make work” name. These should be streamlined for the author’s efficiency as well as the 
executive managers who are to read and act on the reports. 
7.54  Recommendation: During an election cycle, the weekly reports for both the 
manager and the Director should include a two page progress report on achieving the 
milestones necessary to successfully conduct an election. These reports should be based 
on an election plan created by the Director and approved in advance by the Board, and 
highlight deviations from the schedule, areas of concern for the coming election, plans 
for addressing these concerns and any contingency plans that need to be in place to insure 
a successful election. As a guide, the CCBOE should consider the format used by Joe 
Nista to report progress with GEMS implementation 
7.55  Recommendation: The policy manuals for every department need to be re-written 
and vetted both inside the CCBOE and with watchdog groups and the CCBOE’s election 
law attorneys before being finalized. 
Managerial focus and leadership 
7.56  Finding: Restructuring the CCBOE to achieve downsizing of the permanent 
staffing and personnel budget, and improving the technological aspects of the CCBOE 
appear to have been chief objectives of the CCBOE. The Panel could not discern any 
significant efforts designed to systematically improve election performance by increasing 
the accuracy of vote tabulation, of provisional ballot validation, and other concrete steps 
with performance objectives. The Director’s attention to the CCBOE’s actual elections 
performance has ebbed and flowed, with some periods of what some middle managers 
view as extreme micromanagement, and other times with total delegation to the Deputy 
for ongoing operational management. Director Vu’s talents, primary interests and 
expertise, which are substantial, lie within technical and computerized operations. 
[Interviews with Director, Administrator Platten, Deputy Director; press reports on 
Director Vu; Interviews with managers and Board Members] 
The Director and Deputy have alienated the County Commissioners, the County 
Prosecutor’s office, personnel in the Elections Division of the Ohio Secretary of State’s 
Office, the CCBOE’s middle management, and numerous line staff. Building positive 
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relationships with other agencies is part of the job of top managers of an interdependent 
agency. The CCBOE not an island; cooperative relationships are essential. Part of the job 
is to act as an emissary for building good will. It seems, however, that the top managers 
failed to recognize that their conduct toward other agencies and personnel can cause the 
CCBOE to receive the payback of non-assistance and non-cooperation. 
7.57  Recommendation: CCBOE needs to develop and maintain positive relationships 
with other government offices in order to complete its tasks. The Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections needs to work assiduously to shed its image of being an imperious 
arrogant institution managed by those who have nothing to learn from others. 
7.58  Recommendation: The CCBOE and the County Prosecutor need to cultivate a 
cooperative relationship, instead of an adversarial and occasionally hostile one. Attorneys 
assigned to the CCBOE should be encouraged to undertake additional training in election 
law — state and federal — in order to fulfill their tasks of advising the CCBOE 
effectively. 
7.59  Recommendation: All managers in the CCBOE should seek to cultivate positive 
relationships with the public and with watchdog/advocacy groups which are seeking to 
improve elections. They should approach these organizations and their recommendations 
with an open mind and as allies in seeking the best performance possible for the citizens 
of the county. 
7.60  Recommendation: Departments should be routinely scheduled to give reports to 
the Board in meetings as well as be allowed to email the Board Members. Email 
privileges, however, must be used judiciously. 
7.61 Finding: Historically the CCBOE has been accused of hiring or promoting 
individuals to be managers without demonstrated proof of their management skills or 
instincts, and that it has not included these points as part of the essential criteria when 
seeking to hire managers. [Interviews with Direcor and Deputy Director; managers] 
7.62  Recommendation: The CCBOE Board Members should give the Director and the 
Deputy Director that authority to bring forward the best possible individuals to fill 
management positions at the CCBOE. Where election management knowledge is critical, 
the CCBOE should identify and follow the best practices from other Boards of Election 
throughout the country in identifying and hiring the best available individual to perform 
that management function at the CCBOE. The CCBOE should use the following as a 
guide: 
1. A good manager organizes the work and workers so that the highest productivity 
can be achieved with the fewest frustrations and disruptions; delegates work and 
organizes accountability structures so that workers and managers know which 
workers are responsible for what tasks on what schedules, and what the 
consequences will be for not performing; creates a positive workplace and builds 
a team attitude; ensures that staff are trained properly in the skills and knowledge 
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that they need to perform their jobs well; corrects staff mistakes in a manner 
conducive to their improvement as workers, and if work quality does not improve 
after fair notice and correction, either assigns work that is more appropriate for 
that workers’ skill set or transfers or dismisses him/her; and looks out for and 
seeks to protect workers from unfair or injurious work expectations issued from 
higher managers so that all can get their jobs done with the most productivity and 
joy possible. 
2. While the skills for achieving these objectives can be learned and enhanced over 
time, unless a person has the instincts and “people skills” for management, the 
critical nuances of quality management cannot be mastered, and the results will 
lead to the kinds of problems experienced by the CCBOE recently. The higher the 
manager in the hierarchy, the more critical it is for the manager to have highly 
developed managerial skills and instincts because their absence can wreak great 
damage on the entire operation. 
3. In order to permit and promote good departmental management, top/executive 
managers: 
• Must consider managerial time as a scarce resource that must be carefully 
conserved and invested where it is best deployed, and not treat managers 
as another pool of labor that can be used for gap filling when other 
workers are unavailable; 
• Cannot treat the departmental staff as a general pool of workers to be 
pulled away from departmental business and sent around to wherever else 
they might be needed; 
• Must seek to empower the management team to act as managers; where 
there are executive level concerns over management of a department, the 
executive/top managers need to set up meetings outside the hearing of 
departmental workers for learning what has transpired in order to discuss 
and problem-solve, and if possible, reach a consensus that can then be 
announced and implemented by the department manager; the pervasive 
sense of departmental managers and some divisional administrators that 
they might as well not make any decisions because they are constantly 
being undercut and contradicted by the Director, Deputy and HR 
Administrator has to end. 
• Must themselves manifest an attitude of open-minded learning and desire 
to hear ideas from others, rather than closed minded conceit about one’s 
special gifts or expertise. 
• Must be able to conduct effective short and long range planning with the 
involvement of departmental managers, and not waste time by the 
procedures set up for planning. 
4. Simply because someone is good at performing work in a department, or has good 
“people skills” with co-workers, or is well liked by top managers does not justify 
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promotion to a management position. Far more important criteria are those listed 
in point 1, above. At the CCBOE, it seems that quality management skills are not 
perceived and valued as a particular knowledge base and skill set that is needed. 
Thus, it is not surprising that managerial hiring has not focused on ensuring that 
these skills have been demonstrated. Knowledge about elections tasks can be 
learned. But those who have knowledge of elections tasks but poor ability to 
manage will retard the quality of work, organize it in an unproductive and 
wasteful manner, be unable to plan effectively, and generally retard the CCBOE’s 
ability to achieve the public trust and charge of conducting accurate elections 
promptly and lawfully. 
7.63  Recommendation: As a part of the management consultation mentioned above, 
review and revise the expectations and credentials for all managerial positions. Include 
criteria specifying that vacancies for all managerial positions must be posted broadly, and 
the hiring and promotion process must be fair, with neither preference nor negative 
accorded on the basis of experience in CCBOE positions or on political connections. 
7.64  Recommendation: In the transitional period of the next two years, all managerial 
search and interview committees should involve persons external to the CCBOE who 
have demonstrated judgment, insight about management and/or high level managerial 
experience to assist in identifying, recruiting, and hiring the leadership the CCBOE 
needs. This Panel can suggest persons who might be willing to volunteer their time. 
E-voting transition: Transition planning and execution 
Deputy Director and E-Voting Conversion Project Manager 
7.65  Finding: The conversion to electronic voting in Cuyahoga County was at best 
problematic and at worst a disaster. Deputy Director Dillingham served as e-Voting 
Project Manager during the CCBOE’s conversion to electronic voting. The list of failures 
to successfully manage this critical project includes: 
1. Rejecting critical assistance from DESI that was already covered by the contract 
saying, ”If we have to do it after May, we want to learn to do it for ourselves 
before May.” Thus, some services that were prepaid under the SOS Master 
contract with DESI were wasted. Deputy Director Dillingham demanded that 
DESI employees teach CCBOE employees how to do every task themselves 
despite the abbreviated time available for this instruction and practice. [Interviews 
with Deputy Director and Director; with managers] 
2. Wasting valuable time in extended, aimless Implementation Planning meetings 
where she ignored the lists of issues others brought and showed little-to-no 
interest in the concerns and problems managers were encountering. [Interviews 
with Managers; with Administrators; with Board Members] 
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3. Failing to anticipate areas of possible systems breakdown and generating plans to 
prevent these breakdowns, as well as fashioning backup or contingency plans. 
Another area of importance lay in formulating operational plans with realistic 
expectations of people/staff. [Interview with Deputy Director; operational run-
throughs in Pink room; interviews with other managers] 
4. Failing to plan for adequate staffing in all areas of the agency insisting that her 
staffing plans were sufficient, even when workers who were involved in core 
time-bound tasks in their own departments had to be sent, in a crisis management 
mentality, to wherever the latest fire had erupted. [Interviews with CCBOE 
management staff] 
5. Allowing friendships to influence her management staffing recommendations. 
[Multiple interviews with CCBOE management and line staff] 
6. Rejecting practical solutions and suggestions, such as creating a “checklist” to 
assist poll workers and the provisional ballot voters to be aware of all the requisite 
steps required to insure that ballots would be completed in a valid manner. The 
Deputy Director replied that she was “opposed” to checklists. When pressed for 
explanation, she said that a checklist would mean that a poll worker “would not 
have to pay attention” at training. In response, an interviewer said that evidently 
poll workers were not understanding the steps even after training, Deputy Director 
Dillingham said that “might be true” but she was “still opposed.” [Interviews and 
discussions with the Deputy Director] 
7. Rejecting the need for optical scan ballots to be available as backups at polling 
places in case DREs do not function properly. The Deputy Director stated 
emphatically ”we won’t do that.” When pressed for an explanation, she said that 
if optical scan ballots are included in the precinct supply bag, the poll workers 
won’t have any reason to try to set up and run the DRE units, and they would use 
only paper ballots. [Interviews and discussions with the Deputy Director] 
7.66  Recommendation: Given the panoply of serious issues raised, as the public’s 
representatives the Board must decide what to do about the CCBOE’s current 
management and managerial culture. Bearing chief responsibility for the decisions and 
performance on May 2nd are the Director and the Deputy Director/Project Manager for 
the E-Voting Conversion. They are highly talented and knowledgeable individuals. But 
given the history and performance of the CCBOE over the past two years and especially 
on May 2nd, the Board needs to evaluate whether they can provide the leadership for 
moving the CCBOE onto the path of achieving elections administrative excellence. 
The standards against which we believe these incumbents and any potential replacements 
must be measured include: 
1. a demonstrated history of managing to achieve high quality employee 
performance, moving rapidly from low to high employee performance capability; 
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2. some well-regarded managerial experience in achieving smooth workforce 
transitions between outdated systems and new; 
3. an ability to inspire the trust and respect of workers throughout the organization, 
and who comfortably demonstrate respect for workers while inspiring them to 
perform at high levels of productivity and excellence; 
4. demonstrated commitment to honesty, fairness, and lawfulness in personal and 
professional dealings. 
5. an ability and commitment to forging relationships of respect and transparency 
with other government entities. 
Future administrative issues and further study 
Consultants should be retained for assisting with improving managerial structures, 
operations and personnel policies. 
Unlike some past CCBOE undertakings, however, where abstract knowledge of private 
sector business organizational structures seemed to be the primary credential for the 
CCBOE managerial study, any consultants retained must: 
• be sophisticated in election management issues as well as have broad experience 
in effective administrative structures for handling widely varying amounts of 
work (many such firms exist nationally); 
• must understand and integrate into the plan utmost concern for internal and 
external (public) accountability structures, and for legal compliance; personnel 
staffing and managerial organization plans must be designed so that the legal and 
ethical requirements for elections can be met on timetables that are nonnegotiable 
and with employees who are treated fairly; 
• must seek within the organizational structure to achieve continual, demonstrable 
improvement in elections performance with appropriate measures for achieving 
ever higher standards of accuracy in all aspects of elections administration, from 
data entry of voter registrations to tabulating the vote; 
• integrate working knowledge of the complexities of Cuyahoga elections, which 
differ dramatically from other election jurisdictions and manifest sufficient 
understanding of the ebb and flow of work in the elections cycles, which differ 
year to year (and in odd versus even years) and on the basis of two-year and four-
year repetitive cycles; 
• must incorporate recognition that the CCBOE needs to develop and maintain 
cooperative relationships with the various sister agencies and governmental units 
which assist the CCBOE in its work; 
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• understand that the CCBOE employees have undergone repeated and frequent 
restructurings with varying, often negative impact rendering them more cynical 
about any additional restructuring, and integrate into the approach a method for 
building employee support for managerial changes. 
Personnel Policies and Practices 
7.67  Finding: Staff — both managerial and line — at virtually all levels express deep 
concerns over the CCBOE’s personnel policies and practices. At least three recent staff 
departures are traceable to this constellation of issues and several more staff have 
expressed plans to leave before the year is over. Each of these individuals has developed 
substantial expertise in an area of elections operations, and these departures, in the words 
of one staffer, mark a “brain drain” that the CCBOE cannot afford. 
Retention of highly valued employees should be a major consideration of any high 
quality organization — private or public sector. Policies and practices, and the general 
workplace climate, make a huge difference in whether an organization can attract and 
hold top quality candidates for jobs. If the organizations performs well in recruitment and 
retention, its overall costs can be reduced for it does not have to undergo the added costs 
of replacement and retraining of a valued worker. The employer benefits from the 
increased knowledge and skills that the established employee offers the organization. 
And existing employees do not lose time in interviews and reviewing applications for 
employment. 
Numerous very serious personnel issues have been raised with the Panel, and we have 
accorded them dedicated attention. They can be organized topically: 
Workplace Climate:  Not a single employee described the CCBOE workplace in 
predominantly positive terms. Employees described the CCBOE workplace with words 
including: poisonous, toxic, backbiting, vicious, vengeful, mean, nasty, vicious, 
hierarchical, exploitative, oppressive, a sweatshop, cliquish, favoritism unfair, arbitrary. 
Staffing Levels and Quality of Work:  Staff allege that: 
1. Excellence/quality/time schedules are non-achievable goals given the current 
staffing. 
2. The CCBOE failed to include some excess or overflow, on-call staffing in order 
to have enough workers to take care of the unexpected in this last election. 
3. Even though the Director promised e-voting would require less work time and 
would be easier than the punch card procedures, the new e-voting systems have 
created more work and required staff time — not less. 
Work Hours:  Staff allege that, during the election week (May 2-7), various workers 
were ordered to work the following hours: 
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• Three back-to-back 24-hour shifts; 
• Two 24-hour shifts with three hours off and then to report back; 
• One 24-hour shift with 5 hours off and then an 18-hour shift. 
During L&A testing, many workers (both line and managers) were assigned 12-hour 
shifts, 7 days a week, with half being assigned in the night shift, for approximately 10 
days of work. 
7.68  Recommendation: Strategic reconsideration must occur of the amount of 
permanent and temporary reserve staffing in each department and throughout the agency 
which is appropriate, taking into account each of the elections that occur over the four 
year period. Hiring must then occur in all departments, after posting nationwide. 
7.69  Finding: The CCBOE’s staffing is so low that managers are required to work 
excessive hours, effectively off the clock and unpaid because the comp time is maxed 
out. Some salaried employees figure that the amount of overtime that has been required 
has meant that some weeks they work more time uncompensated than compensated. This 
means that their hourly rate is less than half of what they expected. These personnel 
practices and expectations are unacceptable. 
While hourly workers have both compensatory time accounts and overtime pay of 
time and a half, managerial employees have not been compensated for the excessive time 
they have put in by demand of top management. Staff believe that top management does 
not care about their excessive work hours and refuses to listen about the hardships it 
imposes, including the negative impact on job performance. Some staff concerns and 
comments include: 
1. Some managerial workers, for over three months, did not have more than one day 
off per week, and had many weeks with no days off at all. And if they took any 
additional time off, they would be “written up.” 
2. Hourly workers are not interested in spending their entire lives at the CCBOE any 
more than managers, even though they receive better compensation for it. All 
workers have an right to have a family life and personal time that must be 
respected. 
3. Long hours do not take into account medical conditions and nutritional needs. 
They have been ordering diabetics to stay and work 12 hour shifts on penalty of 
losing their jobs. 
4. Any workforce that is this overworked is an example of poor managerial 
planning. 
5. Notifying staff at 3pm on Friday that they must work both weekend days is 
unacceptable. 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 184 of 398 
6. Standing to do L & A testing for 12 hour shifts with no stools or chairs for sitting 
is cruel and may be illegal. 
7. It’s not just the excessive work hours: it’s the stress, medical problems, nutritional 
issues, can’t eat/sleep, disruption of family, constant fatigue and overall 
demoralization. 
8. Everyone should be on the clock for fairness no matter what their rank. “They 
have been exploiting managerial workers with no tracking.” 
9. “Just because we can’t unionize doesn’t mean we have no rights.” 
7.70  Recommendation: Although the CCBOE Executive Management believe the 
CCBOE receives an overall financial benefit of squeezing extra labor from each 
managerial employee without having to pay for it, this staffing approach is both 
imprudent and inhumane. Trying to avoid hiring more permanent employees and paying 
their benefits is a strategy some employers use, but good employees normally have exit 
opportunities. This strategy cannot function long-term. It can lead to even lower 
productivity because workers cannot achieve quality outcomes efficiently if they are 
fatigued. 
7.71  Finding: The CCBOE did not provide the documents that were requested by which 
we could document the managerial work hour excesses. The Director said that the 
documents existed and the HR Administrator said there were no such records. But we 
have sufficient documentation to find that managers have been ordered to work hours far 
in excess of what is reasonable or normally expected, and that they have been used as a 
reserve labor pool to fill staffing gaps. In some cases, the ordered work hours can only be 
described as appalling. [Interviews with department managers, Staff, and Board 
Members] 
7.72  Recommendation: The CCBOE should determine the appropriate staffing based on 
a strategic re-evaluation. 
7.73  Recommendation: Immediately end the use of managers as a reserve labor pool. 
Start keeping accurate track of work time. 
7.74  Recommendation: Staffing at all levels must increase in accordance with work 
demands, consistent with other recommendations 
7.75  Finding: The CCBOE has separate comp time limits for managers and for hourly 
workers. For both it is a use-it-or-lose-it approach. The CCBOE reduced the comp time 
for managers that was permitted to accrue from 140 to 35 hours, and has limited the 
opportunities for managers to take this time off. Thus, managers have been stripped of a 
major employment benefit with no advance discussion of its impact. The main executive 
managerial reason given for the change was to ensure that some managers are always in 
the building in every department. [Personnel Policy; interviews with executive managers] 
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7.76  Recommendation: Many other ways are available to ensure that the time off 
options are spread around without depriving everyone of 80% of their comp time. A 
departmental and managerial sign-up schedule carefully administered is a fairer 
mechanism with fewer unintended consequences. 
7.77  Recommendation: Change managerial comp time limits back to 140, with 
corrected, fair directions on when and how it may be used. Consider using the county 
personnel policies as a model . 
7.78  Recommendation: Personnel procedures need to be clearly defined in writing and 
carefully explained. The procedures for filing complaints lack clarity and must be 
improved. Many personnel evaluations demonstrate a need for further explanation of how 
employees are supposed to use their comp time. The procedure for filing complaints 
needs to be clearly communicated to all staff so that they are aware of the proper 
measures they should follow when voicing problems. Staff should not be disciplined for 
not following procedures they were not aware existed. 
7.79  Recommendation: At the end of each year give employees the option of cashing in 
their comp time at seventy five cents on the dollar. 
7.80  Finding: Employee morale may be at an all-time low. The factors include: 
1. Climate of disrespect; that workers at all levels feel that they are treated poorly 
and that they also treat others poorly because of overwork and feeling beaten 
down and unappreciated; 
2. Retribution rather than appropriate accountability drives disciplinary actions; a 
perception exists that one can be a poor worker and survive fine, but a good 
worker with ideas and recommendations for improvements will be targeted; 
3. Indicted personnel are still in administrative jobs; 
4. Patronage hiring and retention; that some people who have poor work ethic are 
continued dragging down the productivity of all and the sense of workplace 
fairness; political party interference with discipline; 
5. Top managers always stressing the quantity of work and sacrificing quality of 
work; 
6. Low salaries, long hours, loss of personal time; 
7. Lack of training in legal requirements for their jobs and the feeling of great legal 
risk if they make errors; 
8. Management not fixing tech problems like DIMS voter registration or absentee 
ballot problems, and not notifying or explaining to the public (“made to look 
dishonest or worse”); 
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9. The press coverage on the election problems that occurred; the fact that some staff 
tried repeatedly to flag and resolve these problems in a timely manner without 
success “makes us look like a bunch of idiots”; 
10. Salary equity issues — perception of bias in favor of IS Department; no other 
market comparability studies were undertaken for other work classification; 
women staff and managers’ perception of being unfairly paid as compared with 
men; 
11. Top managers rarely call to say “thanks” even after extraordinary work hours; 
12. No merit pay increases/bonuses. 
7.81  Recommendation: The CCBOE must create a mechanism for rewarding staff for 
enduring long hours and performing above and beyond the call of duty in what has been 
one of the most thankless jobs in local government. The CCBOE should adjust its current 
compensation structure to provide merit bonus pay for each employee for achieving 
organization performance goals and for individual employees on the basis of performance 
evaluations. 
7.82  Recommendation: Performance reviews have not included performance measures 
and concrete improvement objectives. Merit increases should be available for quality 
work, and other incentives created to reward employees for quality performance. 
Disciplinary processes have not been consistently used when the same types of conduct 
and performance breaches have occurred. 
7.83  Finding: Despite being “written up” repeatedly for poor performance, some 
employees continue in their jobs with injury to the voters and to workplace morale. For 
instance, a worker entering voter registrations, validating provisional ballots, or issuing 
absentee ballots must have high accuracy levels in typing and a high sensitivity for 
identifying and correcting spelling input errors. Yet some of the workers currently 
assigned to these tasks have manifested repeatedly that they do not have these skills. 
Some problematic employees who are finally removed from one department have been 
transferred to another where the worker then becomes a new department’s problem 
because of the same attitude or skills issues. [Interviews with CVS managers and staff; 
other managers] 
7.84  Finding: Salaries of IS workers were dramatically increased with the explanation of 
in order to make salaries competitive in the IT market. It is unclear whether the skills of 
these employees have equally competitive qualifications to warrant this dramatic salary 
increase nor whether performance was taken into account before this increase [2005 
reorganization plans and salary schedules] 
7.85  Recommendation: Each employee must be given well in advance of evaluation, 
and preferably on an annual basis a clear set of fair performance goals against which 
he/she will be measured. For workers doing the same jobs, the standards should be 
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virtually identical. Performance reviews must assess whether the employee has attained 
these standards, and if not, identify a strategy for improvement. Where improvement does 
not occur in a reasonable period of time, separation from the agency must occur, without 
any political interference to protect these workers. Merit increases should be available for 
quality work, and other incentives created to reward employees for quality performance. 
Demonstrated sub-par performance deficiencies on fair criteria should result in no 
more than one transfer. Thereafter, using the progressive discipline system, dismissal of 
the employee should occur. Repeated poor performance by individual employees cannot 
be accepted, and managers must have the ability to exclude those persons from their 
departments. The Policy and Procedures Manual should be revised to redress these issues. 
Employee input should be sought and the final language needs to be explained carefully 
to all. 
7.86  Finding: CCBOE employees are legally not permitted to unionize or engage in any 
form of collective bargaining. But this does not mean that the employees cannot consider 
forming mechanisms, such as an employee council, by which their concerns can be 
brought to top managers and the Board for resolution. 
7.87  Recommendation: The CCBOE should form an employee council comprised of 
five staff level employees, three managers, the Director and one Board Member to meet 
regularly to discuss employment issues at the CCBOE. 
7.88  Finding: The second restructuring approved Executive Management’s request to 
flatten job classifications so that job titles no longer distinguished greater experience and 
competency than a beginner in the department. The Administrator of HR was the primary 
proponent of this approach, justifying it because the different titles that had been in 
existence created barriers to redeployment of workers in tasks that they felt were not 
appropriate to their skill or title. 
The creation of many departments, CVS for example, resulted in many “senior 
clerks” being reclassified with most being demoted to the lowest title—“technicians.” 
The structure/organization of these departments has been flattened, leaving three real 
levels at each department: management, specialists, and the mass of technicians who have 
experience varying from minimal to decades, and a wide range of competencies. 
Employees have expressed concern over the lack of any opportunities for advancement in 
the CCBOE. [Reorganization plans; personnel files; staff interviews] 
This flattening of job categories, and virtual elimination of progression generated a 
number of dysfunctions for the agency. These included valued senior employees being 
returned to titles that did not distinguish them in any manner from the newest hires. This 
change not only demeaned these mid-level and senior employees but also depressed their 
willingness to use their developed expertise and supervisory skills in the May 2nd 
election. It is broadly perceived that embedded in the changes is a latent managerial 
judgment that all these workers are essentially fungible — that experience, dedication, 
and knowledge of the job do not matter and need not be recognized in any manner. 
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7.89  Recommendation: A series of job classifications should be created that allow for 
employee recognition for talent and increasing competency. For instance, the title 
“Technician” could be graded into I and II, and Specialist I & II. Good employees want 
to have a possibility of progression, and the smart employer generates a system that will 
entice the best to remain. Salary should also increase as the classification of an employee 
progresses. 
7.90  Finding: Employees at all levels have experienced what they consider to be 
continual disrespect, rudeness, condescension and put-downs by top managers. 
7.91  Recommendation: Management must be able to inspire workers to do their best 
work, to protect the public trust that is elections management. To be effective, they must 
be able to show respect and fair treatment of employees. The persons filling these jobs set 
a tone and contribute to a culture that, at the CCBOE, must improve decisively. Managers 
need to be more mindful in the way they address their staff. Many complaints have been 
made concerning managerial interaction with staff. Tempers and disrespectful treatment 
of staff should not be condoned. 
7.92  Finding: Managerial self evaluations and supervisor evaluations repeatedly 
indicated a need for managerial training, including in handling difficult and non-
responsive employees. Training desired by managers was not limited to issues relating to 
the new electronic voting system. No coherent or effective training programs have been 
fashioned for managers in managerial skills and none in the specific duties of their 
departments. Frequently when asking for training, new hires have been told to read Title 
35 of the Ohio Revised Code and to read the directives. [Interviews with managers; 
personnel records] 
7.93  Recommendation: Managerial training should be made a priority. The CCBOE 
needs a dedicated Training Officer to help identify needs and coordinate external 
consulting and training services. Classes need to be scheduled in light of the election 
calendar and the need for recovery post-election. 
7.94  Finding: The training contracted for CCBOE managers must be properly geared for 
the knowledge base and skills that are needed in the CCBOE. Some of the training dollars 
have been wasted by contracting for generalized services of the Election Center in 
Auburn Texas, which is not geared toward Ohio election law compliance. Managers 
report it has been a delightful “junket” but cannot substitute for the managerial training 
and specialized information they need. Additionally, training for managers must take into 
account that the legal standards and legitimate expectations differ between the private 
sector and a public agency such as the CCBOE; public accountability is a value that must 
be inculcated throughout CCBOE training, and not ignored or an afterthought. 
7.95  Recommendation: That a new management position, Training Officer, be created. 
It should be staffed by a person with significant skill and experience in structuring 
educational programs or courses for developing both skills and knowledge. Key 
responsibilities to be exercised by this person for drafting RFPs for training, for 
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evaluating responsive bids/proposals, and for supervising the creation of supportive 
instruction/policy manuals. Ideally, the Training Officer would be a person who has 
experience working in elections (at the polls or in the CCBOE), or who can obtain that 
experience immediately by working at the polling places. The selected candidate should 
plan to work at the polls at least twice a year, rotating into completing the training for the 
particular position and filling it at the polls. This staff member should also rotate into 
temporary position in each department to learn departmental tasks, demands, and 
personnel. The Training Officer should exercise primary responsibility to analyze all 
internal training needs at all levels with both permanent and temporary staff. The officer 
should take charge of poll worker training. 
7.96  Finding: Constant shifts in managerial staff seemed to damage relationships 
between managers and assistant managers, as well as relationships between staff and 
management. The movement of managerial staff results in the need to retrain managers in 
the responsibilities of their new departments. Many of these managerial shifts were 
ordered during key periods. Managerial self-evaluations indicated their awareness that 
they are not as knowledgeable as they need to be. These managerial reassignments whose 
impetus varied from bad relationships or circumstances such as indictments, often led to 
new managerial teams that were not as efficient as the prior assistant manager/manager 
relationship. 
7.97  Recommendation: The need to move employees from a certain position should not 
displace more capable and qualified staff members. Better judgments are needed about 
how and when to fill managerial positions. 
7.98  Finding: The cooperation and teamwork required of employees within the agency 
is not impaired by the employees’ political affiliation. The employees — including 
managers — tend to think of one another in terms of competency, ethics, and dedication, 
sprinkled with personal judgments such as “difficult person.” The agency has some 
marginal employees from each political party. It also has some outstanding employees. 
[Interviews and observations; personnel records] 
The Board has both permanent positions and temporary positions. Processes for 
hiring need to be improved for both classifications. Temporary workers have been hired 
who have not been subjected to background checks. This has led to individuals with 
criminal backgrounds, including a person who was wearing a criminal offender “ankle 
bracelet” being hired to handle ballots. Favoritism and personal relationships have also 
been a factor in hiring and promotion decisions. 
7.99  Recommendation: The CCBOE should confer with County Sheriff Gerald McFaul 
to determine the best way to conduct basic criminal background checks on all permanent 
and temporary CCBOE staff. 
7.100  Finding: Fair accountability for employees and discipline for employee 
performance has sometimes been impaired by political party leaders’ intercession. This 
partisan intrusion reduces the perception and actuality of even-handed performance 
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reviews and discipline, eroding the employees’ sense of managerial fair play, and 
accountability to managers. 
7.101  Finding: The benefits of having experienced staff dedicated to the mission of 
honest and swift results cannot be duplicated by hiring temporary employees from 
employment agencies at minimal wage rates. Executive Managers underestimated the 
value of experienced line staff and demeaned their contributions by restructuring the 
agency to place significant emphasis on allocating work to temporary hires. 
The recruitment and hiring of temporary CCBOE employees occurs in a variety of 
ways. The major political parties or elected office holders have exercised significant 
influence. When the positions required largely unskilled labor, perhaps patronage was 
less of a problem. But most election administrative tasks in the current period require 
skill and conscientious dedication to achievement of quality performance. If a temporary 
worker enters voter registration information erroneously, a qualified voter loses the right 
to vote. If he enters provisional ballot information without care, a qualified voter’s ballot 
will not be counted. If she fails to pack a polling place supply bag carefully, essential 
security seals or memory cards may not be included, causing a polling place to open late 
and turn away voters. If a poll worker does not understand what to do for disabled voters, 
some voters may be denied their voting rights. 
7.102  Finding: Recruitment of election temporary staff has been split among a wide 
range of CCBOE offices, leading to fractured and competitive department relations, 
duplication and wasted staff resources, ineffective strategies, and other problems. Ohio 
law specifically accords certain limited roles to political parties in the staffing of polling 
places and in the CCBOE. [Interviews with managers; e.g., ORC §3501.22(A)] 
7.103  Recommendation: Whether they are hiring for permanent or temporary positions 
the Board Members must put the best interest of the agency ahead of partisanship 
patronage. The CCBOE must move away from the historic view that temporary workers 
are patronage opportunities that place political party ahead of qualifications. Neither 
political parties nor the public at large is best served by staffing elections with individuals 
who cannot perform the tasks at the level required to conduct fair and honest elections. 
Partisan balance, where required by law, cannot be replaced by political patronage hiring. 
7.104  Finding: For the most part, the fact that CCBOE employees are known by 
political affiliation (as an R, D or N) has not created alignments in the workplace that 
undermine the ability to work cooperatively. [Interviews with Managers and workers; our 
observations] While political party affiliation matters less in hiring, retention, and 
promotion decisions, it still plays a significant role. The agency has been the repository of 
patronage hiring from both parties. Sometimes this influence has led to high-quality 
employees, but other times it has resulted in deficient or marginal employees, whose 
presence erodes morale and quality performance within departments and the agency as a 
whole.[Interviews and observations; personnel records] 
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Because certain election tasks are required, by State statute or administrative 
Directive, to be undertaken with a representative of two different political parties, some 
hiring must take into account political party affiliation in order for the requisite 
employees to be available for these paired functions. While all employees are aware of 
this necessity, when an exceptionally qualified applicant is turned down in favor of a less 
qualified applicant of the other major party, further demoralization (about 
professionalizing the CCBOE and reducing patronage hiring) occurs in employee ranks. 
[Employee interviews] 
7.105  Recommendation: This dual and sometimes contradictory personnel approach — 
sometimes merit-based and sometimes with political party trumping — has to be directly 
addressed. One solution is to identify how many permanent employee party pairings must 
be available (at both manager rank and line staff) to perform any task that is legally 
compelled to be conducted in pairs. Such an analysis must take into account vote 
tabulation, recounts, and all other tasks regardless of whether they are contingent 
(recounts) or routine (counting votes). So long as the CCBOE staffing partisan ratios 
dictated by this analysis have been met, then until and unless the required ratio is 
unsettled because of employee departures, the CCBOE should be hiring and promoting 
strictly on the basis of qualifications and merit-based criteria. If a job opening requires 
particular political affiliation (for instance, because the incumbent in the pairing is of one 
party and the new hire must be the other), the posting must mention this criterion. 
7.106  Finding: Recruitment efforts to fill management and line staff positions have 
varied significantly depending on the position, the perceived urgency, and the degree of 
involvement Board Members and political party leaders have exercised. Not infrequently, 
interviews with a range of candidates have been feigned because a prejudgment of who 
will receive the job offer. Hiring with secret criteria, including a particular party 
affiliation, has sometimes caused the disvaluing of professional skills and the knowledge 
base required for particular jobs. This practice can lead to outstanding prospects losing 
interest in CCBOE jobs. [Interviews with managers and line staff] 
7.107  Recommendation: Even where hiring must occur to maintain political balance, 
broad recruitment within the state and nationally should be undertaken for every CCBOE 
position that requires any specialized skills — even if it is an hourly position. Party 
affiliation cannot substitute for or trump meeting the job’s qualifications. 
7.108  Recommendation: Recruitment efforts must be reopened if the skill set and other 
qualifications cannot be met. CCBOE employees and the public must understand that so 
long as partisan balance for certain functions remains in the Ohio statutes, this 
dichotomous approach to hiring must continue as a matter of law. 
7.109  Recommendation: The CCBOE Board Members, and the Cuyahoga political 
party leaders should reach an agreement concerning their roles in CCBOE permanent and 
temporary employee hiring and personnel action decisions. The agreement should include 
such points as: commitment to refer only the most skilled, conscientious, and ethical 
persons to the CCBOE for employment; cooperating in the effort to improve employee 
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morale and performance, as by ceasing intercession to protect the jobs of CCBOE 
employees who have deficient performance as determined on fair and job-related 
measures; and supporting merit-based personnel decisions and a discipline system that 
will earn employee and public respect. 
7.110  Finding: Nonpartisan and third party-affiliated citizens have complained of little 
interest in their applications for permanent and temporary CCBOE employment. The 
manner in which the state statutes are written do not accord the major parties the sole 
positions, even where employee pairs of differing parties are mandated. A great many 
Cuyahoga citizens, and highly qualified persons throughout the nation, are not strongly 
affiliated with one of the two major parties. [Ohio election law; voter registration and 
opinion polling results] 
7.111  Recommendation: Even when hiring for ensuring requisite employees for 
political balance, the CCBOE should be extending the opportunities to those with third 
party affiliation or no political party affiliation. 
7.112  Recommendation: Supplementation or replacement of skilled staff should be 
done by selecting the best qualified individuals vetted through a public process. Partisan 
balance — on the CCBOE Board and also in polling place staffing, which is required 
under Ohio election law — should not be confused with partisan patronage. 
7.113  Finding: Questions were raised by both employees and managers concerning 
whether labor and employment laws (federal, state and local), were violated by the 
extreme overtime requirements on penalty of losing one’s job, and by the restrictions on 
the use of accrued compensatory time. Additionally, questions were raised about the 
hiring of temporary workers, from temp agencies and via the Administrative Assistants, 
without background checks even though they were handling ballots. Other questions were 
raised about the CCBOE’s compliance with Ohio statutory law in partisan balance 
required for certain types of functions. Administrator Platten was only aware of one set of 
questions — whether background checks were necessary — but neither she nor the 
Director had not taken the matter to the CCBOE’s legal counsel for guidance. As the new 
Ballot Department Manager stated, “I don’t feel that I know the legal requirements of my 
job, and my predecessor was indicted for not following the law.” [Interviews with 
Director Vu, Baker, and Platten; with employees] 
7.114  Recommendation: The new position of Ombudsperson Officer must be created as 
at least a part-time position. Ideally, the person will have practiced law in a regulatory 
area and will have some knowledge of federal and state election law, other relevant 
federal and state law that impacts the CCBOE’s activities (including conflict of interest 
law; the Sunshine Laws; public contracting and procurement), county policies and 
procedures, federal and state labor and employment laws governing maximum hours, 
safety and health issues, and a variety of other topics. The public information officers 
should also be re-located to this office. The Ombudsperson must not only be able to 
research the answers to questions presented, but also advise the management on when 
authoritative legal direction must be sought from the Secretary of State or the Attorney 
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General, or other State or county offices. The Ombudsperson needs to know enough 
about these relevant laws that she/he can flag issues proactively and not merely 
reactively. 
7.115  Finding: Temporary workers did not receive background checks to look for legal 
violations which would render them unqualified to work for the CCBOE on Election 
Day. They were deployed without proper supervision or training in critical areas, 
including unpacking supply bags to look for voted ballots and memory cards. [interviews 
with Platten, Director Vu; with managers) The time frame for hiring temporary workers, 
regardless of whether the workers were hired from the CCBOE’s pool or from outside 
sources, was much too short. This is evidenced by a requirement that the Administrative 
Assistants obtain 100 workers in 24 hours or less. No real checks on employees can occur 
if the hiring period is so short. [AA Memo] 
7.116  Recommendation: That the Board adopt a policy that states political parties and 
leaders are encouraged to nominate and refer individuals for both temporary and 
permanent positions, but that all hiring, promotion, and disciplinary matters will occur on 
the merits of the (prospective) employee only, with no role for these nominators. Thus, if 
a poll worker, nominated by a Ward Leader, fails to attend training or does not arrive to 
work at the appointed hour, the CCBOE will exclude the person from its employ. The 
Ward Leader should join with the public agreeing that performance is the first concern. 
The public interest to be served by election workers — both temporary and permanent — 
must become and remain paramount to all other considerations. 
7.117  Recommendation: The CCBOE should confer with County Sheriff Gerald 
McFaul to determine the best way to conduct basic criminal background checks on all 
permanent and temporary CCBOE staff. 
7.118  Recommendation: The Board’s Administrative Assistants and others can 
continue to recruit, but they should forward names of applicants to a nonpartisan CCBOE 
office, where the processing and evaluation of all temporary and permanent hiring will 
occur. This office would not be the current HR office but, to demarcate the sharp shift in 
duties, should be renamed and restaffed: for instance, Workforce Recruitment. This office 
should: 
• Create and update lists (or a bank) of interested and available temporary 
employees by posting requests for statements of interest, or active solicitations of 
temporary employees, on CCBOE and County websites, with area colleges and 
universities, and elsewhere. 
• Require that to be included in the temporary worker registry, an applicant 
complete all application forms, submit to a background check, and complete all 
other pre-hiring steps. Applicants should provide a current email address and 
phone number, if available, and be asked to keep the CCBOE apprised of any 
changes in status or contact information. 
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• Periodically confirm availability, interest and contact information by email or 
phone, at least quarterly, to keep lists current. 
• Ensure that applications contain such information as applicant skills and 
departments/tasks of interest. 
• Develop and maintain lists of qualifications, and administer relevant skills tests 
for positions such as data entry; and hire only those persons who meet minimum 
objective standards. 
The Office must generate creative approaches to develop a knowledgeable, dedicated, 
temporary expansion workforce and keep its registry/listing, contact/availability, and 
interest database current. Instruments for easy, quick and fair evaluation should be 
created by permanent staff managers. Where hiring requires political balance, the 
Administrative Assistants should be involved in selecting employees for the positions. 
Where political balance is not a factor, the AAs should not be involved. Alternatively, 
issue an RFP for a temporary employment agency to do background checks, and create 
and update the temporary worker registry. 
7.119  Finding: Some department managers have requested that certain temporary 
employees not be returned to their departments, yet such workers still get reassigned to 
them. 
7.120  Recommendation: A simple evaluation form needs to be created for managers to 
evaluate all temporary workers. If a manager does not want a person to return, those 
involved with placement decisions need to respect these determinations. 
7.121  Finding: The CCBOE staff made extensive use of pooled staff and temporary 
staff to meet its mission to prepare for an election. Pooled staff members are individuals 
who are transferred between functions as warranted by the CCBOE’s ever-changing 
needs. Unfortunately, prior to the last election, many employees did not receive sufficient 
training to deal with the many and varied tasks they would be asked to perform. The 
CCBOE also relied heavily on temporary staff, many of whom arrived at their job with 
little or no experience in working for a Board of Election. As a result the staff often 
looked confused and offered inaccurate or incomplete advice to the voters. [Staff 
interviews; direct reports from early voters; and independent observation] 
7.122  Recommendation: Previously the CCBOE Board considered and dismissed the 
idea of hiring a Training Officer. A position description was prepared at that time which 
called for this individual to assess the training needs at the CCBOE (see Appendix G). 
The CCBOE Board should revisit this decision so that a Training Officer can be hired in 
a timely fashion and have a positive impact on staff readiness for the November election. 
7.123  Recommendation: A position of Quality Manager should be created with tasks 
including: conducting a debriefing after each election, collecting and following up on 
data (Pink Sheets, incident reports, call center reports, and non-conformances) and 
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creating training programs to help mitigate problems. Please see the Quality Assurance 
and Continuous Improvement proposal for more details, Appendix F. 
7.124  Finding: The CCBOE’s online resources are out of date and poorly constructed. 
The website is currently not up to date, and the polling location finder does not function 
properly. The instructions on how to use the machines are available on the Secretary of 
State’s website, but they are not available on the County site. The DRE demonstration 
dates also need to be updated. Other counties included links to sites such as the Secretary 
of State’s website. The ballots available online do not display the entire ballot. Many of 
the ballots are cropped so that you can not view the races on the left hand side. 
7.125  Recommendation: The website needs to be updated and corrected. More 
information should be included on the site and important information should be easy to 
view. Deadlines such as when to send in absentee ballots and dates associated to 
registration and the day of an election should also be made easy to recognize. The site 
should include instructions on how to use the voting machines. The site should include a 
link to the Secretary of State’s website. An interactive voting program could also be 
created leading an online user through the electronic voting process. 
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Chapter VIII: Additional Concerns and 
Recommendations 
A. The Board of the CCBOE 
The CCBOE Board (“Board”) deals with a number of issues that require it to convene in 
Executive Session. These matters are specified by statute and have been further 
developed by judicial opinions. Personnel action matters, pending litigation, and a few 
other areas are barred from discussion in public on the record.  
8.1  Finding: The Board’s exercise of its Executive Session duties has caused a great 
deal of public confusion and has imposed significant delays on the publicly conducted 
business. This has sometimes led to a perception that the Board is not respectful of 
citizens’ and candidates’ time, or is attempting to conceal its deliberations from public 
scrutiny. 
8.2  Recommendation: The CCBOE Board should adopt several new procedures for 
creating and managing its Public Meeting Agenda: 
1. That any Board agenda that includes an Executive Session include a notice 
written in publicly accessible language explaining that State law forbids the 
CCBOE Board from discussing certain matters in public [with a citation to the 
statute], and that Executive Sessions can begin only after a public call to order. 
2. That Executive Session time be scheduled for the beginning or at the end of a 
Board meeting, with an agenda that notes this and which states the time the public 
session will commence. The CCBOE Board and its clerk should endeavor to 
estimate accurately the Executive Session time required. Under no circumstances 
should it begin a public session before the time stated in the Agenda, and it should 
seek not to delay the Public portions of its agenda. 
8.3  Finding: The Board has adopted policies, for instance, a new policy governing 
recounts, that it did not first publish on its website for public comment. This practice of 
introducing a proposed policy for Board approval on the same day it is first announced 
publicly has led to the Board not receiving timely and useful suggestions for corrections 
and improvements to the proposed policies. The current approach also structurally 
continues the attitude that the public’s suggestions and insights are not valuable or 
desired. This leads to a perception of agency and Board arrogance that undermines the 
Board’s efficacy and public confidence. 
8.4  Recommendation: All proposed internal policies, policy manuals, and decisions 
concerning election management, unless an emergency matter, should be posted on the 
website (and sent to an email list of those who indicate their interest) for advance public 
review and possible comment. The Board should cordially solicit public reactions and 
recommendations, with a request for submission within 15 days of posting so that the 
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managers can consider the responses. A CCBOE staffer should collect and summarize the 
public comment for presentation to managers and the Board with sufficient time for the 
managers to consider revising their policies in light of the comments. The Board should 
also post the summaries of comments it has received from the public well in advance of 
the public meeting to consider the proposed policies.  
If the CCBOE commits to such postings at least 30 days before they appear on the 
Board’s agenda, greater public involvement, especially from area experts and election 
advocacy groups can occur in writing and well before action is taken. For any policy that 
needs to be acted on quickly, the Board should classify it as an interim policy pending 
full discussion and finalization, and schedule the matter for an upcoming Agenda. The 
new Ombuds office should assist in developing these basic administrative process 
policies. This process will better balance CCBOE’s need to develop new policies, its 
needs for greater public advice (free advice and insight) and disclosure, and its ability to 
move quickly when circumstances demand.  
8.5  Finding: Although the Board has contracted for the services of a Court Reporter to 
record all Public Session meetings, for some reasons the Clerk has omitted placing an 
order for many of the transcripts.  Thus, these crucial records are not available to the 
public, and the Board’s record has large holes.  The charge for an individual citizen to 
order the Transcript is often prohibitive.  The transcripts are also not placed on the 
CCBOE website for broadest accessibility.  [Interviews with the Board’s Clerk;  with the 
Board Admin. Assistants] 
8.6  Finding: A great deal more information about the CCBOE and its Board’s actions 
could be easily accessible to the public via the CCBOE website. Some of the information 
that citizens have requested to be posted on the web include:  
• The Board’s Meeting Schedule (including amendments and modifications), 
Agendas, and Summaries/Highlights of Board Action  
• Transcripts of Board Meetings 
• RFPs (Requests for proposal) of goods and services 
• Major contracts for voting equipment and other items  
[Interviews with Advocacy group representatives, with CCBOE staff] 
8.7  Recommendation: Especially now, given that the Board needs to rebuild public 
confidence in its elections process and the entire agency, the Board should direct the 
Clerk to place a standing order for the Reporter to transcribe all of its Public Sessions 
(into an electronic or paper record). Until an agreement is negotiated that explicitly 
authorizes the CCBOE to post on its website all transcripts, a copy of all Board 
transcripts for the last four years should be placed in the files of the CCBOE Public 
Information officers for quick access for public records’ requests. Additionally, the Board 
should seek, perhaps through a procurement process, a reporting vendor that will be cost-
effective and that will agree to the terms of permitting the transcripts to be posted on the 
website for one year from the date of the recorded Public Session.  
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We believe that the Board should post these documents and any others that can help 
provide a window on the Board’s handling of taxpayer dollars, and its pursuit of the 
public trust in elections.  
8.8  Finding: As discussed in Chapter VII, Management and Personnel, the Deputy 
Director has requested that the Board Members not discuss their displeasure with 
managerial performance or otherwise “embarrass” the top managers in the Public Session 
of Board Meetings. The Board’s practice of generally abiding by this request may be not 
only a violation of the Ohio Sunshine laws (an opinion on which should be requested 
from their legal counsel) but also impairs its ability to hold CCBOE top management 
accountable and responsive. By avoiding public discussions of managerial priorities and 
leadership within the CCBOE, the Board also loses one of the biggest “sticks” it has for 
compelling managers’ responsiveness to their directions short of threatening a formal 
personnel action [Interviews with Director and Deputy Director; Board Members]. 
8.9  Recommendation: The Board should strictly adhere to the Sunshine laws and not 
enter Executive Session unless and only for the express purposes listed in the statutes and 
case law. The Board should seek legal guidance on interpreting and applying these 
statutes, but in ambiguous situations we urge erring on the side of full public disclosure. 
Especially now, when public trust and confidence must be rebuilt in the Board and the 
CCBOE’s performance, every lawful step toward public accountability and fullest 
disclosure should be taken. By our lights, for instance, “personnel actions” do not include 
discussions of proposals for administrative restructuring of the CCBOE.  
Additionally, it seems that the June 2006 Board discussion with top managers 
concerning their management decisions and omissions in preparing for the May 2nd 
election should have been conducted in public, on the record. The Board should instruct 
its legal counsel to be present at all Executive Sessions and scrupulously instruct the 
Board when it ventures off into matters that are properly, or arguably, part of the Public 
Record. 
B. Candidate Relations 
8.10  Finding: Candidates for public offices and their current employees often place a 
great deal on the line by their standing for election. But the CCBOE has not promptly 
advised candidates when unexpected obstacles arise in election management or 
tabulations that will lead to delays in reporting the unofficial results. For instance, when 
the absentee ballot scanners failed, and a hand-count procedure was authorized, the 
CCBOE did not notify candidates about the problem or give them information concerning 
its expected conclusion. [Euclid Hearing transcript, Director Vu interview] 
8.11  Recommendation: The CCBOE should attempt to create an email list of contact 
persons for all candidates and issues on the county’s ballot well in advance of the 
election. This information can be collected on a form that is a part of the CVS petition-
filing packet. A “list-serve” created for all contacts (one contact per candidate/issue) in 
advance of Election Day would permit the CCBOE to promptly notify those most directly 
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affected by any election management problem. Even if a problem affects only a portion 
of the list-serve, for instance, candidates in Euclid, the message can clarify that fact 
without requiring the creation of multiple list-serves. 
C. Election Advocacy Organizations 
8.12  Finding: Over the past three years, a number of election “watchdog” organizations 
have identified many problems in the CCBOE’s conduct of elections, and have offered a 
range of recommendations for its improvement. The CCBOE has too often responded to 
these evaluative comments with an administrative attitude of disinterest and disdain. 
Even where the CCBOE Board has instructed the top managers to respond to the critiques 
and recommendations, executive managers have rarely responded on the record at 
succeeding Board meetings. Additionally, the organizations have found executive 
managers relatively unconcerned about even relatively grave matters (e.g. glitches in 
DIMS software) and generally not offering any internal investigation, correction, or 
public report. Public confidence and respect for the CCBOE has suffered greatly under 
current CCBOE management.  
8.13  Recommendation: The Board should create the position of Ombudsperson, with 
the officer charged to report to the Board, the Director, and to the Public. Duties shall 
include following up internally and externally on questions and concerns raised by 
members of the public and watchdog organizations. A standard of reasonableness is 
contemplated, so that a range of concerns can be addressed — not simply those of one 
organization. Other suggestions about this new office are detailed in the Management and 
Personnel section. 
8.14  Finding: Some watchdog organizations have submitted excessively burdensome 
information requests. At times, public information staff have become virtual research 
assistants for these organizations. The organizational leaders have suggested that the 
numerous and burdensome requests are in part spawned by the form in which the 
CCBOE has been publishing its election data; they have argued without CCBOE 
response that presenting the data in other ways and via other databases would greatly 
reduce the numbers of information requests they file and the burden on the public 
information staff. 
8.15  Recommendation: Lead researchers from the Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition, 
Ohio Vigilance, and others which have filed numerous information requests should meet 
with the Information Services Managers to discuss and resolve database and data access 
issues. The watchdog groups and the CCBOE should strive to reach a resolution that will 
yield the CCBOE placing more information in the public domain (e.g. on its website) and 
in a form that permits social scientists to analyze it without the use of the CCBOE staff 
energies. The election watchdog organizations and CCBOE staff should seek to establish 
a cooperative working relationship for full and effective disclosure to the public, and 
hostility on both sides must end. The advocacy organizations and staff should endeavor to 
become allies dedicated to achieving the goal of the CCBOE becoming a beacon for the 
State and Nation in election accountability. 
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D. Independent Monitor for CCBOE Response and 
Implementation 
8:16  Finding: The CCBOE Board Members requested that this Panel consider and make 
suggestions concerning a monitoring mechanism that would help to ensure that this 
Investigation, and the ultimate recommendations and action plan the CCBOE adopts, is 
implemented swiftly. 
8:17  Recommendation: 
• That an independent entity (that does not receive funding from Cuyahoga County 
or the CCBOE, and does not have a contractor or vendor relationship with them) 
be appointed as Monitor; 
• That the Board of the CCBOE consult with the Cuyahoga County Commissioners 
and try to reach consensus on the entity to be appointed to serve as Monitor; 
• That the CCBOE (and County Commissioners) request that independent funding 
sources, such as foundations, provide sufficient support for the Monitor to do high 
quality work; 
• That the entity have staff with substantial elections administration expertise; 
• That the Monitor provide at least monthly written reports to the CCBOE, the 
Board of County Commissioners and to the public concerning the progress that 
has been made in the CCBOE on the action plan, and that the Monitor be 
available for oral reports when the Board requests; 
• That the details and exact charge to the Monitor be created jointly by the CCBOE 
Board, the Board of the County Commissioners, the funding entities, and the 
entity that is selected to be Monitor, with public comment on the initial proposal 
before it is finalized by the CCBOE Board, all acting with great speed; 
• That a two-year commitment be requested of the Monitor and the funding 
sources. 
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Chapter IX: Background Materials, Summaries and 
Analyses 
A. Overview of Testimony Presented by Concerned Cuyahoga 
County Citizens in Public Hearings 
Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones held five Public Hearings in Cuyahoga County 
to gather the testimony of individuals and advocacy organization spokespeople regarding 
the May 2006 primary. 
The dates and locations were: 
• May 22, 2006: Beachwood 
• May 30, 2006: Euclid, 
• May 31, 2006: Cleveland, 
• June 1, 2006: Bedford, 
• June 2, 2006: East Cleveland. 
In addition to the Stephanie Tubbs Jones hearings, a Public Hearing was held for the 
advocacy groups on 5/31/2006. The final Public Hearing was held at Cleveland State 
University on 6/9/2006. 
Problems with the DESI TSx voting machines 
9.1  Citizen Impressions: Cuyahoga County citizens mentioned that there were several 
problems with the voting machines. For example, the machines jammed, froze, crashed 
and ceased to function entirely. Poll workers also indicated that the machines were 
difficult to set up and close down. The poll workers had problems starting the machines 
and running them throughout the day. The machine malfunctions created an overall lack 
of certainty that the machines had the capacity to effectively act as vote tabulators. 
Additionally, the problems experienced left the impression that machine tampering was a 
distinct possibility. 
9.2  Citizen Suggestions: An attendee at the Beachwood hearing suggested that the 
machines be tagged as a two person set-up. 
9.3  Citizen Impressions: Overall, the voters seemed to like the machines. One benefit 
listed at the Cleveland hearing was that “the screens display was comfortable and clear 
and an ease to operate.” Furthermore, persons with disabilities, such as blindness, 
reported being happy to have been able to participate independently in the election for the 
first time. 
9.4  Citizen Impressions: Poll workers experienced problems with the printers and five 
people described the printers as a “mechanical mess.” They found the printer tape was 
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difficult to install and the printer would jammed repeatedly and it was hard to read what 
the printer recorded. 
9.5  Citizen Impressions: Although assistance from DESI had been promised, they 
didn’t always act on the promise. There were complaints about the DESI assistance at the 
Cleveland State hearing. The people from DESI either did not have the competency to 
assist poll workers or they never arrived on the scene. 
Training of Booth Officials requires restructuring 
9.6  Citizen Impressions: There were 42 concerns expressed regarding the effectiveness 
of the training given to Booth Officials. The trainings were described as long and with 
too much information given at once. Additionally, the trainings overly focused on some 
areas and ignored others. For example, Ms. Flasig stated at the Bedford hearing, “They 
were so interested in telling us how to put the machine together; they didn’t tell what we 
had to do afterwards.” 
Poll workers expressed other concerns about the lack of material covered in training 
which in turn compromised the effectiveness of polling places on Election Day. One 
person stated that they had not been taught about the procedure for giving provisional 
ballots to voters. Mr. Capko, a poll worker, said, “[for the] provisional vote, [they spent] 
maybe five or ten minutes [in training].” At the Beachwood hearing, one person 
described the training as ineffective for preparing poll workers for Election Day. He said, 
“Well, let me tell you, it’s like Driver’s Education. You see movies, you read a book, but 
once you get behind the wheel of that car, it’s a different ball game, starting with when 
we opened the polls.” 
9.7  Citizen Impressions: The training sessions were overcrowded and not conducive for 
training, There were too many people per training session and too many people per 
machine during the training session. Further, many people walked in late and were not 
present for the entire training session, which in turn compromised the effectiveness of the 
instruction. 
9.8  Citizen Suggestions: Offer compensation for training sessions. Paying individuals 
for the time they spend in the training session would motivate people to attend the 
scheduled trainings in their entirety. 
9.9  Citizen Suggestions: Provide more machines at the trainings. More machines would 
allow a greater hands-on approach for instructing poll workers. One person stated at the 
Beachwood hearing, “I think had the instructor not had so many people in that class, if it 
had been half that, say maximum 15, it could have been done well. And, I think if they do 
in the future it will work much better.” 
9.10  Citizen Suggestions: A consistent recommendation given at the hearings was to 
invest more time in training Booth Officials and EDTs. Many people expressed 
uneasiness about working with the new technology after just one training session. Some 
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people attended more than the one training session in order to be ready for Election Day. 
They testified that the additional training hours were extremely helpful in shaping their 
understanding of the new Election Day process. 
9.11  Citizen Impressions: The training sessions were described as inconsistent and 
scheduled too far in advance of the Election. One person at the Bedford hearing said that 
“the other Judges didn’t remember how to do anything with the new machines because 
the last time they were trained was too far away from the actual election and they forgot 
how to do most things.” 
9.12  Citizen Impressions: Trainers did not demonstrate professional behavior. Two 
people at the Cleveland State University Forum hearing stated that the trainers argued 
with each other. One trainer was reported to have made an inappropriate “comment” 
about the men in the room. 
9.13  Citizen Impressions: Many Election Day Technicians did not behave in a 
professional manner. For example, one complaint at the Bedford hearing was that “the 
EDT reeked like alcohol when he walked in at 5:30 a.m. I have reported inspectors 
reeking of alcohol for years. Throughout the day he was just sitting in his chair and when 
a problem occurred he said to look in the hand book.” It was also reported that a few 
EDTs were found asleep in their chairs and unresponsive to requests for help. 
9.14  Citizen Impressions: Eleven attendees indicated that the lack of privacy offered by 
the DESI machine design was a great concern to the voters. At the Beachwood hearing, 
someone stated that “the machines were set up in an arc, so you could see everyone else’s 
[voting screen].” 
9.15  Citizen Suggestions: The voters at the Public Hearing recommended that the 
machines be set up so that they do not face the awaiting voters to assure privacy. 
Training materials given to poll workers need to be consistent 
9.16  Citizen Impressions: The directions in the training manual were inconsistent with 
the directions in the other training sources, including the DVD and training session. At 
the Bedford hearing, Ms. Aldridge said, “I went home and read the book. I watched the 
video, and I knew I was in deep trouble.” Additionally, the manuals were described as 
wordy and technical, and the instructions for set-up were described as “daunting.” One 
person was outraged that she received the 5th edition and it still had mistakes. She did not 
receive the final edition (6th edition) until Election Day. To fix mistakes, the CCBOE 
stapled correction pages into the manual. There were 11 problems expressed concerning 
the training manuals. At the Bedford hearing, Mr. Sawastuk stated, “When you look at 
this book, and you go through all these pages, just looking at that book will blow your 
mind.” 
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9.17  Citizen Suggestions: Booth workers need to receive their manuals earlier in order 
to familiarize themselves with the materials and reference format. This would make 
troubleshooting easier on Election Day. 
9.18  Citizen Suggestions: The training manuals should have more detailed instruction. 
The manuals should be written or at least reviewed by those instructing the training 
sessions. This approach would assist in creating continuity between the written material 
and the training session. 
Booth Officials and EDTs were reported to be ill-prepared to complete their 
charge 
9.19  Citizen Impressions: Many EDTs did not show up at the polling place, and others 
were not well trained for their position. At the Bedford hearing, Ms. Aldridge expressed 
concern about an EDT not appearing. “We were promised help from the Election Board 
that an EDT would be with us Monday night. We needed help then, nobody came. We 
called, nobody came. The same thing happened on Tuesday. They promised we would 
have an EDT there. We had problems.” 
At the Beachwood hearing, another Booth Official said, “We had a technician who 
knew nothing. He talked on the phone all day, he went out in his car most of the time. He 
did nothing, nothing constructive for any of us, and it upset us knowing that he was 
getting paid twice as much as we were and he absolutely knew nothing.” 
9.20  Citizen Impressions: The CCBOE did not inform some roving EDTs of their 
assignments, so they were not equipped with automobiles to fulfill their duty. Hearing 
attendees reported that those EDTs spent the day sitting around and getting paid. 
9.21  Citizen Impressions: Both Booth Officials and EDTs were not well trained for 
their positions. They did not know the procedures to follow when something did not 
work, and the EDTs could not fix or troubleshoot the machines. 
9.22  Citizen Suggestions: Poll workers must pass a test to determine if they have the 
ability to perform on Election Day. 
9.23  Citizen Suggestions: Provide Presiding Judges clearer instructions for polling 
location set up and clearly defined roles of all poll workers. 
9.24  Citizen Impressions: In some situations, the younger and older poll workers 
distrusted each other. Younger poll workers described their elder counterparts as being 
“too old” to do their job. One poll worker stated, “the older people did not seem to know 
what they were doing and didn’t trust the younger people at all.” 
9.25  Citizen Impressions: Poll workers themselves felt that they were under trained and 
unable to handle their duties. One Presiding Judge at the Bedford hearing was so 
frustrated with working the polls last spring, he stated “I am very seriously considering 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 205 of 398 
not working again. And I’ve worked a good many years, but they have to do some 
corrections to make it simpler for those people that are not real computer savvy.” 
9.26  Citizen Impressions: Poll worker attendance was poor. Some of the Judges were 
missing from their posts at various times during Election Day and others were reported to 
have simply walked out. One person in Cleveland said that she believed “it was a crime 
for a poll worker to quit on Election Day”. Lack of attendance in part was attributed to 
the pay offered for the long hours assigned. At the Beachwood hearings, Mr. Cargle said 
that “the biggest problem is getting people to work because of the pay and long hours.” In 
addition, two others testified that they felt that the hours were too long. 
9.27  Citizen Suggestions: Create a procedure for confirming poll worker participation 
in advance of Election Day. One citizen said, “A very simple procedure to make sure 
people are going to show up or know who is going to show up is to do what doctors and 
dentists do, call all these people 24 hours or 48 hours before and find out if they’re ill or 
find out if they don’t want any part of it so we know who is there.” 
High School students were an asset at polling locations 
9.28  Citizen Impressions: Fourteen poll workers complimented the high school student 
workers on their performance at the polling locations. 
9.29  Citizen Suggestions: Greater utilization of high school students in the election 
process will benefit the voters of Cuyahoga County. The CCBOE should take greater 
advantage of having the high school students working the polls. One person stated, “The 
students are very good though. You know that the voters love them.” At the Beachwood 
hearing, it was said, “The senior student from Beachwood High School was great,” and 
“the best thing you have going for you for the November election are the students.” 
Responsiveness of the CCBOE was delayed or non-existent on Election 
Day 
9.30  Citizen Impressions: Calls to the CCBOE did not produce necessary support. 
There were five reported instances where a person called the CCBOE because they were 
missing a Judge or a tech, but they were not sent a replacement. There were also five 
comments that someone tried to call the CCBOE and could not get through on the phone. 
9.31  Citizen Impressions: The CCBOE employees were described as rude. Mr. Flasig at 
the Bedford hearings described his experience. “I called the Board of Elections and this 
man said to me, ‘you mean to tell me there are eight people working there, two precincts 
and none of you know what to do.’ And I had said, ‘no.’ And he was very nasty. I won’t 
say what he said, but he was very nasty, and I hung up.” The CCBOE gave out the wrong 
information — even the phone numbers to call with concerns were wrong. One person 
expressed concern that the CCBOE did not give out the correct information regarding 
absentee voting. In addition, the CCBOE did not offer assistance or visit some of the 
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polling places. One person testified at the Bedford hearings that “the Board is not 
responsive to the issues.” 
9.32  Citizen Suggestions: The CCBOE needs to implement better procedures to have an 
organized Election Day. One person at the Cleveland hearing stated that “this is bigger 
than the machines, it’s about the management and how things are going down at the 
Board of Elections on East 30th, and we have to fix this problem.” To be more organized, 
the CCBOE should have more workers and increased phones for questions on Election 
Day. 
Candidates were not told that the vote tabulation would take longer than 
expected 
9.33  Citizen Impressions: The CCBOE did not inform candidates of the process and the 
length of time for counting and certifying the votes with the new technology. The 
experience was described by one person in Cleveland as being the “biggest let down” 
because “for the first time that I can remember being at the Election Board that night I 
left around 3:00 in the morning with no results. That was very frustrating.” 
Elected officials were asked to stay away from polling locations on Election 
Day 
9.34  Citizen Impressions: Elected officials voiced concerns about a letter that they 
received asking them to not visit the polling places. Mayor Pocek of Bedford stated, “I 
voted the day before absentee, because I received a letter from the Board of Elections 
saying that as an elected official I should not interfere in any way, shape, or form with the 
voting process; not even getting a cup of coffee or assisting anybody at a voting location. 
I really resented that, because there was definitely some need of help that day and I 
would have just tried to assist them in any way, to make calls or whatever.” 
Polling locations that did not open in time had compounded problems 
9.35  Citizen Impressions: As a result of the late opening, the lines at the polling places 
were long and many citizens were unable to vote. 
9.36  Citizen Impressions: Many buildings designated as polling locations were not 
available for set-up the night before Election Day. At the Cleveland hearings, one person 
said, “We couldn’t even get in the building because the custodian, since it’s a school and 
he didn’t come until he felt like coming Monday night.” 
9.37  Citizen Impressions: There was a great deal of concern about how the polling 
places were chosen. The poll workers reported that some polling places lacked parking, 
power outlets, and handicap access. 
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Ballots lacked some candidates’ names 
9.38  Citizen Impressions: There were several complaints about names not being on the 
ballot. At the Cleveland hearing, one person testified that “some precinct committee 
persons who were supposed to be on the ballot, their names were not on the ballot.” 
Another person stated, “there was one of your precinct committee people voted along 
with their parents [on] absentee ballots. In the final tally there were no absentee ballots 
listed after her name.” 
November’s election will require greater emphasis on voter education 
9.39  Citizen Impressions: Citizens are concerned that voters will not have the proper 
identification to vote in November. Further, advocacy groups have stated their concerns 
regarding voter registration and the notification to voters and registration groups that 
someone has been successfully registered to vote. 
9.40  Citizen Impressions: A number of voters do not know how to use the machines. It 
was said at the Cleveland hearing that “voters had little knowledge as to what to expect 
from the machines since this was the first time they had used them.” Further, at a 
scheduled voter training session it was reported that the CCBOE set-up the machines 
incorrectly. 
9.41  Citizen Suggestions: It was the opinion of two individuals who testified at the 
hearings that the CCBOE should set up more practice machines to familiarize voters with 
the new system. While The League of Women Voters attempted to conduct such 
sessions, the CCBOE should offer this opportunity at polling places prior to voting. 
B. Overview of Telephone Surveys 
Panel staff conducted two rounds of poll worker interviews to further identify and clarify 
problems that occurred on Election Day. The first phase of telephone interviews took a 
sample of three polling places (Woodbury, Savior, Garden Valley) where serious 
problems were reported to have occurred on May 2nd. Panel staff contacted all Judges, 
EDTs from these locations; thirteen workers that staffed these locations were also 
interviewed to establish the nature of the problems experienced on Election Day. 
In the second phase of this process, Panel staff identified other problem polling locations 
based on the information ascertained by pink memo sheets, Public Hearing reports, focus 
groups, and phone calls or emails sent by poll workers to the panel. Forty-eight poll 
workers from these locations were contacted and interviewed. 
9.42  Poll Worker Impressions: The phone calls with the poll workers revealed 
numerous problems. The most frequently reported problems included insufficient 
training; broken machines, inaccuracies in the poll book, late or very slow opening due to 
problems setting up the machines, and printers jamming due to installation problems. 
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9.43  Poll Worker Impressions: Booth Officials reported mixed feeling in regards to the 
performance of Election Day Technicians (EDTs). While many felt the EDTs were 
useless, other Booth Officials reported that EDTs were very helpful. 
One Booth Official reported that their EDT had only received a single day of training 
the day before the election and did not have specialized technical knowledge. However, 
other Booth Officials indicated that they had problems at the polls until EDTs arrived. 
Booth Officials reported confusion over the role of the EDT; one Booth Official 
repeatedly referred to the EDT as “the person in charge of the polling place.” 
9.44  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers reported that the voters liked the 
machines. However, phone interviews also revealed that many of the voters had concerns 
over the issue of privacy with the new machines. The machines had been placed too close 
together in many locations and poll workers received complaints that other voters could 
see how they were voting. Voters also repeatedly expressed confusion over whether or 
not they were supposed to receive a printed receipt of their ballots. 
9.45  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers were not given enough supplies for their 
charge. Supplies reported as inadequate or missing included: “I Voted” stickers, broken 
machines, security seals, and memory cards. 
9.46  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers indicated that response times by the 
CCBOE was too slow. Requests made for extra supplies and for EDTs were not quickly 
responded to. 
9.47  Poll Worker Impressions: Not all problems were a result of poor planning or lack 
of attention by the CCBOE. A few large problems seemed to be caused by unforeseen 
events such as electricity loss. 
9.48  Poll Worker Impressions: Positive opinions were expressed about the extra 
training that was offered. However, many poll workers indicated that they would be 
reluctant to work again, unless better and more extensive training was provided. 
9.49  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers also stated that student poll workers were 
greatly appreciated and a big help. 
9.50  Poll Worker Suggestions: Suggestions generated to improve the Election Day 
process included: 
• increased training time and number of sessions, 
• smaller classes during training, 
• training should coincide with what is in the manual, 
• training should focus more on closing the machine, 
• there should be more time devoted to troubleshooting issues during training. 
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C. Overview of Poll Worker Focus Groups 
Three focus groups were held by the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel to further 
establish the problems experienced on May 2nd and to offer suggestions for promoting an 
effective and efficient Election Day in November. 
The methodology used for selecting focus group participants was to take a sample of 
Booth Officials and Election Day Technicians that had been flagged based on the 
feedback they provided in the Pink Sheets, the Stephanie Tubbs Jones Public Hearings, 
individuals who have expressed their frustrations to the CCBOE and additional randomly 
selected poll workers from across Cuyahoga County. With this sample, the Cuyahoga 
Election Review Panel was able to identify ways to draw poll workers back into the 
system and to generate suggestions on how to create a better Election Day in November. 
Topics for discussion covered the new technology used on Election Day, poll worker 
training sessions and general improvements for the system. There were three focus 
groups which were held between June 24 and June 29 at Beachwood Library, Eastman 
Library and Cleveland State University. 
The first focus group was held at Beachwood County Library on June 24, and was 
attended by fourteen poll workers. This group was facilitated by Kathy Hexter and led by 
Karen Grachu. The second focus group took place on June 27th at the Eastman Library, 
attended by eleven poll workers, facilitated by Abby Horn and led by Mark Bennett. The 
final focus group meeting was held at Cleveland State University Law Building on June 
29, attended by eleven poll workers, facilitated by Rommel Upshur and led by Leslie 
Huff. 
Poll worker training was insufficient 
9.51  Poll Worker Impressions: Trainers spent too much time concentrating on how to 
set up the machines and not enough time on how to accumulate the cards. As a result poll 
workers did not have the competencies necessary to perform this function. 
9.52  Poll Worker Suggestions: The accumulation should not be done at the polling 
location. Instead everything should be sent down to the CCBOE for accumulation. This 
process would ensure that someone who was properly trained in accumulation would be 
performing this task and also would help to eliminate the possibility of lost memory 
cards. Further, this would allow training sessions to allot enough time to instruct poll 
workers on machine set-up. 
9.53  Poll Worker Suggestions: All training material must have consistency. This 
includes the instructions given in the manual, training sessions, DVD and the machines. 
There also needs to be a guide to help with the trouble shooting. A suggestion was to 
have a cheat sheet with a list of major problems and the way to solve those problems. 
According to one of the poll workers, the Top 10 List was a great asset, however not 
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everyone received it. This needs to be provided to all the precincts to help poll workers 
with trouble-shooting problems. 
9.54  Poll Worker Impressions: Many of the poll workers are uninformed about election 
law. 
9.55  Poll Worker Suggestions: There should be a section in the manual that provides 
them with relevant Election Law components including how many democrats and 
republicans must be present at the polling place and what the restrictions in helping a 
disabled person are. Providing this information would help the poll workers make 
decisions based on what is fact rather than what they think is fact. 
9.56  Poll Worker Impressions: Many poll workers did not receive the full five hours of 
training. For example, one of the EDTs who was present stated that a half-hour after the 
training session had already started people were still coming in and the trainer allowed 
them to continue to stay for the rest of training session. The trainer should have not 
allowed those who walked in late to the training session to stay and the trainers should 
have made the late trainees go to another training session. 
9.57  Poll Worker Impressions: The training sessions are too large to ensure that poll 
workers receive the proper instruction necessary to man the polling locations. 
9.58  Poll Worker Suggestions: Trainings should be planned to be more hands on with a 
smaller number of people attending. Training in smaller groups would allow poll workers 
to have more one on one instruction with the trainers. 
9.59  Poll Worker Impressions: The poll workers are willing to come back to work at 
the polls because many of them believe it is their civic duty and they like the people at 
their polling locations. However, though many of these dedicated workers have worked at 
the polls for many years, they will not come back if things do not change. 
9.60  Poll Worker Impressions: Training sessions did not teach poll workers that every 
precinct was assigned a specific machine based on serial numbers. According to one 
Presiding Judge, a trainer instructed poll workers to allow any voter to use any machine. 
9.61  Poll Worker Impressions: According to the poll workers they observed the use of 
machine during the trainings but did not have enough time to practice on the machines, 
which made many uncomfortable and led to many people quitting or not showing up on 
to work at the polls on May 2nd. 
9.62  Poll Worker Suggestions: The poll workers also have to have the proper materials 
in order to do their jobs; Training Manuals, DVDs and machines need to match. This 
would lead to less confusion and a better guide for the poll workers to use. 
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Election Day polling place problems were often the result of poor planning 
9.63  Poll Worker Impressions: Many of the poll workers were missing equipment or 
found they needed more equipment than was allotted to their polling location. The 
equipment missing included but was not limited to locks, memory cards, tape, and other 
supplies for the election to function properly. 
9.64  Poll Worker Suggestions: Poll workers need to be provided with the proper 
equipment. For example, many poll workers did not have enough seals as the seals kept 
breaking. There either needs to be more seals provided or the CCBOE needs to use seals 
that are not as breakable. 
DESI did not provide on-site staff with expert knowledge of voting 
machines 
9.65  Poll Worker Impressions: Many poll workers were told that there was going to be 
a DESI person on site at each polling location to assist with machines. However, it was 
reported that there was no one from DESI present for most of the day if at all. In addition, 
many of the people from DESI reportedly knew less or the same amount as some EDTs. 
9.66  Poll Worker Suggestions: If the CCBOE is going to have people from DESI in 
attendance to assist at polling locations, DESI employees need to be knowledgeable in 
how the machines work. This would require DESI to have a pool of trained employees 
available for support who had expertise above and beyond what was imparted at the poll 
worker training sessions. 
There was a great deal of confusion as to the roles and tasks assigned to 
poll workers 
9.67  Poll Worker Impressions: There was significant role confusion. Many EDTs were 
told that they were in charge and others were told that the Presiding Judge was in charge. 
This led to great confusion and conflict between the poll workers. It needs to be made 
clear to the poll workers which tasks there are to be performing based on their job title. 
According to the EDTs participating in the focus groups, the instruction given was to 
simply support the Judges and that the Judges would know how to do their jobs. 
However, many of the Judges were told that they would not have to touch the computers 
and all they had to do was sign people in. This enraged many of the poll workers because 
they felt as though they were being deceived by the CCBOE. 
9.68  Poll Worker Suggestions: There need to be clearly defined roles and subsequent 
competencies for all individuals working as poll workers and EDTs. 
9.69  Poll Worker Suggestions: The list of tasks for the EDTs needs to be prioritized. 
According to an EDT and a Presiding Judge, the EDTs have a list, but it focuses on 
details such as putting out the flags and the no smoking signs. This resulted in a focus on 
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extraneous tasks rather than concentrating on primary functions like putting up the 
machines in time. 
9.70  Poll Worker Suggestions: Providing EDTs with a check-list that identifies 
priorities would help to ensure that the poll location is ready to open on time. Again, clear 
definition of the functions and responsibilities of EDTs and Booth Officials must be 
delineated so that polling places can operate smoothly. 
The new technology requires more time for polling location set up and 
break down 
9.71  Poll Worker Impressions: There is not enough time in the morning to get all the 
work that needs to be done. According to a poll worker, the new system was great but 
took more time to set up. “We are putting in extra 3 hours in setting up the new 
machines.” 
9.72  Poll Worker Suggestions: Allow the workers to do more of the set up the night 
before. For example, one of the EDTs suggested allowing them to set up all the way to 
step 4.2 in the manual and then have them run a report and check the seals in the morning 
to ensure that no one tampered with them during the night. This would help greatly with 
getting the polls opened in the morning and on time. Also, allowing more set up on the 
eve of the Election will also allow poll workers to identify machine problems at an earlier 
time. 
9.73  Poll Worker Suggestions: Designate a team of people whose primary function is 
to facilitate the set up and the break down of voting machines. This would eliminate a lot 
of the stress that is placed on the Booth Officials. 
9.74  Poll Worker Suggestions: Have a zone station open the night before. This way the 
poll workers can call the zone and inform them what they are missing in order to receive 
their equipment that evening before polls open. This would mean that all the polling 
locations would be able to solve many of the problems which they had on Tuesday 
morning. A suggested change was to have one person be the contact point. Another 
suggestion was to have the EDTs be the contact person because the Presiding Judges 
need to take care of the voters. 
9.75  Poll Worker Suggestions: Have a crew that comes in just to setup and take down. 
This would eliminate the issue of poll workers not knowing how to setup and take down. 
It also ensures that people who are specifically trained in these procedures are doing the 
process correctly. A majority of the focus group liked this idea because then they cannot 
be blamed if something goes wrong with the setup and the accumulation of the machines. 
This would also help to hold one group accountable if problem arise. 
9.76  Poll Worker Suggestions: There is a need for some kind of order to packing up the 
bag instead of just throwing everything at the end of the night into the red or blue bags. 
An EDT suggested having every object color coded, and having corresponding color-
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coded compartments designated specifically for each object. This would help to ensure 
that nothing gets lost at the end of the night and would lead to less confusion during 
closing procedures. 
9.77  Poll Worker Suggestions: Designate more regional pick up and drop off locations. 
Many people reported that they had to drive much too far to drop off the bags at the end 
of the night. 
Effective communication between the polling locations and CCBOE was 
deficient 
9.78  Poll Worker Impressions: EDTs and Booth Officials experienced great difficulty 
in getting through to the zone stations and the CCBOE for support and assistance. 
9.79  Poll Worker Suggestions: Have more phone lines to both the CCBOE and the 
zones. Also everyone has to have the right phone numbers to both the CCBOE and the 
zones. 
9.80  Poll Worker Suggestions: Poll workers felt that all CCBOE employees and Board 
Members should be trained in machine handling. With widespread knowledge of the 
system, everyone would have the capacity to answer basic poll worker questions with out 
transferring and make them call another number. This would help to eliminate the time 
that the poll workers spend on the phone. Another suggestion was to have more zones. 
This would help with the amount phone calls one zone receives. It would also to help get 
the supplies and support out quicker, meaning that machines would be down for a shorter 
period of time and creates less time the Judges and EDTs have to spend on the phone. 
Engaging poll workers for future civic participation 
9.81  Poll Worker Impressions: The majority of focus group participants agreed that the 
high school students were a great asset at the polling locations. 
9.82  Poll Worker Suggestions: A suggestion to getting new people was to have an ad 
campaign showing that not every one who works at the polls are senior citizens. 
However, the CCBOE needs to make sure that older poll workers do not feel as though 
they are being pushed out of the system. The CCBOE needs to make them feel as though 
their experience of working at the polls is needed and valued. Many of the poll workers 
stated that they would give it one more try and if the system does not improve then they 
will not come back. 
9.83  Poll Worker Suggestions: In order to have a pool of poll workers for November a 
suggestion was to have an advertising campaign to encourage people to work at the polls. 
The CCBOE needs to put forth a campaign that portrays itself in a better light. This 
would help with the recruitment of poll workers. According to an EDT, the CCBOE 
needs to work with employers to encourage them to give their employees a day off to 
help at the polls. People should not penalize for working at the polls on Election Day. 
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Also, there needs to be political balance at the precincts. A suggestion to solve this was to 
do recruiting to a targeted group. 
9.84  Poll Worker Suggestions: Many of the poll workers feel as though the CCBOE 
has solely blamed them for the problems on May 2nd. In order to eliminate this 
perception, there needs to a very public apology to the poll workers for the negative way 
the CCBOE has portrayed the poll workers in the media. This would also help with the 
retention of workers. 
9.85  Poll Worker Impressions: In order to retain poll workers, the CCBOE needs to 
give greater attention to providing effective training. 
Need for increased voter education 
9.86  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers worry about the lack of voter education as 
it affects the elderly. In regards to the voter education, one of the Presiding Judges 
mentioned that the turn out of senior citizens was very low compared to in the years past. 
9.87  Poll Worker Suggestions: More advertising be done to show how easy it is to the 
machines. Also it needs to be stressed that the ballot is backed up three ways: paper trail, 
memory card, and hard drive. It also needs to be conveyed to the people that they will not 
receive a print out of their ballot. The voters need to be educated to how to properly place 
their vote. This would help to limit the problems at the polling locations. 
D. Analysis of May 2, 2006 Poll Worker Incident Reports and 
Election Day Technician Logs 
Incident Reports, or “Pink Sheets,” are the primary mechanism by which the CCBOE 
tracks problems reported by poll workers, Panel staff conducted an analysis of 1,260 
Incident Reports and 179 Election Day Technician (EDT) Logs from the 5/2/2006 
Primary Election. See Appendix J. 
All precincts are supposed to document the range of possible problems experienced 
during Election Day on an Incident Report, and each poll worker and Presiding Judge is 
required to sign the resulting report. As such, the Pink Sheets can be the most 
comprehensive tool we have available to analyze the functioning of polls on Election 
Day. 
Using Pink Sheets as the primary source of information on Election Day problems 
limited the CCBOE’s awareness of all of the issues at the polling locations. For example, 
the CCBOE only found 1,260 of 1,434 total Incident Reports. Many of these Pink Sheets 
were incomplete or blank. A number of these reports were turned in without the signature 
of the Booth Officials. As a result some precincts that may have experienced poll worker 
and EDT absences, mechanical failure, poor training, and inadequate supplies for 
Election Day may not have fully documented deficiencies. Those precincts with serious 
reported problems, such as failures to open the polls on time and long lines at the polls, 
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neglected to include opening times or average wait times. Often poll workers did not 
include whether or not an absent poll worker or EDT arrived or was replaced, whether a 
broken DRE or printer was repaired, or what steps were taken to remedy a problem. 
Training of poll workers requires restructuring and curriculum 
development 
9.88  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers and EDTs felt they had 
inadequate/insufficient training related to the installation, troubleshooting, and closing 
down of DREs and printers. 
9.89  Poll Worker Impressions: Training classes were described as too large and 
disorganized. Often in a large class setting older poll workers reported difficulty seeing 
and/or hearing what was going on. 
9.90  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers who attended two or more training classes 
felt that they were better prepared to work on Election Day but were still unclear on many 
processes and procedures. 
9.91  Poll Worker Impressions: Those who conducted trainings were poorly trained. 
9.92  Poll Worker Impressions: Training materials were confusing, contradictory and 
unclear. When poll workers attempted to refer to the materials on Election Day, they 
discovered that the manual did not correspond to the screens and were unsure how to 
proceed. 
9.93  Poll Worker Impressions: Inadequate/insufficient training of poll workers related 
to paperwork and election procedures. Many poll workers observed that training sessions 
focused so much on DRE training that election processes and paperwork were not 
adequately discussed. Poll workers were unsure how to fill out ballots for 17-year olds, 
notice of death cards, optical scan ballots, and provisional ballots. For example, when 
some polling places were unable to open on time, voters were turned away rather than 
offered optical scan ballots. Some poll workers noted that in circumstances when a 
provisional ballot should have been offered (when a registered voter was not and should 
have been listed in the alphabetical poll book or a voter on the absentee list did not 
receive an absentee ballot) an optical scan ballot was offered instead. Poll workers were 
also unclear how to proceed with independent, issues-only voters. In one phone 
interview, a poll worker reported that she was “relieved” that voters did not need optical 
scan ballots, because there was no training about how to use them. 
9.94  Poll Worker Suggestions: Hold smaller training classes and separate training for 
DREs from training for paper work and voter procedures. Further, sessions should have 
in-depth training on provisional ballots and optical scan processing and when each should 
be offered to voters. 
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9.95  Poll Worker Suggestions: Test poll workers after training to ensure that they are 
adequately prepared for Election Day 
9.96  Poll Worker Suggestions: Ensure that training materials are consistent and that the 
materials correspond correctly to the DRE s. 
Polling places could not open on time 
9.97  Poll Worker Impressions: Polls were often late to open for any of the following 
reasons: poor training of the poll workers on setting up DREs, absent/late poll workers 
and EDTs, inadequate supplies and broken or malfunctioning DREs/printers. In some 
instances, poll workers were unable to enter the polling facility on time on Monday night 
or Tuesday morning, because the facilities were locked or inaccessible. 
9.98  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers were often at their polling locations long 
past the close of the election for any of the following reasons: poor training on the 
accumulation process, absent Booth Officials and EDTs, and malfunctioning DREs/ 
printers. 
9.99  Poll Worker Suggestions: Higher quality of training for Booth Officials and EDTs 
on machine set up and accumulation. This includes the need to: 
• Ensure that an adequate number of qualified poll workers are hired and trained to 
eliminate the staffing difficulties experienced on Election Day 
• Ensure that all supplies are properly ordered and packed for each precinct on 
Election Day 
• Ensure that all DREs and printers are tested to ensure that they function properly 
on Election Day 
• Ensure that CCBOE or Ward leaders contact representatives at each polling 
location to inform them of arrival/departure times of poll workers, verify that the 
locations have proper electrical capabilities, and to obtain contact information for 
the person(s) responsible for letting poll workers into the facility 
• Ensure adequate time for set up on Monday night. 
Poll books had incorrect or missing information 
9.100  Poll Worker Impressions: Names, addresses, and signatures listed in the 
Alphabetical Poll Books are often incorrect. In many instances a voter will have 
complained of an inaccuracy repeatedly for years that has never been fixed. While poll 
workers have taken notice of the errors on the Pink Sheets, no action has been taken to 
remedy the situation. Additionally, voters were often listed two or three times in the poll 
book. Another major problem relates to registered voters who live in a precinct, but 
whose names are not listed in the Alphabetical Poll Book. Rather than deal with the 
intricate paperwork involved with the provisional ballot or because the voter did not have 
the time to do a provisional ballot, voters left the polling location without voting. 
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9.101  Poll Worker Suggestions: Proper forms should be available at each precinct so 
that voters may report these errors directly to the CCBOE for immediate correction. 
Ensure that voters who have been dropped from their Alphabetical Poll Book are 
included. Also, a better system for following up on problems reported by poll workers to 
the CCBOE on the Pink Sheets must be implemented. 
DREs and printers proved confusing and unreliable 
9.102  Poll Worker Impressions: Printer jams, issues with printer installation, and faulty 
printer housing were repeatedly reported by the poll workers. Often it took a long time to 
get the paper in the machine correctly, delaying opening of the polls. Often the printer 
housing was broken or pieces were missing. Workers were frustrated that the flimsy 
printer paper would crumple and tear, complicating matters. Sometimes the printer failed 
to record votes, upsetting voters who believed that their vote was not properly cast. 
Voters also expected to receive a copy of their ballot and were upset that they did not 
receive a print out. Some voters were unaware that they could lift the blue covering of the 
printer to observe the print out and verify their vote. Others reported that magnifiers were 
broken and/or missing (ironically, the magnifier on the machine provided to the Panel by 
the CCBOE is broken). In addition, voters reported that the ballot printed too quickly for 
them to read and verify their vote. Some precincts reported that the printers would not 
print at all, and many precincts noticed that often the DREs would read “low paper” when 
the paper was full. 
 
9.103  Poll Worker Suggestions: Poll workers indicated on the incident logs several 
suggestions for implementation including: 
• The manufacturer should redesign the printers to eliminate the problems. 
• Printers should be set up the night before to prevent opening the polls late on 
Election Day due to printer difficulties. 
• Ensure voters are aware that they may open the printer covering to view the print 
out 
• Ensure voters are aware that they do not receive a print out of their vote (perhaps 
make a sign so that poll workers do not spend so much time explaining that they 
do not get a print out or “receipt”) 
• Make print outs easier to read (ensure ink doesn’t smear, font/text is readable, 
print out doesn’t run by too quickly to be read by voter) 
Polling locations were not given enough supplies for Election Day 
9.104  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers were frequently hindered by the lack of 
necessary supplies throughout the election. They were missing memory cards and did not 
have enough voter access cards for the machines. Sometimes they were not supplied with 
a Zero card. Often there were no electrical cords for machines and the machines could not 
be used after the battery supply was exhausted. Most precincts reported that they needed 
more red security seals and were not provided with any additional paper. Some precincts 
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did not have a phone (or the phone line was dead), VIBS, or flags. Precincts 
overwhelmingly reported that voters wanted “I Voted” stickers. 
9.105  Poll Worker Suggestions: Create detailed checklist for CCBOE employees who 
are charged with packing the red bags for each polling place for use on Election Day to 
ensure that all necessary items are included. Had many of the problems of the May 2nd 
primary been prevented (by better training, careful preparation of supply bags, DREs and 
printers that had been properly tested), then the large volume of calls experienced on 
Election Day would have been prevented as well. 
9.106  Poll Worker Suggestions: The CCBOE should plan to have Election Day 
supplies ordered and available well in advance of Election Day in order to meet precinct 
requirements. 
Provide support staff to meet needs for precincts/polling locations without adequate 
supplies in a timely/efficient manner. 
Communication between the polling location and the CCBOE were 
hindered by poor planning and faulty equipment 
9.107  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers had difficulty getting through to the 
CCBOE on the phones. Often, the phones provided by the CCBOE were broken. Slow 
response times by techs was also reported (some techs never even arrived). Often, DESI 
and CCBOE representatives did not have a solution to a poll worker’s problem/question. 
In addition, it appears that the CCBOE/zones did not have a system for tracking calls and 
responses. In some instances precincts made repeated calls to the CCBOE or zone to 
request an EDT and ended up having several EDTs show up at the same time (these 
EDTs were sorely missed by other precincts). A better system for responding to calls by 
the precincts needs to be implemented. 
9.108  Poll Worker Suggestions: Correct phone numbers should be given to poll 
workers for contacting the CCBOE for support. Phones sent to polling locations should 
be tested to see if they are in working order. 
9.109  Poll Worker Suggestions: Those individuals answering calls need to be trained to 
effectively respond to poll worker issues. Workers answering phones should have access 
to better material than the training manual used to train booth workers and EDTs. A 
manual should be created with common issues and problems and solutions to them so that 
those answering the phones may better assist poll workers. 
9.110  Poll Worker Suggestions: To more efficiently handle poll worker calls and 
eliminate unnecessary transfer of calls and possible disconnections, calls should be made 
to only one call center. There are currently three call centers (supply center, zone, and 
CCBOE). 
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9.111  Poll Worker Suggestions: Designate more than the six zoning stations used on 
May 2nd to more adequately respond to poll worker needs. One zone for each of the 46 
regional locations would be ideal. 
Problems experienced with the DREs 
9.112  Poll Worker Impressions: Poll workers reported a large number of broken 
machines that could not be used on Election Day. Reasons why these machines couldn’t 
be used included: machine malfunctioned, the machine froze and could not be reset, the 
printer failed, or the printer was missing and the machine could not be used. Many 
precincts turned voters away because machines were not working while others offered 
voters optical scan ballots. Faulty table legs on the machines also caused difficulties for 
poll workers who either attempted to find alternative methods of keeping the DRE up (by 
taping the legs, for example) or simply did not use the DRE. There were extensive reports 
of difficulties zeroing out the machines, either due to lack of training, malfunctioning of 
the accumulator machine, or because memory cards were placed in the wrong machines. 
Often printer problems prevented workers from printing a zero report. 
9.113  Poll Worker Suggestions: Ensure that all Electronic voting equipment is tested 
before Election Day to eliminate the volume of broken machines on Election Day. 
Ensure that poll workers and EDTs are more fully trained how to set the DREs up, 
basic troubleshooting, and on the accumulation process. 
Many problems were linked to memory card, voter card or supervisor card 
failure 
9.114  Poll Worker Impressions: Memory cards, voter cards, and supervisor cards often 
failed to work. Cards often became stuck in the machines causing further delays in 
voting. Often memory cards were not placed in their corresponding voting units and 
workers claim that they were never trained to do so. Though orange instruction sheets 
were placed with the supplies and materials given to the poll workers for use on Election 
Day, often these sheets were not discovered until after all of the machines were set up 
and in use. 
9.115  Poll Worker Suggestions: In order to minimize or eliminate problems, memory 
cards, voter access cards, and supervisor cards should be tested prior to Election Day. 
Further, the CCBOE should ensure that all precincts have all required cards for Election 
Day. 
9.116  Poll Worker Suggestions: Include instructions about placing memory cards in 
corresponding voting units in training and make orange instruction sheets more 
conspicuous. Also, ensure that poll workers are properly trained to use the supervisor 
cards. Often workers were hesitant to do so in fear that they would “mess up” the tally on 
the machines. 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 220 of 398 
Malfunctioning encoders caused problems on Election Day 
9.117  Poll Worker Impressions: Often encoders failed to work. At other times the 
buttons on the encoder malfunctioned. Workers reported that encoders sometimes 
programmed the wrong ballot or did not accept programming for issues only ballots. 
9.118  Poll Worker Suggestions: Test encoders before Election Day to ensure that cards 
are programmed correctly and that buttons work. 
There was a shortage of poll workers at the polling places on Election Day 
9.119  Poll Worker Impressions: Some precincts reported that workers left because they 
felt unprepared by the training to work on Election Day. In addition to worker absences, 
some precincts reported that many poll workers were: incapable of working or unhelpful, 
left their station for long periods of time, or were uncooperative and unwilling to work 
with their fellow poll workers. 
9.120  Poll Worker Suggestions: Providing better training for poll workers will ensure 
individuals feel comfortable and prepared to work on Election Day. This process will 
prevent Booth Officials and EDTs from quitting, because they feel unprepared for their 
job. 
9.121  Poll Worker Suggestions: The CCBOE should expand recruitment efforts to 
ensure a more diverse poll worker population. This would include taking measures to 
make the public aware of the need for poll workers. 
9.122  Poll Worker Suggestions: Implement an evaluation process for poll workers who 
have repeatedly been uncooperative, unhelpful, or combative to measure their 
performance on Election Day. The CCBOE should also ensure that some action is taken 
to either remedy the behavior or remove them from their position. 
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Appendix A: Work Plan — Project Scope 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (CERP) Task List 
Review election master plan and evaluate execution of the plan.  
Review all election related procurements and procedures used for those procurements. 
Review the performance of critical CCBOE personnel assigned to the election process. 
Investigate any contractual or other relationship between Dayton Legal Blank, ES&S and 
Diebold. 
Review the Booth Officials Office including: 
• Recruitment 
• Training  
• Deployment of Booth Officials and pool staff 
• Attendance 
• Feedback  
• Analyze incident reports from Booth Officials, and election technicians and 
organizations 
• Interview Booth Officials and election technicians to assess election 
• Conduct telephone surveys of Booth officials and EDTs 
Review of Registration System including: 
• Purging procedures 
• Registration challenge procedures for Election Day 
• Provisional ballot procedures 
Review the operations of the Warehouse including:  
• Device preparation and loading ballot styles by voting location 
• LNA/IV&V Testing at the Warehouse  
• Device deployment 
• Device security 
• Supplies at polling location 
• Voting location readiness and availability @ 6:30 am. 
• Voting device failure rate and reasons for failure 
Review the operations of Ballot Prep including: 
• Design of ballot 
• Creation of ballot styles 
• Ballot rotation and proofing 
• QC of optical scan ballots 
Election Day procedures and performance including: 
• Polling location setup 
• Polling locations open 6:30 am to 7:30 pm 
• Call center logs and resolutions to complaints 
• Pink Sheet issues/Supervisor cards 
• Performance of Election Day technicians 
• Performance of Election Day inspectors 
• Poll closing procedures 
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• Return of memory cards 
• Return of devices 
• Call Centers including scalability and responsiveness 
Ballot Counting procedures and performance including: 
• Testing of vote tabulation machines and readers 
• L&A testing of readers and tabulation machines 
• IV&V by the SOS of readers and tabulation machines 
• Chain of custody of memory cards 
• Reconciliation of Certificate # 1 by polling location 
• Review all procedures used to conduct the official count 
Review Administrative Structure and Personnel Issues including: 
• administrative and reporting structures  
• communication systems between top managers and the Board 
• communication systems between department managers and top managers 
• criteria for hiring and promotion of staff  
• overtime & compensation issues for permanent staff temporary staff recruitment, 
deployment, supervision, and evaluation 
• systems for employee reports of legal infractions (“internal whistleblowing”) 
• methods for follow-up on voter & advocacy organization 
concerns/recommendations 
• communication systems between candidates and BOE on election 
problems/results 
 Absentee Ballot system procedures and performance including:  
• Assess contract compliance by Diebold and MCR 
• Timeliness of procurement process by CCBOE 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system testing including L&A test and ballot test packs 
• Evaluate IV&V testing by Secretary of State  
• Evaluate printed ballots for accuracy for all ballot styles 
• Timing marks 
• Assess alternate ballot count procedures used for unofficial and official count 
• Evaluate the absentee ballot counting system to determine reason for failure 
during unofficial count and assign responsibility for system failure 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system performance during February Special Election 
and any corrective actions  
Election Science Institute (Contract) 
• Exit polling of voter satisfaction with electronic voting 
• Evaluate need for additional machines based on failure rate 
• Compare manual count with electronic vote  
• Compare memory cards to manual count 
• Review election process for security threats 
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SysTest, LLC (Contract) 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system testing including Logic and Analysis (L&A) 
testing and ballot test packs 
• Evaluate IV&V testing by Secretary of State 
• Evaluate printed ballots for accuracy for all ballot styles 
• Timing marks 
• Assess alternate ballot count procedures used for unofficial and official count 
• Evaluate the absentee ballot counting system to determine reason for failure 
during unofficial count and assign responsibility for system failure 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system performance during February Special Election 
and any corrective actions 
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Appendix B: Cuyahoga Election Review Panel Staff 
P osition  N am e S choo l 
D egree  /
Y ear in  S choo l 
P ro ject M anager R achae l B a lanson 
M axine  G oodm an Lev in  C o llege  o f 
U rban  A ffa irs  
M .P .A .  
Lega l A na lys t Laura  B lack C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 3L  
Lega l A na lys t K ev in  B urns 
G eorge tow n Law  C enter, 
W ash ing ton  D .C . 
LL .M . C and ida te  
2007 
Lega l A na lys t / 
D ocs M anager 
M atilda  C arrena  C leve land  M arsha ll C o llege o f Law  3L  
A ss is tan t P .M . / 
Techno logy 
A rthur (Turo) D exte r C leve land  S ta te  U n ivers ity  B .A . C and idate   
Lega l A na lys t C hris tine  F rieder C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 3L  
Lega l A na lys t M ichae l H o lb rook C leve land  M arsha ll C o llege o f Law  1L  
Lega l A na lys t G eorge  Inm an C ase W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 1L  
Lega l A na lys t G abrie lle  K e lly  C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 3L  
S ystem s &   
Lega l A na lys t 
D av id  K e tty le  C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 1L  
S ystem s &   
Lega l A na lys t 
Lou  K roeck C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 1L  
Lega l A na lys t D av id  Lev ine C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 1L  
S ystem s &   
Lega l A na lys t 
A ustin  M cG uan C leve land  M arsha ll C o llege o f Law  3L  
Lega l A na lys t S uzanne M e lgun  C leve land  M arsha ll C o llege o f Law  2L  
O utreach  
C oord ina to r 
R am ona R am os M ercyhurs t C o llege  
B .A . P o litica l 
S c ience  
A dm in  S upport Jerry  R ug ley 
M axine  G oodm an Lev in  C o llege  o f 
U rban  A ffa irs  
B .S . U rban  
S tud ies 
Lega l A na lys t A m ber S am ue lson  C ase  W estern  R eserve  Law  S choo l 1L  
Lega l A na lys t D an ie l Th ie l C leve land  M arsha ll C o llege o f Law  3L  
C o-E d ito r /  
S ta ts  A na lys t 
P au l (B en) T rim b le  
M axine  G oodm an Lev in  C o llege  o f 
U rban  A ffa irs  
M .U .P .D .D . 
C and ida te  
A dm in  S upport H ong Zen isek  C leve land  M arsha ll C o llege o f Law  2L  
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Appendix C: Glossary of Terms 
• 17 Year Old Voters: Voters who will be 18 by the November general election 
and who are allowed to vote for candidates (only) in the Primary Election. 
• Absentee Ballots: A ballot sent to a voter upon request . The ballot must be 
completed according to the directions provided. The cast ballot must be returned 
to the CCBOE office before the close of the polls on Election Day. 
• Access Card: see Voter Access Card. 
• Accumulator Report: Final tally of votes cast on electronic voting devices. The 
report is printed before polls open and at the close of the election. (see also zero 
report). 
• AccuVote TSx: The model of touch-screen DRE voting machine in use on May 
2, 2006, in Cuyahoga County. The AccuVote TSx is a DESI product. 
• Alphabetical Poll Book (APB): The signature book at the polling location listing 
voter names, addresses, dates of birth, and preprinted signatures. Voters must sign 
this book in order to cast a ballot at a polling location. Also referred to as the 
Alpha Book. 
• Audit Book: Book where Booth Officials list the voters’ names according to the 
type of ballot the voter receives (e.g. Republican, Democrat, Independent, Issues 
Only). 
• Barrel Key: A round, hollow, barrel-shaped key used to open several doors on 
electronic voting machines. 
• Board of Elections (BOE): General reference to a Board of Elections, not 
specifically Cuyahoga County’s. 
• Booth Official: Poll worker assigned to a precinct charged with signing in voters, 
receiving ballots, and the opening and closing of a polling place. 
• Central Administration Card (CAC): A card used for administrative control of 
the electronic voting machines. This card has the capability to delete data and zero 
vote totals. 
• Cast: The final act of a voter in entering the voting selections on a ballot. 
• Canvas: Reconciliation of the number of voters recorded in the polling book to 
the number of ballots cast. 
• Card Cast Reports: Report produced by the GEMS program. Shows the votes 
cast in each precinct. 
• Cuyahoga County Board of Elections (CCBOE): The CCBOE is responsible 
for overseeing all Federal, State and local elections held in Cuyahoga County. 
• Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS): System used in Cuyahoga County to 
count absentee ballots. 
• Certificate #1: The form that Booth Workers use to certify their total counts at 
the end of the polling day. 
• Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (CERP): The Cuyahoga Election Review 
Panel has been appointed by the CCBOE to conduct a comprehensive 
independent review of the County’s elections systems and to make 
recommendations for improvement. The Panel is investigating CCBOE practices 
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and technology, as well as personnel issues like staffing and training of poll 
workers and CCBOE employees. The Panel reports both to the CCBOE and to the 
Board of County Commissioners. 
• Crystal Reports: A software package, sold by Business Objects, used to generate 
reports. Crystal Reports is integrated into some of DESI’s election software 
products. 
• Data Information Management System (DIMSnet): Voter registration system 
used in Cuyahoga County. (DIMS is the division of DESI that makes the software 
product called DIMSnet.) 
• Democrat (D): Political party, or member of the Democratic Party. State law 
requires many elections functions to be performed in tandem by a D and an R. 
Each precinct must be staffed by two D Booth Officials and by two R Booth 
Officials. BOE permanent staff are required to reflect bipartisan balance as well. 
• Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI): The vendor of election technologies and 
services used in the May 2, 2006, election in Cuyahoga County, including the 
AccuVote TSx and OS voting systems, the DIMSnet voter registration system and 
the GEMS election management system. 
• Direct Recording Electronic System (DRE): A category of voting system that 
displays a ballot image and allows voters to cast votes via mechanical or electro-
optical devices. The system processes the data by means of a computer program, 
records voting data in internal memory devices, and tabulates voting data as hard 
copy or stores it in a removable memory device. 
• DIMS External Interface (DXI): DESI software used by the State of Ohio to 
interact with county voter registration databases to maintain the state-wide voter 
registration database mandated by HAVA. 
• Election Day Technician (EDT): Poll workers hired by the CCBOE to assist 
with assembling, disassembling, and troubleshooting associated to the DREs, 
encoder cards, VVAPTs on the day of the election. 
• Election Media Processor (EMP): A peripheral device, sold by DESI and 
pending certification in Ohio, that permits simultaneous upload of voting data 
from six memory cards. EMPs are also used to create memory cards prior to an 
election. 
• Encoder: Handheld device used by Booth Officials to program the access cards 
voters use to operate a DRE voting machine. 
• Election Science Institute (ESI): Non-profit organization which performs 
elections and elections technology research. Conducting polling and security 
research for Cuyahoga County. 
• ES&S Systems: Vendor of election systems and equipment. 
• E-Voting: Electronic voting. 
• Government Accountability Office (GAO): The non-partisan audit, evaluation, 
and investigative department of Congress and an agency in the Legislative Branch 
of the United States Government. GAO investigates all matters related to the 
receipt, disbursement, and use of public funds and make reports to the President 
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and Congress with recommendations relating to the efficiency of public 
expenditures. 
• Global Election Management System (GEMS): DESI software used by the 
CCBOE to create ballot layouts and to tabulate votes. 
• Geographical Information Systems (GIS): Computer-based systems for 
creating, storing and querying databases of geographical information based on the 
spatial relations of the data. 
• Help America Vote ACT (HAVA): A Federal law that passed in October 2002 
specifying changes in the nation’s voting systems. 
• House Bill 3 (H.B.3): Bill passed by the Ohio Legislature in early 2006 that 
includes provisions requiring voters to present acceptable identification to poll 
workers in order to vote. 
• The International Board of Standards for Training Performance and 
Instruction (IBSTPI): Prescribes sets of competencies as standards for 
instructors and for instructional design. 
• Institute of Technology Services (ITC): Company contracted by the CCBOE to 
create the training manuals for the 2006 primary elections in Cuyahoga County. 
• Logic and Accuracy Test (L&A Test): The process by which voting equipment 
is configured, tested, and certified for accuracy prior to an election. 
• National Association of State Election Directors (NASED): A group of state 
election directors and administrators that meet and discuss national common 
issues. Certifies elections equipment. 
• Optical Scan Ballot: Ballot form on which voters place votes by either filling in 
a rectangle, circle, or oval or by drawing an arrow corresponding to their voting 
selection. 
• Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.): The Ohio Revised Code contains the laws of Ohio 
enacted by the State legislature. 
• Optical Scan Memory Cards (O/S Memory Cards): Memory cards that go into 
the optical scan unit for ballot tabulation. 
• Optical Scan Unit: The electronic tabulator and auto feeder of the optical scan 
ballots. 
• Personal Computer Memory Card International Association Slots (PCMCIA 
Slot): Location where the memory card is inserted in the DRE machines. 
• Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS): Optical scan voting system where the 
voter inserts the ballot into a device that counts the votes in a polling location. 
• Pink Sheets: Incident reports to be filled out by Booth Officials on the day of the 
election to document problems that occurred throughout the day, especially those 
which affect ballot reconciliation. 
• Pink Room: Room at the CCBOE used on Election Night for intake processing 
of ballots and supplies. 
• Polling Place: Designated voting facility where voters cast ballots. Includes one 
or more precincts. 
• Poll Workers: Booth officials or Election Day Technicians that work at the 
polling places on Election Day. 
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• Pool Workers: Temporary staff members that are on call on the day of an 
election and deployed throughout the County as needed. 
• Precincts: Smallest geographic area in US voting subdivisions for local elections. 
A precinct usually has from 200 to 1,000 voters in it. Each precinct has an elected 
precinct captain or neighborhood party leader. 
• Presiding Judge: Booth Official in charge of each precinct on the day of the 
election. They are responsible for turning in the memory cards and completing 
paper work. 
• Provisional Ballots: Allows individuals whose names do not appear on the 
precinct’s list of registered voters to cast a ballot. This ballot is not added to the 
voted ballots until it is determined by local election officials that the specific 
individual is entitled to vote in the election. 
• Public Service Announcement (PSA): An non-commercial message of a public 
service nature communicated by mass media. Voter education campaigns may 
make use of PSAs. 
• Quality Manager (QM): Manager in charge of organizational quality and 
process documentation. 
• Republican (R): Political party, or member of the Republican Party. State law 
requires many elections functions to be performed in tandem by an R and a D. 
Each precinct must be staffed by two R Booth Officials and by two D Booth 
Officials. BOE permanent staff are required to reflect bipartisan balance as well. 
• Request for Proposal (RFP): A solicitation used when discussion may be 
required prior to contract award; a document used for soliciting competitive 
proposals. 
• Rovers: Election Day Technicians who went from one polling location to another 
to correct problems at the polls such as lack of supplies or technical problems. 
• Supervisor Access Card (SAC): Card that allows access to the administrative 
function of the DREs. 
• Sequoia: Company that sells voting machines and software. 
• Sole Source Purchase Order: An order for purchase of products or services 
when they are available from just a single supplier. Generally receives extra 
scrutiny before issuance due to the potential for higher costs. 
• Secretary of State (SOS): SOS is the elected official in Ohio who is chiefly 
responsible for the conduct of elections in the state. The SOS’s office negotiated 
the master contracts with election system vendors and distributed the federal 
HAVA funds on behalf of the counties. The office is presently held by Hon. J. 
Kenneth Blackwell. 
• Split Precinct: Any precinct where there are separate ballots for localities within 
a precinct due to differences between the precinct boundary and those of another 
jurisdiction. Often these separate ballots have different issues, such as school 
levies. 
• STS100: Type of encoder used to program voter access cards. 
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• SysTest Labs, LLC: Company that does independent voting equipment 
certification and testing. Contracted by Cuyahoga County to evaluate problems 
with optical scan voting in the May 2006 election. See Appendix M. 
• Triad: Elections hardware and software vendor. 
• Voter Access Card: Card encoded by a Booth Official for each voter, which 
allows operation of a DRE voting machine. Encoded to specify proper ballot to be 
displayed for a voter and any special configuration of the voting machine, such as 
a magnified screen, or audio mode of a DRE configured with a VIBS kit. 
Requires re-encoding before each use. 
• VEMACS: The voter registration system used in Cuyahoga County before 
DIMSnet was adopted. 
• Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT): The paper trail of ballots cast 
recorded by the printer on the voting machine. 
• Visually Impaired Ballot Station (VIBS): Headphones and keypads for disabled 
voters to assist them in voting independently. 
• Zero Cards: Memory cards used in association with the accumulation machine. 
• Zero Report: Report that shows that there are zero votes on voting machine. 
Printed at the beginning of Election Day before the polls are opened, to show that 
no votes are present on the memory cards when voting starts. 
• Zone Stations: Locations throughout a city set up to support polling locations 
with supplies and technical assistance. 
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Appendix D: Election Night Proposal 
Proposed Election Night Process 
Transfer Station 
1. Taxi Cab vans pick up Democratic and Republican staff person at the CCBOE 
and travel to transfer station where they meet CCBOE staff. 
2. After polls close, CCBOE staff collects red/blue bags delivered by the Presiding 
Judges, checks them off a list and loads them into a van. 
3. If Red/Blue bags are unsealed a trouble sticker is placed on the bag with the word 
‘seals’ written on the sticker. 
4. CCBOE staff collects bag until 9:00 or until all of the bags are received which 
ever is sooner. If bags are missing at 9:00pm, the van is released and the CCBOE 
staff should remain behind to carry the remaining bags to the CCBOE by car. 
Pink Room 
1. Red/Blue bags loaded on rolling shelves in parking lot and stored under tent until 
there is room in the staging area. 
2. Rolling shelves lot number and bags scanned in staging area. 
3. Scanned rolling shelves wait in the staging area. 
4. Rolling shelves wheeled to each table, city/ward/precinct and seal number 
recorded on Election Night Checklist. 
5. Alpha poll books, memory card bag and curbside voted ballots loaded on to tray 
and checked off checklist. Table Captain verifies the number of memory cards 
corresponds to printed number on outside of memory card bag. If number of cards 
do not correspond to the number on the outside of the bag an ALERT ticket is 
placed in the memory card bag. Checklist placed in red/blue bag. If any items are 
missing from the bag a trouble sticker is placed on the bag and it is referred to the 
trouble table. Bags arriving at the CCBOE with a trouble ticket on them are also 
taken to the trouble table after poll books, memory cards and voted ballots are 
removed. 
6. Runners take alpha poll book to #10 and memory card bag and curbside ballots to 
#7. 
7. Memory card bags logged into computer room. Memory cards removed from bag 
and placed on staging table. 
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8. Empty memory card bags place in window for filing. If memory cards were 
missing from the bag, bag is held in computer room until memory cards are 
recovered. 
9. Empty memory card bags filed on shelves in city/ward/precinct order. 
10. Certificate #1 removed from alpha poll book and taken to the basement where 
they can be sorted by city/ward/precinct for reconciliation with ballots cast report. 
11. Alpha poll books filed by city/ward/precinct. 
12. Trouble table for red/blue bags. 
13. Rolling shelves move to the basement via freight elevator and stored in order by 
lot number. 
14. Red/blue bags containing payroll cards, Pink Sheets, black binders , unvoted 
ballots, provisional ballot affidavit book and green bags secured in the basement 
until items are removed and recorded on checklist. The remaining items on the 
Supply Bag Contents list are also removed once the bags are returned to the 
warehouse, examined and stored for the next election. 
 
 
 
Recommended Pink Room floor plan for Election Night 
(numbered areas correspond to functions above) 
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Appendix E: Pink Room Supply Checklist 
Election Night Checklist 
City______________________________________ 
Ward_____________________________________ 
Precinct___________________________________ 
Seal Number_______________________________ 
_____Red   _____Blue 
Table Captain _________________________________ 
_____ Memory Card Bag _____Number of Cards _____Number Expected 
_____Curbside Ballots 
_____Alphabetical Poll Book 
_____Trouble Table Referral 
Reason:__________________________________________________________ 
 
Basement Inventory Team______________________________ 
_____Green Bag 
_____Black Binder 
_____Pink Sheet 
_____Payroll Card 
_____Provisional Ballot Affidavit Book 
_____Unvoted Paper Ballots 
 
The remainder of the items shown on the Supply Bag Contents form should also 
be removed from bags and stored until the next elections. 
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Appendix F: Quality Assurance and Continuous 
Improvement 
I. Introduction 
Throughout the private sector, there has been a revolution in Quality Assurance. The term 
no longer refers to throwing out defective items at the end of a conveyor belt. Entire 
organizations have refocused themselves to make Quality the driving purpose at every 
station, every desk, every day. Companies large and small have adopted global Quality 
plans that apply the philosophy of Continuous Improvement to every aspect of their 
operations. 
Continuous Improvement is the idea that changes are best made incrementally, the 
organization bettering itself by some small fraction every day. Rather than interspersing 
long periods of stagnation with grand upheavals, companies have been finding ways to 
make positive change a part of everyday business. This philosophy keeps everyone in the 
organization thinking about how to do their jobs more effectively. The time is always 
now—there is no need to wait for the next shake-up to make something happen. 
Momentum builds as people begin to realize that the organization is growing around 
them, and they have a hand in guiding that growth. 
The beginning of any Quality plan is establishing a baseline. If nobody knows how things 
are done now, it can be difficult to find the path toward improvement. An organization 
pursuing Quality must refocus itself on the nuts-and-bolts detail of what it is trying to do, 
because improvements really begin at that level. Quality flows from transparency and 
standardization, so detailed manuals should be written up for every task. Everyone needs 
to know where they stand and what is expected of them. From there, the organization can 
begin monitoring itself from within, using each of its members as a lens. Information 
from these lenses travels to one central point, and an image begins to form. This 
constantly changing image is transmitted to the control center of the organization, where 
it is used to assess the present and chart the future. Each of these steps is described in 
more detail below. 
II. Create Procedure Manuals 
To insure that everyone is performing their tasks completely and efficiently, those tasks 
must be written out in explicit detail. A step-by-step list of every action involved in a task 
should be available to anyone who may end up performing it. This list should be 
exhaustive, in the sense that no key steps are left to the imagination. However, it should 
also be open-ended enough that it does not become useless in a contingency. 
Standardization of manuals allows for ease of lookup and efficiency of understanding. If 
every department’s manual sets forth its procedures in the same format, a reader familiar 
with one can find information in another much more quickly. Standardized formats give 
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the reader a framework on which to hang items of knowledge. This promotes retention 
and eases confusion. 
The CCBOE is currently revamping all of its procedures in the wake of new equipment 
and a new organizational structure. Because new manuals will be written in the near 
future, there is no better time to standardize their formats and incorporate keystroke-level 
depth of instruction. The hope of such a program is that if everyone in the building were 
to vanish, and their functions all had to be performed by emergency stand-ins with no 
knowledge of the job, those stand-ins could proceed per the manuals and not miss a beat. 
This way, when anyone asks how a certain task is being done, the Board can respond 
quickly, confidently, and in exact detail. 
Example: 
4.0 Entering a Customer Order 
4.1 Open the Customer Database by double-clicking the Pyramid icon. 
4.2 Either: Click the New Order icon (upper left corner of the toolbar, looks like 
a blank sheet of paper), or open the Orders pull-down menu and select 
“Create New”…the Order Entry screen should now appear (see illustration). 
4.3 Enter the customer code in the first box, marked “CCode”, then press Tab to 
field-exit. The customer’s full name should appear under the “CCode” box. 
 
4.3.1 To look up an unknown customer code, enter the first two letters of 
the customer’s name in the “CCode” box and press F3. This will 
list all customers referenced under those letters. If the customer 
name does not appear in this list, press F2 to exit and try entering a 
different abbreviation. Ask someone before entering as new. 
4.3.2 If this is a new customer, press F8 to reach the New Customer 
Entry screen. Please see section 2.0, Entering a New Customer. 
4.3.3 DO NOT press F5 on the Order Entry screen until all yellow fields 
have been populated. This will generate an Order Number 
prematurely and create a false record for Billing Department 
 
III. Record Non-Conformances 
Once there is a written objective standard for performing a task, there is a fair basis for 
evaluating actions and situations. Anytime a task does not go as planned, whether in 
process or result, that fact should be recorded and logged. This is not a discipline 
system—the purpose of monitoring non-conformances is to learn which aspects of the 
plan are working and which are dysfunctional. 
Just as standardization allows a set of manuals to communicate more knowledge to more 
people, it also makes recording a problem more manageable. One standard form should 
be used throughout the organization. The form should be a full page, allowing for 
detailed description and follow up. When read from beginning to end, it should convey 
not only what happened but what is going to happen as a result. Dates of every action 
taken should be recorded, as well as who is responsible for each. 
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Writing up a form, especially a new one, can be tedious. When many things are going 
wrong all at once, the last thing anybody wants to do is take time out to write about it. 
This is why the form must be user-friendly, with prompts sufficient to pull the writer 
through it, so that they do not have to organize their thoughts beforehand. Reporting of 
problems should fit into the rhythm of everyone’s work. It should become habit to record 
the small troubles, so that they can be addressed before they blossom into larger ones. As 
with any system, this one can only help to the extent that it is fully supplied with 
information. 
There should be a low threshold for determining what deserves a write-up. This applies 
not only to critical emergencies on election night, but also to minute day-to-day problems 
that one might expect to resolve informally. Examples include software glitches, 
employee absences, responsibility disputes, misplaced items, voter complaints, situations 
not addressed by procedures, and so on. Any time a non-conformance report is not made, 
information about that problem is denied to the Quality Assurance system, and the big 
picture it provides comes through in softer focus. Small issues can grow and combine 
into larger ones, and true origins can remain hidden if information is missing at the 
beginning of the chain. 
Please see Exhibit One, Sample Non-Conformance Form. 
IV. Compile Data 
In order to pursue Quality improvement effectively, someone within the organization 
must own that task. There must be a point person coordinating the effort to improve 
Quality. In a large corporation this can be a full time job, but in most cases this person 
has other primary responsibilities. Titles can vary, but in these materials the point person 
will be referred to as the Quality Manager (“QM”). All data and documentation related to 
the program should pass through his or her hands. 
The main task of the QM is to receive, record, and analyze non-conformance data. 
Instead of making copies of “Pink Sheets” for every department in the building, all non-
conformance forms would be turned into the QM and he/she would determine how to 
proceed with each one. No department would have the responsibility of deciding which 
problems are theirs to address, because that function would be centralized. This is not to 
say that the QM would be making arbitrary decisions about responsibilities—lines of 
responsibility and oversight would already be objectively established in the procedural 
manuals. The job of the QM is to process and apply data in light of those procedures. 
The QM needs a database to list and save all non-conformances. The exact nature and 
style of this database varies with the organization, but it need not be extravagant. It will 
be refined over time. Many organizations use common spreadsheet products to track 
Quality data, but there are specialized software suites on the market designed for this 
purpose. This report makes no recommendation as to what software to use… it could be 
done with pencil and paper if need be. The only necessity is to have one system with one 
person controlling it. 
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V. Enact Solutions 
No non-conformance filing can be closed out until everyone involved has sat down with 
the QM and talked about it. This is not meant to be confrontational, and it will not need to 
be in most circumstances. The purpose is to determine what went wrong and how to 
control for it in the future. Unless they were directly involved in what happened, 
supervisors and other management staff should not be present—as noted, this is not a 
discipline policy. Staff should feel comfortable talking with the QM, or they will avoid 
writing up situations when they should. 
Whatever is decided, it is important that all parties sign off on the solution. Everyone 
involved should have some ownership of the process going forward. No one can say they 
did not know about the specifics of the rule when they signed off on it personally. At the 
QM’s discretion, a follow-up meeting can be scheduled to determine if the solution is 
working. This is suggested when the solution involves a new system or a change in 
procedures, but not for issues of individual compliance. The system is designed to make 
sure nobody within the organization can be left out of the loop—if they are, that will 
become apparent through their actions and appropriate steps can be taken. Outliers are 
identified and brought back into the fold. 
VI. Keep Management Aware 
The QM should address the Board and top management on a regular basis. Meetings 
should be held at least once a month, preferably twice. Weekly meetings may be 
necessary at times depending on the volume and seriousness of data. These meetings may 
or may not include a Quality Team, made up of one non-management representative from 
each department in the organization. Creating a Quality Team enhances the degree of 
ownership that individual staff members feel, including those who are not personally 
involved. At least they know that someone at their level who deals with the same 
difficulties is representing them. This also gives staff an additional conduit through which 
to communicate ideas or concerns to upper management. 
At each meeting, the QM should be reporting all of the data compiled in his/her database 
from non-conformance reports. Management needs to know where problems are 
happening, how frequently, and what changes are being made. These meetings are 
opportunities for various departments to come together and work out solutions that help 
everyone. When departments make their own calls about handling problem issues, they 
often fail to account for the ripple effect their actions can have throughout the 
organization. Furthermore, individual departments can lack the big-picture knowledge 
needed to create the most effective solution, even when the issue falls primarily within 
their area of control. 
VII. Conclusion 
Continuous Improvement will not take hold overnight. However, some benefits will 
appear quickly. Standardized manuals will make cross-training a much smoother process, 
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and the more detailed they are, the less time it takes to get a new employee up and 
running. These manuals will also give third-party observers confirmation that tasks are 
being performed in a uniform and predictable fashion. 
The greatest benefit to this system is the transparency it provides—not only will 
management always know what is going on, they can prove it. This is why so many 
major companies and agencies have demanded that their suppliers achieve formal 
certification of an internal Quality program. Adopting such a program shows outsiders 
that the organization is its own best friend and worst critic. It asserts that nothing is static, 
no one is satisfied, and tomorrow will always be better. 
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EXHIBIT ONE Sample Non-Conformance Form    No. _384_  
 
This section to be filled out by the individual reporting the non-conformance. 
 
Name: Department: __________________________ 
 
Date of Incident:_____________________ Location: __________________________ 
 
What Happened? Describe the incident, including expectations and how those 
expectations were not met. 
 
 
 
 
This section to be filled out by the Quality Manager. 
 
Relevant Procedure (manual, section number, title): ______________________________ 
 
Responsible Party/Department: ______________________________________________ 
 
 
Check All Applicable: Training Issue ____ Rule Infraction ____ 
 
Procedure Unclear ____ Responsibility Unclear ____ Repeat Incident ____ 
 
Election Security Issue ____ Legal Issue ____ Vendor Issue ____ 
 
 
Plan for Resolution: 
 
 
 
 
Initial Meeting Date: _____________ 
 
QM Signature:_______________________________ 
 
Responsible Party:____________________________ 
 
Follow-Up Meeting Date:_____________ 
 
QM Signature:_______________________________ 
 
Responsible Party:____________________________ 
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Appendix G: Job Description for a Training Officer 
Training Officer 
The purpose of this position is to identify training needs, develop and implement training 
and cross training curriculum for agency employees, serves primary training and 
development officer for Elections System (VR) to ensure an efficient, effective and 
current workforce.  
 
Essential Job Functions:  
Identifies agency training needs, develops programs for department employees and 
evaluates effectiveness of training programs (e.g. – assists with the identification of 
training needs through communication with Administrator, conducting surveys and 
tabulating results, assists with the analysis of training techniques and recommends usage 
of new training techniques; assists in securing or developing materials and instructional 
resources for training programs; prepares audio visual aids, bulletin boards, handouts and 
displays, schedules and reserves training facilities when needed).  
 
Implements training programs for department employees (e.g. – assures room and 
equipment are set up correctly for training sessions; coordinates training process, 
conducts training following a lesson plan, analyzes evaluation results to improve 
programs).  
 
Responsible for development and implementation of duty specific training (e.g. – 
develops training tools and trains agency wide departmental staff on Elections System, 
assists in troubleshooting with system operator issues, makes recommendations as needed 
to ensure efficient training and operational procedures). 
 
Works with outside vendors to conduct agency-wide training curriculum; monitors and 
evaluates vendor performance. 
 
Performs administrative duties (e.g. responds to written or verbal inquiries regarding 
training programs; maintains filing system on training data; compiles statistics regarding 
training program effectiveness; inventories training supplies and equipment). 
 
Language Ability and Interpersonal Communication Skills: 
Ability to comprehend a variety of informational documents including memos, training 
literature, and other reports and records.  
 
Ability to comprehend a variety of reference books and manuals including policies and 
procedures, State regulations and training manuals.  
 
Ability to prepare memos, correspondence, proposals, and other job related documents. 
 
Ability to record and deliver information, to explain procedures and follow instructions.  
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Appendix H: Revised Certificate #1 
Revised Certificate #1 (assuming that provisional voters are given optical scan ballots, that the presiding 
Judge must reconcile each precinct, that poll workers have the DRE's produce a report that shows each precinct's results, 
that the poll workers do not accumulate each DRE's results into one DRE   
and that the poll workers fill out a revised audit book with no distinction between Republicans, Issue voters, and Democrats  
         
Reconciliation of Voters to Ballots Cast (revised Certificate #1) 
         
Ohio Revised Code section 3505.26 requires Presiding Judges to “[c]ount the voted ballots,” and states that if the "number 
of voted ballots exceeds the number of voters whose names appear upon the pollbooks, the presiding shall enter on the 
pollbooks an explanation of that discrepancy." This precinct's Presiding Judge must complete this form to comply with that 
section of the Ohio Revised Code.       
         
A. Curbside and Backup Optical Scan Ballots  
         
1 Record the highest number curbside and backup optical scan ballot (record  
 this number before the polls open):       
         
2 Record the lowest number curbside and backup optical scan ballot (record   
 this number before the polls open):       
         
3 Record the number of curbside and backup optical scan ballots cast (remove  
 these ballots from the ballot box and count them after the poll close):    
         
4 Record the number of spoiled curbside and backup optical scan ballots  
 (remove these ballots from Envelope #X and count them after the polls close):    
         
5 Add lines 2, 3, and 4 and enter the total:       
         
6 Verify that the amount on line 5 equals the lowest unused curbside and backup  
 optical scan ballot; if it does not, please explain why:     
         
         
B. Provisional Optical Scan Ballots  
         
1 Record the highest number provisional optical scan ballot (record this number  
  before the polls open):        
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2 Record the lowest number provisional optical scan ballot (record this number  
 before the polls open):        
         
3 Record the number of provisional optical scan ballots cast (remove these ballots  
 from the ballot box and count them after the polls close):     
         
4 Record the number of spoiled provisional optical scan ballots (remove these  
 ballots from Envelope #X and count them after the polls close):    
         
5 Add lines 2, 3, and 4 and enter the total:       
         
6 Verify that the amount on line 5 equals the lowest unused provisional optical  
 scan ballot; if it does not, please explain why:     
         
7 Record the number of provisional voters in the Audit Book:     
         
8 Verify that the amounts on lines 3 and 7 equal; if they do not, please explain why:  
         
         
C. Touch-Screen Votes  
         
1 Record the total number of voters from this precinct's Audit Book:    
         
2 Enter the number of voters for this precinct from Machine 1's Long Report  
 (print this report after the polls close):       
         
3 Enter the number of voters for this precinct from Machine 2's Long Report   
 (print this report after the polls close):       
         
4 Enter the number of voters for this precinct from Machine 3's Long Report   
 (print this report after the polls close):       
         
5 Record the number of curbside and backup optical scan ballots cast (this number  
 should be the same as step A. 3.)      
         
6 Add lines 2 through 5 and enter the total:       
         
7 The amounts on lines 1 and 6 should equal; if they do not, please explain why:   
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D. Certification 
         
We certify that, to the best of our knowledge, the above numbers are complete and   
 represent valid votes:        
         
 Poll Worker (D):           
 Poll Worker (R):          
 Presiding Judge:           
  Presiding Judge's Home Phone Number:        
         
         
E. Canvass (to be completed by Board of Elections Employees) 
         
We have reviewed this document and have entered its data onto the spreadsheet that the  
Board of Elections will use to reconcile the number of voters and ballots casts.   
         
 BOE Employee (D):           
 BOE Employee (R):          
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Appendix I: Standards for Training and Instructional 
Design 
These competencies are detailed thoroughly in publications produced by the International 
Board of Standards for Training, Performance and Instruction (http://www.ibstpi.org). 
Instructional design competencies 
Professional foundations 
• Communicate effectively in visual, oral and written form. (Essential) 
• Apply current research and theory to the practice of instructional design. 
(Advanced) 
• Update and improve one’s knowledge, skills and attitudes pertaining to 
instructional design and related fields. (Essential) 
• Apply fundamental research skills to instructional design projects. (Advanced) 
• Identify and resolve ethical and legal implications of design in the work place. 
(Advanced) 
 
Planning and analysis 
• Conduct a needs assessment. (Essential) 
• Design a curriculum or program. (Essential) 
• Select and use a variety of techniques for determining instructional content. 
(Essential) 
• Identify and describe target population characteristics. (Essential) 
• Analyze the characteristics of the environment. (Essential) 
• Analyze the characteristics of existing and emerging technologies and their use in 
an instructional environment. (Essential) 
• Reflect upon the elements of a situation before finalizing design solutions and 
strategies. (Essential) 
 
Design and development 
• Select, modify, or create a design and development model appropriate for a given 
project. (Advanced) 
• Select and use a variety of techniques to define and sequence the instructional 
content and strategies. (Essential) 
• Select or modify existing instructional materials. (Essential) 
• Develop instructional materials. (Essential) 
• Design instruction that reflects an understanding of the diversity of learners and 
groups of learners. (Essential) 
• Evaluate and assess instruction and its impact. (Essential) 
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Implementation and management 
• Plan and manage instructional design projects. (Advanced) 
• Promote collaboration, partnerships and relationships among the participants in a 
design project. (Advanced) 
• Apply business skills to managing instructional design. (Advanced) 
• Design instructional management systems. (Advanced) 
• Provide for the effective implementation of instructional products and programs. 
(Essential) 
 
 
Instructor competencies (2003) 
• Communicate effectively. 
• Update and improve one’s professional knowledge and skills. 
• Comply with established ethical and legal standards. 
• Establish and maintain professional credibility. 
• Plan instructional methods and materials 
• Prepare for instruction. 
• Stimulate and sustain learner motivation and engagement. 
• Demonstrate effective presentation skills. 
• Demonstrate effective facilitation skills. 
• Demonstrate effective questioning skills. 
• Provide clarification and feedback. 
• Promote retention of knowledge and skills. 
• Promote transfer of knowledge and skills. 
• Assess learning and performance. 
• Evaluate instructional effectiveness. 
• Manage an environment that fosters learning and performance. 
• Manage the instructional process through the appropriate use of technology. 
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Appendix J: Tallies of Booth Official and EDT Incident 
Reports 
 
 
 
Booth Official Incident Report Summary: May 2, 2006 
ISSUE INCIDENTS
POLL BOOK ISSUES 753
MACHINE ISSUES 612
POLL-WORKER ISSUES 534
SUPPLY ISSUES (Insufficiency) 379
ENCODER/ CARD PROBLEMS (other than insufficiency) 350
INSTRUCTIONS/ TRAINING 240
COMMUNICATING WITH CCBOE/DESI 117
LATE OPENING 97
SECURITY SEALS 62
PROVISIONAL VOTING PROBLEMS 36
OTHER  60
TOTAL: 3,240
Notes: Numbers derived from May 2, 2006 Pink Sheets, 1260 of 1434 total precincts 
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Proportions of Poll Worker Complaints 
Poll book issues Machine issues
Poll worker issues Supply issues (insufficiency)
Encoder/Card problems (other than insufficiency) Instructions/Training
Communicating with BOE/Diebold Late opening
Security seals Provisional voting problems
Other
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Booth Official Incident Reports: May 2, 2006 
ISSUE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS 
INSTRUCTIONS/TRAINING 240 
Training materials poorly drafted and 
confusing. 
41 
Training insufficient and/or confusing. 55 
Manual and training did not correspond to 
actual screens and instructions on machine. 
26 
Provisional ballot confusion (must enter “yes” 
2 times). 
10 
Poll workers didn’t understand instructions 
about matching the voting unit numbers with the 
memory card numbers. 
40 
Poll workers didn’t understand that 
accumulator machine is machine “zero.” 
4 
Poll workers did not get vote tally from 
machines. 
15 
Accumulation was not done. 15 
EDT not well trained 34 
    
LATE OPENING 97 
Due to machine problems 73 
Due to supply problems 6 
Due to lack of effective help by supervisors 11 
Need more time Monday night for setup 7 
    
ALPHABET BOOK ISSUES 753 
Names incorrect 252 
Addresses incorrect 174 
Signatures incorrect 121 
Name does not appear in alpha poll book 
(should be there) 
139 
Names Appear 2 or more times in alpha book 63 
Wrong DOB in poll book 4 
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SUPPLY ISSUES (Insufficiency) 379 
Voter access cards 49 
Memory cards (missing) 46 
No “Zero” card supplied 5 
Electrical cords 34 
Red security clips (canister seals) 119 
No telephone 4 
VIBS 3 
“I Voted” stickers 82 
Flags 7 
Paper rolls 27 
Miscellaneous supply issues 3 
    
COMMUNICATING WITH CCBOE/DESI 117 
Problems getting through on the phones 46 
Phones supplied by CCBOE broken 20 
Slow response times by techs 25 
Technician never arrived (non-EDT tech) 8 
DESI representative did not have solutions. 6 
County representative did not have solutions. 1 
Zone station unresponsive. 11 
    
MACHINE ISSUES 612 
Broken machines 143 
Faulty table legs on machine 37 
Had to turn voters away due to machine 
problems 
9 
Had to use optical scan ballots due to machine 
problems 
12 
Blue light not on, but machine still working. 0 
Couldn’t zero out the machine. 31 
Poll workers didn’t know they were supposed 
to zero out the machine. 
8 
Couldn’t print out second zero report. 68 
Accumulator machine malfunctioned 21 
Unable to run accumulation report 25 
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Accumulation was not done on “Zero” card 
because cards were placed in wrong machine. 
13 
Printer Jams 68 
Printer Installation issues 46 
Flimsiness of Printer 8 
Faulty printer housing 31 
Printer failed to record votes 25 
Misc. Machine Problems (ballots expired, 
machine powered down, printer freak outs, etc.) 
67 
    
ENCODER/ CARD PROBLEMS (other than 
insufficiency) 
350 
Memory cards not working 19 
Memory cards were not placed in 
corresponding voting units. 
77 
Voter access cards not working 76 
Supervisor cards come up as “invalid.” 2 
Cards stuck in machine. 17 
Memory cards missing after votes tallied 2 
Voters left with voter access cards 6 
Encoder not accepting programming for issues 
only ballots 
28 
Encoders breaking 35 
Encoders not activating proper ballot 71 
Ballot issues (issues/names missing, etc.) 17 
    
PROVISIONAL VOTING PROBLEMS 36 
Voter did not complete paperwork. 15 
Voter did not sign affirmation 9 
Poll worker did not offer proper paperwork 7 
Poll worker did not sign affirmation 1 
Voter complained that required provisional 
statement did not apply to his/her circumstances. 
(Had neither moved nor changed name, was 
certain had registered to vote in jurisdiction, and 
yet name was missing from poll book.) 
4 
    
SECURITY SEALS 62 
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Instructions Confusing 8 
Fragile and hard to handle 54 
    
POLL-WORKER ISSUES 534 
Poll workers absent 197 
Party Confusion 127 
EDT (Technician) absent 78 
EDT (Technician) late 18 
EDT not assisting poll workers 25 
Poll workers late 22 
Poll workers not assisting others 15 
Students absent/late 16 
Problems w/ polling location (parking, doors 
locked, noisy children, difficult to access, gas 
smell, no power, etc.) 
36 
    
OTHER (DESCRIBE) 60 
Privacy Issues 34 
No security on optical scan ballot bag 3 
Voters signed in at one precinct and then voted 
at a neighboring precinct. 
10 
Difficulties advancing VIB to “Next” 1 
Late closing due to machine problems 8 
Late Closing due to lack of effective help by 
supervisors 
4 
    
TOTAL: 3,240 
Notes: Numbers derived from May 2, 2006 
Pink Sheets, 1,260 of 1,434 total precincts   
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EDT Incident Report Summary: May 2, 2006 
ISSUE INCIDENTS
MACHINE ISSUES 197
SUPPLY ISSUES (Insufficiency) 111
INSTRUCTIONS/ TRAINING 83
ENCODER/ CARD PROBLEMS (other than insufficiency) 70
COMMUNICATING WITH CCBOE/DESI 44
POLL-WORKER ISSUES 40
OTHER  22
LATE OPENING 20
SECURITY SEALS 13
ALPHABET BOOK ISSUES 5
TOTAL: 605
Notes: Data compiled from 179 Election Day Technician Reports from May 2, 2006 
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EDT Incident Reports: May 2, 2006  
ISSUE INCIDENTS 
INSTRUCTIONS/TRAINING 83 
Training materials poorly drafted and confusing. 20 
Training insufficient and/or confusing. 22 
  Manual and training did not correspond to actual 
screens and instructions on machine. 12 
Provisional ballot confusion (must enter “yes” 2 
times).
1 
  
  
Poll workers didn’t understand instructions about 
matching the voting unit numbers with the memory 
card numbers. 18 
  Poll workers didn’t understand that accumulator 
machine is machine “zero.” 1 
Accumulation was not done. 2 
Instructional materials hard to find in election 
materials
1 
EDT not well trained 1 
EDT role was not clearly defined 5 
   
LATE OPENING 20 
Due to machine problems 12 
Due to lack of effective help by supervisors 2 
Need more time Monday night for setup 5 
  Polling site locked; manager did not know voting 
would occur at the location 1 
   
ALPHABET BOOK ISSUES 5 
Names incorrect 2 
Addresses incorrect 1 
Voters signed in at one precinct and then voted at 
a neighboring precinct.
1 
Voter incorrectly listed as felon and has voted in 
previous years
1 
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SUPPLY ISSUES (Insufficiency) 111 
Not enough machines for voters 5 
Voter access cards 8 
Voter registration cards 1 
Memory cards (missing) 9 
No “Zero” card supplied 1 
Electrical cords 8 
Optical scan ballots 1 
Printer housing 1 
Printer module 3 
Red security clips (canister seals) 35 
No telephone 2 
VIBS 6 
VIBS keypad and headset 2 
“I Voted” stickers 17 
Flags 1 
Paper rolls 7 
Missing list of registered voters/absentee voters 2 
HAVA materials 1 
No nametags for EDT 1 
   
COMMUNICATING WITH CCBOE/DESI 44 
Problems getting through on the phones 17 
Phones supplied by CCBOE broken 7 
CCBOE never sent more supplies 1 
Slow response times by techs 5 
Technician never arrived (non-EDT tech) 2 
DESI representative did not have solutions. 1 
Zone station unresponsive. 11 
   
MACHINE ISSUES 197 
Broken machines 38 
Faulty table legs on machine 16 
Screen covering for machine was damaged 1 
Had to turn voters away due to machine problems 1 
Had to use optical scan ballots due to machine 
problems
1 
Blue light not on, but machine still working. 2 
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Couldn’t zero out the machine. 5 
Couldn’t print out second zero report. 11 
Accumulator machine malfunctioned 11 
Unable to run accumulation report 7 
  Accumulation was not done on “Zero” card 
because cards were placed in wrong machine. 7 
Electrical cords did not work 3 
Printer jams 31 
Printer installation issues 18 
Flimsiness of printer 12 
Faulty printer housing 23 
Printer failed to record votes 2 
No ink in printer 1 
No warning given when printer ran out of paper 1 
Printers stacked too high and fell down 1 
VIBS keypad broken 1 
Difficulties advancing to “Next” on VIB 1 
Hard to advance to next screen using touch panel 3 
   
ENCODER/ CARD PROBLEMS (other than 
insufficiency)
70 
Memory cards not working 8 
Memory cards were not placed in corresponding 
voting units.
11 
Voter access cards not working 14 
Cards stuck in machine. 10 
Poll workers were trading memory cards 1 
Encoders not accepting programming for issues 
only ballots
1 
Encoder breaking 12 
Encoder not activating proper ballot 9 
Registered candidates were not listed on the ballot 1 
Access card fell out of terminal 1 
Candidates for same position not listed on same 
screen
1 
Blank ballot was not cancelled 1 
   
SECURITY SEALS 13 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 255 of 398 
Instructions Confusing 4 
Fragile and hard to handle 9 
   
POLL WORKER ISSUES 40 
EDT (Technician) absent 4 
Poll workers absent 26 
Students absent/late 3 
Students not assisting voters 1 
Another precinct took neighbor’s “zero” machine 1 
Party Confusion 4 
Poll worker shifts were too long 1 
   
OTHER (DESCRIBE) 22 
Voter may have voted twice 2 
Voter never received absentee ballot 1 
Voters could not view voting summary 2 
Voter not permitted to write-in candidates 1 
Not enough parking for voters 3 
Horseshoe configuration does not work; lack of 
voting privacy
4 
Font on the memory cards and machines is too 
small
1 
No security on optical scan ballot bag 2 
  Election materials disturbed between Monday 
night and Tuesday morning (no longer secure) 1 
Late Closing due to machine problems 2 
Voter did not complete paperwork. 1 
Voter complained that required provisional 
statement did not apply to his/her circumstances.
2 
   
TOTAL: 605 
Notes: Data compiled from 179 Election Day Technician Reports from 
May 2, 2006 
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Appendix K: Errors and Omissions in the May 2006 
Booth Officials Manual 
 
Page Number    Detailed description of problem 
 
Pg. 9 Important to highlight that precincts can use any 
machine as long as voter’s access card is correctly 
coded. 
 
Pgs. 14, 16, 19 The manual refers to the DESI Quick Reference 
Guide for opening polls, but the guide does not 
specify which steps are done Monday night versus 
those that are done on Tuesday morning. 
 
Pg. 15 In step 9, the book makes reference to figure 8. In 
the other places the steps and figures correspond. 
This could be confusing for some people.   
 
Pg. 16 Directions should say to skip section 5.4 and go 
directly to 5.5 if not setting up a VIBS machine. 
 
Pgs. 16-17 The figures continue with numbering from previous 
page, but the steps start with number one again. 
 
Pgs. 16, 18 The manual says to refer to DESI’s Quick 
Reference Guides for setup, but the manual does not 
state where items are located. 
 
 
Pgs. 19, 24, 25 The manual and the Quick Reference Guide give 
directions on how to install the printer. It’s difficult 
to know when to do the steps when there are 
instructions (that reference each other) in multiple 
places. 
 
Pg. 23 In the manual, steps 3-4 of section 6.6 differ from 
those on the DESI Quick Reference Guide. DESI 
says to insert the memory card, and then press the 
red on/off button. 
 
 
Pg. 25 Section 6.7 is not explained on the DVD that was 
given to poll workers. 
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Pg. 25 Section 6.7 contradicts steps 19-21 on the DESI 
Quick Reference Guide for Printer Module. 
 
Pg. 26 Step 7 of section 6.8 misspelled printer as ‘pritner’. 
 
Pg. 26 Pictures would be helpful for section 6.9. 
 
Pg. 26 The DVD differs from the manual. For example, the 
DVD says “NO” to print write in candidates; 
whereas, the manual says press “Yes.” 
 
Pg. 28 The manual puts Presiding Judge in charge of 
posting voting materials and displaying flag, but the 
section 4.1 of the EDT manual states that it’s a 
priority duty that the EDT should handle. 
 
Pg. 32-33 In section 7.3, the steps use letters (A, B, C), but the 
rest of the manual uses numbers. 
 
Pg. 45 Section 9.8 does not state whether the voter can 
obtain a new Voter Access Card if the ballot is 
cancelled automatically after 120 seconds. 
 
Pg. 47 The “Warning” needs to be moved to the bottom of 
the page. It breaks up the instructions and can be 
confusing to follow. 
 
Pg. 47, 57 Precinct is misspelled as ‘precint’. 
 
Pg. 47 Under section 11.2, step 2, and the manual should 
explicitly state what the Booth Official is hitting 
“Yes” to, or step 2 should be moved to section 11.1 
as step 4. 
 
Pg. 47 Section 11.2, steps 4 and 5, contradict the DVD that 
says “NO” to print write-ins and “YES” to print 
long report. 
 
Pg. 48 Section 11.3, step 7 says to push the red button to 
turn off the voting unit, but doing this actually turns 
the TSX machine back on. 
 
Pg. 48 Section 11.3, step 8 the phrase “on the lock” is 
repetitive and needs to be removed. 
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Pg. 48 Section 11.3, steps 8-9, you cannot insert the key 
into the lock until the Memory Card door has been 
closed. It would be better to combine the steps into 
one. 
 
Pg. 48 In section 11.3, in some instances the ‘m’ in 
memory card is capitalized and other times it is not. 
It needs to be consistent. 
 
Pg. 49-50 Section 11.4, steps 9, 14, 16, 18-25 conflict with 
what the DVD says. 
 
Pg. 54 Section 12.1 with general information on closing 
the polls should come before the technical 
information on how to shut down the machines.   
 
Pg. 55 All the directions in section 12.3 for completing the 
Certificate #1 are incorrect. The directions do not 
match the current Certificate #1 inside the poll 
books. 
 
Pg. 56 The “Warning” phrasing is difficult to follow. 
 
Pg. 56 First time using the term “chamber seal”. No 
explanation of what a chamber seal is and if it is 
different than the seals referred to throughout the 
manual 
 
Pg. 58 The picture of the canister bag needs to be changed. 
The canister bags are green, but in the picture it is 
blue. 
 
Pg. 63 Section 13.6 does not tell Booth Officials where to 
put the payroll card to ensure they are paid for 
working. 
 
Quick Reference – Printer Steps 7 & 13 says to “lower metal platen.” A more 
descriptive term should be used to refer to the 
platen. 
 
General Observation The duties for poll workers on Election Day that are 
not related to the TSX machines appear to be 
“thrown in” the book and not organized 
methodically. (Ex. pgs. 20-21) 
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General Observations The manual should make it clear that the printer 
paper does not belong in the area under the metal 
plate that is marked “for reports only.” 
 
General Observations  The DVD does not mention placing seals or canister 
clips at all. These are things that might be helpful if 
the DVD is meant to demonstrate the actual steps 
taken on Election Day. 
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Appendix L: Documents Inventory 
 
 
TO REQUEST DOCUMENTS, PLEASE CONTACT THE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS AT 2925 EUCLID AVE., CLEVELAND OHIO 44115   
http://boe.cuyahogacounty.us   PHONE: (216) 443-3200 
 
 
File numbers beginning with E denote electronic documents, not hard 
copy 
File # 
 File Name 
1 
 Public Hearings  
1.1  Handouts/Adverts for Stephanie Tubb Jones's Hearings  
1.2  Handwritten Notes from all Stephanie Tubb Jones Public Hearings 
1.3  Transcripts of Stephanie Tubb Jones' Hearings at Bedford City Hall 
1.4  Transcripts of Stephanie Tubb Jones' Hearings at Cleveland City Hall 
1.5  Transcripts of Stephanie Tubb Jones' Hearings at Euclid City Hall 
1.6  Transcripts of Stephanie Tubb Jones' Hearings at Beachwood City Hall 
E1.7 
 
Transcripts from Stephanie Tubb Jones Hearings in Bedford 6-1-06 Voting 3-
Bedford 
E1.8 
 
Transcripts from Stephanie Tubb Jones Hearings in East Cleveland 6-2-06 
Voting 4a-East Cleveland 
E1.9  Cuyahoga Election Review Panel Hearing on June 29 2006-CFO6714 
   
2  Training  
2.1  Booth Official Training Manual (18) plus 1 paper copy 
2.2  Election Day Technician Training Manual (20) 
2.3  Copy of Notice of funds for creation of Booth Official and EDT Training Manual 
2.4 
 
Copies of Request for Proposal (RAP)( for creation of Booth Official and EDT 
Training Manual. 
2.5  EDT Recruitment 
2.6  Bid Specifications for Booth Officials and EDT Professional Training Program 
2.7  Election Official Manual 
2.8 
 
Montgomery County Board of Elections -Poll worker Procedures Manual and 
Mont. City TSX Implementation 
2.9  2004 Chief & Assistant Chief Election Judge Workbook 
2.10-  Lorain County Poll Workers Training Manual Index 
2.11  Dane Thomas Letters 
2.12  Maryann McBride Letters 
E2.13  High Schools for May 06 
E2.14  Final Training Schedule-Phase I-11.08.05 
E2.15  Final Training Schedule-Phase II-11.08.05 
E2.16  11-08-05 St. Helens-Oct 12, 2005-Phase II 
E2.17  11-08-05-Stebbins & Dubar High Schools-September 21 and 27, 2005 classes 
E2.18  05-02-06 Moraine Civic Center & C.F. Holliday-WCR, KT 4, MIA, & MOR-Judge 
E2.19  05-02-06-Payne Recreation Center & Moraine Civic Center-PJ 
E2.20-  Revised Script for Training DVD 
E2.21  Ohio Poll Worker Training Video Script 1 
E2.22  Ohio-How to Vote Large 
E2.23  Training DVD content 
E2.24  RE: Instruction guide Timeline 
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E2.25  How to Vote TSx DVD 
E2.26  Re-FWD_re-Questions & Booth Official Training Classes 
E2.27  Instruction guide timeline 
E2.28  How to mark your ballot- {email} 
E2.29  How to mark your ballot {Adobe} 
E2.30-  FWD:Instruction guide timeline 
E2.31  Pocket Card V3 
E2.32  Ohio guide 9 
E2.33  Booth Official Instructional Video 
E2.34  FWD-Poll Worker Training Scripts 
E2.35  Ohio Poll worker Script w AVPM Ballot Station 4.5.1 rev2 
E2.36  TTT Class roster 1 
E2.37  Cuyahoga Training Manual P47 
E2.38  03089_Election Day Technician Training Manual _Final 
E2.39  03026_Booth Official Training Manual_Final 
2.40-  Training Binder, etc.  
   
3  Administrative/ Personnel 
3.1 
 
Directory: Agency, Employee Contact List, Zone Addresses, BOE directory and 
email addresses 
3.2  Memorandum from 2006 from: 
3.2-1  Michael Vu 
3.2-2  Brain Kalusek Election Support Division Manager and his assistant-Joe Dennis 
3.3  Board of Election Meeting Agenda 
3.4  Board of Election-Board Action Highlights for March 6 and 13 2006 
3.5  Status Report 
3.6 
 
Ms. Judy Grady's letter and Report on Logic Accuracy Script using DRE Voting 
Units 
3.7  L&A Planning Meeting Outline 
3.8  Review Panel: Meeting Agenda and etc 
3.9  Regional Uploading Site Locations and Instructions 
3.10-  Electronic Voting Implementation-Status Report 3 
3.11  Board Resolutions 
3.12  Emails 
3.13  Project Plans, Tasks, and Initial Risk List for Cuyahoga May Election 
3.14 
 
Status and Concerns as of April 5, 2006; and CCBOE Imp Project May V13 and 
V11 with baseline (also in electronic copy) 
3.15  Letter from Diebold RE: Implementation of Touch Screen Voting Equipment 
3.16  Cuyahoga County Project Status Report 
3.17  Action Items List-State of Cuyahoga County-Revision Date 10/7/05 
3.18  Suggestions for Vote Counting and Hand Counting 
3.19  Directives 
3.20-  Black Box Voting-Ballot Tampering in the 21st Century 
3.21  CASE Review of May 2 Election and Recommendations for November Election  
3.22  May 2, 2006 Master Project Plan/ (9 month schedule) 
3.23  Directory: Districts, Precincts sorted by various categories 
3.24  CONTRACTS: Vendor Contract Agreement and amendments 
3.25  Cuyahoga County Project Plan Assumptions  
3.26  Transcripts of Board Meetings pertaining to electronic Voting 
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3.26-1  HAVA Selection of Vendor-February 9th 2004 
3.26-2  Selection of Vendor-February 16, 2004 
3.26-3 
 
Diebold- Question and Answer Session re- voting units, security and any election 
issues-May 3, 2004 
3.26-4 
 
Special Election in Fairview Park, Berea City School Dis., Fairview Park City 
School Dist., & Parma City School District-Feb. 8, 2005 
3.26-5  Meeting  of March 7th 2005 
3.26-6  Meeting of May 2nd 2005 
3.26-7  In RE: Electronic Voting on April 3, 2006 
3.26-8  In RE: Cuyahoga City Board of Elections Meeting on May 1, 2006 
3.26-9  In RE: Cuyahoga City Board of Elections Meeting on May 2, 2006 
3.26-10  In RE: May 2, 2006- Primary Election Update on May 8th, 2006. 
3.26-11  In RE: Cuyahoga City Board of Election on May 20, 2006 
3.26-12  In RE: Electronic Voting on October 17, 2005 
3.26-13 
 
BINDER: Board Meeting Transcripts from January to June 2006; TWO 
BINDERS 
3.27  Time Sheets of Temporary Workers 
3.28  Weekly Reports from different departments in the Board of Election (3 Copies) 
3.28-1  Ballot Department 
3.28-2  Information Systems Department 
3.28-3  Absentee Voting/ Candidate Services Department 
3.28-4  Community Outreach Department 
3.28-5  Candidate and Voter Services (Registration Focus)  
3.28-6  Election Support Division 
3.28-7  Booth Officials  
3.28-8  Voting Locations 
3.28-9  Procurement and Operations Department 
3.28-10  Staff Meeting 
3.28-11  Unknown Name: From Irene Lange 
3.29  Policy and Procedures of Cuyahoga City Board of Elections 
3.30-  Emails from Management regarding Hours of Staff 
3.31  Visitors Log 
3.32  Report from the Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition 
3.33  Electronic Voting Implementation Team 
3.34  Registration Department Procedural Manual 
3.35  Elections Divisions Procedural Manual 
3.36  Voting Locations Department Procedural Manual 
3.37  Procurement and Operations Department Procedural Manual 
3.38  Booth Officials Procedural Manual  
3.39  Absentee Voting/ Candidate Services Department Procedural Manual 
3.40-  Diebold Proposal 
3.41  Ballot Department Procedural Manual  
3.42  Office Vouchers 
3.43  Budgets 
3.44  Implementation Team Highlights and Memo 
3.45  Salaries Schedule 
3.46  Contract with Secretary of State 
3.47  Other Contracts and Agreements 
  For Voting Location report see 4.20 below 
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3.48  Cuyahoga City Board of Elec. Organizational Chart and Job Descriptions 
3.49  Invitation for a Price Quote (Informal Request for Proposal)-Temporary Workers 
3.50-  Annual Salary Schedule 
3.51  DIMS and GEMS Questions by the Cuyahoga City Board of Elections 
3.52  2006 Departmental Budget for various departments 
3.53  State St Consult-Operating Request: Waiver for Competitive Selection  
3.54  Time Balances per pay periods 
3.55  CCBOE Electronic Voting- Implementation teams  
3.56  Notes/ Letters to Polling Places 
3.57  Association for Computer Machinery- Statewide Databases of Registered Voters 
3.58 
 
Questions to Michael Vu and His Responses on Logic Accuracy Test and 
Overworked Employees 
3.59  PowerPoint on "Making the Switch" 
3.60-  Resumes and Job Qualifications 
3.61  Bid Proposal from The Institute of Technology Consulting 
3.62  Diebold Proposal: A Voter Registration System (CVRS) and Related Services 
3.63 
 
Diebold Proposal: DRE Precinct Voting System, Absentee Voting System & 
Voter Registration System 
3.64  Hart Interactive Docs 
3.65  Secretary of State's Reference Guide on Recounts of Election Results 
3.66 
 
Letter from Michael Vu and Summary of Emails RE: Interaction and support level 
with Diebold 
E3.67-  Weekly status reports for Cuyahoga county for certain dates 
E3.67-1  2/3/2006 
E3.67-2  2/17/2006 
E3.67-3  3/10/2006 
E3.67-4  12/16/2005 
E3.67-5  1/13/2006 
E3.67-6  12/9/2005 
E3.67-7  4/7/2006 
E3.67-8  3/17/2006 
E3.67-9  2/24/2006 
E3.68  New Conversion Status Project Plan-April 27 
E3.69  2003 Commissioner Electronic Voting Meeting 
E3.70-  Cuyahoga County Project Plan Milestones 2-17-06 
E3.71  Risk Management Plan for Cuyahoga 1-11-06 
E3.72  memo6-16 for panel-poll worker hiring 
E3.73  Petition Module Concerns 06-28-06 
E3.74  Registration errors still not on db 6-29-06 
E3.75  Exit Poll Report 07-06-06 
E3.76  Request for BOE policy on Registration follow up 
E3.77  FWD: Exit Poll report for panel 
E3.78  comp time policy06-26 
E3.79  memo6-16 for panel- 
E3.80-  Poll Book Justification Procedure 
E3.81  Poll Book Justification 
E3.82  EDT 
E3.83  2004_repub_Polling_inspector_comments-Survey Results 
E3.84  Largest County Analysis 
E3.85  BOCC Agencies 
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E3.86  Email from Candice to Michael Vu [FWD Memo Attached] 
E3.87  Bob Diekman Meeting Agenda 6-9-2005 
E3.88  Briefing Memo Summary 
E3.89  Contract--proposed changes for County DRE 
E3.90-  Corp College Agreement 
E3.91  Dir2005-27 
E3.92  DVComparison_Cleveland_1306688_7-Cleveland_1306688_8 
E3.93  Electronic Voting-Briefing Memo 
E3.94  Electronic Voting -Request for Board Action 
E3.95  Secretary of State Monty Lobb-Official Canvas-Official Count Response Letter 
E3.96  Electronic Voting Spreadsheet 
E3.97  Official Canvass Plan-May 2, 2006 Primary 
E3.98  R802.01 petition statistics_2 
E3.99  R802.01 TEL Petition 8-05 Final 
E3.100-  Corp College Bid 
E3.101  Corp. College Bidder's Checklist 
E3.102  Invoice-Crystal Reports Training DO 
E3.103  Cuyahoga Draft Implementation Plan 
E3.104  Diversity scope Informal RFP 
E3.105  Diversity Spreadsheet 80105 
E3.106  Do Diversity Training Invoice 
E3.107  Electronic Voting Allegation Confirmation 
E3.108  Electronic Voting Diebold Contract Analysis 
E3.109  Electronic Voting Implementation Synopsis 
E3.110-  Electronic Voting Purchases Changes Since Original Negotiations-Jeff Jones 
E3.111  Electronic Voting Spreadsheet 
E3.112  JCO Bidder's Checklist 
E3.113  John Carroll's Bid 
E3.114  LCC Bidder's Checklist 
E3.115  Lorain CCC's Bid [fax] 
E3.116  Manager's Training, Corp College 
E3.117  Memo- Board Implementation Electronic Recommendation 
E3.118  Memo-Board members-11B Poll Workers History 
E3.119  Memo-Board members-2005 NCOA Mailings and Maintenance Efforts 
E3.120-  Memo-Board members-Absentee Application Policy 
E3.121-  Memo-Board members-Administrative Assistants Responsibilities 
E3.122-  Memo-Board members-Campaign Finance Report QA 
E3.123  Memo-Board members-Cleveland Candidates Petitions in Question 2005 
E3.124  Memo-Board members-Dr. White Statement on Transmission of Election Result 
E3.125  Memo-Board members-IS Department Recommendation 
E3.126  Memo-Board members-IT Administrator & Ballot Manager 
E3.127  Memo-Board members-Logic & Accuracy Test Procedures 
E3.128  Memo-Board members-Lorain County Polling Location  
E3.129  Memo-Board members-Organizational Reengineering 
E3.130-  Memo-Board members-Poll Worker Salary Increase 
E3.131  Memo-Board members-Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) 
E3.132  Memo-Board members-Realignment 2005 General Staff 
E3.133  Memo-Board members-Realignment Schedule 
E3.134  Memo-Board members-Scanning Documents Initiative 
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E3.135  Memo-Board members-Scott Miller Russo Court Action 
E3.136  Memo-Board members-Summary Examination of Pepper Pike D 
E3.137  Memo-Board members-Transmission of Election Results 
E3.138  Memo-Bob Bennett-US Flag Bids 
E3.139  Memo-Optical Scan Position 
E3.140-  Memo-Sally Florkiewicz L and A Concern Response 
E3.141  Memo Board Members-Electronic Voting Purchase Order 
E3.142  Message 
E3.143  Norman Robbins-Electronic Voting Response Letter 
E3.144  Ohio BOE's Electronic Voting-Responded- 11-25-2005 
E3.145  Ohio Counties Implemented- November 8, 2005 
E3.146  Public Hearing Agenda- October 17, 2005 
E3.147  Questions to Dana Watch 
E3.148  Regarding personnel changes and procedures-Response 
E3.149  Sam Kindred-RE-implementing a state wide voter registration system 
E3.150- 
 
Secretary of State Blackwell-Electronic Voting Implementation Concerns Letter 
(Final Version)-Not Sent 
E3.151  SOS-County Vendor Selection Confirmation 10-13 
E3.152 
 
Summary of Request-Request for Agenda-To County Commissioner to approve 
Diebold 
E3.153  Conversion Status Project Plan Report #1 
E3.154  Conversion Status Project Plan Report #2 
E3.155  Memo sent 1-27-06 Winter Conference follow-up 
E3.156  sorry here are the reports-letter from Michael Vu 
E3.157  15 absentees 
E3.158  Board, Administrators & Managers-Communication Memorandum 
E3.159  Contract & Ancillary Equipment 
E3.160-  FWD:-Comments to Agreements with Diebold 
E3.161  FWD:-additional correspondence and documents 
E3.162  FWD: communication with the board members 
E3.163  FWD response to questions at review panel meeting and person 
E3.164  FWD: other documents related to the conversion operations 
E3.165  FWD:: response to questions at review panel meeting and person 
E3.166  Email: Luncheon with Stephen Werber 
E3.167  Re- Correction to my earlier note 
E3.168  Voting Machine Contract 
E3.169  LWV_EMAIL_TO_CITY_PROSECUTORS_4_24_06 
E3.170-  Managers-Administrators Meetings 
E3.171  10.6.05 Agenda and Letter 
E3.172  17 year olds & federal elections 
E3.173  Absentee Application & Return of Absentee Ballot 
E3.174  Additional Voting units Question 
E3.175  Administrator's meeting-commissioner's meeting 
E3.176  amended Blackwell optical scan decision overview 
E3.177  amended Org. Chart 
E3.178  attached are 2 letters that I have sent to Dana 
E3.179  BLACKWELL NEGOTIATES BEST IN NATION VOTING MACHINE DEAL 
E3.180-  Blackwell press release 
E3.181  board meeting dates 
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E3.182  commissioners and staff meeting 
E3.183  commissioner's meeting-Diebold Contract postponed 
E3.184  contract 
E3.185  contract concerns 
E3.186  contract issues 
E3.187  contract update 
E3.188  copy available 
E3.189  correction to my earlier note 
E3.190-  county prosecutor letter 
E3.191  county requests 
E3.192  Cuyahoga county board of election security plan-transmission 
E3.193  Cuyahoga county implementation clarification needs and concerns 
E3.194  Cuyahoga county press release 
E3.195  Cuyahoga county status update regarding tax limitation 
E3.196  FWD- 10.6.05 agenda and letter 
E3.197  FWD- BLACKWELL NEGOTIATES BEST IN NATION VOTING MACHINE DEAL 
E3.198  FWD- Commissioners & staff meeting 
E3.199  FWD- Commissioner's letter 
E3.200-  FWD- Contract Issues 
E3.201  FWD- Contract  
E3.202  FWD- FWD-cart info for Cuyahoga 
E3.203  FWD- Issues not returned from SOS 
E3.204  FWD- League of Women Voters of Ohio, et al. V. Taft, et al. 
E3.205  FWD- M2 change 
E3.206  FWD- Master Contract 
E3.207  FWD-memo attached 
E3.208  FWD-My expertise 
E3.209  FWD- Posted-Sample Ballots 
E3.210-  FWD- Project Plan 
E3.211  FWD-Re-Contract 
E3.212  FWD-Re-Cuyahoga County Vendor Selection Meeting Request 
E3.213  FWD-Re-Diebold 
E3.214  FWD-Re-Professor Werber reply and more 
E3.215  FWD-Re-Response 
E3.216  FWD-Revised Best Offer 
E3.217  FWD-State Contract 
E3.218  FWD-Suggested changes to the contract 
E3.219  FWD- State contract 
E3.220-  FWD-Suggested changes to the contract 
E3.221  FWD-Tarfis v. BOE-Acknowledgement of Assignment 
E3.222  FWD-Updates-Voting Equipment, DIMS Conference & Weekly Leg 
E3.223  FWD- Voter ID Chart 
E3.224  FYI- Corrupting an Access Card 
E3.225  I'll be available for a call at 3-30pm 
E3.226  Implementation Team Meeting 
E3.227  Individuals who will be attending tomorrow's meeting 
E3.228  Letter I would like to send to all Agency Directors 
E3.229  Letter to the commissioners 
E3.230-  Master Contract 
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E3.231  Master Contract 
E3.232  Meeting Dates etc.-Voting System 
E3.233  Meeting with Jim Freidman, Jeff Jones & Dave Lambert 
E3.234  Memo-Communication Protocol 
E3.235  Memo-Monday Night Organization Meeting and Election Morning 
E3.236  Memo-Security Handling Procedures 
E3.237  Memorandum-Affidavits 
E3.238  Miscellaneous Items Outside SOS Contract 
E3.239  Mitigation Strategy 
E3.240-  My expertise 
E3.241  My testimony to the EAC 
E3.242  New Organization Chart-Please Check 
E3.243  Official Canvass 
E3.244  Org Chart version 
E3.245  Organization Chart 
E3.246  Other points to consider in the letter 
E3.247  Ownership and Digital Guardian 
E3.248  Pat Toller 
E3.249  Performance Test 
E3.250-  Phone Conversion Availability 
E3.251  Please review for accuracy 
E3.252  POSTED-Sample Ballots 
E3.253  Primary Election Ballot Using Optical Scan 
E3.254  Public Hearing   
E3.255  RE- Additional Voting Units Question 
E3.256  Re- Ballot accounting chart 
E3.257  Re-BOCC Representative for voting systems process 
E3.258  Commissioners meeting 
E3.259  Re-Conference Call 
E3.260-  Re- Confirmation on March 23rd Meeting 
E3.261  Re- Contract 
E3.262  Re- Cuyahoga County transmission briefing 
E3.263  Re- Cuyahoga County-Diebold Agreement for purchase 
E3.264  Re- Cuyahoga County -Diebold Agreement for purchase of  
E3.265  Re-Diebold 
E3.266  Re-Diebold Agreement 
E3.267  RE-Diebold Contract 
E3.268  Re-Diebold Equipment 
E3.269  Re-Diebold-Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Agreement 
E3.270-  Re-Diebold Cuyahoga County Clean Agreement 
E3.271  Re-DIMS Voter Registration System Agreement 
E3.272  Re-Distribution to commissioners 
E3.273  Re-FWD:-Diebold Election Systems 
E3.274  Re-FWD: Limited License 
E3.275  Re-FWD-Cuyahoga Additional Equipment Acquisition 
E3.276  Re-FWD-Response to Cuyahoga 
E3.277  Re-FYI 
E3.278  Re-Hart 
E3.279  Re-Hip Pockets 
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E3.280-  Re-Individuals who will be attending tomorrows meeting 
E3.281  Re-L.A. County VR Documents 
E3.282  Re- Logic & Accuracy Test Scenario 
E3.283  Re- Master Contract 
E3.284  Re-Maximus 
E3.285  Re-Meeting Dates etc-Voting System 
E3.286  Re-Memorandum regarding comments of Candice Hoke 
E3.287  Re-email 
E3.288  Re-Phone Survey for presiding Judges and election Day 
E3.289  Re-Phone mail from Jason Krieser, Jones Day 
E3.290-  Re-Pre-Meeting 
E3.291  Re- Response 
E3.292  Re-Revised Best Offer 
E3.293  Re- Revised State Plan comment 
E3.294  Re-Scheduling 
E3.295  Re-State Plan Committee member Appointment 
E3.296  Re-The Columbus Dispatch-Local-State.htm 
E3.297  Re- The Herald-Star New Voting machines considered a success-- 
E3.298  Re-Thursday Commission Meeting 
E3.299  Re- Tuesdays Meeting 
E3.300-  Re-Voter registration System-Competitive Bidding 
E3.301  Re-VR Contract 
E3.302  Remaking Ballots 
E3.303  request for hearing and count 
E3.304  response to Cuyahoga  
E3.305  revised Best Offer 
E3.306  Revised Contract 
E3.307  School Resolution & Baxter Letter 
E3.308  Smoke Free Ohio Initiative Petition Protest 
E3.309  State Contract 
E3.310-  Thursday Commission Meeting 
E3.311  Tie Vote-Parma Tax Initiative Petition 
E3.312  Transmission of Election Results 
E3.313  Transmission of lection Results via DRE & Recount Procedures 
E3.314  Transmitting Elections Results & Recounts on electronic Voting 
E3.315  Update-Diebold Contract 
E3.316  Vendor Selection Scheduling 
E3.317  Verbiage 
E3.318  Voter ID chart 
E3.319  Voting System usage in Ohio 
E3.320-  VR contract 
E3.321  VVPAT 
E3.322  VVPAT & Recount 
E3.323  Website and L7A Script 
E3.324  051205dSchdeule B(revised) Pat Toher 
E3.325  Additional (non Sch B) Items 
E3.326  Additional Equipment Purchase -Management Team Version 
E3.327  Austin Mc Guan-Poll Book Justification 1_1 
E3.328  Conversion Budget June 05 w out DRE Stuff 
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E3.329  Electronic Voting Purchases Changes Since Original Negotiations-Jeff Jones 
E3.330-  Electronic Voting Spreadsheet 
E3.331  In Meeting 2nd Copy 
E3.332  L&A Matrix 
E3.333  OH Election supply order form 2-4-05_1 
E3.334  OHIOSCHEDULEB 
E3.335  SchB-Additional_1 
E3.336  State Contract fully signed 
E3.337  SECURITY4 
E3.338  Cuyahoga County DRAFT Project Plan 
E3.339  2006 Electronic Voting Security Recommendations for ISS Review 
E3.340-  092205a Conf for Consultant (CUYAHOGA) 
E3.341  Administrators & Managers-Communication Memorandum-May 2, 200 
E3.342  Agenda 
E3.343  Blackwell's decisions on Voting System 
E3.344  Bob Diekmann- Proposal Response Letter 
E3.345  CCBOE & Diebold Contract (Revised) -10-17-2005 
E3.346  CCBOE Scope Document 051106 
E3.347  Commissioners-Clear Understanding of Contract Letter 
E3.348  Commissioners-Electronic Voting from Board Members letter -12-12-2 
E3.349  Contract --proposed changes for county DRE 
E3.350-  count request 
E3.351  Cover Memorandum to Directive 2005-07 
E3.352  Cuyahoga BF revised 5-25-05 Preliminary 
E3.353  Cuyahoga equipment form 2-3-04_2 
E3.354  Cuyahoga Financial Analysis for Cuyahoga County (4) 
E3.355  Cuyahoga Michael BAFO 2-12-04 
E3.356  Dana _extensions 
E3.357  Dana_HAVA 
E3.358  Diebold Meeting-Jim Friedman 
E3.359  DIMS 
E3.360-  Directors-Election Day Assistance Letter 
E3.361  DVComparison _CLEVELAND_1306688_1-CLEVELAND_1306688_4 
E3.362  DVComparison _CLEVELAND_1306688_7-CLEVELAND_1306688_8 
E3.363  DVComparison _CLEVELAND_1306688_1-CLEVELAND_1306688_3 
E3.364  Electronic Voting Allegation Confirmation 
E3.365  Judy Grady-Logic & Accuracy Plan 
E3.366  Judy Grady-Transmission of election Results Plan 
E3.367  Kevin Baxter-Board Members Intention Letter-Version #1 
E3.368  Letter of Invite 
E3.369  Logic &Accuracy Procedures 
E3.370-  LovegrenActivism2005July 
E3.371  LovegrenResume2055July 
E3.372  MAXIMUS CORPORATE PROFILE 
E3.373  Mechanical Testing and usability testing of the Diebold Accuvote 
E3.374  Memo-Administrative and Management Staff-MNOM and election Moi 
E3.375  Memo-Management Staff-Security Handling of DRE 
E3.376  Memo-Signing of Affidavits 
E3.377  Michael Vu Testimony to Eac-Provisional Voting 
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E3.378  Mitigation Strategy- May 2, 2006 
E3.379  Official Canvass Plan release 
E3.380-  Organization Chart Version 1.4.2006 
E3.381  Organization Chart Version 12.15.2005 
E3.382  Organization Chart Version 12.20.2005 
E3.383  Performance Committee -Contract Information 
E3.384  RESOLUTION-Public Schools as Polling Locations 
E3.385  Revisions to version 8- License Agreement-OSU Revisions of August 25 
E3.386  Selection Directive 4-14-05 
E3.387  Staff Meeting Agenda 
E3.388  Summary of Request-Request for Agenda    
E3.389  Summary of Request for Appropriation 
E3.390-  Trafis, Matthew; v. BOE, COA 87048.0922.05. Oradini 
E3.391  Trafis, Matthew; Worgull, Jim v. USDC. 05CV1282.092305.Oradini 
E3.392  Version 3 DIMS Voter Registration System Agreement 
E3.393  Version 4-Agreement for acquisition of Additional Equipment 
E3.394  Vu memo 3.06 
E3.395  WHY THE ADDITIONAL VOTING UNITS  
E3.396  William Mason-Benesch Freidlander Coplan Aronoff Contract Extension Letter 
E3.397  Hugh Shannon1 
E3.398  Image.XXX 
E3.399  Blank Bkgrd 
E3.400-  Scenario in California as of 11 
E3.401  Revisions 
3.402  Provisional Report 
3.403  Conversion Projection 
3.404  Mike Defranco's Emails 
3.405  Information from Jacqui Maiden 
3.406  Dane Thomas Emails Re: Diebold 
3.407  Gwen Dillingham's Record on Interoffice Memo for Administrative departments 
3.408 
 
Results of Exit Poll on May 2,2006; by volunteers of the greater Cleveland Voter 
Coalition. Norman Robbins-Study Leader. 
3.409  Annual Report 2004-2005 
3.410-  Board of Elections Reorganizations 2003 "Planning for the future of elections" 
3.411  Michael Vu's Interoffice Memos and etc. 
3.412  letter to Michael Vu from Betty Jones and Linda Stemie  
3.413  Sample Ballots 
3.414  Report on Issues on the Ballots in Cuyahoga County 
3.415  Race Summary in the May 2nd Primary Election 
   
4  Election Day Management 
4.1  Command Center Phone Calls 
4.2  Election Night Personnel  
4.3  Official Bulletin-Official Count for Unauthorized Write-In Candidates 
4.4 
 
Election Summary Report-Summary for Jurisdiction Wide, All Counters, All 
Races-Official results 
4.5  Election Day Technician [EDT] Day log for Tuesday [5/2/2006] 
4.6  Election Day Management Events Information 
4.7  Unofficial Absentee Results 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 271 of 398 
4.8  Command Center Report Forms 
4.9  Alerts for Booth Officials 
4.10-  Monday Absentee Route 
4.11  Advisories on Election Day procedures and Using DRE Voting units 
4.12  Command Center Information Binder 
4.13  Poll workers response to issues on election day 
4.14  Election Day Legal problems for Kerry-Edwards 2004 
4.15  Election Night Bag Return Plan 
4.16  Temporary elections workers request forms 
4.17  electronic voting supplies data by precincts 
4.18  public hearing on electronic voting 
4.19  voter education & community outreach project plan 
4.20-  voting locations report 
4.21  election wrap up reports 
4.22  election voting system survey 
4.23  Participants workbook (2/18) Rough Draft 2/21  [Manual] 
E4.24  Summary documents for Poll Workers on opening_closing polls with TSx 
E4.25  cctboe-03036-newburg-blank 
E4.26  cctboe-03036-ecleveland-blank 
E4.27  cctboe-03036-test-1 
E4.28  Montgomery County Voter Ed Brochure [FWD 3  page fax from '+] 
E4.29  Posting Results Cuyhaoga Procedures 
E4.30-  Secure.050206_1-Election Night Security Plan 
   
5  Diebold/ Procurement/ Reconciliation 
5.1  Instructions for: Transmission Upload, Fax, Bag Delivery 
5.2  DRE Security and Handling Procedures 
5.3  2005 & 2006  Directives, memorandum and Advisories (2) original and (3) copies 
5.3-1  2005 & 2006  Directives, memorandum and Advisories (1) original 
5.3-2  2005 & 2006  Directives, memorandum and Advisories (2) original 
5.3-3  2005 & 2006  Directives, memorandum and Advisories (1) copy 
5.3-4  2005 & 2006  Directives, memorandum and Advisories (2) copy 
5.3-5  2005 & 2006  Directives, memorandum and Advisories (3) copy 
5.4 
 
Tests Conducted and testing of transmission of election results over fax lines/ 
accumulation process 
5.5  Computer Testing Reports 
5.6  Issues encountered by CVS Division in utilizing TSX units 
5.7  Ohio AccuVote-TSx L&A Checklist 
5.8  Ballots Cast Distribution Summary 
5.9 
 
Preliminary Findings as of June 5th 2006; Note from Tom Hanes; and Status 
reports from Michael Holbrook 
5.10-  Summary of Costs-RE: Diebold, DRE, DIMS etc. 
E 5.10-
1  Copy of Cuyahoga Cost Feb Analysis 1 page- 
E5.10-2  Copy of Diff DRE PCOS Years Version 2 
E5.10-3  Copy of DRE- PCOS Difference (Years 1-10) 
E5.10-4  Copy of PCOS Start-Up to Yr 10-2 
E5.11  Election Calendar    
E5.11-1  Election Calendar 05-06 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 272 of 398 
E5.11-2  2006 Ohio Election Calendar 
E5.12  NR testimony 10-17-05 NR Financial-2 
5.13  Ohio AG: Petro's Opinion Re: Precinct Count Optical Sounds 
5.14  Directives Secretary of State: 2005-55, 2005-02,2005-07, 2006-05, 2006-01 
5.15 
 
Testimony Outline of Norman Robinson Financial Issues in the choice of DRE's 
or Optical Scan for Cuyahoga. City.) 
5.16  DIMS-NET Voter Registration System 
5.17  Encoder Inventory and Usage 
5.18  DRE Election Results and A Sample Ballot 
5.19  Ballot Cast Book / Poll Book Justification 
5.20-  Cards Cast Report for may 2nd Election 
5.21  Precincts Information 
5.22  Vendor Negotiation Results 
5.23  DIMS-NET Implementation Guide- Data Map Workbook 
5.24  Diebold Supplies List 
5.25  Diebold's Memo on Response to VSPP Recommendations on April 26, 2004. 
5.26  Project Plan presentation by Diebold 
5.27  Electronic Voting Demo Survey Results by Diebold 
5.28  Correspondences sent by Diebold 
5.29  Itemized list of Supplies included in Contract with Secretary of State and Diebold 
5.30- 
 
Diebold's Minutes of Meeting with the Cuyahoga Board of elections-Title: 
Cuyahoga Planning 
5.31  Voting System Conversion Report 
5.32  Statewide Voting Systems: Vendor Proposal Evaluation Findings Report 
5.33  Maps/ Work Plan 
5.34  Precinct Count Optical Scan Solution Report for Cuyahoga County 
5.35  Cuyahoga City Implementation Kick Off Presentation 
5.36  Accu-Vote Acceptance Testing Procedures-Absentee Ballot Systems 
5.37 
 
Invitation for a Price Quote (Informal Request for Proposal)-Printing of Optical 
Scan Ballots 
5.38  2006 Electronic Voting Network Security Analysis 
5.39  Cost Analysis by Cuyahoga County Board of Elections 
5.40-  Security Event Logs 
5.41 
 
AccuVote-TSX with the AVPM Poll Workers Training Manual for Ballot Station 
4.6.1 and GEMS 1.18.22 
5.42  Mike DeFranco's emails plus DIMS- Net external interface-User's Guide 
5.43  Les Nyland Emails 
5.44  Lou Irizarry and Toni LaMarca Emails 
5.45  Pricing Summary on various dates 
5.46  Departmental Procedures 
5.47  Warehouse Layout 
5.48  Broken Seal found in BOE parking lot 
5.49  Questions for DIEBOLD 
5.50-  Unidentified Handwritten Notes 
5.51  Invoices 
5.52  DIMS Net Training Workbook 
5.53  Risk Mitigation Strategies 
5.54  Notes: Diebold Projects 
5.55  Unidentified Notes and Board Meeting Agenda 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel   Final Report 
July 20, 2006  Page 273 of 398 
5.56 
 
Dr. M. Brian Thomas: Mechanical Testing and Usability Testing of the Diebold 
AccuVote-TSX Voting Machine  
5.57  Lisa Durkin Emails 
5.58  Michael Vu's Emails Regarding Diebold/Procurement  [3 BROWN BINDER]  
5.59  Brent Lawler's DIMS Trouble Areas 6/28/06 
5.60-  DRE Technical Security Assessment Report 
5.61 
 
Personal Response for a Vote Tabulation and Reporting System by Election 
Systems & Software 
5.62  Brent Lawler's DIMS Project Files 
5.63  Election Systems & Software 
E5.64  FWD:_ Instruction guide timeline 
E5.65  Who has responsibility for source information on races, candidate & issues 
E5.66  Voter Id Numbers for provisional Voters 
E5.67  TSx Upgrade Status 
E5.68  TSx Modems- Do not need to be purchased 
E5.69  TSx Inverter Upgrade 
E5.70-  SOS guidelines on modeling election results 
E5.71  Revised Project Plan 
E5.72  Pricing on ST-100 card burner and VC Programmer  
E5.73  Planned Action Items for this Week 
E5.74  My Thoughts on where I should be directing my time 
E5.75  Minutes from Yesterday's meeting on GEMS Reports 
E5.76  Manpower Needs for L&A in Cuyahoga 
E5.77  L&A Test Script and Some performance issues 
E5.78  Warehouse status and charge _Discharge Concerns 
E5.79  Important-Gems data base load (May Election data base) import status  
E5.80-  Generating Voter Access Cards- Getting DIMS software and support 
E5.81  Final Cuyahoga County Diagnostic Testing Counts 
E5.82  Equipments purchase decisions 
E5.83  Cuyahoga L&A Manpower Needs 
E5.84  Creating Voter Access cards for absentee voting on the TSxs 
E5.85  Daily totals for 12-16 
E5.86  TSX Inverter_Capacitor Problem 
E5.87  Testing Counts for 12-27, 12-28 & 12-29 
E5.88  Re_ Testing Counts for 12_30_05& 1_3_06 
E5.89  Daily Diagnostic Testing Totals for Monday 12_18_05. Also, IV&V Counts 
E5.90-  Daily Counts for 12_15 
E5.91 
 
RE_ your appearance at the Cuyahoga County GEMS training Classes week of 
January 23 
E5.92  Re- Website results export-fields snapshot 
E5.93  Re-Update 
E5.94  Re- status of Carts, VC Programmer, etc,-info needed for Cuyahoga meeting  
E5.95  FWD:-Printer Specifications 
E5.96  RE-Manuals on CD 
E5.97  Re-Diebold supplied staff for L&A 
E5.98  Re: Current TSx Upgrade Status 
E5.99  FWD:- Cuyahoga L&A Manpower Needs 
E5.100-  FWD:-Cuyahoga County GEMS Ballot Creation Assistance 
E5.101  RE-Approach for AV on TSXs 
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E5.102  FWD:-Copyright question 
E5.103  FWD:-Cart Prices 
E5.104  FWD:-Ohio DESI Office Relocating 
E5.105  Opem Records Guidelines cln (1-13-06) 
E5.106  GEMS _1.18-Users_ Guide _Revision_12 
E5.107  Ballot station 
E5.108  AV-TSX-hardware guide 8.0 
E5.109  Ballot -specifications-revisions-2.0 
E5.110-  GEMS_1 
E5.111  Action Items List 12-20-05 
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Appendix M: Report of SysTest Labs, LLC 
The report of SysTest Labs, LLC follows. 
 
	

		
	
		
	
 !"#	"$%" &'










 
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF 
ABSENTEE BALLOT SYSTEM 
QUALITY ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT 
REPORT 
 
	


CUYAHOGA ELECTION REVIEW PANEL 
		
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS 

 
	


 
SysTest Labs Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page ii 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02 July 14, 2006 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................5 
1.1 PURPOSE .......................................................................................................................................5 
1.2 SCOPE ...........................................................................................................................................5 
1.3 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS..............................................................................................................6 
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................11 
2.1 ROOT CAUSE OF ABSENTEE BALLOT ISSUES ................................................................................11 
2.2 VENDOR COMPLIANCE ................................................................................................................13 
2.3 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................14 
2.3.1 Overall...................................................................................................................................14 
2.3.2 Timing of Ballot Testing and Preparation.............................................................................14 
3 QUALITY ASSURANCE STUDY  - RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................16 
3.1 VENDOR COMPLIANCE REVIEW ..................................................................................................16 
3.1.1 Vendor Relationships.............................................................................................................17 
3.1.2 Diebold Compliance Matrix ..................................................................................................17 
3.1.3 Diebold Training Compliance Matrix ...................................................................................20 
3.1.4 MCR Printer Compliance Matrix ..........................................................................................20 
3.1.5 Timelines ...............................................................................................................................21 
3.2 SYSTEM TESTING AND SIMULATIONS..........................................................................................21 
3.2.1 Precinct Count Mode.............................................................................................................22 
3.2.2 Central Count Mode ..............................................................................................................22 
3.2.3 Issues .....................................................................................................................................24 
3.2.4 Recommendations..................................................................................................................25 
3.3 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................25 
3.3.1 Lack of Knowledge of documented processes and procedures..............................................25 
3.3.2 Delay in preparation Central Count......................................................................................26 
3.3.3 Incomplete training of permanent and temporary staff .........................................................27 
3.3.4 Use of Temporary Workers....................................................................................................29 
3.3.5 Lack of Overall Detailed Project Plan ..................................................................................29 
3.3.6 Qualifications of Temporary Workers ...................................................................................29 
3.3.7 Maintenance and Storage of Equipment................................................................................30 
3.3.8 Delay in L&A Testing ............................................................................................................31 
3.3.9 Delay in receipt of Final Test Desks for AccuVote OS System..............................................31 
3.3.10 Machine Security on Election Day ...................................................................................32 
3.3.11 Security for Precinct Material Bags .................................................................................32 
3.3.12 Location of Election Supplies ...........................................................................................33 
3.3.13 Instructions on Absentee ballots and Pamphlets ..............................................................33 
3.3.14 Transport of Voted absentee ballots .................................................................................33 
4 VENDOR COMPLIANCE REVIEW METHODOLOGY............................................................35 
4.1 CONTRACT AND RFP REVIEW ACTIVITIES ..................................................................................35 
4.1.1 RFP Review Activities ...........................................................................................................35 
4.1.2 Vendor Contract Performance ..............................................................................................36 
5 SYSTEM TESTING AND SIMULATIONS METHODOLOGY..................................................38 
5.1 MASTER TEST PLAN....................................................................................................................38 
5.2 ACCESS TO ELECTION SYSTEMS AND PRIMARY BALLOTS...........................................................38 
5.3 INSPECTION METHODS ................................................................................................................38 
5.3.1 Printer’s Ruler.......................................................................................................................39 
5.3.2 Diebold Election Systems – Template BT014 ........................................................................39 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page iii 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02 July 14, 2006 
5.4 SYSTEM TESTS AND SIMULATIONS..............................................................................................39 
5.4.1 Tests.......................................................................................................................................40 
6 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY...................................................................42 
7 APPENDIX A – TERMINOLOGY..................................................................................................44 
8 APPENDIX B – MASTER TEST PLAN .........................................................................................46 
8.1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................46 
8.1.1 Purpose..................................................................................................................................46 
8.1.2 System Test Overview ............................................................................................................46 
8.1.3 Assumptions...........................................................................................................................46 
8.1.4 Reference Documents ............................................................................................................47 
8.2 SYSTEM TESTING AND SIMULATIONS..........................................................................................47 
8.2.1 Test 1 .....................................................................................................................................48 
8.2.2 Test 2 .....................................................................................................................................48 
8.2.3 Test 3 .....................................................................................................................................49 
8.2.4 Test 4 .....................................................................................................................................49 
8.2.5 Test 5 .....................................................................................................................................49 
8.2.6 Test 6 .....................................................................................................................................50 
8.2.7 Test 7 .....................................................................................................................................51 
8.2.8 Test 8 .....................................................................................................................................51 
8.3 TEST ITEMS .................................................................................................................................51 
8.4 RESULTS MATRIX .......................................................................................................................51 
8.5 ISSUE MANAGEMENT PROCESS ...................................................................................................53 
8.6 SYSTEM TEST FINAL REPORT......................................................................................................54 
9 APPENDIX C – TRACEABILITY MATRIX.................................................................................55 
9.1 DIEBOLD SECRETARY OF STATE RFP..........................................................................................55 
9.2 DIEBOLD TRAINING REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................64 
9.3 DELIVERABLES ...........................................................................................................................67 
9.4 PRINTING RFP.............................................................................................................................68 
10 APPENDIX D – OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTATION ..................................72 
11 APPENDIX E – SYSTEM TEST RESULTS...................................................................................73 
12 APPENDIX F – BOE DOCUMENTATION OF MAIN ACTIVITIES TO CONDUCT AN 
ELECTION..................................................................................................................................................74 
 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page iv 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02 July 14, 2006 
Signoffs 
Name Role Date Signature 
S. Candice Hoke Election Review Panel Member   
Judge Ronald B. 
Adrine 
Election Review Panel 
Member   
Tom Hayes Election Review Panel Member   
 
Revision History 
Version Date Description Author 
Rev 00 07/10/2006 Draft Release SysTest Labs 
Rev 01 07/12/2006 Final Release SysTest Labs 
Rev 02 07/14/2006 
Updated Final Report to reflect receipt of additional 
documentation from the BOE regarding the primary 
activities required to conduct an election. 
Corrected various editorial typographical errors and 
omissions. 
SysTest Labs 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page 5 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02  July 14, 2006 
1 Introduction 
Cuyahoga County experienced problems in the May 2, 2006 Primary Election 
following a conversion of the Diebold optical scan absentee ballot voting 
equipment from “precinct count” to “central count”.  Reported pre-election day 
problems include: 
 Failures in the ability of the Diebold optical to accurately scan absentee 
ballot voting equipment to read and/or process test decks from officially 
approved ballots. 
 Insufficient time required for pre-election test activities for the specific 
election. 
Cuyahoga County contracted with SysTest Labs of Denver, Colorado to assess 
contractor performance, Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan systems and operational 
readiness of the County Board of Elections to conduct future elections.   
1.1 Purpose 
This Quality Assurance Report summarizes the activities, procedures and major 
findings of SysTest Labs as a result of the Cuyahoga County Independent 
Assessment and System Testing.   
1.2 Scope 
The Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissions (CCBCC) and the 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (CERP) have requested that SysTest Labs 
provide the following services focused solely on ballot preparation processes, 
voting processes, counting processes, and equipment related to the absentee 
ballot system.   
 Review the contracts governing the services performed by both the printer 
(MCR) and the voting equipment manufacturer (Diebold) to evaluate the 
level of compliance with terms and conditions related to the absentee 
system 
 Review the requirements/specifications outlined in the RFP and evaluate 
each vendor’s performance against those requirements 
 Review the requirements/specifications outline in the RFP and evaluate 
their alignment with the targeted business objectives 
 Review the timeliness of any RFP, award of a contact and deliverables 
and quality of deliverables by the County and both vendors.  
 Review and evaluate the quality of deliverables produced by each vendor 
and the effectiveness of the County’s review process 
 Conduct absentee system testing for readers and ballots.   
 Review accuracy of the printed ballots.  
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 Timeliness of ballot preparation by County staff  
 Accuracy of ballot style for absentees.  
 Position of timing marks on absentee ballots  
 Election Day absentee ballot counting procedures.  
 System testing with live ballots to determine of failure was the result of 
printer, ballot style, paper ballot, reader failure or calibration of machines 
by County staff and/or Diebold staff.  
1.3 Reference Documents 
1. AccuVote-OS Hardware Guide, Diebold Election Systems, Revision 6.0, 
February 17, 2005. 
2. AccuVote-OS Central Count 2.00 User’s Guide, Diebold Election Systems, 
Revision 4.0, September 17, 2004. 
3. AccuVote-OS Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide, Diebold Election 
Systems, Revision 4.0, February 17, 2005. 
4. GEMS 1.18 User’s Guide, Diebold Election Systems, Revision 12.0, April 
21, 2005 
5. AccuVote-OS Service Guide, Diebold Election Systems, Revision 1.0, 
November 26, 2004 
6. 10,132 .pdf files that contained the ballots for the May 2, 2006 Primary 
7. Examples of Lorain and Montgomery County Ballots 
8. absentee ballot Mailer & Envelopes, CCBOE  
9. Absentee Voter Instruction Guide, CCBOE 
10. Agreement for Acquisition of Additional Equipment and Related Services, 
CCBOE, Never signed by CCBOE 
11. Ballot Order by Precinct and Party, CCBOE 
12. Bid or Proposal - Printing of the Optical Scan Ballots and absentee ballot 
on Demand Pages for the May2, 2996 Primary Election - MCR, CCBOE, 
March 2, 2006 
13. Bid Specifications - Printing of the Optical Scan Ballot Pages and 
absentee ballot On Demand Pages for the May 2, 2006 Primary Election, 
CCBOE, Unknown 
14. Booth Officials Training Manual May 2006, CCBOE 
15. CCBOE Application for Absent Voter's Ballot, CCBOE, , Form No. 11-A 
16. CCBOE Dec 2005-May 2006 Implementation Calendar, CCBOE, 12/1/05-
5/31/06 
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17. CCBOE Registration Department Calendar, CCBOE, 2/2005-6/2006 
18. CCBOE Temporary Election Worker Request Forms (Filled out), CCBOE, 
3/12/2006 
19. Contract for the Printing of Optical Scan Precinct Ballot Pages and the 
absentee ballot Pages for the May 2, 2006 Primary Election with MCR, 
CCBOE, March 6, 2006 
20. Cuyahoga County Board of Election May 2, 2006 Primary Election 
Information - Media Information Packet, CCBOE, 2006 
21. Election Day Technician Training Manual May 2006, CCBOE 
22. Introducing Our New Voting System, CCBOE, 2006 
23. May Primary 2006 - Voter Education Plan (MS Project), CCBOE, May 17, 
2006 
24. MCR/CCBOE Printer Contract for May 2, 2006 Ballots, CCBOE, 3/6/2006 
25. Monday Night and Tuesday Morning Procedures, CCBOE, May 2006 
26. Official Voter Information Guide, CCBOE, 2006, rev 1 
27. Our New Optical Scan Voting System - Absentee Voter Instruction Guide, 
CCBOE, 2006 
28. Our New Voting System - Voter Instruction Guide for AccuVote-TSX TM 
Voting System, CCBOE, 2006 
29. Outside Facilitators Procedures, CCBOE, Unknown 
30. Procedures for Payroll for the May 2nd, 2006 Primary Election, CCBOE, 
Unknown 
31. Purchase Order List Year 2006, CCBOE, 5/18/2006 
32. Serve Your Community as a Election Day Booth Official, CCBOE, 2006 
33. Student Poll Worker Program, CCBOE, 2006 
34. Cuyahoga County Questions and Concerns, CCBOE/Diebold Response 
35. Montgomery County Primary Ballot May 2, 2006, Dayton Legal 
documents, 6/19/2006 
36. AccuVote TSX Touch Screen Poll Worker Training Video, Diebold, 2006, 
Rev 1 
37. AccuVote-TSX Touch Screen CD, Diebold 
38. AccuVote-TSX Touch Screen Video, Diebold 
39. AccuVote-TSX with the AVPM Poll Workers Training Manual for Ballot 
Station 4.6.1 and GEMS 1.18.22, Diebold, Sep-05, TP-821179-001A 
40. AVOS CC Diagnostics, Diebold, 3/6/2006, Rev. 1.3 
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41. Ballot Specifications, Diebold, February 24, 2006, 2 
42. Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide, Diebold, 3/22/2005, Rev 1.0 
43. CCBOE Imp Project Feb, Diebold, 6/29/2005 
44. CCBOE Imp Project Feb, Diebold, 6/29/2005 
45. CCBOE Imp Project May, Diebold, 6/29/2005 
46. Cuyahoga Calendar of Events Leading to the May 2 election day - May 9, 
2006, Diebold, 5/9/2006 
47. Cuyahoga County Implementation Project Executive Summary, Diebold, 
9/12/05-5/2006 
48. Cuyahoga County May 2006 Implementation Kickoff, Diebold, December 
12, 2005 
49. Cuyahoga County Training Plan - Course Descriptions, Diebold, 2006, 
Rev 1 
50. Delivery Acknowledgement, Diebold, 12/12/2005 (order date) 
51. Election System Introduction - Admin Training Manual for the State of 
Ohio, Diebold, Jan-06, Version 1.0 
52. Financial Analysis For Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Diebold, 
53. Letter: Jessica Hiner (Diebold) to Michael Vu (CCBOE), Diebold, 7/1/2005 
54. Roles and Responsibility Transition, Diebold, 
55. Training Implementation Plan Cuyahoga for Feb 07, Diebold, 6/30/2005 
56. Training Implementation Plan Cuyahoga for May 06, Diebold, 6/30/2005 
57. Training Implementation Plan Cuyahoga for Nov 05, Diebold, 6/30/2005 
58. Shipment Information (re: 15 Optical Scanners - may not be valid), DMNI 
Logistics, Inc - faxed to the CCBOE by Jessica Hiner of Diebold, 
6/26/2006, HAWB - Tracking number 
59. MCR Response to May 2, 2006 Board of Elections Meeting, Frank R. 
Piunno, Sr., 5/5/2006 
60. Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Optical Scan timeline, Gwen 
Dillingham, 11/05-4/06 
61. E-Mail - Diebold Training (list training class attendees), Gwen Dillingham, 
6/22/06 
62. Email : RE: Diebold Training, Gwen Dillingham, 6/22/2006 
63. CCBOE Community Outreach Dept Voter Education Outreach Events 
Calendar, Jane Platten, 5/17/2006 
64. May Primary 2006 Voter Education Plan, Jane Platten, 1/25/06-4/30/06 
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65. Lorain County Primary Ballots May 2, 2006, Lorain County, 6/30/2006 
66. Administrators Mtg Notes , Lou Irizarry, 4/4-4/25/2006 
67. Poster Log from GEMS Server, Lou Irizarry, 4/7/2006 
68. Ballot Order/Delivery Schedule, MCR, 3/31-5/2 
69. Email List from Michael Vu Regarding Diebold Emails, Michael Vu, 2/4/02-
6/6/2006 
70. Interoffice Memorandum- Subject Optical Scan L&A Proposal, Michael Vu, 
4/26/2006 
71. May 2, 2006 Master Project Plan, Michael Vu, 1/2/2006-5/17/2006, 
Version 3_1 
72. 2006 Ohio Election Calendar, Ohio Secretary of State, 1/1/06-1/6/07, Rev 
1 
73. 2006 Voter Information Guide, Ohio Secretary of State, 2006 
74. Absentee Application & Ballot Policy, Ohio Secretary of State, 3/13/2006 
75. Advisory 2006-05 - Changes in State Law Governing Election 
Administration  & Procedures, Ohio Secretary of State, 38873 
76. Amendment #1 to Secretary of State Contract #217 between OSOS & 
Diebold Election Systems (Added VVPAT), Ohio Secretary of State, May 
19, 2005 
77. Application for Absentee Voter's Ballot, Ohio Secretary of State 
78. Certification for AccuVote OS Central Count System, Ohio Secretary of 
State, February 16, 2006 
79. Diebold Election Systems - Vendor Contract Agreement, Ohio Secretary 
of State, Janaury 30, 2004 
80. Directive 2006-50 - Election Recount Requirements and Procedures, Ohio 
Secretary of State, May 17, 2006 
81. Election Official Manual for Ohio County Boards of Election, Ohio 
Secretary of State, Unknown 
82. Memorandum - Lucas County Board of Elections - Results of Investigation 
Following November 2004 General Election, Ohio Secretary of State, April 
5, 2005, Updated as of June 1, 2006 
83. RFP - Statewide Voting Systems - SOS0428365 & Amendments, Ohio 
Secretary of State, May 23, 2003, Ver 3.13.2006 
84. Vendor Proposal Evaluation Findings Report & Addendum - Statewide 
Voting Systems, Ohio Secretary of State, August 15, 2003 & September 
10, 2003, Form No. 11-A 
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85. Optical Scan Test Deck Instructions, SOS/CCBOE, 4/24/2006 
86. SOS Logic Accuracy Methodology Scenario, SOS/CCBOE, 4/24/2006 
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2 Executive Summary 
Preparing for and managing a Cuyahoga County election is a very complex and 
challenging process.  Many elements must come together in a timely fashion in 
order to ensure that all aspects of the election are ready on election day.  This is 
true for both the electronic ballots and voting equipment used on election day at 
the polling places as well as the paper absentee ballots and the optical scanning 
devices used to read the paper ballots.  Our assessment of the processes and 
equipment used to prepare and vote the absentee ballots for the May 2, 2006 
Primary Election, in addition to the ability of the voting equipment vendor and 
printing vendor to meet their contractual obligations and county officials in 
performing the required duties have resulted in some significant findings.  The 
detailed results of each aspect of our assessment are contained in either this 
report or in attached electronic files.  However, the highlights of our findings are 
provided for in this Section. 
2.1 Root Cause of absentee ballot Issues 
Results for both system testing and simulated elections have helped SysTest 
Labs to identify what we believe is the root cause of the failures of the ballots to 
be accurately read by the AccuVote Optical Scan equipment.  From the various 
tests that were run that repeated the County’s testing activities along with 
additional tests that were run using ballot styles taken from Lorain County and 
Montgomery County, SysTest Labs has concluded that the ballot style used for 
Cuyahoga County can cause the AccuVote Optical Scanner to report either 
inaccurate results or report unexpected vote marks on blank ballot pages. 
Although the ballot layout and style used by Cuyahoga County is supported by 
and was developed using the Diebold GEMS Election Management System 
(EMS) and placement of the ovals on the ballots is consistent with Diebold’s 
specifications for oval placement and well within tolerances, our testing has 
shown that the proximity of the ovals to the thick black lines separating the 
various contests on each paper ballot places the black lines within the tolerance 
area (0.125 inches from the left and right of the center of the voting position and 
0.1 inches from the top and bottom of the center of the voting position).  This 
placement, when the oval happens to be aligned with a black line separator from 
a column to the left of the contest, can cause the optical scanner to erroneously 
identify what it believes to be a marked oval.  In Diebold’s “Test” mode, when 
blank ballots are run through the scanner for testing purposes, this can cause 
errors in reading the ballots (the scanner is expecting no votes cast).  Once the 
polls are open and actual voted ballots are processed by the scanners, this may 
cause inconsistent results.  The following figure illustrates the explanation. 
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The ballots developed by the Ballot Department within the BOE were similar to 
the style recommended by the Ohio Secretary of State’s office with a few 
exceptions.  The lines shown for separating contests and other text were of a 
greater weight on the Cuyahoga County absentee ballots and the placement of 
the ovals were marginally closer to these lines.  It is these differences that led to 
the issues with reading the absentee ballots.  SysTest Labs obtained ballots 
developed for Lorain County and Montgomery County, both of which were 
developed using the GEMS EMS and were successfully read by the Diebold 
AccuVote Optical Scan devices used in these counties.  The ballots for these 
counties used significantly thinner lines for contest and text separation and the 
ovals were placed approximately 1/4 of an inch away from the lines.  Neither 
Lorain County nor Montgomery County experienced any difficulties in processing 
the absentee ballots.  When ballots for Brookpark Precinct within Cuyahoga 
County were recreated using both the Lorain County and Montgomery County 
ballot styles and reprinted by MCR following the exact same process as that 
used for the original ballots, our testing found no issues in reading the blank 
ballots nor where there any inconsistent or inaccurate vote totals across 
Cuyahoga County’s AccuVote OS machines. 
SysTest Labs was unable to find any indication in the Diebold documentation that 
warns the user against placing the ovals for a printed absentee ballot to close to 
large black lines.  However, the Diebold Ballot Specifications guide (item no. 41 
in Section 1.3, Reference Documents) does specify that there is a tolerance area 
of 0.125 inches to the left and right of the center of the voting position and 0.1 
inch above and below the center of the voting position.  However, the ballot style 
and layout used by Cuyahoga County for the May 2, 2006 Primary was a valid 
ballot layout and style produced by the Diebold GEMS system.  
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2.2 Vendor Compliance 
SysTest Labs’ analysis of contractual documents, vendor provided deliverables, 
and interviews of key personnel from Diebold (the voting equipment 
manufacturer), MCR (the absentee ballot printer), and County Board of Elections 
(BOE) staff have shown that each Vendor has substantially met their contractual 
obligations. 
Results for both System testing and simulated elections have helped SysTest 
Labs to potentially identify the root cause of the failures of the ballots to be 
accurately read by the AccuVote Optical Scan equipment.  From the various 
tests that were run that repeated the County’s testing activities along with 
additional tests that were run using ballot styles taken from Lorain County and 
Montgomery County, SysTest Labs has concluded that the ballot style used for 
Cuyahoga County can cause the AccuVote Optical Scanner to report either 
inaccurate results or report errors on the ballot pages. 
Although the ballot layout and style used by Cuyahoga County is supported by 
and was developed using the Diebold GEMS Election Management System 
(EMS) and placement of the ovals on the ballots is consistent with Diebold’s 
specifications for oval placement and well within tolerances, our testing has 
shown that the proximity of the ovals to the thick black lines separating the 
various contests on each paper ballot can cause shadows on the ovals when 
being read by the optical scan device.  These shadows can cause the optical 
scanner to erroneously identify what it believes to be a marked oval.  In Diebold’s 
“Test” mode, when blank ballots are run through the scanner for testing 
purposes, this can cause errors in reading the ballots (the scanner is expecting 
blank ballots).  Once the polls are open and actual voted ballots are processed 
by the scanners, this may cause inconsistent results.   
The ballots developed by the Ballot Department within the BOE were similar to 
the style recommended by the Ohio Secretary of State’s office with a few 
exceptions.  The lines shown for separating contests and other text were of a 
greater weight on the Cuyahoga County absentee ballots and the placement of 
the ovals were marginally closer to these lines.  It is these differences that led to 
the issues with reading the absentee ballots.  SysTest Labs obtained ballots 
developed for Lorain County and Montgomery County, both of which were 
developed using the GEMS EMS and were successfully read by the Diebold 
AccuVote Optical Scan devices used in these counties.  The ballots for these 
counties used significantly thinner lines for contest and text separation and the 
ovals were placed approximately 3/16 of an inch away from the lines.  Neither 
Lorain County nor Montgomery County experienced any difficulties in processing 
the absentee ballots.  When ballots for Brookpark Precinct within Cuyahoga 
County were recreated using both the Lorain County and Montgomery County 
ballot styles and reprinted by MCR following the exact same process as that 
used for the original ballots, our testing found no issues in reading the blank 
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ballots nor where there any inconsistent or inaccurate vote totals across 
Cuyahoga County’s AccuVote OS machines. 
2.3 Operational Assessment  
Section 3.3 provides the detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations on 
a variety of operational issues that SysTest Labs considers to have contributed to 
the disappointing May election.  Overall, our observations lead us to believe that 
corrective actions can be taken and would be welcomed.   
2.3.1 Overall 
The Operational Assessment of the Cuyahoga Board of Elections was conducted 
through interviews, observations and review of documentation provided to the 
SysTest team.  It was our intent to conduct these interviews in a setting that 
allowed for the free flow of information from which we based a number of our 
findings and recommendations.   
Critical to our process were the observations and unofficial conversations that we 
had with employees throughout the Board of Elections facilities.  Hearing from 
those who actually perform the tasks and who have worked under the direction of 
multiple directors and/or Boards of Election, allowed us to form objection 
conclusions based on the diversity of opinions we encountered.  It was never our 
intent to lead conversations, only to be open to the thoughts, concerns and 
solutions shared by the many individuals with whom we conversed during our 
stay. 
Written documentation provided to the SysTest team was less than anticipated.  
The lack of formally written policies, processes and procedures or lack of 
knowledge of any written documented policies, processes and procedures 
confirmed our suspicions that institutional knowledge guides the day-to-day 
operations and organizational planning at the Board of Elections.  Though our 
team recognizes the difficulties faced when new technology is introduced into 
traditional settings, we can not stress enough the importance of outlining policies 
and procedures in writing both for the sake of those giving direction, but more 
importantly for those who are implementing the new processes. 
2.3.2 Timing of Ballot Testing and Preparation 
One of the most publicly criticized processes within the BOE was the timing of 
activities involved in testing of the ballots and performing logic and accuracy 
(L&A) tests.  SysTest Labs discovered through interviews that testing began on 
March 29, 2006, shortly before the absentee ballots were mailed to the voters, 
and that this initial testing was limited to confirmation that blank ballots could be 
read by one optical scan device in “Test Mode”.  It was reported that this test 
resulted in no errors although no test documentation exists to verify the results.  
Based on this test, the absentee ballot printer, MCR, was given the go-ahead to 
print, fold and stuff the envelopes.   
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Once the ballots were printed, folded and stuffed into envelopes, the BOE 
selected a random sample of these ballots and ran them through the optical 
devices, again, in the Test Mode.  It was reported that this test resulted in no 
errors although, again no test documentation exists to verify the results.  Based 
on these results the ballots were mailed to the voters.   
The L&A Tests were not performed on the absentee ballot system until the 
weekend of April 28, 2006.  Several factors contributed to the timing of this event, 
not the least of is that notification of a State Certified Central Count Server, a 
component critical to the absentee ballot system configuration planned for the 
May 2nd Primary, was not delivered to the Cuyahoga County BOE until March 23, 
2006.  In addition, the additional optical scanning equipment required for the 
absentee ballot voting did not arrive at BOE until April 14, 2006, the network 
components were not available for the BOE until April 19, 2006 and it took the 
both the County and the Diebold technician until April 28, 2006 to configure and 
connect the absentee ballot system to the Central Count server.  Regardless of 
the availability of printed absentee ballots for L&A testing, L&A testing could not 
be completed for the absentee ballot system until well after the ballots had to be 
mailed to the voters. 
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3 Quality Assurance Study  - Results and Recommendations 
3.1 Vendor Compliance Review 
SysTest Labs completed a review of the two (2) major contracts involved with the 
conduct of the absentee ballot process for the May 2, 2006 primary election in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio – Diebold Election Systems (hardware and software) 
and MCR (local printing).   A traceability matrix was prepared to allow the 
comparison of the Request for Proposal requirements with the actual 
performance and delivery activities and is included in this Report as Appendix C. 
A letter requesting information from the Ohio Secretary of State’s office was sent 
on June 6, 2006 requesting copies of 6 of the 10 deliverables described in 
Section 2 of the RFP that lead to the selection of Diebold.  These deliverables 
included: 
2.a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and Deployment Schedule 
(Deliverable 1) 
2.c Validation of State’s requirements (Deliverable 3) 
2.d Installed and configured DRE, PCOS, ABS and EMS system 
(Deliverable 4).  If this can be separated into absentee ballot System 
(ABS) and Election Management System (EMS) components, that 
would serve our purposes. 
2.e Documentation.  If this can be separated into absentee ballot System 
(ABS) and Election Management System (EMS) components, that 
would serve our purposes. 
2.g Training 
2.i Election Administration Support 
Secondly, SysTest Labs requested copies of the following Qualification and 
Certification Reports for the absentee ballot voting equipment  and related 
software used in the recent May primary election: 
1. Independent Test Authority (ITA) Qualification Report(s) 
2. State Certification Report(s) 
These reports provide information regarding the specific voting equipment and 
software configurations qualified by the ITA and certified by the Secretary of 
State’s office to be used in elections within the State of Ohio.  These reports 
would allow SysTest Labs to confirm that all equipment and configurations used 
by Cuyahoga County were both qualified and certified. 
Subsequently, SysTest Labs requested copies of the IV&V reports conducted by 
a contractor for the Secretary of State on the Diebold Accuvote OS devices that 
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were delivered in two (2) batches to Cuyahoga County.  This request was made 
on June 21, 2006. 
As of July 14, 2006, SysTest Labs has not received either the Qualification and 
Certification Reports or the IV&V reports. 
However, SysTest Labs did receive some of the requested information directly 
from Diebold, so we were able to complete portions of the traceability matrix that 
is attached as Appendix C. 
3.1.1 Vendor Relationships 
In our observations and discussions, the vendors who work with the Cuyahoga 
Board of Elections expressed difficulty in maintaining respectful and positive 
working relationships.  Vendor recommendations are not always followed.  The 
lack of project planning creates tension with the election vendors.  
Recommendation:  Consider vendor recommendations and select those that 
make operational and economic sense to the BOE. Creation and adherence to 
Master Project Plans which incorporate the Secretary of State’s election calendar 
is also recommended. 
3.1.2 Diebold Compliance Matrix 
No major discrepancies were found in Diebold’s contract performance.  However, 
the following items were identified as potential issues.  Due to non-receipt of the 
requested reports from the SOS office, SysTest Labs was unable to confirm 
items 1 and 2 shown in Exhibit 1 - Diebold Compliance Matrix.   
Item 3 has the potential for turning into a significant discrepancy.  SysTest Labs 
was unable to determine if the ballot style used by Cuyahoga County was tested 
in ITA Qualification or State Certification or if Diebold was aware of the potential 
for reading errors using this ballot style.  Regardless, SysTest Labs believes that 
if Cuyahoga County’s BOE Ballot Department staff had been trained in the use of 
GEMS prior to having created the ballots for the May Primary, the ballot styles 
would have more closely resembled the SOS’s recommended ballot style and the 
absentee ballot issues may have been avoided. 
Exhibit 1 - Diebold Compliance Matrix 
Item RFP/ Contract Requirement Discrepancy 
Description 
Recommendations 
1. All hardware and software 
components of the proposed 
system, including provisions for 
absentee voting and voters with 
disabilities, must comply with the 
FEC Voting System Standards. 
All hardware shall have achieved 
compliance at the time that the 
Exception - 
documentation 
requested but not 
provided by SOS 
Timely compliance by SOS 
office to requests from 
Election Review Panel 
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Item RFP/ Contract Requirement Discrepancy 
Description 
Recommendations 
proposal is submitted. Software 
and firmware shall have been 
submitted to the appropriate 
Independent Testing Agency 
(ITA) at the time the proposal is 
submitted, as evidenced by a 
letter from the ITA indicating 
receipt, and testing must be 
completed.  The proposal must 
contain a copy of a letter to each 
ITA authorizing the ITA to 
release to the State any records 
or test results related to the 
proposed voting system (Page 
17) 
2. Independent Test Authority.  
All equipment and software 
proposed must be qualified by 
an ITA or currently pending ITA 
qualification provided the system 
has successfully completed the 
source code review portion of 
the testing. The ITA certification 
must be demonstrated with a 
copy of the qualification 
certificate issued by NASED 
approved ITA, or documentation 
from a NASED approved ITA 
that the system is pending 
qualification and that the source 
code review portion of the 
testing is complete and 
satisfactory, must be included in 
the Executive Summary, along 
with signed authorization 
directing the ITA that performed 
or is currently performing the 
qualification testing.  
Exception - 
documentation 
requested but not 
provided by SOS 
Timely compliance by SOS 
office to requests from 
Election Review Panel 
3. absentee ballot System (ABS) 
systems should accurately report 
all votes cast. (Page 18) 
Exception – Used the 
GEMS EMS to create 
Cuyahoga County 
ballots in a ballot style 
that was provided by 
GEMS.  This style 
resulted in ballots that, 
Formal training of Ballot 
Department employees by 
Diebold on GEMS system.  
(This was completed during 
the week of June 26, 2006).  
Support from Diebold for the 
general election in November 
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Item RFP/ Contract Requirement Discrepancy 
Description 
Recommendations 
when read by the 
Diebold AccuVote 
Optical Scan device, 
caused erroneous 
and/or inconsistent 
results. 
2006.  A new contract with 
Diebold my be required to 
accomplish this 
recommendation. 
4. Provisional Voting.  Offerors 
shall discuss how their DRE, 
precinct count optical scan, and 
ABS voting equipment, as well 
as the EMS, can separate 
provisional ballots from non-
provisional ballots cast at the 
precinct on Election Day and 
discuss how results from 
provisional ballots can be easily 
downloaded into the final tally of 
votes if those provisional ballots 
are determined to be eligible for 
counting. 
Exception.  -  Unable 
to determine from 
Diebold 
documentation how 
these required 
election functions 
were accomplished. 
Diebold document a formal 
process as prescribed by the 
Ohio Secretary of State. 
5. Attachment 4.  To confirm 
successful installation and 
configuring of all DRE, precinct 
count optical scan, ABS and 
EMS systems, the Vendor will: 
• Comply with all delivery and 
set-up dates detailed in 
Attachment 10; and 
• Prepare, assure completion of 
and submit a checklist filled-in 
and signed by a duly authorized 
State representative attesting to 
the successful installation, 
configuration and testing of 
equipment at each location. 
(Page 25). 
Exceptions - delivery 
and testing 
documentation not 
available. Diebold 
formal Work 
Breakdown structure 
not provided.  Several 
versions have been 
reviewed. 
Unable to find delivery 
confirmation for 
second shipment of 15 
OS devices.  Unable 
to document testing 
checklist. 
Timely compliance by Diebold 
and the Ohio Secretary of 
State’s office to requests 
made by the Election Review 
Panel. 
6. 8. Describe in detail the method 
for handling recounts on each 
Voting System. Electronic 
recount? Manual recount? Can 
each voter’s ballot image be 
reproduced as is? If so, does 
voter anonymity remain in 
Exception.  Available 
Diebold 
documentation does 
not describe these 
processes.  County 
processes unavailable 
as well. 
Diebold document a formal 
process as prescribed by the 
Ohio Secretary of State. 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page 20 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02  July 14, 2006 
Item RFP/ Contract Requirement Discrepancy 
Description 
Recommendations 
place? (Page 25) 
 
3.1.3 Diebold Training Compliance Matrix 
Diebold generally complied with the requirements of the Master Contract with the 
Ohio Secretary of State’s office and offered all of the required training.  However, 
Cuyahoga County opted to customize the training program and did not fully 
utilize the services offered by Diebold in several instances (See the Operational 
Assessment for details).  The training compliance matrix is incorporated into this 
report in Appendix C as a table. Two exceptions were noted in the SysTest Labs 
review: 
Item RFP Training Requirement Diebold RFP Response Not Achieved 
1.  + Positive Diebold RFP 
Response 
- Not Achieved 
  
2.  • Conduct of a recount + − 
3.  • Conduct of a contested election + − 
3.1.4 MCR Printer Compliance Matrix 
Several exceptions were noted regarding ballot delivery dates.  However, the 
data suggests that the delays were primarily due to County editing and ballot 
correction rather than issues with MCR.  We have not confirmed two activities 
outlined in the RFP: 
Item RFP Section RFP Requirement Issue description Recommendations 
1.  3 CCBOE will provide a file 
from past elections for the 
vendor to provide 20 proofs of 
precinct OS ballots and 20 
proofs of absentee ballots 
Documentation not 
available to 
confirm this 
activity 
CCBOE provide 
documentation of 
this activity. 
2.  7 Final inspection of the printing 
equipment and supplies.  No 
ballots to be printed until final 
approval granted by BOE. 
Documentation not 
available to 
confirm this 
activity 
CCBOE provide 
documentation of 
this activity. 
 
Recommendation.  One recommendation that would improve the County testing 
process for future elections would be to require that all initial ballot test decks 
arrive at least six (6) weeks prior to the election for Logic and Accuracy Testing.  
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This was suggested by MCR in their correspondence to the Cuyahoga Election 
Review Panel on July 5, 2006 and SysTest Labs endorses that recommendation. 
3.1.5 Timelines 
Ohio of Secretary of State (SOS), Cuyahoga County and Diebold created several 
different timelines for the entire election process.  These versions included: 
1. 2006 Ohio Election Calendar – SOS 
2. 2006 Implementation Calendar (beginning in 2005) – Cuyahoga County 
3. May Primary 2006 Voter Education Plan – Cuyahoga County 
4. May 2, 2006 Master Project Plan – Cuyahoga County 
5. Cuyahoga County Optical Scan Timeline – Cuyahoga County 
6. Cuyahoga Calendar of Events Leading To May 2 Election Day – May 9, 
2006 – Diebold.  This is a recap of events, not a project timeline. 
7. Training Implementation Plan – Cuyahoga – May 06 – Diebold 
8. CCBOE Imp. Project May – Diebold 
The primary issue with these diverse schedules from multiple sources is that a 
single project plan with management sign-off was never created.  This lead to 
lack of coordination of key activities required to complete all required activities in 
a timely manner. 
Recommendation.  SysTest Labs recommends that the CCBOE create a single, 
master election project plan that includes all major activities for all entities 
including SOS, hardware/software vendors, printers and other election supply 
vendors.  A Project Management Office (PMO) should be established at the 
CCBOE and accountable to the Director and Deputy Director. A formal process 
with sign-offs and exceptions documented should be implemented for the next 
major election cycle. 
Milestone and completion charts should be posted in each major department and 
updated on a regular basis.  This should conform to the SOS election calendar, 
Cuyahoga County implementation calendar and master project plan.  Weekly 
status meetings should be established and each department held accountable for 
projected milestones.  Missed deadlines should be escalated with forecasted 
impact and proposed resolution included. 
3.2 System Testing and Simulations 
As indicated above, SysTest Labs developed a Master Test Plan that consisted 
of eight (8) separate tests using the Cuyahoga County AccuVote OS systems 
provided by Diebold.  The tests were conducted in both precinct and central 
counts modes.  All tests were conducted at the County Board of Elections 
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facilities in Cleveland, OH.  The following provides a summary of those testing 
activities: 
3.2.1 Precinct Count Mode 
SysTest Labs used three (3) OS units – two from the initial shipment of five (5) 
and one from the second shipment of fifteen (15) units.   
3.2.1.1 Test One – Precinct Mode. 
Three machines indicated actual votes on blank ballots: 
Serial Number % of Errors 
37741  8.5 % 
31038 3 % 
37730 45 % 
 
3.2.1.2 Test Two  
The results from Test 2 were used to verify the process used in Test 1 (and 
subsequent tests) as well as the results from Test 1. 
3.2.1.3 Test Three – Precinct Mode, Custom Voted Ballots 
Of the three optical scan devices used for this test, the results from one of the 
machines did not match the expected vote counts.  SysTest Labs believes that 
this is related to the ballot style.   
3.2.1.4 Test Four – Precinct Mode 
SysTest Labs used the same three units indicated in Test One with the 
Brookpark precincts 1 – 4 (same used for County Logic and Accuracy Tests.  
Inaccurate results were indicated on one of the three machines including under 
votes and over votes. 
3.2.2 Central Count Mode 
3.2.2.1 Test Five – Central Count Mode 
SysTest Labs used seventeen (17) machines configured in central count mode 
with the same Brookpark test deck described in Test Four).  70.6%  (12/17) 
reported inaccuracies in the 87 races contested: 
Serial Number Test Results 
37747 Accurate Vote Count 
38896 Accurate Vote Count 
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Serial Number Test Results 
31039 Accurate Vote Count 
40450 Accurate Vote Count 
38654 Accurate Vote Count 
31055 Inaccurate Vote Count 
38671 Inaccurate Vote Count 
37674 Inaccurate Vote Count 
31110 Inaccurate Vote Count 
31397 Inaccurate Vote Count 
40409 Inaccurate Vote Count 
31060 Inaccurate Vote Count 
31047 Inaccurate Vote Count 
37730 Inaccurate Vote Count 
31048 Inaccurate Vote Count 
 
3.2.2.2 Test Six – Central Count Mode 
Inaccuracies were detected in that in races that were not voted, certain 
candidates received votes. 
3.2.2.3 Test Seven – Central Count Mode, Election Simulation 
Of the three optical scan devices used for this test, the results from one of the 
machines did not match the expected vote counts.  SysTest Labs believes that 
this is related to the ballot style.   
3.2.2.4 Test Eight – Ballot Style Comparison 
SysTest Labs has recommended a series of follow-on tests using a different 
ballot design.  When SysTest Labs reviewed the February 2006 Cuyahoga 
County OS ballots and ballots created for both Montgomery and Lorain Counties, 
Ohio for the May 2006 primaries, it was observed that the oval used to indicate a 
vote for a candidate or yes/no for an issue was one column to the right of the 
position selected by Cuyahoga County for the May 2006 election.  In combination 
with a thick black, horizontal line used to separate races/issues, the position of 
this blank oval may cause “phantom” votes to be counted or other inaccuracies to 
occur.   
These tests involve the use of two new ballot designs using the Brookpark ballots 
from May 2006 primary to create two (2) new sets of test decks following both the 
Montgomery County and Lorain County styles.  SysTest Labs will then conduct 
another series of test with these new “decks” in both central count and precinct 
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modes.  This will allow the determination to be made if the inaccuracies 
encountered are actually a result of the ballot design.  We expect to conduct 
theses tests during the week of July 10, 2006 and will update this draft report 
with those results. 
SysTest Labs used five (5) machines configured in central count mode with the 
same Brookpark test deck described in Test Five printed using the ballot styles 
used at Lorain County and Montgomery County.  There were 0% reported 
inaccuracies in the 87 races contested. 
Serial Number No. of Tally Errors or Inconsistencies  
S/N 40409 0 
S/N 31110 0 
S/N 31397 0 
S/N 37730 0 
S/N 31060 0 
 
SysTest Labs used two (2) machines configured in precinct count mode with 
blank Brookpark test deck printed using the ballot styles used at Lorain County 
and Montgomery County.  There were no errors in reading the ballots. 
Serial Number % of Errors 
S/N 37741 0% 
S/N 31038 0 %  
 
SysTest Labs believes that the inaccurate voting results that were observed in 
both central count and precinct count modes may be due to ballot design, as 
opposed to printing quality or machine defects.   
The optical scan ballot pages produced by MCR for the May 2, 2006 election 
were produced well within the tolerances specified by Diebold and attached by 
Cuyahoga County to the ballot printing specifications, even accounting for minor 
deviations that may have been due to the conversion from GEMS to Adode 
Acrobat (.pdf) files. 
3.2.3 Issues 
3.2.3.1 Full Memory Card  
The AccuVote Optical Scan system does not provide an error message if the 
128KB memory card is full and is unable to record additional votes. 
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3.2.3.2 User Guides 
The AccuVote OS Users Guide does not accurately reflect the actual AccuVote 
optical scan procedures required to open and close an election.  SysTest Labs 
followed the AccuVote OS User Guides provided to the County for the processes 
of opening and closing an election.  We were unable to correctly open and close 
the election using the steps defined in the User Guides. 
3.2.3.3 GEMS Audit Log 
The GEMS Audit Log process, in the Central count configuration, failed to 
capture an attempt to vote with an invalid ballot.  This is a requirement from the 
Voting Systems Standards, Version 2002. 
3.2.4 Recommendations 
SysTest Labs recommends that the Cuyahoga County Ballot Department avoid 
using the ballot style used in the May 2, 2006 Primary Election and follow the 
ballot styles adopted by Lorain County. 
SysTest Labs recommends that the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and 
the Secretary of State’s Board of Machine Examiners discuss with Diebold the 
following issues: 
 the lack of a warning message for a Full 128KB Memory Card 
 accuracy of User Guide instructions 
 missing audit log entry 
3.3 Operational Assessment 
The operational assessment was intended to ascertain if the county’s processes 
and procedures were either complete or sufficient enough to support effective 
preparation for a Primary or General Election.  The following items are detailed 
findings, conclusions and recommendations on a variety of operational issues 
that SysTest Labs considers to have contributed to the disappointing May 
election process.  Over all ,our observations lead us to believe that corrective 
actions can be taken that would help to ensure that the issues encountered in 
preparation for the May Primary are not repeated for any future elections. 
3.3.1 Lack of Knowledge of documented processes and procedures 
One of the greatest issues within the BOE organization is a lack of knowledge by 
the workers that certain processes and procedures exist.  When the Department 
Managers and Assistant Managers were asked by SysTest Labs if documented 
processes and procedures were available for our review, we were told that they 
did not exist.  Though numerous requests were made to secure what 
documentation exists, to date only those in place for Booth Officials and Voter 
Outreach were provided to the SysTest Labs team and not until July 11, 2006 did 
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we receive any additional documentation and those that were received had not 
been reviewed and/or updated in over 3 years.  Subsequently to July 11, 2006, 
SysTest Labs received a great deal of documentation from the Director of 
Election and the Deputy Director of Elections regarding the primary activities 
required to conduct elections.  The documentation received from the Director of 
Election and the Deputy Director of Elections has been summarized in Appendix 
F. 
Institutional memory and reliance on “how we’ve always done things” plagued the 
implementation of new systems and procedures.     
Recommendation:  SysTest Labs cannot stress enough the need for process 
and procedure documentation referencing the statutes and directives that guide 
their implementation.  In addition, training, use, and continuous improvement of 
the process and procedures must be enforced throughout the organization. 
3.3.2 Delay in preparation Central Count 
The inability of the memory cards to handle the complex election anticipated in 
May was discovered as early as November 2005.  On December 28, 2005 twenty 
additional optical scanners were requested from the Secretary of State office 
presumably to be used in Precinct Count configuration.  On March 23 it was 
determined that even with the additional units, there was not enough room on the 
memory cards to handle the 2,000 different ballot styles and that pre-sorting the 
voted absentee ballots by ballot style would be extraordinarily time consuming 
and inefficient.  Diebold suggested going to Central Count configuration, an 
option that had not been previously identified.  The certification by the Secretary 
of States Office of the Central Count configuration was not finalized with the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections until March 23, 2006. Implementation of 
this configuration required the Diebold technicians to attend specialized training 
which took place on April 22, 2006 in Canton, OH.  
Fifteen optical scan units were delivered to Cuyahoga County on April 14.  No 
documentation verifies whether or not these units received IV&V.  Additionally, 
the bill of lading, that SysTest Labs was given by Diebold did not identify serial 
numbers of the machines delivered and the person who actually signed the 
delivery receipt can not be identified as an employee of the BOE. It is our belief 
that this was not the appropriate document. 
On April 7 it was determined that a network switch, cables and connectors were 
required to complete the Central Count configuration.  Diebold provided the BOE 
with a list and price for the required ancillary supplies.  It was not until April 10 
that Diebold answered the BOE’s request to confirm the equipment list was 
correct, thus further delaying the ordering of the equipment. Because the cost 
exceeded $15,000, the requirement to utilize the bid process using the “lowest 
and best” award practices caused delay in the purchase of the supplies needed.  
The bid was awarded to CDW and delivery of these supplies was made on April 
24 and April 25.  Although it was believed that the OTS (off the shelf) ancillary 
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supplies purchased from CDW would adequately address the configuration 
needs, additional wiring and reconfiguration was required to accomplish this 
effort.   
After gaining assurance from Diebold that the BOE had everything needed to 
support the Central Count configuration; it was on April 26 discovered that a 
“Batch Start Card” was required to begin the Central Count process.  This was 
requested from Diebold and delivered to Cuyahoga County BOE on April 27.  
Recommendation:  Since the May 2 election critical staff has attended further 
training on the GEMS system.  It is SysTest Labs’s recommendation that ongoing 
training be provided and that Cuyahoga BOE elicit assistance from Diebold in 
ballot creation, especially so for the November election. 
3.3.3 Incomplete training of permanent and temporary staff 
Training inadequacies are evident throughout the organization from ballot design 
and preparation to training of Booth Officials and Election Day Technicians.   
Bob Baker, hired on November 22, 2005, stated that he was not properly-trained 
for the efforts he was asked to undertake.  Although his credentials included 
election support for five Ohio Counties as a contractor for Diebold, he had not 
received Diebold training on either the DIMS (Data Information Management 
System) or GEMS (Global Election Management System).   
Booth Official training needs were identified in a preliminary meeting held with 
Diebold on December 12.  It was determined that a Train the Trainer program 
would need to be implemented and Diebold recommended their five day course 
which they believed would provide the training needed for the trainers to be 
competent to train the 6,000 plus Booth Officials for the May 2006 election.  
Retired teachers were identified to be the appropriate candidates for this effort 
and forty were selected and secured by the Booth Official department.  On 
February 24, Mr. Thomas met with Diebold to discuss the specifics of this 
training.  The recommended training schedule was modified by the BOE Director 
and reduced from five days to two and one half days.  When the training actually 
took place, a power outage on day one caused the training to be cancelled 
resulting in the Train the Trainer program to be condensed into one and one half 
days from the recommended five. 
In as much as Diebold provided the Cuyahoga BOE their completed Booth 
Official training manual and an Election Day Quick Reference Guide, in January 
it was determined that Cuyahoga County would produce a customized training 
manual.  Pam Heschel of ITC. Inc was hired to create the manual as well as to 
assist in developing the Train the Trainer program.  Delays in printing the training 
manual abound.  The BOE suggests that Diebold was uncooperative in providing 
the artwork requested and Diebold counters saying the requests were untimely 
and from their perspective unnecessary given the fact that they willingly offered 
their training documentation.  Multiple drafts were created and ultimately the BOE 
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Director took responsibility for final edits and proofing for print.  When the Booth 
Official training classes began on March 20, the training manuals were 
incomplete or not available for distribution, consequently some Booth Officials did 
not receive manuals until they were mailed to them well after the fact. 
Booth Official training followed the same timelines as training in the past even 
though new voting equipment was being used countywide for the first time.  
Three hour training sessions were planned with attendance limited to 
approximately thirty people per class.  320 classes were scheduled during the six 
weeks prior to the election.  In one interview with BOE staff the first days of 
training were categorized as “disasters”.  The trainers were not prepared and the 
materials were not available There was a reported drop out rate of three hundred 
Booth Officials after they had attended the training. 
Once it was identified that the complexities of the TSx machines to be used at 
the polling places far surpassed the abilities of traditional poll workers (Booth 
Officials) Cuyahoga BOE agreed to hire Election Day Technicians (EDTs) to be 
present at each of the 578 sites.  EDTs were recruited and hired by the BOE 
Administrative Assistants, mitigating the role of the Booth Official department and 
infusing non-election oriented personnel into an already contentious mix.  In 
addition to the standard three hour training attended by all Booth Officials, EDTs 
were provided and additional two hours of training in order to troubleshoot 
machine malfunctions on Election Day. Shortfalls of the EDT training include a 
lack of troubleshooting techniques, in that problem scenarios could not be 
created on which to train, as well as limited knowledge by some of the trainers of 
TSx operations.  The amount of phone calls from polling locations the morning of 
the election indicated to the BOE that some polling locations were unprepared to 
open the polls without assistance, Diebold, who per there contractual obligations 
supplied trained personnel to assist at the polling sites. The BOE had 
understaffed their call center, and so, poll workers, finding the Diebold help 
center number in their documentation, placed calls directly to Diebold.  
Recommendations: DIMS and GEMS training for the BOE Ballot department 
staff.  
Follow the Diebold recommended training for the Train the Trainer and Poll 
Worker training programs.  
Establish a project plan for the creation of all training documentation. Bring in 
volunteer, experienced poll workers to run through the documentation for 
comprehensibility in a practice election day environment before documentation 
publication. 
The Booth Officials department should qualify, hire, and train potential EDTs. It is 
also recommended that the 17 year old poll workers with technical understanding 
be allowed to fill the EDT positions. 
The BOE should have a plan for worse case senarios for the opening and closing 
of the poll locations and have alternative plans in place. 
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3.3.4 Use of Temporary Workers 
In the Candidate/Voter Services department, training concerns are also evident.  
No documentation was provided of written guidelines, policies and/or procedures 
for the qualification and input of voter registration applications, absentee ballot 
applications, or signature verification on returned voted absentee ballot secrecy 
envelopes.  This lack of documentation leads us to conclude that the “tribal 
knowledge – institutional memory” training prevails and that OTJ (on the job 
training) is what directs the processing of these critical functions throughout this 
department. 
In as much as temporary workers required for voter registration and absentee 
ballot processing tasks are needed to handle the volume in these activities, it 
appeared that they were individually allowed to qualify applications and to verify 
signatures for absentee ballot qualification.  Traditionally a bi-partisan team 
should be assigned this important final step before voted absentee ballots are 
approved and readied to be counted. 
Recommendation:  SysTest Labs recommends that all policies and procedures 
be documented and reviewed for adherence to Ohio law.  Signature verification 
criteria should be well documented and training should take place specifically on 
this function.  Bi-partisan review of registrations, applications and signed 
affidavits should be standard practice. 
3.3.5 Lack of Overall Detailed Project Plan  
Project plans and timelines were made available to our team from the Director 
and Assistant Director which revealed how uncoordinated the overall election 
planning was.  Early deadlines were missed resulting in an ongoing effort to try to 
catch up.  The most clearly defined and adhered to plan was that created for 
Voter Outreach.  Over 600 demonstrations were scheduled and took place 
between June 2005 and the May election.  Eleven full time personnel were 
dedicated to this effort in addition to ten temporary staff that were primarily 
recruited from the Booth Official pool of employees.  Additionally, a county-wide 
mailer was sent providing instructions to voters about Election Day voting and 
their precinct location assigned. 
Recommendations:  SysTest Labs recommends that training be provided to 
departmental managers and assistant managers on project management and 
plan documentation.  Each department should identify its various responsibilities 
and document all policies and procedures for reference and training purposes. 
3.3.6 Qualifications of Temporary Workers 
As we understand, the temporary worker classification is a long-standing tradition 
in Cuyahoga County and one utilized throughout the BOE.  Certainly the 
increased workload prior to and immediately following any election gives cause 
to have temporary workers, but it was unclear to our team the advantage of 
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employing so many “short term employees” at crunch times in lieu of having 
better trained permanent staff which would provide greater continuity and 
professional work practices on the efforts that are truly year round 
responsibilities.   
Take for example Booth Official recruiting.  There are four full time employees 
and one manager assigned to the recruitment of Booth Officials.  Prior to each 
election, temporary employees are brought in to assist the full timers in recruiting 
the 6,000 or so Booth Workers required for a county-wide election.  These 
temporary workers are assigned particular districts, i.e. cities and/or wards in 
which to recruit.  Prior to each election and after politically appointed Booth 
Officials are identified each potential Booth Official is called on the phone, 
assigned to a polling location and assigned for training.  Correspondence is 
mailed to the Booth Officials and a signed confirmation is returned to the 
department by the Booth Official acknowledging their commitment to attend 
training and work at the polling location assigned.  Given the complexities of this 
important function and the benefit of securing long term commitments from Booth 
Officials, it would seem reasonable to annually identify Booth Officials, appoint 
them for each applicable election in a year’s time and strive for continuity and 
commitment from those willing to work each year.  Instead, the four full time 
employees spend considerable time training the temporary workers on the 
logistics of recruitment and assignments.  They have minimal control over who is 
called once cold calling begins and their oversight is compromised by the 
turnover in staff assigned to their department. 
These temporary workers were also assigned to the help desk on Election Day to 
troubleshoot problems at the polling locations.  Insufficient training was 
evidenced by their inability to walk Booth Officials through processes, as they 
themselves had not received adequate training on the TSx equipment.  
Excessive calls to the help desk overwhelmed the staff and resulted in phone 
lines ringing busy for other Booth Officials attempting to get assistance. 
Recommendation:  Minimum standards should be identified for temporary 
workers and strictly adhered to.  All temporary workers should receive thorough 
training in their respective areas and be provided written direction as well as 
documented policies and procedures. 
3.3.7 Maintenance and Storage of Equipment 
Issues that came to our attention were more logistical than operational in that 
5,406 TSx machines take up a tremendous amount of space and require multiple 
stages of preparation prior to each election.  The need for additional power 
became evident upon delivery of the machines as each unit had to be powered, 
drained and re-powered prior to delivery to the polling locations.  Additionally, 
each machine had to be tested for logic and accuracy and then programmed with 
the scripts provided by the Ballot Department.  
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Multiple unit transport and storage carts are in use, however not enough have 
been purchased to store every unit.  Use of these carts greatly reduces the 
opportunity for damage both at the warehouse and in transporting equipment to 
the polling locations. 
A wet sprinkler system is in use in the warehouse and should it be activated, the 
damage would be significant.   
On June 27th SysTest Labs visited the warehouse for a second interview and 
observed a security breech:  
When the buzzer was not answered at the front door an employee from a 
different office in the building allowed us to ‘piggy-back’ into the building when 
she opened the secured door with her pass key. When we got to the second floor 
we were allowed entrance into the warehouse as a temporary worker opened the 
secure door to leave on a break. We entered the warehouse and walked into the 
offices unchallenged. 
Recommendation:  Additional storage carts should be purchase as soon as 
possible.  The warehouse should either be retro-fitted to a dry sprinkler system 
and/or water proof covers purchased that would cover the storage carts. 
Tighten and adhere to security policies. 
3.3.8 Delay in L&A Testing 
Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing was significantly delayed for the TSx units as 
ballot scripts were not made available until April 12.  Early scripts were 
inaccurate and confusing and have to be rewritten for programming.  The delays 
compounded the urgency of testing and Election Day programming requiring 
multiple shifts scheduled to complete this function.  Temporary staff as well as 
other BOE employees, i.e. Comptroller, were recruited to assist in the effort.  On 
the job training was the method employed to complete this critical function. 
Diebold warned the BOE that the delay caused by the TSx L&A testing would 
have negative ramifications on the Optical Scanner testing. All manpower was 
diverted from the OS testing to the TSx testing. 
Recommendation:  SysTest Labs encourages the BOE to establish timelines 
that are realistic and allow for systematic and well supervised testing and 
programming of the TSx units.  Training should be provided well in advance of 
the actual testing and those who participate should receive written 
documentation on testing and programming procedures. 
3.3.9 Delay in receipt of Final Test Desks for AccuVote OS System 
The fact that the test decks for the optical scan system were not received until 
days before the election is incomprehensible.  No ballots should have been 
released to voters until all programming and testing had been completed.  As we 
understand it, the only testing done prior to the mailing of the absentee ballots 
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was to make sure that they were accepted by the optical scanners and that the 
counter incremented accordingly.  No predetermined tests were run on marked 
ballots to ensure that the votes were being recorded correctly.  Had this testing 
taken place prior to the mailing of ballots the inaccuracies found when testing did 
occur the day before the election, could have been identified and remedied well 
in advance.   
Recommendation:  SysTest Labs suggests that testing of any and all optical 
scan ballots and equipment be scheduled to take place well in advance of ballot 
distribution to the public.  Test decks should be created and tested prior to 
printing any and all additional ballots.  Testing must include voted ballots, ballots 
that have been folded for mailing as well as blank ballots.  A test plan should be 
written and followed.  All tests run should be logged and results documented in 
writing.  Test decks, results and documentation should be sealed and secured for 
use in Election Day testing and post election testing of equipment.  Each and 
every optical scan device should be tested using consistent procedures. 
3.3.10 Machine Security on Election Day 
TSx machines are programmed prior to the delivery to the polling locations.  
Once programmed the machines are sealed with tamper tape and security seals.  
The tamper tape and the seals are purchased for an election supply company 
and though the supply company monitors their sales, realistically these supplies 
could in the possession of almost anyone.  Though the security seals are 
numbered, these numbers are not tracked when the machines are sealed nor are 
they verified when the seals are broken at the polling locations. 
Recommendation:  SysTest Labs recommends that customized security seals 
and tape be purchased and that all security seal numbers be recorded when the 
units are sealed and verified by the Booth Officials at the polling locations when 
the seals are broken.   Due to the large number of TSx devices used in 
Cuyahoga County, we recommend the customization include a bar code that can 
be tracked electronically. 
3.3.11 Security for Precinct Material Bags 
Precinct material bags are sealed with the same or similar security seals 
addressed in 1.1.1.10.  Numbered seals are used, however no tracking is done 
to ensure that the bags have not been opened once transported to the polling 
locations and sealed again by someone other than an election official. 
Recommendation:  SysTest Labs recommends that customized security seals 
be purchased and that all security seal numbers be recorded when material bags 
are sealed and verified by the Booth Officials at the polling locations when the 
seals are broken.   Due to the large number of material bags used in Cuyahoga 
County, we recommend the customization include a bar code that can be tracked 
electronically. 
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3.3.12 Location of Election Supplies 
Post election observations reveled that election supplies were located in a variety 
of places throughout the BOE facility.  Inventory and security seemed to be 
relatively haphazard. 
Recommendation:  Because of the inadequacy of storage at the BOE facility, 
perhaps a centralized location in or near the warehouse would better serve this 
function.  In this regard, transport of the supply bags from the BOE to the 
warehouse would be eliminated and all items could be stocked, inventoried and 
secured in one central location. 
3.3.13 Instructions on Absentee ballots and Pamphlets 
Voter instructions included with the absentee ballots failed to address the 
requirement that the ballot stubs not be torn off or separated from the ballots.  
Because the voter’s identity and mailing address were printed on these stubs, 
voters understandably were confused and some removed the stubs unaware that 
their ballots would be disqualified and not counted.  Review of ballots from other 
counties showed that the instructions “Important - do not removed ballot stub” 
was printed on each of the ballot stubs.  This was not the case in Cuyahoga 
County. 
Another problem with the instructions arose with the fact that the instructions 
state that the ballots can only be filled in using a black or blue ballpoint pen. 
According to the SOS (and the ballots from Lorain and Montgomery Counties) a 
#2 pencil is also allowed. Ballots were initially with held because they had been 
filled out with pencil. 
Recommendation:  Firstly, no individual’s information should be printed on the 
ballot and/or ballot stub.  The voters identifying information should be printed on 
the reverse side of the ballot secrecy envelope so that once the ballot is removed 
from that envelope no identifying information is available on the ballot.  Secondly, 
both the instructions and the stubs of the ballot should have instructions to the 
voter that removal of the stubs will cause the ballot not to be counted. Thirdly, the 
instructions should read, “Use a blue or black ink pen or a #2 pencil to fill in the 
oval”. 
3.3.14 Transport of Voted absentee ballots 
In our interviews we were informed that absentee ballots that could not be 
qualified due to incomplete information and/or signature variances were first 
reviewed by the Candidate/Voter Services manager and/or assistant manager 
and then, if not resolved, where delivered to the Director’s office for review by the 
Director and/or Assistant Director for qualification.  It was explained that a 
transmittal sheet accompanied the ballots, but it was unclear whether the ballots 
were tracked by number in the batch or by individual voter name.  Regardless, 
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the ballots left Candidate/Voter Services department for an undisclosed period of 
time while being reviewed. 
Recommendation:  At no time should voted absentee ballots be out of the 
control of Candidate/Voter Services department until they are transported to the 
Tabulation Room for counting.  Written procedures must be developed and 
strictly adhered to prevent any speculation of improprieties. 
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4 Vendor Compliance Review Methodology 
SysTest Labs’ vendor compliance thread was designed as a detailed review of 
the contractual relationship between the Cuyahoga County Board of County 
Commissioners and /or the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its primary 
vendors for voting equipment and ballot printing.  The methodology was 
designed to both identify and remediate the issues defined by the CCBCC and 
the CERP.  Specifically our vendor compliance thread assessed the following 
areas of need as identified by the Board of Elections: 
1. Contract Review.  Review the contracts governing the services performed 
by both the printer and Diebold to evaluate the level of compliance with 
terms and conditions related to the absentee system 
2. Vendor Performance.  Review the requirements/specifications outlined in 
the RFP and evaluate the vendor’s performance against those 
requirements 
3. Timelines.  Review election project  plans and vendor’s compliance 
4. Deliverable Review.  Review and evaluate the quality of deliverables 
produced by the vendor and the effectiveness of the County’s review 
process 
The specific activities that SysTest Labs engaged in to complete this area of 
work include: 
4.1 Contract and RFP Review Activities 
SysTest Labs reviewed Diebold’s response to the RFP and the contracts from 
both Diebold and the county’s chosen vendor for printing ballots.  As part of the 
review, the team developed a contractual obligations matrix (Appendix C - 
Traceability Matrix) to determine whether the vendors met the stated 
requirements.  SysTest Labs also interviewed the County’s Contracting Officer to 
discuss and clarify various contract terms and other specifics related to the two 
contracts.    SysTest Labs analyzed this information to identify problems with the 
existing contracts and also to identify opportunities for improvement. 
4.1.1 RFP Review Activities 
In conjunction with the contractual review above, SysTest Labs reviewed the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) released by the County.  The team completed the 
following activities: 
1. Reviewed requirements/specifications outlined within the RFP 
2. Facilitated stakeholder interview with the appropriate County personnel to 
review/confirm the business objectives for the absentee system  
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3. Completed a requirements traceability matrix for the absentee system that 
will classify each RFP requirements as “satisfied” or “not achieved” by the 
vendor 
4. Assessed the alignment of the targeted County objectives and the 
documented requirements/specifications within the RFP 
5. Outlined recommendations for requirement/specification clarifications that 
are more closely aligned with targeted County objectives 
6. Reviewed Requirement/Clarification recommendations and Requirement 
Traceability Matrix findings with CERP  
7. Outlined an implementation plan for the vendor to address “not achieved” 
requirements 
4.1.2 Vendor Contract Performance 
SysTest Labs evaluated the performance of Diebold and the printing vendor 
following the analysis of the RFP and the contracts.  In addition to the tasks 
mentioned above, SysTest Labs completed the following activities and reviews: 
1. Interviewed the County’s Project Manager staff and appropriate team 
members to evaluate the critical components of the project  
a. RFP Project Timeline (Vendor’s Compliance) 
b. Project Timeline Revisions (Causes of timeline changes) 
c. Inventory of Project Deliverables 
d. Deviations from the RFP and corresponding documentation (i.e. 
Change Request Forms, Project Plan Documents) 
e. Quality Management Process 
f. Issue/Risk Management Process 
g. Capability Transfer Programs (Training, Knowledge Transfer, Support)  
h. Testing Strategies/Processes 
i. Project Deliverable Review/Approval Process 
j. Capability Deployment Process (transitioning from deliverable to 
production) 
2. Review Project Deliverables 
a. Reviewed system design deliverables for completeness and 
compliance with defined requirements and stated Board objectives 
b. Reviewed process deliverables for compliance with defined 
requirements and stated County objectives 
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c. Reviewed Training deliverables for completeness, usability, and 
consistency with process deliverables 
d. Reviewed Testing deliverables and evaluate level of consistency with 
the defined requirements and quality expectations of the County 
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5 System Testing and Simulations Methodology 
5.1 Master Test Plan 
SysTest Labs developed a Master Test Plan required to provide guidance and 
standards for the onsite election system testing activities.  Seven separate tests 
were designed and executed with the goal to understand the anomalies that were 
observed by Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, MCR and Diebold staff in the 
days leading up to the May 2, 2006 primary elections.  SysTest Labs was able to 
re-create a number of the scenarios during its independent testing including the 
counting of Primary Election ballots that were clearly blank. Also, different vote 
counts were obtained during the testing in both precinct and central count modes 
using exactly the same ballot pages. 
5.2 Access to Election Systems and Primary Ballots 
1. SysTest Labs had access to the following items as test inputs: 
a. Sample blank ballots pulled randomly from the supply of blank ballots 
provided by the Ballot Printer, MCR. 
b. Original 20 Test Decks (containing 25 voted ballots each) that were 
used for the County’s official Logic and Accuracy Test (L&A Test) on 
April 30, 2006 and May 1, 2006. 
c. Sample test ballots that were hand voted by The SysTest Labs team. 
2. SysTest Labs had access to all 20 AccuVote optical scan devices planned 
for use as the absentee ballot voting machines. 
3. SysTest Labs had access to a fully configured absentee ballot 
configuration that includes the AccuVote optical scanners (configurations 
with 3 precinct count and 16 central count AccuVote machines), the 
Digiport servers (2), the network switch, and the Central Count Server 
(GEMS). 
4. The three (3) machines that were converted back to Precinct Count 
configurations by Diebold Technicians on the morning of May 2, 2006 
remained in that configuration prior to re-conversion to Central Count 
devices.  Onsite Diebold personnel accomplished this conversion activity. 
5.3 Inspection Methods 
SysTest Labs inspected a number of the Cuyahoga County ballots that were 
prepared for the Optical Scan units for the purpose of counting absentee ballots.  
The primary inspection methods involved the use of two (2) tools: 
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5.3.1 Printer’s Ruler 
The printer’s ruler provides several ways to measure document font, line and 
spacing sizes including inches, points and agate line. 
5.3.2 Diebold Election Systems – Template BT014 
Diebold provided a standard Mylar (clear plastic) template that allow precise 
measurement of optical scan ballot generated from the GEMS system.  This 
includes cut tolerance marks, timing marks, score locations and valid voting oval 
positions. 
5.4 System Tests and Simulations 
SysTest Labs’ activities under our system Testing and Simulations thread 
assessed the following areas of need as identified by the CERP: 
1. Absentee system testing by County personnel for readers and ballots.   
2. Simulating the Primary Election with live ballots to establish the 
repeatability of the failures encountered during the Primary Election. 
3. System testing with a mixture of mocked-up ballots to determine if the 
failure was the result of the EMS Print Files, actual paper ballots, reader 
failure or calibration of machines by County staff and/or Diebold staff.   
SysTest Labs conducted a series of simulated elections using the AccuVote 
Optical Scanning devices in addition to functional system testing of the scanner 
devices.  For the system test effort, SysTest Labs planned a series of tests so 
that expected results could be determined prior to test execution.  We used each 
scanner approved for use in the May 2, 2006 Primary and stepped through the 
set-up and configuration procedures for each.  Following Diebold’s documented 
processes, the team ran the diagnostics tests that are an integral part of the 
installation and power up.   
In order to provide effective tests that would uncover issues that led to the 
problems encountered during the Primary Election, SysTest Labs needed to work 
with County officials authorized to use the Diebold Election Management System 
(EMS), GEMS, used to create the contests, ballot layouts and ballot print files.  
Following Cuyahoga County processes for creating the Primary Election, 
SysTest Labs requested that the county officials recreate a limited number of 
precinct ballot memory cards and associated ballot print files. 
Once fully prepared, SysTest Labs ran all functional system tests, including but 
not limited to processing the following ballot types: 
1. ballots created for the functional system test election,  
2. blank ballots,  
3. invalid ballots, e.g., over votes, 
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4. under voted ballots, 
5. blank paper, 
6. ballots that have extraneous marks,  
7. ballots that were created not using the Diebold EMS, i.e., a counterfeit 
ballot. 
Once the test was completed, results were analyzed by SysTest Labs and 
compiled for presentation purposes in this Final Report. 
5.4.1 Tests 
The eight (8) tests that formed the primary testing and simulation activities were: 
5.4.1.1 Test One 
Test 1 provided a range of results across the 3 AccuVote-OS optical scan 
devices over a set of up to 35 blank ballots.  The purpose of this test is to 
observe whether or not ALL blank ballots can be successfully read by each of 
these Precinct Count versions of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device.   
5.4.1.2 Test Two 
Test 2 provided a range of results across the 3 AccuVote-OS optical scan 
devices using the ballots that were successfully read during Test 1.  The purpose 
of this test is to observe whether or not ballots that were successfully read by 
each of these Precinct Count versions of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device 
accurately count the votes. 
5.4.1.3 Test Three 
Test 3 consisted of custom voted ballots, ballots created by SysTest Labs, that 
are voted on the Precinct Count version of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device.  
This test will employ a Test Deck that is made up of valid blank ballots, ballots 
voted in a valid manner (with and without under votes), and ballots voted in an 
invalid manner (check marks, extraneous marks, overvotes). 
5.4.1.4 Test Four 
Test 4 consisted of voted ballots created by MCR, that are voted on the Precinct 
Count versions of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device.  This test employed a 
Test Deck that was made up of valid blank ballots, and ballots voted in a valid 
manner (with and without under votes).  This was the Test Deck for Brookpark 
precincts that were used for late stage Logic and Accuracy Tests. 
5.4.1.5 Test Five 
Test 5 duplicated official L&A Test required by the County.  Originally, the County 
intended to use 22 Test Decks with 6 ballots per deck.  This test employed a Test 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page 41 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02  July 14, 2006 
Deck with 36 validly voted ballots pages.  This test included 16 optical scan 
devices networked into the Central Count server.   
5.4.1.6 Test Six 
Test 6 was another L&A Test using ballots “voted”  by SysTest Labs’ staff.  This 
test employed a Test Deck that was made up of valid blank ballots, invalid blank 
ballots (created by printing the .pdf on a personal printer), ballots voted in a valid 
manner (with and without under votes), and ballots voted in an invalid manner 
(check marks, extraneous marks, over votes). 
5.4.1.7 Test Seven. 
Test 7 simulated an election.  This test employed a Test Deck that consisted of 
19 voted ballots which was returned by Cuyahoga County voters for the May 2nd 
primary election 
5.4.1.8 Test Eight. 
Test 8 simulated both the pre-L&A tests as well as the L&A tests using test decks 
for Brookpark precinct that were designed in the styles used by Lorain County 
and Montgomery County.  The test decks consisted of blank ballots, ballot voted 
during the printing process using the MCR L&A algorithm, and ballots hand voted 
following SysTest Labs’ expected results. 
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6 Operational Assessment Methodology 
Our activities under our Operational Assessment thread assessed the following 
areas of need as identified by CERP: 
1. Accuracy of the printed ballots.  
2. Timeliness of ballot preparation by County staff  
3. Accuracy of ballot style for absentees.  
4. Position of timing marks on absentee ballots  
5. Election Day absentee ballot counting procedures 
SysTest Labs assessed the County’s operations to determine its preparedness 
for an election and to determine potential risks and issues with the current 
processes and procedures.  SysTest Labs’ Operational Assessment thread will 
assess the following areas, as identified by the CERP: 
1. Ballot preparation procedures  
a. Ballot style set-up 
b. Ballot style accuracy verification 
c. Ballot ordering from printer 
d. Printed ballot accuracy verification 
e. Printed ballot distribution 
2. Absentee ballot procedures 
a. Absentee ballot requests 
b. Completed absentee ballot receipt and time stamping 
c. Absentee ballot counting 
3. Canvassing and direct recording procedures 
a. Direct recording tabulation procedures 
b. Storage and gathering of direct recording memory device procedures 
c. Back-up mechanism/audit trail procedures 
d. Other polling location procedures that affect vote collection 
4. Voting equipment set-up procedures 
a. Pre-election absentee system testing for readers 
b. Pre-election direct recording voting machine procedures 
  The specific activities that completed in this area of work include: 
a) Collect/Gather Procedural Documentation 
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SysTest Labs gathered the County’s existing documentation on election 
processes and procedures.  Documentation included process maps, 
training materials, procedure manuals, etc. used for the May 2, 2006 
Primary.  SysTest Labs also conducted interviews with County staff and 
vendor representatives  (Diebold and MCR )  to verify and validate the 
County’s documented procedures.  Where documentation does not exist, 
interviews and other data gathering mechanisms may be used as a 
baseline.   
b) Analysis and Comparison 
SysTest Labs analyzed the County’s existing documentation on the 
processes and procedures for accuracy, completeness, clarity, and timing.   
SysTest Labs looked for potential points of failure or areas where the 
process could encounter problems/errors.  The processes/procedures 
were compared to election best practices.   
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7 Appendix A – Terminology 
1. Central Count Optical Scan Device – a central count optical scan device 
refers to the AccuVote OS optical scanners that have been specifically 
configured with the firmware required for the device to function as a 
central count voting machine.  The ballot definition for precincts is 
contained in the Central Count Server database  and not on the AccuVote 
OS optical scanners.  All votes are stored in the Central Count Server 
database. 
2. Central Count Server – the Central Count Server is the GEMS server 
used to program AccuVote-OS memory cards, receive uploaded election 
results in Precinct Count mode, and dynamically control the acceptance 
and posting of ballots in Central Count mode. 
3. Digiport Server – the Digiport server is a network device that allows 
multiple AccuVote OS optical scanners, in Central Count configuration, 
to be networked directly into the Central Count Server via a network 
switch (see AccuVote OS optical scanners). 
4. Election Totals Report – In Precinct Count mode, the Totals Report lists 
all candidate totals for all races in the election. The Totals report may be 
issued: 
a. Following the counting of test ballots in Pre-Election Mode 
b. Following the counting of official ballots in Election Mode 
c. In Post-Election Mode 
5. Firmware – firmware is software that is permanently loaded on an 
EPROM computer chip.  The only way the firmware can be altered is by 
replacing the EPROM chip. 
6. Invalid Votes – invalid votes typically indicate a vote that has not met the 
voting requirement specified on the ballot for each contest.  This does not 
include an under vote which is considered a valid vote.  This does include 
an over vote or marks on the ballot that are outside of the ovals designed 
for the actual vote. 
7. Memory Card – A storage card used in the AccuVote-OS ballot 
processing unit to store precinct information and to record ballot results. 
8. Overvote – A contest on a ballot with more candidates selected than the 
allowable number of candidates that are allowed to be selected. 
9. Precinct Count Optical Scan Device – a precinct count optical scan 
device refers to AccuVote OS optical scanners that have been specifically 
configured with the firmware required for the device to function as a 
precinct count voting machine.  The ballot definition for the specific 
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precinct is contained in the 128KB memory card and all votes are stored 
on in memory on the AccuVote OS optical scanners. 
10. System Memory Test – Test available in Diagnostics Mode, used to test 
the functionality of AccuVote-OS RAM memory. 
11. Test Ballots – Function available in Pre-Election Mode, used to 
performed the Unvoted, Fully Voted, and Count Tests. 
12. Timing Marks – Black boxes set at ¼” intervals along the outside edges 
of the length of the printed ballot. All voting ovals printed on the ballot 
must be aligned with timing marks and Diagnostic marks so as to allow the 
AccuVote-OS to recognize marked candidate voting ovals in the course of 
ballot counting. 
13. Valid Votes – valid votes are those votes that meet the voting 
requirements specified on the ballot for each contest, e.g., “Vote For Not 
More Than One”. 
14. Undervote – Condition in which race with less candidates than the 
number to vote for have been voted; only valid in races with number to 
vote for greater than 1. 
15. Undervoting – Undervoting involves the selection of less candidates than 
the number to vote for in a race. Undervoting is only applicable to races 
with a number to vote for greater than 1. 
16. Vote Mark – A mark on the ballot made in a voting oval corresponding to 
either a candidate or question response. 
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8 Appendix B – Master Test Plan 
This section of the Final Report contains the text from the Master Test Plan, 
SysTest Labs Document Number SL-CUY-MTP-0-060206, Rev 0.5 dated July 
10, 2006. 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Purpose 
This Master System Test Plan (MSTP) documents the major planning and 
procedures that SysTest Labs’ System Test team will utilize during the course of 
the Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment System Test.  These steps are 
the basis for ensuring that all major milestones and activities planned are 
successfully accomplished.  
8.1.2 System Test Overview 
Cuyahoga County experienced problems in the May 2, 2006 Primary election 
following a conversion of the Diebold optical scan absentee ballot voting 
equipment from “precinct count” to “central count”.  Reported pre-election day 
problems include: 
 Failures in the ability of the Diebold optical scan absentee ballot voting 
equipment to read and/or process test decks from officially approved ballots 
 Insufficient time required for pre-election test activities for the specific election  
The Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissions (CCBCC) and the 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (CERP) have requested that SysTest Labs 
provide the following system test and simulated election tasks:   
 Review the printed ballots.  
 Accuracy of ballot style for absentees.  
 Position of timing marks on absentee ballots 
 Paper width and ballot positioning (skewed or straight)  
 Systems testing with live ballots to determine if failure was the result of paper 
ballot, reader failure or calibration of the AccuVote OS devices.   
 Conduct an absentee ballot processing simulated election.  
8.1.3 Assumptions 
In describing the System Test effort, SysTest Labs makes these assumptions: 
1. SysTest Labs will have access to the following items as test inputs: 
a) Sample blank ballots pulled randomly from the supply of blank ballots 
provided by the Ballot Printer, MCR. 
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b) Original 20 Test Decks (containing 25 voted ballots each) that were used 
for the County’s official Logic and Accuracy Test (L&A Test) on April 30, 
2006 and May 1, 2006. 
c) Sample test ballots that can be hand voted. 
2. SysTest Labs will have access to all 20 AccuVote optical scan devices 
planned for use as the absentee ballot voting machines. 
3. SysTest Labs will have access to a fully configured absentee ballot 
configuration that includes the AccuVote optical scanners (configurations with 
1, 10, and 15 AccuVote machines), the Digiport server, the network switch, 
and the Central Count Server. 
4. The three (3) machines that were converted back to Precinct Count 
configurations by Diebold Technicians on the morning of May 2, 2006 will 
remain in that configuration. 
8.1.4 Reference Documents 
1. AccuVote-OS Hardware Guide, Diebold Election Systems, Revision 6.0, 
February 17, 2005. 
2. AccuVote-OS Central Count 2.00 User’s Guide, Diebold Election Systems, 
Revision 4.0, September 17, 2004. 
3. AccuVote-OS Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide, Diebold Election Systems, 
Revision 4.0, February 17, 2005. 
4. GEMS 1.18 User’s Guide, Diebold Election Systems, Revision 12.0, April 21, 
2005 
5. AccuVote-OS Service Guide, Diebold Election Systems, Revision 1.0, 
November 26, 2004 
8.2 System Testing and Simulations 
The system testing strategy involves these primary activity areas:   
 Test 1 - Testing with 35 blank ballots on each of the 3 remaining Precinct 
Count configured AccuVote optical scan devices 
 Test 2   Replication of Test 1 for diagnostic purposes  
 Test 3 - Testing with custom voted ballots, ballots voted by SysTest Labs on 3 
Precinct Count versions of the AccuVote-OS  optical scan devices 
 Test 4 - Testing with 22 Test Decks with 6 voted ballots each on the 3 
Precinct Count configured AccuVote optical scan devices 
 Test 5 - Testing with custom developed Test Decks on the 17 Central Count 
configured AccuVote-OS optical scan devices 
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 Test 6 – Testing with 22 Test Decks with 6 voted ballots each on the 17 
Central Count configured AccuVote optical scan devices 
 Test 7 – Testing with a Test Deck with 19 voted ballots on the 17 Central 
Count configured AccuVote optical scan devices 
 Test 8 – Testing the Cuyahoga County ballots (Brookpark precinct) designed 
using the ballot style for Lorain and Montgomery Counties. 
8.2.1 Test 1 
Test 1 will provide a range of results across the 3 AccuVote-OS optical scan 
devices over a set of up to 35 blank ballots.  The purpose of this test is to 
observe whether or not ALL blank ballots can be successfully read by each of 
these Precinct Count versions of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device.  The test 
will look to ensure that the feedback from the AccuVote-OS indicates “OKAY” for 
each blank ballot scanned. 
The drawing shown in Figure 1 - Test 1, 2, 3 and 4 Hardware Configuration 
depicts the AccuVote-OS optical scan device in the Precinct Count standalone 
configuration.  It will be this configuration that is used for Test 1. 
NOTE:  the Model Number shown for the Diebold AccuVote-OS found on the 
back of each device is 79811-04.  
8.2.2 Test 2 
Test 2 was a duplicate of Test 1 and was used to support diagnostic activities.  . 
NOTE:  the Model Number shown for the Diebold AccuVote-OS found on the 
back of each device is 79811-04.  
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Figure 1 - Test 1, 2, 3 and 4 Hardware Configuration 
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8.2.3 Test 3 
Test 3 will consist of custom voted ballots, ballots created by SysTest Labs that 
are voted on the Precinct Count version of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device.  
This test will employ a Test Deck that is made up of valid blank ballots, ballots 
voted in a valid manner (with and without under votes), and ballots voted in an 
invalid manner (check marks, extraneous marks, overvotes). 
The configuration for Test 3 is the same as that for Test 1 shown in Figure 1 - 
Test 1, 2, 3 and 4 Hardware Configuration. 
8.2.4 Test 4 
Test 4 will consist of voted ballots, ballots created by MCR that are voted on the 
Precinct Count versions of the AccuVote-OS optical scan device.  This test will 
employ a Test Deck that is made up of valid blank ballots, and ballots voted in a 
valid manner (with and without under votes).   The test will look to ensure that the 
AccuVote-OS can scan and tabulate results correctly with the correct ballot 
count. 
The configuration for Test 4 is the same as that for Test 1 shown in Figure 1 - 
Test 1, 2, 3 and 4 Hardware Configuration. 
8.2.5 Test 5 
Test 5 will duplicate official L&A Test required by the County.  Originally, the 
County intended to use 22 Test Decks with 6 ballots per deck.  This test will 
employ a Test Deck with up to 25 validly voted ballots for Brookpark precinct.  
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The configuration for Test 4, shown Figure 1 - Test 1, 2, 3 and 4 Hardware 
Configuration, will only include 17 optical scan devices networked into the 
Central Count server.  Three of the original 20 Central Count configured optical 
scan devices were converted by Diebold Technicians to Precinct Count 
configuration for debug purposes, with permission from the County, the morning 
of May 2, 2006.  One of the scan devices is used for uploading Memory Cards for 
Precinct Count. 
Figure 2 - Test 5, 6 and 7 Hardware Configuration 
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8.2.6 Test 6 
Test 6 will mimic the L&A Test used by the County but will make use of custom 
developed ballots created by SysTest Labs.  This test will employ a Test Deck 
that is made up of valid blank ballots, invalid blank ballots (created by printing the 
.pdf on a personal printer), ballots voted in a valid manner (with and without 
under votes), and ballots voted in an invalid manner (check marks, extraneous 
marks, overvotes). 
The configuration for Test 6 is the same as that for Test 5 shown in Figure 2. 
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8.2.7 Test 7 
Test 7 will simulate an election.  This test will employ a Test Deck that consists of 
19 voted ballots which was returned by Cuyahoga County voters for the May 2nd 
primary election. 
The configuration for Test 7 is the same as that for Test 5 shown in Figure 2. 
8.2.8 Test 8 
Test 8 will simulate both the pre-L&A tests as well as the L&A tests using test 
decks for Brookpark precinct that have been designed in the styles used by 
Lorain County and Montgomery County.  The test decks will consist of blank 
ballots, ballots voted during the printing process using the MCR L&A algorithm, 
and ballots hand voted following SysTest Labs’ expected results. 
The configuration for Test 8 is the same as that for Test 1 shown in Figure 1 and 
Test 5 shown in Figure 2. 
8.3 Test Items 
The specific features to be tested in this set of system tests are limited to the 
ability of the AccuVote-OS optical scanners to perform the following functions: 
 Read any and all ballots without errors 
 Read and process properly voted ballots 
 Reject invalid ballots 
 Overvotes 
 Extraneous marks 
 Invalid marking, e.g., check marks instead of ovals filled in 
 Ballots that fall outside of the cut tolerances, i.e., the ballot paper’s length 
and width must fall within a specific set of values and tolerances. 
 The ability of the AccuVote-OS optical scanners to read ballots with valid 
votes, process these ballots, and transmit the results for each ballot to the 
Central Count server for counting and consolidation. 
 Accuracy of the AccuVote-OS optical scanners in counting ballots with valid 
votes. 
 The ability of the Central Count Server to process and accurately count the 
votes obtained from the AccuVote-OS optical scanners. 
8.4 Results Matrix 
The results matrix for this effort consists of a series of potential resulting 
conditions from Tests 2, Test 3, and Test 4.  The results shown in the matrix 
correspond to the specific results from comparisons between the known vote 
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counts for the ballots voted and the vote counts obtained from the Central Count 
Server.  In addition, there will be conditions where ballots that were scanned in 
Test 1 resulted in an “error” but will be used to cast votes in Tests 2 through 4.  
Based on the results obtained, SysTest Labs hope to narrow down the root 
cause of the discrepancies between the expected results and the Central Count 
Server results. 
Table 1 - Result Matrix 
Description 
Problems 
with Ballot 
Printer 
Problems 
with Ballot 
Style 
Problems 
with 
Paper 
Problems 
with Read 
Heads 
Problems 
with Central 
Count 
Server 
Central Count Tally does not Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did NOT Have 
Intermittent Errors reading the 
Ballots in TEST Mode 
      X 
Central Count Tally does Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did NOT have  
Intermittent Errors reading the 
Ballots in TEST Mode 
Should have been no problems with the absentee ballot System 
Central Count Tally does not Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count did NOT Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did NOT Have 
Intermittent Errors reading the 
Ballots in TEST Mode 
    X   
Central Count Tally does Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count did NOT Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did NOT Have 
Intermittent Errors reading the 
Ballots in TEST Mode 
    X   
Central Count Tally does not Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did Have Intermittent 
Errors reading the Ballots in TEST 
Mode 
  X   X 
Central Count Tally does Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did have Intermittent 
  X     
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Description 
Problems 
with Ballot 
Printer 
Problems 
with Ballot 
Style 
Problems 
with 
Paper 
Problems 
with Read 
Heads 
Problems 
with Central 
Count 
Server 
Errors reading the Ballots in TEST 
Mode 
Central Count Tally does Match the 
Precinct Count and 
Precinct Count did NOT Matched the 
Expected Count 
Precinct Count did have Intermittent 
Errors reading the Ballots in TEST 
Mode 
  X X   
Precinct Count identifies errors in blank 
ballots in “Test” Mode using 
Cuyahoga County ballot style 
Central Count tally results in inconsistent 
results with voted ballots using the 
Cuyahoga County ballot style 
Precinct Count identifies NO errors in 
blank ballots in “Test” Mode using 
Lorain and Montgomery County 
ballot styles 
Central Count tally results in consistent 
results with voted ballots using 
Lorain and Montgomery County 
ballot styles 
 X    
Precinct Count identifies errors in blank 
ballots in “Test” Mode using 
Cuyahoga County ballot style 
Central Count tally results in inconsistent 
results with voted ballots using the 
Cuyahoga County ballot style 
Precinct Count identifies errors in blank 
ballots in “Test” Mode using Lorain 
and Montgomery County ballot 
styles 
Central Count tally results in inconsistent 
results with voted ballots using 
Lorain and Montgomery County 
ballot styles 
X     
 
8.5   Issue Management Process  
Issue management spans all periods of the system test effort.  For issue 
management process, the team will use the IssueTracker™ tracking tool.  
IssueTracker is a tool designed to assist in establishing a systematic method for 
documenting and tracking issues identified during the course of the effort.  
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8.6 System Test Final Report 
The Final Report will be provided to the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel by 
SysTest Labs  no later than Monday, July 10, 2006, 11am EST.  This report will 
document the overall results for each of the system test efforts: 
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9 Appendix C – Traceability Matrix 
9.1 Diebold Secretary of State RFP 
Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
17 
All equipment and software must be certified by the State of Ohio. A copy of the certification 
issued by the State must be included in the Executive Summary.  This is a mandatory 
requirement. X X 
       
17 
Offerors must also provide a statement that their proposed system does not require an 
interface with any X X 
 Voter Registration system. This is also a mandatory requirement.     
       
17 
All hardware and software components of the proposed system, including provisions for 
absentee voting X 
Exception - 
documention 
requested but not 
provided by SOS 
 
and voters with disabilities, must comply with the FEC Voting System Standards. All hardware 
shall have     
 
achieved compliance at the time that the proposal is submitted. Software and firmware shall 
have been 
    
 
submitted to the appropriate Independent Testing Agency (ITA) at the time the proposal is 
submitted, as     
 evidenced by a letter from the ITA indicating receipt, and testing must be completed.     
 
The proposal must contain a copy of a letter to each ITA authorizing the ITA to release to the 
State any     
 records or test results related to the proposed voting system.     
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Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
 Independent Testing Agency (ITA) X 
Exception - 
documention 
requested but not 
provided by SOS 
 
All equipment and software proposed must be qualified by an ITA or currently pending ITA 
qualification     
 
provided the system has successfully completed the source code review portion of the testing. 
The ITA 
    
 
certification must be demonstrated with a copy of the qualification certificate issued by NASED 
approved     
 
ITA, or documentation from a NASED approved ITA that the system is pending qualification 
and that the     
 
source code review portion of the testing is complete and satisfactory, must be included in the 
Executive 
    
 
Summary, along with signed authorization directing the ITA that performed or is currently 
performing the     
 qualification testing to:     
       
18 Both DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS systems should: X   
 
o Produce a paper audit trail. To guard against fraud, systems shall not produce individual 
paper   X 
 records that voters could remove from the polling place;     
 
o Accurately report all votes cast; 
  
Exception - see 
report 
 
o Control logic and data processing methods to detect errors and provide correction method; 
  
X 
 
o Provide for the storage and tabulation of write-in votes; 
  
X 
 
o Accommodate multi-member districts whereby multiple votes are cast for more than one post 
in   X 
 the same election;     
 
o Permit diagnostic testing of all the major components within each unit; 
  
X 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page 57 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02 – INITIAL DRAFT July 14, 2006 

Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
 
o Provide printout results containing candidates and/or issues in an alphanumeric format next to 
the     
 vote totals;   X 
 
o Provide logic and accuracy tests in the memory of the main processor and the programmable 
  
X 
 
memory device used on Election Day, including zero printouts before each election and a 
precinct     
 tally printout at the close of each election.     
 
o Permit recounts and contested elections to be conducted pursuant to the requirements of Title 
35   X 
 of the Ohio Revised Code; and     
 
o In the event of the failure of a unit, retain a record of all votes cast prior to the failure. 
  
X 
       
18 Audit and Security X   
 
The following requirements pertain to DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS systems 
unless     
 otherwise noted:     
 o Provide a paper audit trail as referenced under Accuracy above;   X 
 
o Provide that each voter’s ballot is secret and the voter cannot be identified by image, 
code or 
  
X 
 
other methods; 
    
 
o Provide for summary reports of votes cast on each voting device by extracting 
information from a 
  
X 
 
memory device or a data storage device; 
    
 
o Provide printed records regarding the opening and closing of the polls and include the 
following: 
  
X 
 
 Identification of election, including opening and closing date and times; 
  
X 
 
 Identification of each unit; 
  
X 
 
 Identification of ballot format; 
  
X 
 
 Identification of candidate and/or issue, verifying zero start; 
  
X 
 
 Identification of all ballot fields and all special voting options; 
  
X 
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Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
 
 Summary report of votes cast for each device, or ability to extract same; 
  
X 
 
 Prevent printing of summary reports before the sequence of events required for closing of 
  
X 
 the polls are completed;   X 
 
 Poll opening reports should have all system audit information required; 
  
X 
 
 No loss of data during generation of reports including results, images and inaccurate vote 
  
X 
 counts;     
 
 Integrity and security of data maintained according to time frame for federal, state and 
  
X 
 local elections;     
 
 Prevention of functions in an improper sequence; 
  
X 
 
 Security provisions compatible with administrative set up and operational use; 
  
X 
 
 Requirement for pre-election testing of logic and accuracy; 
  
X 
 
 Requirement for logic and accuracy results to be stored in memory of main unit processor 
  
X 
 and Election Day device;     
 
 Programmable memory device to be sealed in unit with means of tamper detection; 
  
X 
 
 Allow for extraction of data from memory devices to a central host; 
  
X 
 
 Prevent modification of the voter’s vote after the ballot is cast; 
  
X 
 
 Protect the secrecy of the vote such that the vote may not be observed during the voter’s 
  
X 
 selection of preferences, during the casting of the ballot, and as the voted ballot is     
 transmitted for recording on a storage device; and     
 
 Prohibit voted ballots from being accessed by anyone until after the close of polls. 
    
 o Provide for security procedures system-wide, from turn on to turn off; and   X 
 
o Provide for safeguards against and evidence of tampering, theft or damage of the 
system and 
  
X 
 
units. 
    
       
20 The EMS shall provide a software capability for the creation of newly defined elections, for the X X 
 retention of previously defined formats in that election, and for the modification of a previously     
 defined ballot format. Such systems shall be designed so as to facilitate error-free definition of     
 elections and their associated ballot layouts for DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS and     
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Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
 comply with the ballot rotation requirements of R.C. 3505.03.     
 
The subsystem shall be capable of handling at least 500 potentially active voting positions, 
arranged     
 
to identify party affiliations in a primary election, offices and their associated labels and 
instructions,     
 
candidate names and their associated labels and instructions, and issues or measures and 
their     
 associated text and instructions.     
   
  
  
21 Absentee Voting     
 
o The absentee voting system must be integrated with the entire Voting System provided by the 
Vendor. X X 
 
 o The devices that produce or process the absentee ballots shall be programmed from the 
same database and 
  
X 
 election definition that is used to program the precinct voting devices.     
 
o The reporting and tallying system for the absentee ballot system shall be capable of tallying 
the absentee 
  
X 
 votes as a separate precinct or allocating the absentee votes back to the voter's precinct.     
 
o The absentee results shall be easily integrated with Election Day results (if applicable) in a 
timely manner.   X 
 
o The absentee voting system element must produce and record results from an optical scan 
ballot.   X 
       
21 Provisional Voting X 
Exception - 
Documentation 
does not supprot 
thes features 
 
Offerors shall discuss how their DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS voting equipment, 
as well as     
 the EMS, can separate provisional ballots from non-provisional ballots cast at the precinct on     
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Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
Election 
 
Day and discuss how results from provisional ballots can be easily downloaded into the final 
tally of votes     
 if those provisional ballots are determined to be eligible for counting.     
       
22 Election Reporting Requirements X   
 
o Provide a cumulative, canvass and precinct report of absentee voting, provisional ballot 
voting and   X 
 Election Day voting as one total.     
 
o Provide for unofficial and official reports, in standard or custom format, including absentee 
and, Election 
  
X 
 Day and total vote.     
 
o Provide the ability to custom design an election report to include the following information in 
total or in 
  
X 
 part:     
 
• Name of election; 
    
 
• Political subdivision and party involved - separate reports should be available for each 
subdivision     
 and party;     
 
• Date of election; 
    
 
• Type of report; 
    
 
• Total number of registered voters in each political subdivision and total number of registered 
    
 voters in each race, and, where applicable, a breakdown by party; and     
 
• Total number of registered voters in each voting precinct, including a sub-listing when the 
precinct     
 is split; and     
 
• Provide for the formatting of election results by capturing election data embedded in the 
database     
 and producing specialized reports, i.e. a report of votes by multi-member district, legislative     
 district or congressional district.     
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Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
 
o Provide, for election night reporting, a listing of precincts reporting and a listing of precincts 
not reporting.   X 
 
o Provide for the operator of the reporting system to change the appearance of the report by 
reformatting 
  
X 
 the data.     
 
o Provide for the removal of an already counted precinct and a re-counting of that same 
precinct in the   X 
 event of errors in transmission.     
 
o Provide individualized sample ballot information for storage on a Web site and for 
reproduction and   X 
 distribution.     
 
o Provide for the automatic transmission of election results through whatever medium chosen 
by the State,   X 
 whether it be Internet, telephone lines, electronic data, etc.     
 
o Provide for the storage of election results in any version of software required, i.e., Access, 
Excel, Adobe, ASCII and HTML   X 
 
o  Provide for election results to be produced in such a manner as to allow for easy copying for paper 
distribution upon request. X 
       
24 DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS Comfort Requirements X   
 
The following requirements pertain to poll workers and Election Officials and staff for DRE, 
precinct count     
 optical scan, and absentee ballot Systems:     
 
o Devices should be transportable, without damage to internal circuitry; 
  
X 
 
o Devices should withstand frequent loading and unloading, stacking, assembling, 
disassembling,   X 
 reassembling, and heavy use, without damage to internal circuitry.     
 
o Devices should provide poll workers with a method to immediately detect if a voting unit is not 
  
X 
 operating properly;     
 
o The programmable memory device should be easy for poll workers to operate after the 
  
X 
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Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment 
No. 3       
closing of 
 the polls; and     
 
o Devices should be “tamper-proof” while in a storage configuration either in storage or the 
polling   X 
 location.     
      
 
The Contractor must supply the State of Ohio with installed and configured DRE, precinct count 
optical   X 
 
scan, ABS and EMS systems needed to respond with the State’s commitment to meet the 
voting system 
    
 
standards of the 2000 Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The Contractor must also provide 
training and     
 
overall knowledge transfer to State and local election officials. The Contractor will provide State 
and local     
 Election Officials and Pollworkers with training materials for use in voter education programs.     
       
 
Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment  
No. 4 
      
25 Installed, configured DRE, precinct count optical scan, ABS and EMS system     
  
To confirm successful installation and configuring of all DRE, precinct count optical scan, ABS 
and EMS     
  systems, the Vendor will:     
  
• Comply with all delivery and set-up dates detailed in Attachment 10; and 
  
Exception - WBS 
not provided 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page 63 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02 – INITIAL DRAFT July 14, 2006 

Page # Description 
Diebold 
RFP 
Response 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved 
(Commented) 
Attachment  
No. 4 
      
  
• Prepare, assure completion of and submit a checklist filled-in and signed by a 
  
Exception - 
delivery and 
testing 
documentation not 
available 
  duly authorized State representative attesting to the successful installation,     
  configuration and testing of equipment at each location.     
       
  A detailed training program for each county   X 
       
  
4. Describe the particulars of your ABS system, including the procedures for creating and 
setting up   X 
  ballots for DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS.     
       
  
. How are write-in votes handled on each Voting System (DRE, precinct count optical scan, and 
ABS)?   X 
  7. How are provisional ballots handled (DRE, precinct count optical scan, and ABS)?   X 
  
8. Describe in detail the method for handling recounts on each Voting System. Electronic 
recount?   Open 
  
Manual recount? Can each voter’s ballot image be reproduced as is? If so, does voter 
anonymity     
  remain in place?     
       
  
25. How should the Voting System be tested prior to absentee voting and Election Day to 
ensure the   X 
  accuracy and readiness of each device?     
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9.2 Diebold Training Requirements 
RFP Training Requirement Diebold Response 
Achieved/Not 
Achieved 
+ Achieved     
- Not Achieved     
• Programming of units  + + 
• Preparation of each individual unit  + + 
• Preparation of polling place to accept voting devices + + 
• Electronic transmission of election results  + + 
• Tabulation of results  + + 
• Equipment and software used at the central + + 
counting station N/A      
• Methods of ensuring the accuracy of precinct + + 
results      
• Full understanding of the audit procedures  + + 
• Conduct of a recount  + ? 
• Conduct of a contested election  + ? 
• Records preservation  + + 
• Printing, designing and reformatting election + + 
reports      
• Troubleshooting to solve temporary problems  + + 
• Safeguards to prevent and detect tampering or + + 
theft      
• Hot points for system errors − + 
• Training on the use of the Election Management + + 
System to design and layout ballots      
   
A detailed training program for each county, which shall     
include:     
• Setting up and testing the voting equipment  + + 
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RFP Training Requirement Diebold Response 
Achieved/Not 
Achieved 
+ Achieved     
- Not Achieved     
• Suggestions for precinct set-up  + + 
• Operation of the voting device from start to + + 
finish      
• Processing of voters, to the absentee voter, to the + + 
regular voter, to the provisional voter      
• Troubleshooting methods to quickly identify and + + 
resolve any problems      
• The opening and closing of polling locations on + + 
Election Day      
• Proper operation and security for modem + + 
transmission of election results (if applicable)      
• Printing of zero counts before the polls open  + + 
• Assisting voters who require help while in the + + 
voting process      
• Immediate determination of device problems − + 
• Using the battery back-up during electrical N/A   
failure N/A      
• Taking a malfunctioning piece of equipment out − + 
of service      
• Closing the polls and producing results in any of + + 
the methods available for that particular device      
• How and when to place service calls  − + 
• Poll worker training provided by the vendor, to + + 
the county, at the direction of the county     
• Training materials for use by election personnel + + 
when conducting educational outreach programs     
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RFP Training Requirement Diebold Response 
Achieved/Not 
Achieved 
+ Achieved     
- Not Achieved     
      
Assistance with pre-election training of poll workers shall + + 
be performed prior to the primary, special and general    
elections in the first even-year federal statewide election    
of use    
      
The vendor will provide a poll-worker training program on − + 
videotape to the SOS and each county board of elections.    
This video program will assist the SOS and local election    
officials in preparing poll workers to work the polls and    
properly operate the voting equipment. The State    
anticipates that this videotape should be 15-20 minutes in    
duration and will likely include a brief message from the    
Secretary of State, an overview of the State’s response to    
the Help America Vote Act, and a demonstration of the    
features and functions of the new voting system. The    
State expects the vendor to assume responsibility for    
producing this instructional video program and arranging    
to make at least one copy for each precinct    
      
Voter education programs will be conducted by the state + + 
and the counties. However, the vendor will be expected to    
provide basic voter education material to support state and    
county efforts    
      
The vendor is also expected to partner with the State in + + 
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RFP Training Requirement Diebold Response 
Achieved/Not 
Achieved 
+ Achieved     
- Not Achieved     
using the Secretary of State’s Web presence as a    
communication and instructional medium for the new    
voting system. To this end, the vendor will actively    
participate in creating of informative communiqués of    
public interest during the project. The vendor will also    
develop an on-line demonstration and simulation of the    
new voting equipment as an additional educational tool     
 
9.3 Deliverables 
Diebold Contract 
Deliverables 
  
  
  
  
  
Contract Section Description Status 
2.a 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and Deployment Schedule 
(Deliverable 1) Received  
  
    
2.c Validation of State’s requirements (Deliverable 3) Not received 
  
  
  
2.d 
Installed and configured DRE, PCOS, ABS and EMS system 
(Deliverable 4) Not received 
  
    
2.e Documentation (Deliverable 5) Partial 
  
Not received: 
  
  
2.e.iii  ID of version releases 
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Diebold Contract 
Deliverables 
  
  
  
  
  
Contract Section Description Status 
  
2.e.iv  ID of procedures  
  
  
  
  
2.g Training (Deliverable 7) Partial 
  
Missing recount and contested election procdures 
  
  
  
  
  
    
2.i Election Administration Support (Deliverable 9) Not received 
 
9.4  Printing RFP 
 
RFP Section RFP Requirement 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved (Commented) 
1 
Awarded bidder shall be required to print all of the ballot pages 
for the May 2, 2006 election. X 
      
2 
Printing shall be for the purposes of conducting the May 2, 2006 
elections X 
      
3 
CCBOE will provide a file from past elections for the vendor to 
provide 20 proofs of precinct OS ballots and 20 proofs of 
absentee ballots 
Documentation not 
available 
      
4 
All ballots shall have clean perforations for the ballot tabulations 
in OS readers X 
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RFP Section RFP Requirement 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved (Commented) 
      
5 
Paper stock shall be 8.5 x 17 " 90# index stock two sided paper.  
Any open boxes become the property of CCBOE X 
      
6 
No changes/additions/deletions to any of the ballots shall be 
made w/o prior approval of the BOE X 
      
7 
Final inspection of  the printing equipment and supplies .  No 
ballots to be printed until final approval granted by BOE 
Documentation not 
available 
      
8 Description & quantity of items needed:   
      
I Precinct OS Ballots   
      
8.i.1 8.5 x 17" 2-sided 90# stock X 
8.i.2 
2 perforated stubs at ballot top, consecutively numbered with 
municipality, ward and precinct that leave a smooth clean cut 
when removed X 
8.i.3 Delivery on or before 4/15/06 
Exception - due to County 
delays 
8.i.4 
Quantity - 150,000 for 1,434 precincts.  Sample ballots 2 sets of 
approved ballots/precinct of each style in that precinct marked 
sample X 
8.i.5 Ballots should be clear shrink wrapped in packs of 50 or less X 
8.i.6 Sample election data enclosed X 
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RFP Section RFP Requirement 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved (Commented) 
8.ii absentee ballots on Demand   
      
8.ii.1 8.5x 17", 2 sided, 90# index stock X 
8.ii.2 
2 perforated stubs at ballot top labeled A & B, consecutively 
numbered with municipality, ward and precinct that leave a 
smooth clean cut when removed X 
8.ii.3 
The absentee ballots shall be folded between timing marks with 
the municipality, ward & precinct, voter name, mailing address, 
voter ID, bar code and ballot style visible on the B stub when 
folded and thru the envelope window X 
8.ii.4 Delivery on or before March 28, 2006 and then on a daily basis X 
8.ii.5 
Quantity +/- 50,000 ballots at two sheets per ballot equaling an 
estimated 100,000.   This quantity spread over a 35 day period.  
The ballot pages will have to be inserted into pre-stuffed 
envelopes (two envelopes) that will be provided by the CCBOE.  
Sample ballots: one set of approved ballots of each style in that 
precinct.  Three or less ballot pages per voter X 
8.ii.6 
The vendor will also be responsible for stuffing an instructional 
pamphlet into the pre-stuffed envelopes with the ballot pages.  
The pamphlet will be provide by CCBOE. X 
8.11.7 Sample data enclosed   
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RFP Section RFP Requirement 
Achieved (X) /Not 
Achieved (Commented) 
9 Vendor Responsibilities   
      
9.A 
The vendor is responsible for meeting all the attached Diebold 
Election System Optical Ballot Specifications X 
9.B 
One sample ballot of every precinct including absentee precinct 
shall be submitted to the CCBOE for testing and approval prior 
to the printing of the order X 
9.C 
The vendor must provide a voted test deck after the printed 
delivery deadline X 
9.D 
The vendor shall submit a sample of every fifth (sic) (50) ballot 
printed Revised  - BOE 4/26/06 
9.E 
Absentee OS Ballots shall be delivered on a daily basis.  The 
CCBOE will provide the selected vendor with a data file of 
names, address and ballot style daily at a time agreed upon by 
the vendor and the CCBOE.  The selected vendor will deliver an 
absentee ballot on demand from the adat (sic) file at a time 
agreed upon by the vendor and the CCBOE X 
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10 Appendix D – Operational Assessment Documentation 
The following electronic files in Excel format are incorporated in this report by 
reference. 
Operational Assessment Questionnaire File Name 
Cuyahoga County 1a Voting Systems - Machine Operations and Maintenance.xls 
Cuyahoga County 1b Voting Systems - Machine Preparation and Delivery TSX.xls 
Cuyahoga County 1c Voting Systems - Elect. Voting System Prep and Delivery.xls 
Cuyahoga County 1d Central Count-Machine Storage.xls 
Cuyahoga County 1e Voting Systems-Machine Storage.xls 
Cuyahoga County 2a Absentee Application and Distribution.xls 
Cuyahoga County 2b Absentee Receipt Processing and Reporting.xls 
Cuyahoga County 3 Accessibility – ADA.xls 
Cuyahoga County 4a Election Management.xls 
Cuyahoga County 4b Election Workers.xls 
Cuyahoga County 5a Election Worker Training.xls 
Cuyahoga County 5b Training and Education - Voter Outreach.xls 
Cuyahoga County 6a Ballot Preparation and Review.xls 
Cuyahoga County 6b Electronic Ballot Review.xls 
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11 Appendix E – System Test Results 
The following electronic files in Excel format are incorporated in this report by 
reference. 
Test Run Result File Name 
1 Test 1 AccuVote-OS.xls 
2 Test 2 AccuVote-OS.xls 
3 Test 3 AccuVote-OS CustomVote.xls 
4 Test 4 AccuVote-OS BRPK.xls 
5 Test 5 Central Count BRPK.xls 
6 Test 6 Central Count CustomVote.xls 
7 Test 7 Central Count LiveBallots.xls 
8 Test 8 Lorain-Montgomery Ballot Styles.xls 
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# Documentation of Primary Activities to Conduct an Election Received Up to Date Out of Date 
 Note:  Red Font indicates either not received or out of date documentation    
1 Voter Registration 
   
 DIMS procedures Y  X 
 Scanning Operations Y X  
 Data Entry Procedures Y X  
 Phone Procedures Y X  
 Additonal List of Electors Y X  
 Procedures for Cancellation of Electors Y X  
 Procedure for Provisional Data Entry Y X  
 Procedures for Petiton Certification Y X  
 Creating and delivering Poll Books Y X  
2 Maintenance of Voter records Y X  
 
Updates reflecting change in address, change in name, change in party 
affiliation Y X  
 
Marking records for absentee/military absentee/alternative ballots Y X  
3 Changes to precinct/district boundaries 
   
 
New districts are added Y X  
 
Boundaries change after census to reflect number requirements set by statute Y X  
 
Updates to street locator system Y X  
4 Recruitment and/or retirement of Election Workers   
 
 
Working with Wards to secure election workers Y X  
 
Identifying those individuals who are no longer capable of serving Y X  
5 Securing and/or moving polling locations   
 
 
Creating long term commitments N   
 
Assessing and modifying to meet ADA requirements Y X  
6 Updates on election related legislation  
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Instituting changes as they become law N   
 
Educating voters, election workers and staff on changes Y X  
7 Voter education and outreach   
 
 
Registration drives Y X  
 
Presence at appropriate political activities Y X  
 
Working with schools to encourage voter participation Y X  
 
Kids Voting Programs Y X  
 
Press releases to newspapers Y X  
 
Election dates and deadlines Y X  
 
Notices required by law Y X  
8 Printing materials and supplies inventory   
 
 
Awareness of timelines Y X  
 
Securing reputable and capable printers Y X  
 
Maintaining stock of voter registration forms, absentee/alternative ballot 
applications 
   
9 Campaign reporting  
  
 
Notices to candidates and political parties Y X  
 
Monitoring contribution reports Y X  
 
Questions by media – public access to records Y X  
10 Election year calendar   
 
 
Special elections Y X  
 
Recall elections Y X  
 
Special district elections Y X  
 
Town/Municipal elections Y X  
 
Communications with interested parties Y X  
 
Notices required by law Y X  
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Calendar for participating entities Y X  
 
Odd year elections Y X  
 
Even year elections Y X  
 
Primary elections Y X  
 
Precinct caucus – party assemblies Y X  
 
General elections Y X  
11 Petition approval and verification   
 
 
Timelines Y X  
 
Requirements Y X  
 
Petition checking Y X  
12 Getting Ready – Specific timeline for election at hand 
   
 
Statutory deadlines for election activities Y  X 
 
Secure bids for printing N   
 
Order absentee envelopes/labels/supplies/provisional ballot 
envelopes/instructions Y  X 
 
Order polling place supplies Y  X 
 
Check voting systems to make sure they are functional, maintenance in 
completed, all systems are go Y X  
 
Contact election workers-getting their commitments-making sure to have 
back-up workers available Y X  
 
Contact Canvass Board members, confirm participation with parties N   
 
Schedule election worker training Y X  
 
Contact polling locations-making sure agreements are in place, contacts are 
identified, access is guaranteed Y X  
 
Coordinate with any entities participating in the election N   
 
Notices and deadlines are published Y X  
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Campaign/Candidate information is available for distribution N   
 
Signs for posting polling locations are ordered Y Y  
 
Ballot layout is completed N   
 
Ballot styles and numbering is outlined Y X  
 
Number of ballots to order is calculated Y X  
 
Ballot order submitted to printer Y X  
 
Upon return of the ballots from printer, review of styles, sequencing, 
accuracy N   
 
Prepare game plan for election night reporting Y X  
 
Set up web site  N   
 
Prepare to mail absentee ballots Y  X 
 
Contact press to make sure they have an understanding of the process Y X  
 
Required testing of voting systems is completed Y  X 
 
Voting equipment is secured for election day Y X  
 
Early voting preparations begin – polling locations set-up and staffed 
   
 
Conduct election worker training Y X  
 
Distribute voting equipment to polling locations Y  X 
 
Distribute election day materials and ballots to appropriate sites Y  X 
13 Election Day Activities   
 
 
Trouble shooting polling place problems Y X  
 
Telephone inquiries Y X  
 
Am I registered? Y X  
 
Where do I vote? Y X  
 
Did I request and absentee ballot? Y X  
 
Where do I find out who to vote for? Y X  
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14 Problem voters 
   
 
Not registered Y X  
 
Registered late Y X  
 
Moved from another county Y X  
 
Moved from another state Y X  
15 Press Inquiries Y X  
16 Election Night   
 
 
Return of results Y  X 
 
Electronic N   
 
Central Count N   
 
Return of supplies Y  X 
 
Security Y X  
 
Voted Ballots Y  X 
 
Unused Ballots Y  X 
 
Voter rolls/poll books Y X  
 
Provisional Ballots Y X  
 
Public reports 
   
 
Press Y X  
 
Candidates Y X  
 
Web-site N   
17 Preparation for Canvass Board 
   
 
Provisional Ballot Review Y   
 
Poll books scanned Y X  
 
Security of documents Y  X 
 
Log of activities N   
 
Identification of problems Y  X 
Cuyahoga County Independent Assessment  
Quality Assurance Assessment Report 


 Proprietary & Confidential  Page 79 
 Document No. SL-06-G-COH-006, Rev 02 – INITIAL DRAFT  July 14, 2006 
# Documentation of Primary Activities to Conduct an Election Received Up to Date Out of Date 
 
Recount potential Y X  
 
Notices for recounts Y X  
18 Recounts  
  
 
Scheduling 
   
 
Attendance Y X  
 
Procedures Y X  
 
Notification Y  X 
19 Election Clean Up 
   
 
Judges pay Y X  
 
Pick up of supplies at polling locations Y  X 
 
Update voter records Y X  
 
Mailing to confirm updates N   
 

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Appendix N: Interim Report 
The Panel’s Interim Report, issued on June 14, 2006, follows. 
 
To: The Board of Elections and the Board of County Commissioners of 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
 
From:  The Cuyahoga County Election Review Panel 
 
Subject: Interim Report on Issues Surrounding the Conduct of the Primary Election 
Held in Cuyahoga County on May 2, 2006 
 
Date: June 14, 2006 
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Introduction 
 
During the May 2, 2006 Primary Election, most Cuyahoga County voters (“electors”) 
were required, for the first time, to cast ballots for the candidates and issues of their 
choice electronically. Despite extensive planning and preparation at all levels by the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections for this momentous transition from punch cards to 
e-voting technologies, significant problems occurred at the polling places on Election 
Day as well as in tabulating the vote. Completion of the unofficial vote count was 
delayed for approximately a week. 
 
In light of the range of unanticipated problems, before the unofficial election results were 
announced the Board of Elections had started moving toward the creation of an 
independent review. On May 17, 2006, the Board of Elections unanimously passed a 
formal resolution constituting and charging the three-member Cuyahoga Election Review 
Panel. The resolution charged us to conduct an independent investigation into the 
surrounding facts and circumstances that adversely affected the outcome of the 2006 
primary in this County. One day later, expressing its own concerns, the Cuyahoga County 
Board of Commissioners adopted a similar resolution, endorsing this Panel’s 
investigation, pledging the necessary resources for the transaction of our work, and 
requesting full reports on the outcomes of this study. 
 
The Panel moved quickly to identify areas of investigation, assemble a competent staff 
and to marshal necessary experts and other resources to conduct a thoughtful and 
thorough inquiry. As charged by the Board of Elections, we are to:  
 
1. Identify the deficiencies in the Cuyahoga County elections performance occurring 
in the May 2, 2006 election, including problems: (a) with preparation for the 
election, (b) with the conduct of the election on May 2, and (c) following the 
closing of the polls, including tabulating the vote.  
 
2. Ascertain the causes and contributing factors to each aspect of deficient 
performance, including the technological failures, and training and administrative 
issues. 
 
3. Provide a set of recommendations for remedying the deficiencies and achieving 
the highest standards in election administrative performance.  
 
We recognize that the overarching purpose is primarily constructive: identify promising 
resolutions of those issues before the beginning of November’s General Election cycle, 
which predominantly commences at the end of August 2006. We have dedicated 
ourselves to that mission. 
 
Accountability is central to this investigation. We seek to provide via this post-mortem 
investigation, accountability: accountability for decisions made and systems adopted to 
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collect, count and safeguard our votes. Such accountability is needed to correct the 
problems that have been revealed and achieve the required improved performance. 
 
Accountability is also required for the restoration of the public’s confidence in its 
electoral system. In our interviews within the management and staff of the Board of 
Elections, as a preliminary matter we were impressed that most appeared competent, 
dedicated, and hardworking. They present as individuals who are committed to the 
production of open, fair, efficient and accurate elections for our community. 
 
Additionally, Cuyahoga County conducted an initial survey of voter attitudes toward the 
new electronic voting process following the May 2, 2006 primary. The preliminary 
results of that survey suggest that, overall, a significant majority of those who voted 
experienced no problem with the new technology. Yet, by many measures, that election 
was dangerously flawed. We are thus left to answer the question: Why wasn’t the 
election flawless?  
 
Our plan for pursuing the answers to that question is contained in the pages of this 
Interim Report. The Panel’s Final Report and Recommendations will be simultaneously 
delivered to the Board Members of the Cuyahoga Board of Elections and the County 
Commission on July 17, 2006. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
____________________________   ____________________________ 
Judge Ronald B. Adrine, Chair    Director Thomas J. Hayes 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Professor S. Candice Hoke 
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I. Work Plan & Methodology 
The scope of this investigation covers the breadth of activities of the Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections in preparing and implementing procedures for the May 2nd election, 
and the strategies that need to be undertaken to achieve excellence in election 
administrative performance.  
 
In order to fulfill the charge, this investigation has commenced using the framework 
outlined in the CERP work plan (Appendix B). The broad areas of investigation called 
for by the work plan are: 
• The election master plan and its execution; 
• Procurements and procurement procedures affecting the conduct of the election, 
and relevant contractual relationships; 
• Structure, coordination, and performance of critical Board of Elections units; 
• Recruitment, training, deployment and support of poll workers (Booth officials 
and Election Day Technicians); 
• Voter registration and provisional ballot systems and procedures; 
• Equipment, supplies and ballot preparation and testing procedures, deployment, 
security and proper function; 
• Election Day logistics, systems, procedures, and performance of personnel; 
• Ballot counting systems and procedures including testing, security, and 
reconciliation; 
• Absentee ballot systems and procedures including procurement, preparation, and 
testing. 
 
The CERP has planned and begun to use a number of methods for investigating issues 
and developing recommendations to be disseminated in the final report of July 17, 2006. 
 
Data is being gathered through: 
• Interviews with Board of Elections personnel and walk-throughs of processes; 
• Public hearings; 
• Exit polls of voters; 
• Telephone testimonies from voters and polling place personnel; 
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• Information provided by e-mail, online web forms, and other written submissions; 
• Focus groups and surveys; 
• Legal source materials; 
• Documents provided by vendors, advocate groups, and the Board of Elections; 
• Interviews with relevant vendor personnel; and 
• Interviews with relevant government offices from the State and its Counties. 
 
Primary analysis is through: 
• Analysis of a range of relevant documents from Board of Elections administration 
and Election Day activities; 
• Research into additional sources of corroboration for information reported by 
voters, poll workers, technicians, Board of Elections employees, and others; 
• Reconciliation of actual systems and procedures, and received equipment and 
materials, with those called for by contracts, directives, and the governing law. 
 
Recommendations are being developed through: 
• Review of national “Best Practices”; 
• The compilation of relevant recommendations given by the Board of Elections 
personnel, poll workers, advocacy organizations, and voters in interviews and 
testimony; 
• Additional corrections which become apparent through analysis of expected, 
planned, and actual performance; and 
• Review of the successes of other jurisdictions. 
 
 
Through these and other appropriate methods, the CERP will continue to examine the 
issues that impeded the Board of Elections’ conduct of the May election. It will identify 
solutions to resolve as many issues as possible before the beginning of November’s 
General Election cycle, which commences at the end of August.  
II. Staffing 
The CERP hired a Project Manager to be the administrative head of the operation. Jointly 
with a Panel member, the Project Manager then interviewed dozens of recommended 
candidates and hired a staff of 16 individuals to conduct the investigation under the 
CERP’s direction. (Appendix D) 
 
The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel staff is comprised of well-qualified individuals that 
are representative of Cuyahoga County. The Panel gave careful consideration to the 
criteria for selecting individuals to account for both the scope of the investigation as well 
as the timeframe. Staff members have backgrounds in law, public administration, 
operations management, software engineering, and urban affairs. These individuals 
demonstrate a combination of acumen and skill that is appropriate for this initiative.  
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Working in project teams, each team is assigned one of the areas of inquiry called for by 
the work plan (Appendix B, summarized above). Guided by Panel members, each team is 
actively investigating problems raised by Board of Election personnel, citizens of 
Cuyahoga County, and community organizations. The teams seek to identify the 
problems uncovered by their research, and to generate recommendations to address them 
which can be implemented for the next election. 
III. Office Setup 
With the dedicated assistance of multiple departments of the County (especially the 
County Administrator’s Office) and of Cleveland State University, the CERP was able to 
set up its office and begin operations in a matter of days. The office design and layout 
serves to facilitate secure document analysis and storage, telephone interviews, research 
and efficient administration. 
 
The CERP office, located at 1801 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio is a fully-functional 
office environment equipped with telephones, computers, Internet access, copying and 
document storage systems. Systems and procedures were established at once to ensure 
security and confidentiality; computer systems have been inspected and approved by a 
network security specialist. Systems and procedures are reviewed from time to time to 
ensure continuing security of sensitive materials. 
IV. Public Outreach 
The CERP has arranged forums and systems for voters, poll workers (Booth Officials and 
Election Day Technicians), and other citizens of Cuyahoga County to provide input about 
problems they experienced with the May 2nd election. Through public hearings, telephone 
calls, electronic submissions and faxes, information is being gathered and used by the 
CERP’s project teams in their investigation.  
1) Public Hearings 
Public hearings were held to gather input from individuals and representatives of 
organizations wishing to testify about the conduct of the May 2006 primary. 
Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones, The Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban 
Affairs Forum Program, and the Center for Election Integrity acted as partners of the 
CERP in holding these hearings. 
 
Although Congresswoman Tubbs Jones intended to hold public hearings prior to the 
appointment of the Panel by the Board of Elections and the Cuyahoga County Board of 
Commissioners, the Congresswoman facilitated the scheduled hearings by explicitly 
stating that they served as forums for the CERP investigation. Panel members were 
present at most of these Hearings. 
 
Sensitive to the concerns of local advocacy organizations, the CERP identified groups 
actively doing locally based election review and/or advocacy work at the time of the 2006 
primary election. The Panel then held a hearing to gather input from these groups. The 
CERP invited these organizations to prepare presentations and submit reports in order for 
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it to understand their concerns. The Panel then incorporated, for consideration by its 
project teams, the relevant observations and research so obtained.  
 
Finally, the Panel accepted an invitation by the Center for Election Integrity to refocus its 
planned June 9 election issues conference in order to assist the Panel’s work. The Center 
offered to organize a series of conference panels, partnering with The Maxine Goodman 
Levin College of Urban Affairs Forum program. The June 9th conference, entitled 
“Lessons Learned From Ohio’s Primary: Making November a Success,” produced 
additional valuable information, for example, presentations from election directors in 
Columbus and in Akron, which were heard alongside a presentation by Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections Director Michael Vu. The Panel’s final Public Hearing was scheduled 
to follow directly after the Conference. This arrangement made it possible for the Panel 
to hear further testimony in a community forum setting and at low cost to the taxpayers. 
 
The CERP and staff heard 104 testimonies in these hearings, and a court reporter 
recorded the proceedings of each for use by the CERP. Below is a breakdown of the 
various hearings, their dates, and the number of testimonies recorded:  
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones Public Hearings: 
May 22, 2006  Beachwood:  21 testified  
May 30, 2006 Euclid:  21 testified 
May 31, 2006 Cleveland: 15 testified  
June 01, 2006 Bedford:  15 testified 
June 02, 2006 E. Cleveland:  15 testified 
  
Advocacy Group Public Hearing 
May 31, 2006    5 testified 
 
Public Hearing following the Election Conference 
June 09, 2006   12 testified 
2) Telephone Calls 
The CERP office solicits testimony via telephone to its office in order to hear the 
concerns of members of the community not present at hearings. At the time of this report, 
the CERP has collected data from eighteen (18) individuals by telephone. The contact 
number is 216-802-3020. 
3) Electronic Submissions 
The CERP maintains the www.cuyahogavoting.org Web site as a conduit for public input 
and to disseminate public information about its mission. Through online forms and e-
mail, to date, the CERP has received testimony from 59 individuals electronically. 
4) Faxes 
The CERP maintains a fax line as an additional mechanism to gather input. The contact 
number is 216-802-3344. 
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V. Investigation  
The CERP has delineated a method for investigating the events during and leading up to 
the May 2nd election including interviews with involved parties, Board of Elections on-
site studies, document analysis and legal research. 
1) Interviews 
The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel has interviewed the vast majority of permanent 
staff and managers at the Board of Elections. It has also conducted interviews with poll 
workers and interested voters to fully understand the problems of the May 2nd election. At 
the time of this report, fifty-five (55) Board of Elections line staff members have been 
interviewed, and twenty (20) Board of Elections administrators and managers have been 
interviewed.  
 
In order to remain objective and preserve the validity of the findings, Panel members 
have avoided any conflict of interest in interviewing Board of Election management and 
staff. Care has been taken to ensure that no interviewee, at any time, directly reported to 
the CERP member conducting his or her interview. 
2) On-site Study at the Board of Elections Offices 
In order to understand the intricacies of the planning and implementation of the May 2nd 
election, the CERP and staff participated in Board of Elections “walk-throughs”. During 
each of the following, all Panel members attended and asked questions to fully develop 
an understanding of the internal processes:  
 
May 30, 2006  Registration, Absentee Voting and Alphabetical Poll 
Book Prep processes (over 3 hours) 
 
June 01, 2006  Candidate Petitions, Ballot Prep and Voting Device Prep processes 
(over 3 hours) 
 
June 08, 2006  Election Day, Election Night and Ballot Count processes (over 4 
hours) 
3) Document Analysis  
Document analysis is a primary means of investigating the issues and possible causes of 
problems experienced in the May 2nd election. Steps have been taken by the CERP and 
staff to insure that a consistent flow of pertinent information is available to the 
investigative project teams and Panel members. As of this writing, the CERP and staff 
have reviewed two hundred two (202) documents. A considerable number of additional 
documents have been received and not yet reviewed, and further document requests are 
awaiting fulfillment. 
Creation of Document Analysis form 
In order to track and quantify the issues raised in problem report forms and in testimony, 
the CERP enlisted the assistance of a legal professional with extensive experience in 
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election evaluation methods. The CERP commissioned a grid for analysis as a primary 
tool to be used in analyzing the problems reported by Board of Elections employees, poll 
workers and voters.  
Document Intake Process Design 
The need for security and tracking of the multiple sets of documents required for its 
investigation required the CERP to initiate an effective document intake process. Similar 
to a library system, the document management design delineates methods for recording 
incoming documents, phone calls, e-mails, faxes and electronic submissions received. 
 
The CERP’s document management system categorizes documents into areas of concern 
corresponding to the CERP project teams. This process outlines the steps which are taken 
to disseminate information to the appropriate project team, and tracks which documents 
are in whose hands at any given time. 
4) Legal Research 
A large portion of the CERP investigation is heavily rooted in the question of contractual 
promises verses delivered outcomes. Some of the areas of legal research conducted by the 
CERP and staff include: 
 
• Regulation regarding the purchase of voting machines 
• BOE reporting of election results 
• Federal and State voting machine technical specifications 
• Tying agreements related to ancillary equipment specified by Diebold 
• Ballot creation 
• Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail 
• Voting machine per resident requirement 
• Recount standards 
• Poll worker eligibility and polling place staffing 
• Warranty issues on equipment 
VI. Future Investigative Direction 
The CERP will continue to assess the problems and causes of the problems experienced 
in the May 2nd election. Fulfilling its charge, the Panel will prioritize constituent concerns 
and develop recommendations for measurable improvement in Board of Elections 
operations.  
 
One of the planned activities of the CERP includes soliciting poll worker opinions 
through focus group discussions. These focus groups are intended to identify areas of 
greatest concern to poll workers and gather their specific recommendations on ways to do 
their jobs more effectively. The Panel will also investigate those precincts with 
previously-identified problems, as well as any other precincts where other challenges are 
discovered. 
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VII. Future Activity of the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel 
The CERP Schedule of Activities between the time of this interim report and the release 
of the final report is as follows: 
 
June 19  Conference w/ staff, in re: preliminary findings and conclusions, direction 
of final investigative push 
 
June 30  Delivery of final investigative work product by staff to Panel for 
consideration 
 
July 7   Staff Draft of Final Report delivered to Panel 
 
July 7 - 9  Discussions and Modifications to Final Report by Panel 
 
July 10  Final Report Proofing 
 
July 11  Report Printed for Distribution 
 
July 12  Preview of Final Report's Findings and Recommendations  
 
July 17  Final Report Delivered to the Board of Elections and the Board of County  
 Commissioners 
VIII. Conclusion 
The CERP has acted in earnest to fulfill the charge directed by the Board of Elections and 
Cuyahoga County Commissioners within the timeframe allotted. The progress to date is 
significant, and findings are being documented and substantiated through the 
investigation team.  
 
As a part of the July 17th final report, the CERP will inform the Board of Elections and 
the Board of County Commissioners of reasonable measures that can be taken to achieve 
excellence in the County’s election administration. 
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Appendix A.1 Policy Statement and Resolution of the Cuyahoga County Board of 
Elections 
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections 
Policy Statement 
and 
Formation of the Election Review Panel 
Comprehensive Review of the Problems that Occurred in Preparing For and Conducting 
the May 2, 2006 Election in Cuyahoga County 
The Cuyahoga Board of Elections recognizes that a variety of problems occurred on 
Election Day, May 2nd, and others arose during its activities preparing for this election. 
This primary election was the first in which two new electronic voting systems were used 
county-wide. It required the creation and deployment of a wide range of new 
administrative and training systems in a very short period of time. Effective completion 
of these tasks presented high hurdles, and despite its dedicated efforts, the Board did not 
clear the bar in some respects.  
We sought to conduct an error-free election. We join the voters and candidates in saying 
that the technical and administrative performance levels of the May 2nd election are 
unacceptable and cannot be repeated. We can and will dramatically improve this Board's 
performance in conducting elections before the next federal election scheduled for 
November 7, 2006. The voters of this county deserve nothing less. 
For these improvements to occur in less than the six months remaining before November, 
the Board must initiate a rigorous, independent, and comprehensive review that will 
identify both the causes and effective solutions to these difficulties. And it must be 
completed expeditiously in light of the election calendar. We must structure the inquiry in 
a manner that will incorporate relevant expertise, depth of insight, and sound judgment. It 
must be able to move quickly and surely to determine the problems and the needed 
resolutions. And it must be conducted with the utmost integrity and impartiality.  
Obviously, this independent and impartial inquiry must be conducted by those who have 
no financial connection to Board Members, its employees, and contractors. It must not be 
politically biased in any manner. It must avoid a cumbersome structure that would make 
the logistics and pace of its work difficult to achieve. And the panelists must be available 
to start on this work immediately.  
With these principles in mind, the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections has created the 
Cuyahoga Election Review Committee. We have directed all employees and contractors 
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of the Board to cooperate in every manner with the Review Committee's work. We 
request that all persons within County government, within its contractors' staffs, and 
members of the public at large who might have relevant information to be forthcoming 
with that information. We also charge the Review Committee to cooperate with the 
Secretary of State's investigation into the events under examination, and to obtain 
relevant information and evaluations from the County's technical contracting firm on an 
expedited basis. 
We believe that this independent inquiry will generate the information that is essential for 
the Board to receive so that it can correct various problems that may impede citizens' 
rights to vote and the ability of the Board of Elections to tabulate that vote accurately. 
Further details can be found in the statement below.  
************************** 
Name: Cuyahoga Election Review Committee  
Composition: 3 members: Appointed to these posts are: 
1. Judge Ronald B. Adrine 
2. Director Thomas J. Hayes 
3. Professor Candice Hoke 
Agreeing to chair this inquiry is Judge Ronald B. Adrine.  
Charge:  
1. Identify the deficiencies in the Cuyahoga County elections performance occurring 
in the May 2, 2006 election, including problems with (a) preparation for the 
election, (b) the conduct of the election on May 2, and (c) those following the 
closing of the polls, including tabulating the vote.  
2. Ascertain the causes and contributing factors to each aspect of deficient 
performance, including the technological failures, and training and administrative 
issues. 
3. Provide a set of recommendations for remedying the deficiencies and achieving 
the highest standards in election administrative performance. 
Timetable for Reports: A report is to be completed by July 17, 2006 with an interim 
report submitted to the Board by June 14, 2006. 
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Appendix A.2 Resolution of the Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resolution passed May 18, 2006  
will soon be available on the  
Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners  
website at the following URL: 
 
http://cuyahogacounty.us/bocc/resolutions/resoyear.asp
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Appendix B. Work plan - May 18, 2006 Project Scope 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (CERP) Task List 
Review election master plan and evaluate execution of the plan.  
Review all election related procurements and procedures used for those procurements. 
Review the performance of critical CCBOE personnel assigned to the election process. 
Investigate any contractual or other relationship between Dayton Legal Blank, ES&S and 
Diebold. 
Review the Booth Officials Office including: 
• Recruitment 
• Training  
• Deployment of booth officials and pool staff 
• Attendance 
• Feedback  
• Analyze incident reports from booth officials, and election technicians and 
organizations 
• Interview booth officials and election technicians to assess election 
• Conduct telephone surveys of Booth officials and EDTs 
Review of Registration System including: 
• Purging procedures 
• Registration challenge procedures for Election Day 
• Provisional ballot procedures 
Review the operations of the Warehouse including:  
• Device preparation and loading ballot styles by voting location 
• LNA/IV&V Testing at the Warehouse  
• Device deployment 
• Device security 
• Supplies at polling location 
• Voting location readiness and availability @ 6:30 am. 
• Voting device failure rate and reasons for failure 
Review the operations of Ballot Prep including: 
• Design of ballot 
• Creation of ballot styles 
• Ballot rotation and proofing 
• QC of optical scan ballots 
Election Day procedures and performance including: 
• Polling location setup 
• Polling locations open 6:30 am to 7:30 pm 
• Call center logs and resolutions to complaints 
• Pink Sheet issues/Supervisor cards 
• Performance of Election Day technicians 
• Performance of Election Day inspectors 
• Poll closing procedures 
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• Return of memory cards 
• Return of devices 
• Call Centers including scalability and responsiveness 
Ballot Counting procedures and performance including: 
• Testing of vote tabulation machines and readers 
• L&A testing of readers and tabulation machines 
• IV&V by the SOS of readers and tabulation machines 
• Chain of custody of memory cards 
• Reconciliation of Certificate # 1 by polling location 
• Review all procedures used to conduct the official count 
Review Administrative Structure and Personnel Issues including: 
• administrative and reporting structures  
• communication systems between top managers and the Board 
• communication systems between department managers and top managers 
• criteria for hiring and promotion of staff  
• overtime & compensation issues for permanent staff temporary staff 
recruitment, deployment, supervision, and evaluation 
• systems for employee reports of legal infractions (“internal whistleblowing”) 
• methods for follow-up on voter & advocacy organization 
concerns/recommendations 
• communication systems between candidates and BOE on election 
problems/results 
 Absentee Ballot system procedures and performance including:  
• Assess contract compliance by Diebold and MCR 
• Timeliness of procurement process by CCBOE 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system testing including L&A test and ballot test 
packs 
• Evaluate IV&V testing by Secretary of State  
• Evaluate printed ballots for accuracy for all ballot styles 
• Timing marks 
• Assess alternate ballot count procedures used for unofficial and official 
count 
• Evaluate the absentee ballot counting system to determine reason for 
failure during unofficial count and assign responsibility for system failure 
• Evaluate absentee ballot system performance during February Special 
Election and any corrective actions  
Election Science Institute (Contract) 
• Exit polling of voter satisfaction with electronic voting 
• Evaluate need for additional machines based on failure rate 
• Compare manual count with electronic vote  
• Compare memory cards to manual count 
• Review election process for security threats 
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Appendix C. Panel Organization Chart  
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CONSULTANT
ANALYSTS
Incident Report Forms
ANALYSTS
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ANALYSTS
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(exclusive of optical scanning)
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(recruitment, training, evaluation)
ASSISTANT
PROJECT MANAGER
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OUTREACH
COORDINATOR
PROJECT MANAGER
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Appendix D. Staff Member Overview 
 
 
Position First Last School
Degree /Year 
in School 
 
Project 
Manager Rachael Balanson 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban 
Affairs M.P.A.  
Legal Analyst Laura Black Case Western Reserve Law School 3L 
Legal Analyst Kevin Burns Georgetown Law Center, Washington D.C. LL.M. Candidate 2007 
Legal Analyst Matilda Carrena Cleveland Marshall College of Law 3L 
Assistant P.M. / 
Technology Arthur Dexter Cleveland State University BA Candidate  
Legal Analyst Christine Frieder Case Western Reserve Law School 3L 
Legal Analyst Michael Holbrook Cleveland Marshall College of Law 1L 
Legal Analyst George Inman Case Western Reserve Law School 1L 
Legal Analyst Gabrielle Kelly Case Western Reserve Law School 3L 
Legal Analyst David Kettyle Case Western Reserve Law School 1L 
Legal Analyst Lou Kroeck Case Western Reserve Law School 1L 
Legal Analyst David Levine Case Western Reserve Law School 1L 
Legal Analyst Austin McGuan Cleveland Marshall College of Law 3L 
Legal Analyst Suzanne Melgun Cleveland Marshall College of Law 2L 
Outreach 
Coordinator Romona Ramos Mercyhurst College 
B.A. Political 
Science 
Legal Analyst Amber Samuelson Case Western Reserve Law School 1L 
Legal Analyst Daniel Thiel Cleveland Marshall College of Law 3L 
Writer / Stats 
Analyst Ben Trimbell 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban 
Affairs 
M.U.P.D.D. 
Candidate 
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Appendix E. Panel Members’ Investigative Activity: Summary  
 
May 17  All - After meeting with Panel appointees, Board of Elections formally 
adopts charge. 
 
May 17  Tom Hayes (TH) – Conducted 15 staff interviews. Candice Hoke (CH) – 
Researched absentee ballot system consultants; logistics issues; staff 
recruitment and application review. 
 
May 18  Judge Ron Adrine (RA) - Conducted 4 BOE management staff interviews; 
these interviews averaged 1/2 hour each. CH – Responded to email and 
telephone inquiries from poll workers and citizens; logistics issues, 
including website; drafted poll worker and citizen surveys for website. 
 
May 18  RA, CH - conducted 4 additional interviews with BOE management staff;  
averaged between 2 1/2 and 4 hrs each. 
 
May 18  TH - Conducted 21 staff interviews. 
. 
May 18  All - After meeting with Panel appointees, Board of County 
Commissioners formally adopts charge. 
 
May 19  RA, CH - Interviewed BOE Member Sally Florkiewicz. 
 
May 20 CH – Attended Board Meeting (CCBOE) on primary election issues. 
 
May 21 CH – Interviewed (with Project Manager) all finalist staff candidates. 
 
May 22  RA, CH - Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones Election Forum - 
Beachwood, Ohio. 
  
May 22 TH - Conducted 5 staff interviews. 
 
May 22 CH – Telephone interview with SysTest Representative. 
 
May 23  RA – Conference call with the SOS, regarding investigative priorities. 
 
May 23  TH – Conducted 12 staff interviews. 
 
May 24  TH – Conducted 1 staff telephone interview. 
 
May 24  RA, CH - Concluded orientation meeting with CERP Staff. 
 
May 24  RA, CH - Conference with CERP Project Manager and Assistant Project 
Manager. 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel  Interim Report 
June 14, 2006  Page 20 of 38 
 
 
May 24  All - Conference call with the other members of the Panel. 
 
May 25  All - Briefing with Plain Dealer Editorial Board. 
 
May 25  RA - Briefing with Call & Post Editorial Board. CH – Conducted 
interview with 1 member of management staff (3 hours). 
 
May 26  TH - Conducted 1 staff telephone interview. CH – Conducted interview 
with 1 member of management staff, interview (2 hours). 
 
May 30  All - Walk-through of Registration, Absentee Voting and Alphabetical 
Poll Books. CH – Workshop research issues. 
 
May 30  RBA - Interview with Associated Press. 
 
May 31  All - CERP Election Groups Forum. 
 
May 31  All - Cong. Stephanie Tubbs Jones Cleveland Election Forum. 
 
June 1  All - Walk-through of Candidate Petitions, Ballot Prep and Voting 
Devices. 
 
June 1   RA - Board of County Commissioners retains SysTest to perform forensic 
Examination. 
 
June 1  RA, TH - Met with BOE Top Management and Forensic Team from 
SysTest. 
 
June 1   RA - Radio Interview. 
 
June 1   TH - Cong. Stephanie Tubbs Jones Bedford Forum. 
 
June 5   All - Conference call with CERP staff. 
 
June 6   All - Conference call with CERP staff. 
 
June 7  All - Conference call with CERP staff. RA, CH – Interviews with 3 
members of management staff. 
 
June 8  RA, CH Interview with BOE Member Edward Coaxum. CH – Worked on 
BOE document collection. 
 
June 8   All - Walk-through of BOE Election Services (Warehouse)/Election Day 
Operations (Pink Room) & Ballot Count process. 
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June 9  RA - Closing remarks for CSU Center for Election Integrity Public Forum. 
CH – Attended forum. 
 
June 9   CERP Public Forum on Cuyahoga County Election Process  
Future Activity. CH – Interview with 1 member of management staff. 
 
June 12 RA, CH – Interviews with 3 members of management staff (4 hours). CH 
– Interviews with 2 members of management staff (2.5 hours). 
 
June TBA  RA, CH, TH - Interview with BOE Member Loree Soggs. 
 
June 12  RA - 11th Congressional District Caucus Meeting. 
 
June 14  Delivery of Interim Report. 
 
June 16  RA, CH - Interview with BOE Chair Bob Bennett. 
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Appendix F. Press Release 
 
 
Media Advisory and Request 
May 30, 2006 
 
Contact: Turo Dexter, 216-802-3020 
 
The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel urgently requests that each media outlet serving 
Cuyahoga County convey the following information to the public: 
 
The Election Review Panel seeks to hear from voters and other county residents on all concerns 
they have about elections and voting systems in this county. 
 
The Panel was created by action of both the County Commissioners and by the Board of Election 
to: 
 
4. Identify the deficiencies in the Cuyahoga County elections performance occurring in the 
May 2, 2006 election, including problems with (a) preparation for the election, (b) the 
conduct of the election on May 2, and (c) operations following the closing of the polls, 
including tabulating the vote.  
 
5. Ascertain the causes and factors contributing to each aspect of deficient performance, 
including technological failures, and training and administrative issues. 
 
6. Provide a set of recommendations for remedying the deficiencies and achieving the 
highest standards in election administrative performance. 
 
In order to fulfill these crucial public duties, the Panel needs to hear from the voters and citizens 
of the County. 
 
Please alert your listeners, readers, and viewers to these various ways they can contact 
the Panel to relate concerns, suggestions, and other comments: 
 
• Web site: www.cuyahogavoting.org , where comments can be entered online, either 
anonymously or with personal contact information; 
 
• Phone: 216-802-3020, where callers can remain anonymous if desired; 
 
• Email: comments@cuyahogavoting.org 
 
• In person at a Public Hearing on June 9, from 1:00- 5:00 pm, at CSU’s Urban College 
Atrium, corner of E. 18th Street at Euclid Avenue. 
 
Interviews or further information: If your media outlet wishes to conduct an interview with 
Panel members about the work the Panel has undertaken to investigate and restore the integrity of 
the County’s voting and elections processes, or has any questions or suggestions for the Panel, 
please contact Turo Dexter, Assistant Project Manager, at 216-802-3020. 
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Appendix G. Congressional Contacts  
 
Christopher Nance, Deputy District Director 
Office of Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones, OH-11 
3645 Warrensville Center Road, Suite 204 
Shaker Heights, OH 44122 
(216) 522-4900 
chris.nance@mail.house.gov 
 
 
Marty Gelfand 
Office of Congressman Dennis Kucinich, OH-10 
14400 Detroit Ave. 
Lakewood, OH 44107 
(216) 228-8850 
marty.gelfand@mail.house.gov 
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Appendix H. News reports and editorials about the May 2, 2006 Primary Election 
 
 
 
 
Elections board opens probe into voting fiasco  
Tuesday, May 09, 2006 
Joan Mazzolini 
Plain Dealer Reporter  
 
The Cuyahoga County elections board today launched an investigation into why last 
week's election was such a fiasco, creating a committee to probe administrative, 
personnel and technical issues.  
The board acted at a special meeting Monday, which also featured a grim report by 
Elections Director Michael Vu.  
Blame was widely spread, with board members especially critical of Diebold 
Elections Inc., manufacturer of the touch-screen machines used at the polls and optical-
scan machines used to count absentee ballots.  
Officials complained that the company shipped the optical-scan machines late and 
failed to provide general technical help when it was most needed.  
But voter advocates reminded the board that they had warned well before the election 
that poll-worker training was inadequate and that confusion would reign at the polls.  
And Diebold spokesman Mark Radke, who was not invited to speak, said afterward 
that his company sent 115 people to Cuyahoga County to help poll workers on Election 
Day when it became clear that many poll workers were not showing up to work.  
Radke defended the machines, pointing out that 47 other Ohio counties used the same 
machines without problems. All those counties used the same Dayton-area company to 
print the paper ballots, while Cuyahoga County used a local printer.  
Radke also argued that board officials themselves are responsible for the late arrival 
of the optical-scan machines, which weren't ordered until mid-March.  
But Vu said it was clear after several test runs that the optical scanning process wasn't 
working. That forced officials to hand-count 15,000 absentee ballots, which in turn 
created a domino effect that brought everything else to a virtual standstill.  
"It turned our attention from poll workers and voters to hand-counting," said Vu.  
Less attention was given during Monday's meeting to the other major problem: that 
poll workers lost 70 computer memory cards holding vote totals from hundreds of 
precincts.  
Vu conceded that some memory cards -- seven to 12 -- are still unaccounted for. 
Election officials were able to get results in those precincts only by reading the "flash 
memory" on touch-screen machines, a sort-of temporary data storage.  
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Elections board Chairman Bob Bennett announced two members of the committee, 
Cleveland State University law professor Candice Hoke and Ohio Lottery director Tom 
Hayes.  
Hoke will be in charge of investigating the adequacy of the training poll workers 
received. Hayes, who was director of the elections board in the mid-1990s and is a 
running buddy of Vu, will oversee a probe of the board's administrative and election 
procedures.  
Bennett said others would soon be named to the committee.  
"I can assure you it will be independent and thoughtful," Bennett said.  
He added that the results of the investigation, due by mid-July, could result in 
resignations by board members or the removal of board members by the secretary of 
state.  
The internal investigation was ordered by the Secretary of State Ken Blackwell's 
office on Friday. The secretary's office has also given board officials until Wednesday to 
submit a written plan on how they will conduct the official canvass -- essentially a 
recount to ensure accuracy before the election is deemed official.  
As part of the canvass, board employees will have to recount paper ballots cast by 
absentee voters. The first hand count took six days of 24-hour counting. The canvassing 
must be completed by May 23.  
Also Monday, the Ohio Democratic Party called on Blackwell to step aside from the 
investigation, saying he has "numerous" conflicts of interest, including his candidacy for 
governor. The party called for appointment of a "special master" to handle the probe.  
 
To reach this Plain Dealer reporter:  
jmazzolini@plaind.com, 216-999-4563  
 
 
 
 
A primary post-mortem 
A good, hard, independent look at Election Day mishaps is the first step toward a 
better performance in November  
Wednesday, May 10, 2006 
 
With the unofficial count of last week's primary ballots finally done, the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Elections now must begin restoring its credibility in advance of 
November's high-turnout main event.  
The board has to get this right. Nothing less than public confidence in the democratic 
system is at stake. There can be no more excuses.  
At a special meeting on Monday, Chairman Robert Bennett announced that a 
committee of outsiders would investigate last week's problems and recommend reforms. 
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Bennett promised that the committee would be independent and that its work would be 
open to the public. We intend to hold him to his word. 
Bennett also announced two lead investigators: S. Candice Hoke, the law professor 
who runs Cleveland State University's Center for Election Integrity, will focus on poll 
worker recruitment, training and performance; Ohio Lottery Director Tom Hayes will 
examine the election board staff's performance. Bennett and his three board colleagues 
are still looking for candidates to lead the overall probe, to zero in on last week's 
technical glitches and to fill out the investigative team.  
Hoke and Hayes are a good start. They need to be joined by others of similar talent 
and integrity who reflect this community. The overall leader needs to be someone of 
unquestioned fairness who will be unafraid to go wherever the facts lead - someone like 
retired Common Pleas Judge Burt Griffin or Cleveland Municipal Judge Ronald Adrine.  
The investigators need to figure out what went wrong with the system for counting 
some 17,000 absentee ballots. The vendor who printed the ballots and the one who made 
the optical scanners blame each other. Responsibility needs to be pinpointed, both to fix 
the problems and to determine who should reimburse taxpayers for the cost of a long 
hand count.  
That count divided the board's attention on a day when the county was using touch-
screen voting machines for the first time. Most worked fine, as did most poll workers. 
But a disturbing number of workers did not know what to do, either when machines went 
haywire or when it came time to close the polls. Elections boss Michael Vu admitted 
Monday that training was inconsistent and that not every worker got complete 
instructions. Layer on those who did not grasp what they were told, add in those who 
simply didn't show up, and you had a fiasco in too many precincts.  
Here's one thing that may help in November: Rather than depending on well-meaning 
volunteers to staff the polls, use county employees wherever possible. In particular, put 
county supervisors in charge of polling sites, especially those with poor track records. 
They could get extra training and, unlike volunteers, could be held responsible if 
problems aren't addressed.  
November's election will be critical to Ohio's future. Cuyahoga County's votes must 
be cast and counted without the hand-wringing, finger-pointing and uncertainty of the 
past week.  
 
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel  Interim Report 
June 14, 2006  Page 28 of 38 
 
 
 
 
 
Diebold voting machine spurs security concerns  
Thursday, May 11, 2006 
Dan Goodin 
Associated Press  
 
San Francisco- Officials overseeing elections in three states have directed local 
authorities to take additional security measures with a popular type of electronic voting 
machine to prevent election fraud.  
California, Iowa and Pennsylvania issued the voting directives in recent weeks after 
researchers discovered a feature that could allow someone to load unauthorized software 
on Diebold Election Systems computerized machines.  
Diebold is a unit of Green, Ohio-based Diebold Inc.  
A hacker theoretically could use the software to rig or sabotage an election or to 
perform some other unauthorized function, said Michael Shamos, a computer science 
professor at Carnegie Mellon University.  
"It's worse than a hole," said Shamos, who has been briefed on the vulnerability of the 
Diebold machines. "It's a deliberate feature that was added by Diebold that we all believe 
is unwise."  
In the wake of the ballot-tabulating problems that plagued the 2000 presidential 
election, electronic voting has become a flash point for many people concerned about fair 
elections. Critics charge that electronic voting machines are too susceptible to fraud and 
error to be trusted and should not replace traditional balloting until proper safeguards are 
installed.  
Diebold spokesman David Bear said there is no evidence electronic results have been 
subject to tampering. He added it would be hard for anyone to exploit the recently 
discovered flaw if officials follow security procedures already in place, but that Diebold 
is developing a permanent solution to address concerns.  
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Voting machines a winner in poll: But problems being probed  
Saturday, May 13, 2006 
Grant Segall 
Plain Dealer Reporter  
 
When the new machines worked, the voters loved them.  
An exit poll shows this rare bit of good news from Black Tuesday - Cuyahoga 
County's sputtering May 2 primary.  
"The voters were overwhelmingly satisfied with the system," Steven Hertzberg, 
project director of Election Science Institute, said Friday.  
Still, an independent committee began Friday to investigate the primary's many 
problems, including missing memory cards, hours of delay in opening some polls and 
days of delay in counting absentee ballots by hand.  
The committee's chairman, Judge Ronald Adrine of Cleveland Municipal Court, 
hopes to help the county elections board do much better in November's general election.  
"I am absolutely hopeful that we'll be able to turn it around," said Adrine.  
The committee's other members are Thomas Hayes, Ohio Lottery director and the 
board's former director; and Candice Hoke, a law professor running the Elections 
Institute at Cleveland State University.  
The exit poll reflects 2,597 voters at 50 locations. Among the highlights:  
Ninety-five percent of the voters called the new touch-screens easy to use.  
Ninety-two percent said the screens beat the old punch cards.  
Ninety percent reported no problems with them.  
Ninety-four percent were confident that their votes would be counted correctly.  
On a troublesome note, 35 percent of Clevelanders said they'd been asked for 
identification, versus 16 percent of suburbanites. The gap was nearly as wide between 
black voters (31 percent) and white voters (18 percent).  
The immediate issue may be moot in November, when all voters will need IDs. But 
county official Hugh Shannon promised that the staff would investigate whether the gaps 
reflected valid differences or unequal treatment.  
People should have been asked for identification this month only if voting for the first 
time at their current address or at all.  
The nonprofit Election Science Institute of San Francisco got help with the poll from 
Edison Media Research of New Jersey. Edison is best known for a 2004 exit poll off by a 
fateful couple of points, showing a win for John Kerry in the presidential election.  
Under a $275,000 county contract, Election Science will continue to study the May 2 
vote, partly by auditing the tallies on three kinds of media: paper, memory cards and the 
machines' internal records.  
County commissioners are expected Thursday to give Election Science $66,000 more 
to survey poll workers about their struggles with the machines.  
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Cuyahoga aiming for better result in election 
Board's procedures to be reviewed, changed  
Thursday, May 18, 2006 
Joan Mazzolini 
Plain Dealer Reporter  
 
Look for big changes for this November in how Cuyahoga County recruits and trains 
precinct workers for Election Day.  
The panel investigating the May 2 election debacle said Wednesday it would come up 
with a system for finding competent people to work the polls and a program to give those 
people all the training necessary to guarantee a successful election.  
"We see our primary responsibility to get this board ready for November and to 
restore public confidence in the election system," said Candace Hoke, a law professor 
running the Center for Election Integrity at Cleveland State University.  
The three-member election review panel worked out the scope of the investigation 
Wednesday with Bob Bennett, elections board chairman. Essentially, the panel will 
conduct a wholesale review of how the board runs elections. The panel will examine how 
the board prepares machines for election day, sets up poll locations, designs ballots and 
awards contracts.  
Panelists told Bennett they need a specialist to help figure out why the county's new 
optical scanners failed to accurately read absentee ballots. The failure resulted in the 
board hiring an army of temporary workers to hand-count 17,000 absentee ballots, which 
delayed election results for six days. The specialist would be an expert in ballot printing 
and Diebold Inc. election machines.  
Cleveland Municipal Judge Ronald Adrine and Thomas Hayes, Lottery Commission 
director and former elections board director, are on the panel with Hoke. They said they 
plan to hire law students from CSU and Case Western Reserve University to help them 
review all the data and come up with ways to fix the system.  
A report is due to the elections board July 14. With a big November election looming 
- the governor, a U.S. Senate seat and all seats in Congress are up - board officials will 
have little time to revamp procedures.  
The voting machines were just part of the problem May 2. Nearly 20 percent of the 
poll workers did not show up, leading many polling locations to open late. Then, after the 
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polls closed, workers lost more than 70 memory cards from the machines. The cards store 
the votes.  
Elections board officials still haven't accounted for about a dozen of the cards but 
hope to find them during the official, final vote count, due at the secretary of state's office 
Tuesday.  
For the official count, elections officials decided not to repeat the hand-counting of 
the absentee ballots. Instead, workers entered votes recorded on the paper absentee 
ballots into touch-screen machines.  
Michael Vu, executive director of the elections board, said the counts haven't been 
compared with the unofficial count completed last week.  
He expects the counts to differ. He said hand-counting is the least accurate method.  
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How the vote got messed up 
Lorain kept election schedule; Cuyahoga problems snowballed 
Wednesday, May 31, 2006 
Joan Mazzolini 
Plain Dealer Reporter 
 
A lot had to happen, on time, for the May 2 primary election to be successful in 
Cuyahoga and Lorain counties. 
Both counties were using Diebold's new optical scanners to count absentee ballots, so 
they had technical challenges to overcome. 
Both counties had to modify the machines, wiring them directly into elections 
computers to bypass the limited capacity in the machines' memory cards. 
Both counties also needed big stacks of test ballots to run through the machines to see 
if they counted accurately. 
Both counties needed to test the machines well before Election Day, leaving enough 
time to fix anything that did not work. 
But only one county, Lorain, met the deadline. Cuyahoga was a step behind from the 
start and never caught up. 
The result was that Lorain County voters learned the results of their elections May 2. 
Cuyahoga voters waited five more days. 
Lorain County had one advantage. It had the four optical scanners it needed on hand 
six months before Election Day. Cuyahoga County, nearly five times the size of Lorain, 
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received five machines from the secretary of state's office in January, but it had been 
lobbying for more since late December. 
After months of back-and-forth discussions, Cuyahoga received 15 more optical scan 
machines April 14, just 18 days before the primary. 
"Things were running late," said Michael Vu, director of the Cuyahoga County Board 
of Elections. "But it was more global, it wasn't just localized to the board." 
One of the key problems involved the memory cards for the machines. They did not 
have the capacity to hold the 2,000 different ballots to be used in Cuyahoga County for 
the primary. 
Diebold consultants in both counties told election officials they were pushing the state 
to approve modifying the machines to get around the memory cards. The modification, 
used in other states, wires the machine to election computers, which contain all forms of 
the ballots. 
Ohio's Board of Voting Machine Examiners certified the modifications in mid-
February. 
But the two counties differed in their approach to the changes. 
Lorain elections officials ordered the equipment they needed from Diebold on April 
12, said Marilyn A. Jacobcik, director of the Lorain County Board of Elections. 
The equipment arrived the next day, on April 13, and the county's four machines were 
wired into elections computers that afternoon, Jacobcik said. 
Cuyahoga County went to other vendors for the equipment and didn't get everything 
it needed until April 25, seven days before the primary. 
"We received something from Diebold showing the cost would be nearly $6,000," Vu 
said. "Anything over $5,000 we have to bid." 
Vu said two other vendors came in less than $6,000. 
Going with another vendor created a new problem, with board officials needing 
confirmation from Diebold that they were buying the right equipment. 
"We tried to get confirmation on April 10 . . . but we didn't get a response back until 
April 18," Vu said. 
Then, Vu said, the Diebold consultant adapting the machines didn't get training on the 
conversion until April 22. 
"We're now a week away from the election," Vu said. The modifications were not 
complete until April 28 or 29, four days before the primary. 
Even if the machines had been ready earlier, Cuyahoga County didn't have ballots to 
conduct tests. 
Lorain election officials ordered their absentee and test ballots in early January and 
had the absentee ballots in hand by early April, the same time Cuyahoga's four-member 
board was getting around to picking a printer to do the ballots. 
The test ballots for Lorain arrived April 14, and by the 19th, the testing of the optical 
scan machines was complete. 
"It was a little later than we would have liked," Jacobcik said of the testing. But she 
said the conversion from punch ballots to electronic voting "was a learning experience." 
In Cuyahoga County, elections officials and Diebold representatives were worrying in 
mid-April that their test ballots wouldn't arrive in time. 
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The printer, MCR Inc., gave assurances to the county, but the test ballots did not 
arrive until April 30, two days before the primary. 
On May 1, testing began. By 2:30 a.m. Election Day, elections officials realized that 
machines were not counting accurately and decided not to use them. 
Instead, temporary workers began hand-counting 15,000 absentee ballots on Election 
Day. They finished five days later. 
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Spate of lawsuits target e-voting 
By Patrick O'Driscoll, USA TODAY 
Posted 6/4/2006 11:15 PM ET
 
 By Bill Kalina, The YorkDispatch via AP
 
 E-VOTES INCREASE
 
Percentage of registered voters whose 
jurisdictions use electronic voting 
machines: 
2000: 12.6% 
2002: 22.5% 
2004: 28.9% 
2006: 39.1% 
Source: Election Data Services 
Machine Inspector Fran Eck, left, and Judge of Elections Belita Rosier prepare the 
polling station at Lutheran Nursing Home in York, Pa., May 16. Electronic voting 
machines debuted during this primary election, but lawsuits have targeted the devices in 
ennsylvania and other states.P 
 
DENVER — Electronic voting machines, adopted widely after the disputed Florida ballot 
count in the 2000 presidential election, are under legal attack as primary election season 
heats up. 
Lawsuits have been filed in at least six states, the most recent last week in Colorado, 
to block the purchase or use of computerized machines. 
Voter Action, a non-partisan advocacy group, led the challenge filed Thursday 
against the state of Colorado and nine counties, as well as similar lawsuits in California 
and Arizona this spring and New Mexico last year. Court actions by others targeted the 
devices in Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
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Most of the suits argue that the machines are vulnerable to software tampering, don't 
keep an easily recountable printed record and may miscount, switch or not record votes 
and even add phantom votes. 
In California, one of eight states holding primaries Tuesday, a lawsuit in March led 
several counties to switch to printed ballots counted with optical scanners, a competing 
technology. Six of the eight states will have some electronic balloting, which records 
votes by touch screens. 
Texas and Illinois had some problems using electronic voting machines during their 
March primaries.  
About one-third of the USA's 3,114 counties use some electronic systems, according 
to Election Data Services, a consulting group. It says half the counties use optical 
scanners that read dots or marks that voters pencil in on ballots. 
The rest vote by other means, mostly hand-counted paper ballots in smaller 
communities but also lever-type machines in New York and Connecticut. 
No case yet has claimed intentional manipulation of electronic vote data. But another 
advocacy group, Black Box Voting, reported last month that a Finnish expert found 
security flaws for a Diebold Election Systems model.  
Diebold, a major manufacturer, says the vulnerability is theoretical and will be fixed 
this year. 
System defenders say most problems occur because of hasty set-up before elections 
or poor training of poll workers. "Certainly none of the allegations of security breaches 
on the equipment have ever been demonstrated to be true," says R. Doug Lewis of the 
Election Center, a group of state and local election officials.  
Electronic voting, in use for more than a decade, didn't catch fire until Congress 
passed the Help America Vote Act in 2002. It overhauled election standards and required 
states to replace old voting methods such as punch cards, which fouled up the 2000 
election in Florida. Congress also gave states more than $300 million to replace outdated 
systems.  
Paul DiGregorio of the federal Election Assistance Commission acknowledges some 
glitches but says any system "can be trusted" as long as safeguards are in place. 
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Blackwell gets brunt of registrants' anger  
He denies trying to disenfranchise voters  
Tuesday, June 06, 2006 
Ted Wendling 
Plain Dealer Bureau  
 
Columbus- Democrats and representatives of voter-registration groups accused Secretary 
of State Ken Blackwell on Monday of trying to rig this November's election by 
publishing draconian new rules governing the activities of people who register voters.  
Testifying at a hearing chaired by Judy Grady, Blackwell's director of elections, 
lawyers for ACORN, Common Cause, the Ohio Democratic Party and other groups said 
training documents drafted by Blackwell's office are so vague that they subject registrars 
to felony penalties for even inadvertent violations.  
As a result, ACORN, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, 
has drastically cut back its voter-registration efforts while its lawyers review the new 
rules, Katy Gall, Ohio ACORN's head organizer, said in an interview.  
Gall said ACORN has registered 35,000 voters in six Ohio cities since February. Its 
goal is 130,000.  
Samuel Gresham, an attorney for Common Cause, charged that the rules are "part of a 
consistent pattern, intentionally so," by Blackwell to disenfranchise black, low-income 
and Democratic voters.  
Blackwell's actions, Gresham and others said, are intended to suppress Democratic 
voter turnout in what is shaping up as a closely contested governor's race between 
Blackwell, a Republican, and Democratic U.S. Rep. Ted Strickland.  
"It appears that Ken Blackwell finally figured out how to deal with long lines on 
Election Day," said state Democratic Party spokesman Brian Rothenberg. "He's just 
trying to outright deny people the right to vote now."  
Those criticisms brought a scathing response from Blackwell's campaign spokesman, 
Carlo LoParo.  
"That's outrageous," LoParo said. "The Blackwell campaign is making a very focused 
effort to gain the votes of Ohio's urban voters, but particularly Ohio's African-American 
voters, and that's because Ken Blackwell is the only candidate in this race that can 
articulate their concerns."  
In contrast, Strickland is so out of touch with black voters, LoParo said, that "before 
this campaign, his idea of diversity was opting for Neapolitan ice cream at the 
congressional buffet."  
The rules were drafted to comply with a new state election-reform law. The focus of 
most of the voter-registration activists' ire is a provision that says registrars must return 
applicants' forms "directly" to the secretary of state's office or a county board of 
elections.  
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Peg Rosenfield, elections specialist for the League of Women Voters of Ohio, said a 
strict interpretation of that rule means that the person who registers a voter can't even turn 
the form over to his supervisor for review.  
Angered by the passage of a similar law in Florida, the League ceased all voter-
registration efforts and sued Florida elections officials last month with the assistance of 
the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law. A lawyer for 
the Brennan Center also testified at Monday's hearing in Columbus.  
State Rep. Kevin DeWine, the legislator who sponsored the election-reform law, said 
he believes Blackwell's office faithfully drafted the rules to comply with the bill.  
However, he said the law "might need a fix" because lawmakers didn't intend to 
subject registrars to criminal penalties if they turn their forms over to a supervisor for 
review instead of directly submitting them to the secretary of state.  
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New rules criticized by voting groups 
BY JOHN MCCARTHY | THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
 
COLUMBUS - New rules issued by the Ohio secretary of state's office governing groups 
that pay people to register voters are confusing and have hindered their efforts to sign up 
new voters, critics of the rules said Monday. 
Representatives of the Ohio Democratic Party, the League of Women Voters of Ohio 
and groups active in registering voters said the rules developed by Secretary of State Ken 
Blackwell's office go beyond the law they were intended to implement. 
The Legislature, controlled by Republicans, passed the bill in January. The rules 
covering paid circulators went into effect May 2, the day of Ohio's primary in which 
Blackwell defeated fellow Republican Jim Petro for the GOP nomination for governor. 
The rules grew out of a bill Gov. Bob Taft signed Jan. 31 that overhauls Ohio election 
law. It will require voters to show identification at the polls before being allowed to vote, 
bars the attorney general and secretary of state from acting as treasurer or in an official 
capacity for ballot initiatives and sets new rules for people paid to collect voter 
registrations or signatures to qualify an issue for the ballot. 
A rule requires paid circulators to return signed registration cards within 10 days to 
county boards of elections or to the secretary of state's office, not to the group paying 
them. That goes beyond what legislators intended, critics said. 
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Groups such as MoveOn.org and America Coming Together actively registered 
voters in the groups' attempt to defeat President Bush in 2004. Don McTigue, a lawyer 
representing a similar group, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
said the rules are causing such groups to look for new voters outside Ohio. 
"They want to engage in voter registration drives, but they might not be able to," 
McTigue told Judith Grady, Blackwell's elections director, at a hearing on the new rules. 
The League of Women Voters of Ohio is being peppered with questions from groups 
that pay circulators, said Peg Rosenfield, the league's elections specialist. 
"We need answers," she said. 
The requirement to submit registrations directly to elections officials singles out 
groups usually associated with political causes, said Wendy Weiser, deputy director for 
democracy programs for the Brennan Center for Justice, a New-York based think tank. 
"While a library might be able to accept a lot of individual forms and submit them in 
a box, a voter registration group could not," Weiser said. "It's just calculated to make it as 
difficult as possible."  
 
 
 
Block the Vote, Ohio Remix  
Published: June 7, 2006 
 
If there was ever a sign of a ruling party in trouble, it is a game plan that calls for 
trying to win by discouraging voting.  
The latest sign that Republicans have an election-year strategy to shut down voter 
registration drives comes from Ohio. As the state gears up for a very competitive election 
season this fall, its secretary of state, J. Kenneth Blackwell, has put in place "emergency" 
regulations that could hit voter registration workers with criminal penalties for perfectly 
legitimate registration practices. The rules are so draconian they could shut down 
registration drives in Ohio.  
Mr. Blackwell, who also happens to be the Republican candidate for governor this 
year, has a history of this sort of behavior. In 2004, he instructed county boards of 
elections to reject any registrations on paper of less than 80-pound stock — about the 
thickness of a postcard. His order was almost certainly illegal, and he retracted it after he 
came under intense criticism. It was, however, in place long enough to get some 
registrations tossed out. 
This year, Mr. Blackwell's office has issued rules and materials that appear to require 
that paid registration workers, and perhaps even volunteers, personally take the forms 
they collect to an election office. Organizations that run registration drives generally have 
the people who register voters bring the forms back to supervisors, who can then review 
them for errors. Under Mr. Blackwell's edict, everyone involved could be committing a 
crime. Mr. Blackwell's rules also appear to prohibit people who register voters from 
sending the forms in by mail. That rule itself may violate federal elections law. 
Mr. Blackwell's rules are interpretations of a law the Republican-controlled Ohio 
Legislature passed recently. Another of the nation's most famous swing states, Florida, 
has been the scene of similar consternation and confusion since it recently enacted a law 
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that is so harsh that the Florida League of Women Voters announced that it was stopping 
all voter registration efforts for the first time in 67 years. 
Florida's Legislature, like Ohio's, is controlled by Republicans. Throughout American 
history both parties have shown a willingness to try to use election law to get results they 
might otherwise not win at the polls. But right now it is clearly the Republicans who 
believe they have an interest in keeping the voter base small. Mr. Blackwell and other 
politicians who insist on making it harder to vote never say, of course, that they are 
worried that get-out-the-vote drives will bring too many poor and minority voters into the 
system. They say that they want to reduce fraud. However, there is virtually no evidence 
that registration drives are leading to fraud at the polls. 
But there is one clear way that Ohio's election system is corrupt. Decisions about who 
can vote are being made by a candidate for governor. Mr. Blackwell should hand over 
responsibility for elections to a decision maker whose only loyalty is to the voters and the 
law. 
 
 
